The analysis of the irregular moral sentiments that Smith describes in TMS II.iii evidences the enormous influence of David Hume’s theory of passions in the moral theory of his successor, as well as the critical differences between these Scottish philosophers’ moral proposals. Moreover, these atypical situations also allow us to grasp the different parts of Smithian moral judgment, and to exclude – despite Smith’s assertion – the influence of moral luck on these judgments.Keywords: Adam Smith, David Hume, moral judgment, passions, moral luck.
{"title":"La influencia de la teoría de las pasiones de Hume en el juicio moral de Adam Smith","authors":"María A. Carrasco","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.04","url":null,"abstract":"The analysis of the irregular moral sentiments that Smith describes in TMS II.iii evidences the enormous influence of David Hume’s theory of passions in the moral theory of his successor, as well as the critical differences between these Scottish philosophers’ moral proposals. Moreover, these atypical situations also allow us to grasp the different parts of Smithian moral judgment, and to exclude – despite Smith’s assertion – the influence of moral luck on these judgments.Keywords: Adam Smith, David Hume, moral judgment, passions, moral luck.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":"268-276"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49260062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014). Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.
{"title":"Belief and pluralistic ignorance","authors":"Marco Antonio Joven Romero","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03","url":null,"abstract":"Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014). Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"21 1","pages":"260-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44507067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
John Searle claims that consciousness is ontologically subjective, since conscious mental phenomena only exist as long as they are experienced. Therefore, mental phenomena are essentially conscious, insofar as their mental character depends on their connection with consciousness. However, to align (a) the acceptance of unconscious mental phenomena with (b) his Cartesian view of consciousness (as the essence of the mind), Searle defends (c) adispositional account of the unconscious. The problem is that some cases of unconscious mental causation require that certain decisive mental properties (sensorial and intentional properties) exist in an occurrent way, and not merely as dispositions. By accepting unconscious mental causation, Searle (inadvertedly) commits himself to a mental existence that isindependent from consciousness. Such unconscious existence implies that certain mental phenomena are ontologically objective, and not subjective as he claims, because they exist without being experienced.Keywords: Ontological subjectivity, unconscious, disposition, mental causation, objectivity.
John Searle声称意识在本体论上是主观的，因为有意识的心理现象只有在经历时才存在。因此，心理现象本质上是有意识的，因为它们的心理特征取决于它们与意识的联系。然而，为了将(a)对无意识心理现象的接受与(b)他的笛卡尔意识观(作为心灵的本质)结合起来，Searle为(c)无意识的禀性解释辩护。问题在于，某些无意识的心理因果关系要求某些决定性的心理属性(感觉和意图属性)以一种发生的方式存在，而不仅仅是作为一种倾向。通过接受无意识的心理因果关系，Searle(无意中)将自己置于一种独立于意识的心理存在中。这种无意识的存在意味着某些心理现象在本体论上是客观的，而不是他所说的主观的，因为它们存在而不被体验。关键词:本体论主体性，无意识，倾向，心理因果，客观性。
{"title":"Um argumento contra a tese da subjetividade ontológica da consciência no naturalismo biológico de John Searle","authors":"Tárik de Athayde Prata","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.08","url":null,"abstract":"John Searle claims that consciousness is ontologically subjective, since conscious mental phenomena only exist as long as they are experienced. Therefore, mental phenomena are essentially conscious, insofar as their mental character depends on their connection with consciousness. However, to align (a) the acceptance of unconscious mental phenomena with (b) his Cartesian view of consciousness (as the essence of the mind), Searle defends (c) adispositional account of the unconscious. The problem is that some cases of unconscious mental causation require that certain decisive mental properties (sensorial and intentional properties) exist in an occurrent way, and not merely as dispositions. By accepting unconscious mental causation, Searle (inadvertedly) commits himself to a mental existence that isindependent from consciousness. Such unconscious existence implies that certain mental phenomena are ontologically objective, and not subjective as he claims, because they exist without being experienced.Keywords: Ontological subjectivity, unconscious, disposition, mental causation, objectivity.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":"303-311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45247748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A zombie world is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are identical to the truths in our world, but no one is phenomenally conscious. A zombie is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who has none of the phenomenal conscious experiences of the individual in our world. An inverted is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are not only identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who also has phenomenal conscious experiences. These experiences, however, are qualitatively different from the ones of the individual in our world. The first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument against materialism is that a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects this premise in claiming that: given that current physics does not allow philosophers to establish a clear concept of the physical that could be opposed to something else non-physical, a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are merely prima facie, but not ideally conceivable. This objection is called the Obscurity of the Physical Objection. Key-words: Zombies, qualia, conceivability, possibility, physics.
{"title":"The obscurity of the physical: an objection to Chalmers’ conceivability argument","authors":"Felipe G. A. Moreira","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.07","url":null,"abstract":"A zombie world is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are identical to the truths in our world, but no one is phenomenally conscious. A zombie is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who has none of the phenomenal conscious experiences of the individual in our world. An inverted is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are not only identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who also has phenomenal conscious experiences. These experiences, however, are qualitatively different from the ones of the individual in our world. The first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument against materialism is that a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects this premise in claiming that: given that current physics does not allow philosophers to establish a clear concept of the physical that could be opposed to something else non-physical, a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are merely prima facie, but not ideally conceivable. This objection is called the Obscurity of the Physical Objection. Key-words: Zombies, qualia, conceivability, possibility, physics.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"21 1","pages":"296-302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42867072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The text aims to explore legal and moral aspects of torture. Under the legal aspect the text compares three definitions of torture: UN definition, Brazilian definition, and Spanish definition. In this regard, neither the UN formulation nor the Brazilian formulation are ideal, because the Brazilian legal definition restricts the element of action by the part of the perpetrator of torture, and the UN convention restricts the effect on the victim, given that pain or suffering should be severe. The hypothesis is that a better proposal could be linked to the Spanish Penal Code, which in its art. 174 defines torture as the submission of someone “to conditions or procedures that, due to their nature, duration or other circumstances, involve physical or mental suffering, the suppression or decrease of their faculties of knowledge, discernment or decision, or that otherwise undermine their moral integrity”. Concerning the moral meaning of the repulse to torture it is intended to defend the paradigmatic character of the human right to not be tortured in at least two respects. The first aspect refers to its universalizing vocation in the full sense, since it can be extended to all sentient beings. In this regard, the prohibition of torture goes beyond the dominium of personality to advance in the direction of a domain of suffering not determined by the mask of personality. The second aspect is that the prohibition stands for an absolute right with no exceptions, precisely because of its deeper moral content. Keywords: radical evil, torture, perpetrator.
{"title":"Torture: banality of evil or radical evil?","authors":"Delamar José Volpato Dutra","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.01","url":null,"abstract":"The text aims to explore legal and moral aspects of torture. Under the legal aspect the text compares three definitions of torture: UN definition, Brazilian definition, and Spanish definition. In this regard, neither the UN formulation nor the Brazilian formulation are ideal, because the Brazilian legal definition restricts the element of action by the part of the perpetrator of torture, and the UN convention restricts the effect on the victim, given that pain or suffering should be severe. The hypothesis is that a better proposal could be linked to the Spanish Penal Code, which in its art. 174 defines torture as the submission of someone “to conditions or procedures that, due to their nature, duration or other circumstances, involve physical or mental suffering, the suppression or decrease of their faculties of knowledge, discernment or decision, or that otherwise undermine their moral integrity”. Concerning the moral meaning of the repulse to torture it is intended to defend the paradigmatic character of the human right to not be tortured in at least two respects. The first aspect refers to its universalizing vocation in the full sense, since it can be extended to all sentient beings. In this regard, the prohibition of torture goes beyond the dominium of personality to advance in the direction of a domain of suffering not determined by the mask of personality. The second aspect is that the prohibition stands for an absolute right with no exceptions, precisely because of its deeper moral content. Keywords: radical evil, torture, perpetrator.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"21 1","pages":"240-250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46212357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gregory Currie has argued for the indispensability of i-desires – a kind of imaginative counterpart of desires – by drawing a distinction between the satisfaction conditions of the desire-like states involved in our emotional responses to tragedies and those of genuine desires. Nevertheless, Fiora Salis has recently shown that the same sort of distinction can also be found in nonfictional cases and has proposed a solution to the issue of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. In this paper, I refute Salis’s stance and argue for the indispensability of i-desires. For this aim to be achieved, I first argue that the distinction between the satisfaction conditions of i-desires and those of desires can be given a different explanation, and that in this case, the same sort of distinction cannot arise in nonfictional cases; Secondly, I argue that we cannot make sense of the conflict between our desire-like states triggered by fictions and our background desires, and therefore i-desires should be introduced to avoid this conflict. Keywords: i-desires, desire-like imaginings, tragedy, imaginative desires,
{"title":"Revisiting the problem of satisfaction conditions and the indispensability of i-desire","authors":"Yuchen Guo","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.02","url":null,"abstract":"Gregory Currie has argued for the indispensability of i-desires – a kind of imaginative counterpart of desires – by drawing a distinction between the satisfaction conditions of the desire-like states involved in our emotional responses to tragedies and those of genuine desires. Nevertheless, Fiora Salis has recently shown that the same sort of distinction can also be found in nonfictional cases and has proposed a solution to the issue of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. In this paper, I refute Salis’s stance and argue for the indispensability of i-desires. For this aim to be achieved, I first argue that the distinction between the satisfaction conditions of i-desires and those of desires can be given a different explanation, and that in this case, the same sort of distinction cannot arise in nonfictional cases; Secondly, I argue that we cannot make sense of the conflict between our desire-like states triggered by fictions and our background desires, and therefore i-desires should be introduced to avoid this conflict. Keywords: i-desires, desire-like imaginings, tragedy, imaginative desires,","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"21 1","pages":"251-259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46602781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
John Searle alega que a consciencia e ontologicamente subjetiva , pois os fenomenos mentais conscientes so existem na medida em que sao vivenciados. Portanto, fenomenos mentais sao essencialmente conscientes, na medida em que seu carater mental depende de sua conexao com a consciencia. Entretanto, para compatibilizar (a) a aceitacao de fenomenos mentais inconscientes com (b) essa sua visao cartesiana da consciencia (como a essencia da mente), Searle defende (c) uma teoria disposicional do inconsciente. O problema e que casos de causacao mental inconsciente exigem que certas propriedades mentais importantes (propriedades sensoriais e propriedades intencionais) existam de modo ocorrente , e nao meramente de forma disposicional. Ao aceitar a causacao mental inconsciente, Searle esta se comprometendo (inadvertidamente) com uma existencia mental independente da consciencia. E tal existencia inconsciente implica que certos fenomenos mentais sao ontologicamente objetivos , e nao subjetivos, como ele alega, pois eles existem sem serem vivenciados. Palavras-chave: Subjetividade ontologica, inconsciente, disposicao, causacao mental, objetividade.
{"title":"An argument against the thesis of the ontological subjectivity of consciousness in John Searle’s biological naturalism","authors":"T. D. A. Prata","doi":"10.4013/RFU.V21I3.19345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/RFU.V21I3.19345","url":null,"abstract":"John Searle alega que a consciencia e ontologicamente subjetiva , pois os fenomenos mentais conscientes so existem na medida em que sao vivenciados. Portanto, fenomenos mentais sao essencialmente conscientes, na medida em que seu carater mental depende de sua conexao com a consciencia. Entretanto, para compatibilizar (a) a aceitacao de fenomenos mentais inconscientes com (b) essa sua visao cartesiana da consciencia (como a essencia da mente), Searle defende (c) uma teoria disposicional do inconsciente. O problema e que casos de causacao mental inconsciente exigem que certas propriedades mentais importantes (propriedades sensoriais e propriedades intencionais) existam de modo ocorrente , e nao meramente de forma disposicional. Ao aceitar a causacao mental inconsciente, Searle esta se comprometendo (inadvertidamente) com uma existencia mental independente da consciencia. E tal existencia inconsciente implica que certos fenomenos mentais sao ontologicamente objetivos , e nao subjetivos, como ele alega, pois eles existem sem serem vivenciados. Palavras-chave: Subjetividade ontologica, inconsciente, disposicao, causacao mental, objetividade.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"21 1","pages":"303-311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43406014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the last decades of the twentieth century, various social and philosophical changes pushed to problematize some of the fundamental ideas of the theory of justice. Among them is the relationship that until then was postulated between the ideas of justice, an ideal construction that the philosopher was supposed to elucidate, and injustice, a secondary concept understood as the absence of justice. The idea of the “priority of injustice” now appears as a fundamental starting point for many philosophers of diverse traditions. In this article I will analyze the different meanings that this priority adopts in the main representatives of this “shift”, as well as their different ways of conceiving injustices, giving reasons to prefer some approaches to others. This “Copernican shift”, as I will attempt to show, entails transformations relevant to the idea of justice that no contemporary theory should ignore.Keywords: justice, injustice, ideal theory, democracy, justice as a process.
{"title":"La prioridad de la injusticia: el giro copernicano en la teoría de la justicia","authors":"F. Brotons","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.05","url":null,"abstract":"During the last decades of the twentieth century, various social and philosophical changes pushed to problematize some of the fundamental ideas of the theory of justice. Among them is the relationship that until then was postulated between the ideas of justice, an ideal construction that the philosopher was supposed to elucidate, and injustice, a secondary concept understood as the absence of justice. The idea of the “priority of injustice” now appears as a fundamental starting point for many philosophers of diverse traditions. In this article I will analyze the different meanings that this priority adopts in the main representatives of this “shift”, as well as their different ways of conceiving injustices, giving reasons to prefer some approaches to others. This “Copernican shift”, as I will attempt to show, entails transformations relevant to the idea of justice that no contemporary theory should ignore.Keywords: justice, injustice, ideal theory, democracy, justice as a process.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43835172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Judith Butler draws on Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics in order to question processes of humanization and dehumanization taking place through various practices of representation of the face of the other. This is a singular reading leading Levinas’ work to the field of media representations conceived as an agonistic social landscape where the demand of the face is offered or, on the contrary, hidden from us. In that sense, Butler’s cultural transposition of Levinasian ethics entails a politicization of ethics which is indistinguishable, at the end, from an ethic assault to the politics of representation. In this cultural bond among ethics and politics arise fundamental questions on responsibility linking it to the practice of cultural translation while offering alternatives to some common universalist shortcuts of contemporary ethical reflection.Keywords: Cultural translation, ethical responsibility, ethics of alterity.
{"title":"Traducir el rostro del otro: encuentros culturales entre Judith Butler y Emmanuel Levinas","authors":"P. P. Navarro","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.06","url":null,"abstract":"Judith Butler draws on Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics in order to question processes of humanization and dehumanization taking place through various practices of representation of the face of the other. This is a singular reading leading Levinas’ work to the field of media representations conceived as an agonistic social landscape where the demand of the face is offered or, on the contrary, hidden from us. In that sense, Butler’s cultural transposition of Levinasian ethics entails a politicization of ethics which is indistinguishable, at the end, from an ethic assault to the politics of representation. In this cultural bond among ethics and politics arise fundamental questions on responsibility linking it to the practice of cultural translation while offering alternatives to some common universalist shortcuts of contemporary ethical reflection.Keywords: Cultural translation, ethical responsibility, ethics of alterity.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"21 1","pages":"286-295"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41651044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Judith Butler recurre a la etica de Emmanuel Levinas para interrogar los procesos de humanizacion y deshumanizacion a traves de practicas representacion del rostro del otro . Se trata de una lectura singular que acerca la obra de Levinas a espacios de representacion mediatica concebidos como escenario agonistico en que se nos ofrece o, por el contrario, se nos escamotea de la demanda etica del rostro. En ese sentido, el tipo de trasposicion cultural de la etica de Levinas que practica Butler representa una politizacion de la etica que resulta indistinguible, a la postre, del asalto etico a las politicas de la representacion. Surgen, en este nexo cultural entre etica y politica, preguntas fundamentales sobre la responsabilidad que la ligan a la practica de la traduccion cultural a la par que ofrecen alternativas a los atajos universalistas comunes en el pensamiento etico contemporaneo. Palabras clave: Traduccion cultural, responsabilidad etica, eticas de la alteridad.
{"title":"Translating the other’s face: cultural encounters between Judith Butler and Emmanuel Levinas","authors":"Pablo Navarro","doi":"10.4013/RFU.V21I3.18981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/RFU.V21I3.18981","url":null,"abstract":"Judith Butler recurre a la etica de Emmanuel Levinas para interrogar los procesos de humanizacion y deshumanizacion a traves de practicas representacion del rostro del otro . Se trata de una lectura singular que acerca la obra de Levinas a espacios de representacion mediatica concebidos como escenario agonistico en que se nos ofrece o, por el contrario, se nos escamotea de la demanda etica del rostro. En ese sentido, el tipo de trasposicion cultural de la etica de Levinas que practica Butler representa una politizacion de la etica que resulta indistinguible, a la postre, del asalto etico a las politicas de la representacion. Surgen, en este nexo cultural entre etica y politica, preguntas fundamentales sobre la responsabilidad que la ligan a la practica de la traduccion cultural a la par que ofrecen alternativas a los atajos universalistas comunes en el pensamiento etico contemporaneo. Palabras clave: Traduccion cultural, responsabilidad etica, eticas de la alteridad.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":"286-295"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46369752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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