Pub Date : 2024-01-17DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-124-152
I. E. Magadeev
This article endeavors to delineate the conceptual landscape occupied by the notions of prospective multipolarity within the strategic discourse of Soviet diplomacy during the latter phases of the Great Patriotic War. Particular emphasis is placed on the intellectual contributions of two prominent Soviet diplomats, M.M. Litvinov and I.M. Maisky. The author substantiates these insights by drawing upon both published and archival source materials, including the diaries and records maintained by officials within the Soviet Foreign Office, as well as documents emanating from the "Litvinov commission."While the diplomatic theories formulated by Litvinov and Maisky during the years 1943–1945 have been subject to analysis by Russian and international scholars, the majority of extant scholarship has traditionally focused on the content and nuances of their perspectives on specific international "questions." Departing from this convention, this article adopts a methodological approach that seeks to explore the underlying conceptual foundations upon which the ideas of Litvinov and Maisky were constructed. Additionally, the essay introduces a novel dimension by surveying the viewpoints of other Soviet diplomats (S.A. Lozovskii, B.E. Shtein, Ia.Z. Surits, E.V. Tarle), who have garnered relatively less scholarly attention.Of paramount interest is the manner in which Litvinov and Maisky envisaged the post-World War II international landscape, albeit without explicitly employing the term "multipolarity." The article addresses critical questions, such as their perception of the global scenario following WWII, their consideration of the inevitability of Soviet-American bipolarity, and the factors and circumstances that influenced their conceptualizations. The contemporary resurgence of discussions surrounding the trajectory of multipolarity in the twenty-first century underscores the pertinence of this historical inquiry.The article's key conclusion posits that the conceptual framework embraced by Soviet diplomats during 1943–1945 was not centered on notions of bipolarity or an imminent Cold War. While acknowledging the potential escalation of tensions between the USSR and Western nations led by the USA and Great Britain, they favored collaboration among the principal powers of the antiHitlerite coalition, grounded in an implicit understanding of their respective "spheres of influence." Although Soviet Foreign Office officials did not discount the possibility of the formation of a united Anglo-American front against the USSR, they believed that Soviet diplomacy should actively work to prevent such an outcome by capitalizing on the fissures between Washington and London.
{"title":"Ideas of Multipolarity in the Conceptual Frame of the Soviet Diplomacy during the Final Phases of the Great Patriotic war (1943–1945)","authors":"I. E. Magadeev","doi":"10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-124-152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-124-152","url":null,"abstract":"This article endeavors to delineate the conceptual landscape occupied by the notions of prospective multipolarity within the strategic discourse of Soviet diplomacy during the latter phases of the Great Patriotic War. Particular emphasis is placed on the intellectual contributions of two prominent Soviet diplomats, M.M. Litvinov and I.M. Maisky. The author substantiates these insights by drawing upon both published and archival source materials, including the diaries and records maintained by officials within the Soviet Foreign Office, as well as documents emanating from the \"Litvinov commission.\"While the diplomatic theories formulated by Litvinov and Maisky during the years 1943–1945 have been subject to analysis by Russian and international scholars, the majority of extant scholarship has traditionally focused on the content and nuances of their perspectives on specific international \"questions.\" Departing from this convention, this article adopts a methodological approach that seeks to explore the underlying conceptual foundations upon which the ideas of Litvinov and Maisky were constructed. Additionally, the essay introduces a novel dimension by surveying the viewpoints of other Soviet diplomats (S.A. Lozovskii, B.E. Shtein, Ia.Z. Surits, E.V. Tarle), who have garnered relatively less scholarly attention.Of paramount interest is the manner in which Litvinov and Maisky envisaged the post-World War II international landscape, albeit without explicitly employing the term \"multipolarity.\" The article addresses critical questions, such as their perception of the global scenario following WWII, their consideration of the inevitability of Soviet-American bipolarity, and the factors and circumstances that influenced their conceptualizations. The contemporary resurgence of discussions surrounding the trajectory of multipolarity in the twenty-first century underscores the pertinence of this historical inquiry.The article's key conclusion posits that the conceptual framework embraced by Soviet diplomats during 1943–1945 was not centered on notions of bipolarity or an imminent Cold War. While acknowledging the potential escalation of tensions between the USSR and Western nations led by the USA and Great Britain, they favored collaboration among the principal powers of the antiHitlerite coalition, grounded in an implicit understanding of their respective \"spheres of influence.\" Although Soviet Foreign Office officials did not discount the possibility of the formation of a united Anglo-American front against the USSR, they believed that Soviet diplomacy should actively work to prevent such an outcome by capitalizing on the fissures between Washington and London.","PeriodicalId":42127,"journal":{"name":"MGIMO Review of International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139617311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-16DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-7-12
K. M. Barsky
This editorial introduces a series of papers based on presentations made at the "Soviet Diplomacy during World War II" conference held at MGIMO on June 30, 2023. It draws attention to notable aspects of Soviet diplomacy during the wartime period. Firstly, it highlights the persistent effort and skill in negotiating despite significant divergences in interests and approaches. Secondly, it discusses the adeptness in striking a careful balance between steadfastly maintaining one's stance and employing flexibility and pragmatism to achieve the ultimate objective of victory over the enemy. Thirdly, the article examines the history of international negotiations during World War II as an illustration of the clash and collaboration among prominent political figures, notably emphasizing how I.V. Stalin often outplayed his counterparts in this personalized “diplomacy of leaders.”The history of World War II compellingly illustrates the necessity of diplomacy, not only during the conflict but also in the transition to peace and negotiations thereafter, as well as in the establishment of a new global order.
{"title":"Soviet Diplomacy: Waging and Winning Its Own War – Introduction to the Forum","authors":"K. M. Barsky","doi":"10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-7-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-7-12","url":null,"abstract":"This editorial introduces a series of papers based on presentations made at the \"Soviet Diplomacy during World War II\" conference held at MGIMO on June 30, 2023. It draws attention to notable aspects of Soviet diplomacy during the wartime period. Firstly, it highlights the persistent effort and skill in negotiating despite significant divergences in interests and approaches. Secondly, it discusses the adeptness in striking a careful balance between steadfastly maintaining one's stance and employing flexibility and pragmatism to achieve the ultimate objective of victory over the enemy. Thirdly, the article examines the history of international negotiations during World War II as an illustration of the clash and collaboration among prominent political figures, notably emphasizing how I.V. Stalin often outplayed his counterparts in this personalized “diplomacy of leaders.”The history of World War II compellingly illustrates the necessity of diplomacy, not only during the conflict but also in the transition to peace and negotiations thereafter, as well as in the establishment of a new global order.","PeriodicalId":42127,"journal":{"name":"MGIMO Review of International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139620032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-16DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-13-36
V. O. Pechatnov
Based on an analysis of documentary sources from Russian, American, and British archives, this article delves into the intricacies of coalition diplomacy among the Allies during World War II. It places special emphasis on the adherence to obligations and coalition behavior norms, encompassing respect for partners' interests, maintaining unity amidst divergences, coordinating actions towards shared objectives, and avoiding actions that risk coalition breakdown. The comparative analysis of Soviet and Anglo-American diplomacy reveals that the principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition generally adhered to these norms, contributing to the ultimate defeat of their common adversary. However, the study indicates that the Soviet Union exhibited greater fidelity in fulfilling its obligations and was more proactive in institutionalizing the coalition for enhanced stability and equal participation in strategic decision-making for war conduct and postwar arrangements. This quest for parity was often impeded by the Western powers' reluctance to accept the Soviet Union as an enduring, equal partner and legitimate member of the great powers' club, both during and after the war. This hesitance, the article argues, was rooted not just in geopolitical considerations but also in deep-seated cultural factors, particularly the traditional Western sense of superiority and perception of Russia as a 'lesser' civilization not fit for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community. The article brings to light lesser-known documents from US and UK archives to illustrate this mindset. It also acknowledges dissenting voices in Anglo-American political spheres who advocated for a more equitable relationship with the USSR. However, these perspectives did not significantly alter the overarching direction of Western policy.
{"title":"Exploring Lessons from Soviet Diplomacy and Western Allied Cooperation in World War II","authors":"V. O. Pechatnov","doi":"10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-13-36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-13-36","url":null,"abstract":"Based on an analysis of documentary sources from Russian, American, and British archives, this article delves into the intricacies of coalition diplomacy among the Allies during World War II. It places special emphasis on the adherence to obligations and coalition behavior norms, encompassing respect for partners' interests, maintaining unity amidst divergences, coordinating actions towards shared objectives, and avoiding actions that risk coalition breakdown. The comparative analysis of Soviet and Anglo-American diplomacy reveals that the principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition generally adhered to these norms, contributing to the ultimate defeat of their common adversary. However, the study indicates that the Soviet Union exhibited greater fidelity in fulfilling its obligations and was more proactive in institutionalizing the coalition for enhanced stability and equal participation in strategic decision-making for war conduct and postwar arrangements. This quest for parity was often impeded by the Western powers' reluctance to accept the Soviet Union as an enduring, equal partner and legitimate member of the great powers' club, both during and after the war. This hesitance, the article argues, was rooted not just in geopolitical considerations but also in deep-seated cultural factors, particularly the traditional Western sense of superiority and perception of Russia as a 'lesser' civilization not fit for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community. The article brings to light lesser-known documents from US and UK archives to illustrate this mindset. It also acknowledges dissenting voices in Anglo-American political spheres who advocated for a more equitable relationship with the USSR. However, these perspectives did not significantly alter the overarching direction of Western policy.","PeriodicalId":42127,"journal":{"name":"MGIMO Review of International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139620404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-16DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-37-68
V. S. Khristoforov
Through both intelligence channels and foreign policy efforts, Moscow gathered information in early 1941 about the growing alliance between Berlin and Helsinki, including increased German-Finnish military collaboration, the deployment of German troops and military equipment in Finland, the recruitment of Finnish volunteers for SS units in Germany, the construction of fortifications along the Soviet border, and the massing of Finnish forces near the Soviet frontier. Despite initially maintaining neutrality after Germany's invasion of the USSR, Finland declared war on the Soviet Union on June 26, 1941. The initial phase of the Soviet-Finnish front from July to December 1941 saw military successes favoring Finland. Subsequently, from late December 1941 until summer 1944, a "positional war" ensued with little change to the front line. During this period, Stockholm emerged as a key geopolitical hub where Soviet diplomats, led by A. Kollontai, and intelligence officers navigated the complex task of encouraging Finland to engage in peace talks with the Soviet Union and withdraw from the war. Sweden's neutrality in the conflict and its traditionally strong ties with Finland positioned it as an effective mediator in these negotiations. Additionally, Moscow successfully lobbied Washington to apply diplomatic pressure on Helsinki to initiate negotiations, which gradually began to yield positive results. The multifaceted efforts of Soviet diplomats and intelligence, coupled with A. Kollontai’s active involvement in this diplomatic endeavor, facilitated two rounds of Soviet-Finnish negotiations in Moscow in March and September 1944. While the March talks faltered due to Finnish delegates and political stances, the September negotiations succeeded in persuading Finland to agree to a truce, ceasing hostilities. This diplomatic victory contributed to the gradual disintegration of the anti-USSR coalition led by Germany, with Finland becoming a crucial component to exit this alliance.
{"title":"Soviet Diplomacy and Intelligence Efforts to Facilitate Finland’s Withdrawal from the 1941– 1944 War: Insights from Russian Archive","authors":"V. S. Khristoforov","doi":"10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-37-68","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-37-68","url":null,"abstract":"Through both intelligence channels and foreign policy efforts, Moscow gathered information in early 1941 about the growing alliance between Berlin and Helsinki, including increased German-Finnish military collaboration, the deployment of German troops and military equipment in Finland, the recruitment of Finnish volunteers for SS units in Germany, the construction of fortifications along the Soviet border, and the massing of Finnish forces near the Soviet frontier. Despite initially maintaining neutrality after Germany's invasion of the USSR, Finland declared war on the Soviet Union on June 26, 1941. The initial phase of the Soviet-Finnish front from July to December 1941 saw military successes favoring Finland. Subsequently, from late December 1941 until summer 1944, a \"positional war\" ensued with little change to the front line. During this period, Stockholm emerged as a key geopolitical hub where Soviet diplomats, led by A. Kollontai, and intelligence officers navigated the complex task of encouraging Finland to engage in peace talks with the Soviet Union and withdraw from the war. Sweden's neutrality in the conflict and its traditionally strong ties with Finland positioned it as an effective mediator in these negotiations. Additionally, Moscow successfully lobbied Washington to apply diplomatic pressure on Helsinki to initiate negotiations, which gradually began to yield positive results. The multifaceted efforts of Soviet diplomats and intelligence, coupled with A. Kollontai’s active involvement in this diplomatic endeavor, facilitated two rounds of Soviet-Finnish negotiations in Moscow in March and September 1944. While the March talks faltered due to Finnish delegates and political stances, the September negotiations succeeded in persuading Finland to agree to a truce, ceasing hostilities. This diplomatic victory contributed to the gradual disintegration of the anti-USSR coalition led by Germany, with Finland becoming a crucial component to exit this alliance.","PeriodicalId":42127,"journal":{"name":"MGIMO Review of International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139527594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-16DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-69-91
V. F. Pryakhin
The history of Soviet-Hungarian interactions from the establishment of diplomatic relations until Hungary joined World War II alongside the Axis powers offers valuable insights into the dynamics between small and great powers, as well as the efforts of small European states, particularly Hungary, to navigate their national interests in foreign policy amidst Nazi Germany's encroachments. This period was defined by two primary factors: the Hungarian political elite, led by Miklós Horthy, sought to join a quasi-"crusade" against Comintern Soviet Russia, while simultaneously striving to avoid deep involvement in major conflicts between the great powers. This dual approach aligned with the policies of Hitler's Western appeasers, who aimed to redirect German expansion eastward. In this geopolitical scenario, American and Western European actors (including Great Britain and France) were relegated to the role of observers, anticipating a prolonged conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that would drain both. Hungary, as strategized by Budapest, hoped to secure a position among these observers, avoiding direct conflict participation, and to later engage in territorial reconfiguration post-World War II. However, the reality in Europe by the early 1940s diverged significantly, with Western powers (the USA and Great Britain) unable to redirect Hitler's global domination ambitions eastward. Facing an existential threat, these powers were compelled to enter the war. Against this backdrop, Soviet diplomacy endeavored to deter Hungary's alliance with Nazi Germany. Although ultimately unsuccessful, examining these diplomatic efforts offers valuable lessons in the context of the current evolution towards a multipolar world.
{"title":"Soviet Diplomatic Efforts to Prevent Hungary’s Alignment with Germany in World War II (1939– 1941)","authors":"V. F. Pryakhin","doi":"10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-69-91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-6-93-69-91","url":null,"abstract":"The history of Soviet-Hungarian interactions from the establishment of diplomatic relations until Hungary joined World War II alongside the Axis powers offers valuable insights into the dynamics between small and great powers, as well as the efforts of small European states, particularly Hungary, to navigate their national interests in foreign policy amidst Nazi Germany's encroachments. This period was defined by two primary factors: the Hungarian political elite, led by Miklós Horthy, sought to join a quasi-\"crusade\" against Comintern Soviet Russia, while simultaneously striving to avoid deep involvement in major conflicts between the great powers. This dual approach aligned with the policies of Hitler's Western appeasers, who aimed to redirect German expansion eastward. In this geopolitical scenario, American and Western European actors (including Great Britain and France) were relegated to the role of observers, anticipating a prolonged conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that would drain both. Hungary, as strategized by Budapest, hoped to secure a position among these observers, avoiding direct conflict participation, and to later engage in territorial reconfiguration post-World War II. However, the reality in Europe by the early 1940s diverged significantly, with Western powers (the USA and Great Britain) unable to redirect Hitler's global domination ambitions eastward. Facing an existential threat, these powers were compelled to enter the war. Against this backdrop, Soviet diplomacy endeavored to deter Hungary's alliance with Nazi Germany. Although ultimately unsuccessful, examining these diplomatic efforts offers valuable lessons in the context of the current evolution towards a multipolar world. ","PeriodicalId":42127,"journal":{"name":"MGIMO Review of International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139619805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-28-57
V. T. Yungblud, A. I. Sennikov
At the close of 1979, the United States encountered a critical need to realign its Middle East strategy in the wake of the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by supporters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah R. Khomeini on November 4, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 25. Faced with the challenges presented by the Iranian and Afghan crises, the United States' analytical, intelligence, and military bodies navigated various resources in search of viable solutions. This study delves into the consideration of the Kurdish factor as a potential instrument in shaping the regional landscape. The National Security Council (NSC), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the US Department of Defense all scrutinized the Kurdish movement, evaluating its prospects for advancing American interests. Drawing from documents obtained from the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, this article tracks the evolution of US policy concerning the Kurdish movement and its utility in realizing Washington's strategic objectives during the most critical phases of the Iran and Afghanistan crises. The analysis underscores the fundamental flaw in the initial evaluation of events in Afghanistan and Iran, misinterpreting them as a calculated move within a Soviet strategy to extend influence into the Persian Gulf region. This misconception was the primary cause of the Carter administration's failure in utilizing the Kurds as a counterforce against the Khomeini regime and its erroneous perceptions of the Iranian political regime's vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in Washington's relationship with Tehran hindered the formulation of a coherent approach toward the Afghan-Iranian direction.
1979年底，在伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·r·霍梅尼(Ayatollah R. Khomeini)的支持者于11月4日占领美国驻德黑兰大使馆以及随后于12月25日在阿富汗部署苏联军队之后，美国遇到了重新调整其中东战略的迫切需要。面对伊朗和阿富汗危机带来的挑战，美国的分析、情报和军事机构利用各种资源寻找可行的解决方案。本研究深入探讨了库尔德因素作为塑造区域景观的潜在工具的考虑。美国国家安全委员会(NSC)、国务院、中央情报局(CIA)和美国国防部都仔细审查了库尔德运动，评估了其促进美国利益的前景。根据从国务院、国家安全委员会和中央情报局获得的文件，本文追踪了美国关于库尔德运动的政策演变，以及在伊朗和阿富汗危机最关键阶段，它在实现华盛顿战略目标方面的作用。该分析强调了对阿富汗和伊朗事件的初步评估的根本缺陷，将它们误解为苏联将影响力扩展到波斯湾地区的战略中经过深思熟虑的举动。这种误解是卡特政府未能利用库尔德人作为对抗霍梅尼政权的力量的主要原因，也是卡特政府错误地认识到伊朗政治政权的脆弱性的主要原因。华盛顿与德黑兰关系的不一致阻碍了在阿富汗-伊朗问题上形成连贯一致的方针。
{"title":"The Kurdish Movement’s Factor in US Politics at the Peak of Iran and Afghanistan Crises, 1979 – January 1981","authors":"V. T. Yungblud, A. I. Sennikov","doi":"10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-28-57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-28-57","url":null,"abstract":"At the close of 1979, the United States encountered a critical need to realign its Middle East strategy in the wake of the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by supporters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah R. Khomeini on November 4, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 25. Faced with the challenges presented by the Iranian and Afghan crises, the United States' analytical, intelligence, and military bodies navigated various resources in search of viable solutions. This study delves into the consideration of the Kurdish factor as a potential instrument in shaping the regional landscape. The National Security Council (NSC), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the US Department of Defense all scrutinized the Kurdish movement, evaluating its prospects for advancing American interests. Drawing from documents obtained from the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, this article tracks the evolution of US policy concerning the Kurdish movement and its utility in realizing Washington's strategic objectives during the most critical phases of the Iran and Afghanistan crises. The analysis underscores the fundamental flaw in the initial evaluation of events in Afghanistan and Iran, misinterpreting them as a calculated move within a Soviet strategy to extend influence into the Persian Gulf region. This misconception was the primary cause of the Carter administration's failure in utilizing the Kurds as a counterforce against the Khomeini regime and its erroneous perceptions of the Iranian political regime's vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in Washington's relationship with Tehran hindered the formulation of a coherent approach toward the Afghan-Iranian direction.","PeriodicalId":42127,"journal":{"name":"MGIMO Review of International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136351821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-7-27
A. S. Khodnev
The article delves into the historical context of cross-border radio broadcasting during the 1930s by the League of Nations (LN) and the significant impact of Switzerland's neutrality as the host country on this international organization. Drawing from the recently digitized and accessible LN archive in Geneva, this narrative unveils a minor conflict of interest that evolved into a notable political crisis, marking an international legal precedent by showcasing the influence wielded by a smaller host nation upon a global organization. The architects of the League of Nations envisioned Geneva as an ideal hub for the organization's activities, complete with modern communication technologies for global outreach. However, Switzerland's neutral stance posed an obstacle to the establishment of the League's radio broadcasting infrastructure. Recognizing the absence of robust emergency communications, transport links, and the absence of a dedicated radio station in Geneva during the mid-1920s, the LN sought an agreement with the Radio-Swiss station. Consequently, the LN's own radio station, Radio-Nations, commenced broadcasting on February 2, 1932, coinciding with the start of the Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Arms. By May 1938, amidst mounting tensions in Europe, Switzerland chose to assert complete neutrality within the League. Discussions within the Federal Council revolved around the possibility of suspending the agreement made on May 21, 1930, along with the support for Radio-Nations. Unexpectedly, on November 3, 1938, the LN leadership in Geneva expressed a desire to re-evaluate the 1930 convention. The outbreak of World War II drastically reshaped the relationship between the LN and Radio-Nations. Switzerland decided against entering into a new agreement with the LN, leading to the closure of Radio-Nations on February 2, 1942. Maintaining the nation's neutrality, the Swiss government vigilantly observed the unfolding events during the war. During the peak of Nazi Germany's advances, Bern adopted stringent measures against the LN, upholding a resolute diplomatic stance. However, the Swiss stance toward the LN and the division of Radio-Nations’ ownership gradually shifted from 1943, culminating in the resolution of several financial matters. Ultimately, in 1947, the LN's liquidation commission transferred the remaining assets of Radio-Nations and its radio waves to the United Nations.
{"title":"Lost in Broadcasting: League of Nations, International Broadcasting and Swiss Neutrality","authors":"A. S. Khodnev","doi":"10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-7-27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-7-27","url":null,"abstract":"The article delves into the historical context of cross-border radio broadcasting during the 1930s by the League of Nations (LN) and the significant impact of Switzerland's neutrality as the host country on this international organization. Drawing from the recently digitized and accessible LN archive in Geneva, this narrative unveils a minor conflict of interest that evolved into a notable political crisis, marking an international legal precedent by showcasing the influence wielded by a smaller host nation upon a global organization. The architects of the League of Nations envisioned Geneva as an ideal hub for the organization's activities, complete with modern communication technologies for global outreach. However, Switzerland's neutral stance posed an obstacle to the establishment of the League's radio broadcasting infrastructure. Recognizing the absence of robust emergency communications, transport links, and the absence of a dedicated radio station in Geneva during the mid-1920s, the LN sought an agreement with the Radio-Swiss station. Consequently, the LN's own radio station, Radio-Nations, commenced broadcasting on February 2, 1932, coinciding with the start of the Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Arms. By May 1938, amidst mounting tensions in Europe, Switzerland chose to assert complete neutrality within the League. Discussions within the Federal Council revolved around the possibility of suspending the agreement made on May 21, 1930, along with the support for Radio-Nations. Unexpectedly, on November 3, 1938, the LN leadership in Geneva expressed a desire to re-evaluate the 1930 convention. The outbreak of World War II drastically reshaped the relationship between the LN and Radio-Nations. Switzerland decided against entering into a new agreement with the LN, leading to the closure of Radio-Nations on February 2, 1942. Maintaining the nation's neutrality, the Swiss government vigilantly observed the unfolding events during the war. During the peak of Nazi Germany's advances, Bern adopted stringent measures against the LN, upholding a resolute diplomatic stance. However, the Swiss stance toward the LN and the division of Radio-Nations’ ownership gradually shifted from 1943, culminating in the resolution of several financial matters. Ultimately, in 1947, the LN's liquidation commission transferred the remaining assets of Radio-Nations and its radio waves to the United Nations.","PeriodicalId":42127,"journal":{"name":"MGIMO Review of International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136351558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-105-125
T. A. Vorotnikova
The article examines the political potential of Latin American countries in bolstering their influence within the Indo-Pacific region (IP). It delves into the Indo-Pacific concept, championed internationally by India and Japan, as an alternative viewpoint in contrast to the predominant orientation towards China as the regional leader in the Asia-Pacific region. Carlos Exudé's "Peripheral Realism" provides the theoretical framework for the study, although Latin American states strive to move beyond their peripheral status. The focus is on four Pacific coastal countries in Latin America: Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. It identifies key areas of cooperation between these nations and major players in the IP such as India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Chile and Peru have established a more robust transpacific partnership compared to their neighbors. However, Mexico possesses a significant advantage due to its unique geographical position intersecting the Atlantic and Pacific routes.Colombia, along with Mexico, Chile, and Peru, formed the Pacific Alliance, an integration association that emphasizes closer ties with Asian countries. Over its decade-long existence, this Alliance has significantly increased in both economic and political significance. The article highlights the pivotal role of this alliance in fostering Asian-Latin American trade and entrepreneurship. The study also delves into the prospects of integrating the two regions by extending the reach of Pacific economic megablocks (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Trans-Pacific Partnership) to Latin America. After the ratification of the TPP by Mexico, Peru, and Chile, an agreement that unites all four Pacific Ocean continents for the first time emerged. The advent of the RCEP, which includes powerful economies such as China, South Korea, and Japan, demonstrates a clear global shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from West to East. The inclusion of Latin American countries in these processes is poised to advance their regional and global interests on the international stage.
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Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-189-196
D. A. Maryasis
Book review: Essa A. 2023. Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between Israel and India. London. Pluto Press.
书评:Essa A. 2023。敌对的家园:以色列和印度之间的新联盟。伦敦。冥王星的新闻。
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Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-126-154
I. D. Loshkariov, I. S. Kopyttsev
Recent years have seen a substantial increase in remittances from diaspora communities to their home countries, prompting developing economies to establish and enhance institutional mechanisms. These mechanisms aim to channel and leverage the emotional connections of emigrants to their native lands for economic purposes. This article concentrates on the influence of migrant remittances on the formulation of diaspora policies in Africa. It closely examines two clusters encompassing a total of 8 states recognized as leaders in terms of migrant remittances’ share in GDP and their absolute value, respectively. The article evaluates three primary categories of tools and practices that structure diaspora cooperation: formal institutional means, economic tools, and socio-cultural practices. The research applies a neo-institutional approach, conceiving diaspora policy as a network of interconnected practices across various spheres. By comparing cases within and between these clusters, it demonstrates diverse approaches to developing diaspora cooperation mechanisms. Additionally, the authors outline the most promising pathways for advancing diaspora policies while identifying existing barriers. They advocate for the establishment of distinct platforms for diaspora representation, deepening cooperation between origin and host states, and extending certain diaspora policy mechanisms to subnational and supranational levels. However, the development of diaspora politics in the examined cases is impeded by insufficient resources, weak state institutions, and state reluctance to cede control over their population's interaction with external actors. Despite the prevalent notion that the evolution of diaspora cooperation mechanisms correlates with the volume of migrant remittances, empirical analysis within the African context exposes the explanatory limitations of such a model.
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