Recently, philosophers and political theorists who defend a more practical or realistic approach to the issue of global justice have challenged the purely theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, the debate can be regarded as excessively restricted to the discussion about policies and institutions neglecting the non-contingent dimensions of the problem. In principle, both positions, theoretical and practical, may be understood as diverging from each other. However, abstract and concrete demands of justice can also be complementary to each other. Thus, in this special issue of Etikk i Praksis we propose to explore the points of convergence and divergence between the theoretical and the practical approaches to global justice. We encourage submissions: (1) arguing for or against the theoretical approach; (2) arguing for or against the practical approach; (3) exploring or rejecting the possibility of convergence between them.
{"title":"Realizing global justice: Theory and practice","authors":"Melina Duarte, Tor Ivar Hanstad","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1940","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, philosophers and political theorists who defend a more practical or realistic approach to the issue of global justice have challenged the purely theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, the debate can be regarded as excessively restricted to the discussion about policies and institutions neglecting the non-contingent dimensions of the problem. In principle, both positions, theoretical and practical, may be understood as diverging from each other. However, abstract and concrete demands of justice can also be complementary to each other. Thus, in this special issue of Etikk i Praksis we propose to explore the points of convergence and divergence between the theoretical and the practical approaches to global justice. We encourage submissions: (1) arguing for or against the theoretical approach; (2) arguing for or against the practical approach; (3) exploring or rejecting the possibility of convergence between them.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"10 1","pages":"1-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70780973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lillian Lillemoen, Irene Syse, Reidar Pedersen, R. Førde
Kliniske etikkomiteer (KEK) har vaert etablert i norske helseforetak siden 1996, forst som et proveprosjekt, senere som et permanent tiltak med et nasjonalt mandat. I forbindelse med det nasjonale etikkprosjektet «Samarbeid om etisk kompetanseheving» har det ogsa i noen kommuner blitt etablert KEK. Senter for medisinsk etikk ved Universitetet i Oslo er tildelt ansvaret for oppfolging av KEK i helseforetakene og er i tillegg gitt et langsiktig ansvar for etikkarbeid og forskning i den kommunale helse- og omsorgstjenesten. Hensikten med denne studien har vaert a fremskaffe kunnskap om hvordan det star til med KEK som er etablert i kommunene. Hva jobber de med, hvilken betydning erfarer de at KEK har og hvilke ressurser har de? Studien har et kvalitativt design. Materialet er basert pa telefonintervjuer med ledere for KEK og gjennomgang av komiteenes arsrapporter. Det er gjennomfort en kvalitativ innholdsanalyse av datamaterialet. Komiteene arbeider bade med enkeltsaker, saker av mer prinsipiell karakter og etikkskolering. Arbeidet vurderes som betydningsfullt og gjennomfores til tross for fa ressurser og svak forankring. Kanskje vil en styrket forankring og ressurssituasjon og et nasjonalt mandat bidra positivt til komiteenes arbeid. Nokkelord: Kliniske etikkomiteer, kommunal helse- og omsorgstjeneste, evaluering English Summary: Are clinical ethics committees in the municipal health and care services sustainable? Clinical ethics committees (CEC) have been established in Norwegian hospital trusts since 1996, first as a pilot project, later on a permanent basis with a national mandate. As part of the national ethics project "Cooperation on ethical competence" some municipalities have also established a CEC. Centre for Medical Ethics at the University of Oslo is given the responsibility to support CECs in hospital trusts, and is also given a long-term responsibility for ethics support and research in municipal health care services. The purpose of this study was to obtain knowledge about the situation of CECs established in municipalities. What are they working on, what impact do they find that CEC has, and what resources do they have? The study has a qualitative design. The material is based on telephone interviews with CEC chairs, and reviews of the committees' annual reports. We have carried out a qualitative content analysis of the data. The committees work with individual cases, issues of a more principle character, and ethics training. The work is considered to be significant, and is carried out despite limited resources and weak anchoring. Perhaps a stronger anchoring, resource situation and a national mandate could strengthen the committees’ situation. Keywords: Clinical ethics committees, municipal health and care services, evaluation
{"title":"Er kliniske etikk-komiteer i den kommunale helse- og omsorgstjenesten bærekraftige?","authors":"Lillian Lillemoen, Irene Syse, Reidar Pedersen, R. Førde","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1939","url":null,"abstract":"Kliniske etikkomiteer (KEK) har vaert etablert i norske helseforetak siden 1996, forst som et proveprosjekt, senere som et permanent tiltak med et nasjonalt mandat. I forbindelse med det nasjonale etikkprosjektet «Samarbeid om etisk kompetanseheving» har det ogsa i noen kommuner blitt etablert KEK. Senter for medisinsk etikk ved Universitetet i Oslo er tildelt ansvaret for oppfolging av KEK i helseforetakene og er i tillegg gitt et langsiktig ansvar for etikkarbeid og forskning i den kommunale helse- og omsorgstjenesten. Hensikten med denne studien har vaert a fremskaffe kunnskap om hvordan det star til med KEK som er etablert i kommunene. Hva jobber de med, hvilken betydning erfarer de at KEK har og hvilke ressurser har de? Studien har et kvalitativt design. Materialet er basert pa telefonintervjuer med ledere for KEK og gjennomgang av komiteenes arsrapporter. Det er gjennomfort en kvalitativ innholdsanalyse av datamaterialet. Komiteene arbeider bade med enkeltsaker, saker av mer prinsipiell karakter og etikkskolering. Arbeidet vurderes som betydningsfullt og gjennomfores til tross for fa ressurser og svak forankring. Kanskje vil en styrket forankring og ressurssituasjon og et nasjonalt mandat bidra positivt til komiteenes arbeid. Nokkelord: Kliniske etikkomiteer, kommunal helse- og omsorgstjeneste, evaluering English Summary: Are clinical ethics committees in the municipal health and care services sustainable? Clinical ethics committees (CEC) have been established in Norwegian hospital trusts since 1996, first as a pilot project, later on a permanent basis with a national mandate. As part of the national ethics project \"Cooperation on ethical competence\" some municipalities have also established a CEC. Centre for Medical Ethics at the University of Oslo is given the responsibility to support CECs in hospital trusts, and is also given a long-term responsibility for ethics support and research in municipal health care services. The purpose of this study was to obtain knowledge about the situation of CECs established in municipalities. What are they working on, what impact do they find that CEC has, and what resources do they have? The study has a qualitative design. The material is based on telephone interviews with CEC chairs, and reviews of the committees' annual reports. We have carried out a qualitative content analysis of the data. The committees work with individual cases, issues of a more principle character, and ethics training. The work is considered to be significant, and is carried out despite limited resources and weak anchoring. Perhaps a stronger anchoring, resource situation and a national mandate could strengthen the committees’ situation. Keywords: Clinical ethics committees, municipal health and care services, evaluation","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"46 7 1","pages":"127-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this interview, Eva Erman clarifies basic concepts and distinctions in her research on democratic theory, discourse theory and global institutions, relating some of them to current issues.
{"title":"A critical theory of democratic agency: An interview with Eva Erman","authors":"Øyvind Stokke","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1929","url":null,"abstract":"In this interview, Eva Erman clarifies basic concepts and distinctions in her research on democratic theory, discourse theory and global institutions, relating some of them to current issues.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"10 1","pages":"109-118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I claim that there are moral reasons for making climate denialism illegal . First I define climate denialism, and then I discuss its impact on society and its reception in the media. I build my philosophical arguments mainly on John Stuart Mill and Thomas M. Scanlon. According to Mill’s utilitarian justification of free speech, even untrue opinions are valuable in society’s pursuit of more truth. Consequently one might think that Mill’s philosophy would justify climate denialists’ right to free speech. A major section of the paper argues against that view. The main arguments are: Climate denialism is not beneficial because its main goal is to produce doubt, and not truth. Climate denialism is not sincerely meant, which is a necessary condition for Mill to accept utterances. Climate denialists bring harm, by blocking necessary action on climate change. Primarily they harm future generations and people in developing countries. Hence the case can be made in terms of global justice: Would future generations and people in developing countries support my claim? I think so, or so I argue. My argument from global justice is built on Scanlon’s distinction between the interests of participants, the interests of audiences, and the interests of bystanders. The climate denialists have participant interests ‘in being able to call something to the attention of a wide audience’. Audience interests consist in ‘having access to expressions that we wish to hear or read, and even in being exposed to some degree to expressions we have not chosen’. Future generations and people in poor countries are bystanders to the climate debate. If the debate postpones necessary actions, it is the bystanders who must pay the price. I argue that bystanders’ costs outweigh participants’ and audiences’ interests, and that this is an argument for a statutory ban on climate denialism. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015
{"title":"Climate change denial, freedom of speech and global justice","authors":"Trygve Lavik","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1923","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I claim that there are moral reasons for making climate denialism illegal . First I define climate denialism, and then I discuss its impact on society and its reception in the media. I build my philosophical arguments mainly on John Stuart Mill and Thomas M. Scanlon. According to Mill’s utilitarian justification of free speech, even untrue opinions are valuable in society’s pursuit of more truth. Consequently one might think that Mill’s philosophy would justify climate denialists’ right to free speech. A major section of the paper argues against that view. The main arguments are: Climate denialism is not beneficial because its main goal is to produce doubt, and not truth. Climate denialism is not sincerely meant, which is a necessary condition for Mill to accept utterances. Climate denialists bring harm, by blocking necessary action on climate change. Primarily they harm future generations and people in developing countries. Hence the case can be made in terms of global justice: Would future generations and people in developing countries support my claim? I think so, or so I argue. My argument from global justice is built on Scanlon’s distinction between the interests of participants, the interests of audiences, and the interests of bystanders. The climate denialists have participant interests ‘in being able to call something to the attention of a wide audience’. Audience interests consist in ‘having access to expressions that we wish to hear or read, and even in being exposed to some degree to expressions we have not chosen’. Future generations and people in poor countries are bystanders to the climate debate. If the debate postpones necessary actions, it is the bystanders who must pay the price. I argue that bystanders’ costs outweigh participants’ and audiences’ interests, and that this is an argument for a statutory ban on climate denialism. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"10 1","pages":"75-90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows an alternative way in which compatriot partiality could be justified within the framework of global distributive justice. Philosophers who argue that compatriot partiality is similar to racial partiality capture something correct about compatriot partiality. However, the analogy should not lead us to comprehensively reject compatriot partiality. We can justify compatriot partiality on the same grounds that liberation movements and affirmative action have been justified. Hence, given cosmopolitan demands of justice, special consideration for the economic well-being of your nation as a whole is justified if and only if the country it identifies is an oppressed developing nation in an unjust global order. This justification is incomplete. We also need to say why Person A, qua national of Country A, is justified in helping her compatriots in Country A over similarly or slightly more oppressed non-compatriots in Country B. I argue that Person A’s partiality towards her compatriots admits further vindication because it is part of an oppressed group’s project of self-emancipation, which is preferable to paternalistic emancipation. Finally, I identify three benefits in my justification for compatriot partiality. First, I do not offer a blanket justification for all forms of compatriot partiality. Partiality between members of oppressed groups is only a temporary effective measure designed to level an unlevel playing field. Second, because history attests that sovereign republics could arise as a collective response to colonial oppression, justifying compatriot partiality on the grounds that I have identified is conducive to the development of sovereignty and even democracy in poor countries, thereby avoiding problems of infringement that many humanitarian poverty alleviation efforts encounter. Finally, my justification for compatriot partiality complies with the implicit cosmopolitan commitment to the realizability of global justice theories. Article first published online: 9 NOV 2015
{"title":"Compatriot partiality and cosmopolitan justice: Can we justify compatriot partiality within the cosmopolitan framework?","authors":"Rachelle Bascara","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1921","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows an alternative way in which compatriot partiality could be justified within the framework of global distributive justice. Philosophers who argue that compatriot partiality is similar to racial partiality capture something correct about compatriot partiality. However, the analogy should not lead us to comprehensively reject compatriot partiality. We can justify compatriot partiality on the same grounds that liberation movements and affirmative action have been justified. Hence, given cosmopolitan demands of justice, special consideration for the economic well-being of your nation as a whole is justified if and only if the country it identifies is an oppressed developing nation in an unjust global order. This justification is incomplete. We also need to say why Person A, qua national of Country A, is justified in helping her compatriots in Country A over similarly or slightly more oppressed non-compatriots in Country B. I argue that Person A’s partiality towards her compatriots admits further vindication because it is part of an oppressed group’s project of self-emancipation, which is preferable to paternalistic emancipation. Finally, I identify three benefits in my justification for compatriot partiality. First, I do not offer a blanket justification for all forms of compatriot partiality. Partiality between members of oppressed groups is only a temporary effective measure designed to level an unlevel playing field. Second, because history attests that sovereign republics could arise as a collective response to colonial oppression, justifying compatriot partiality on the grounds that I have identified is conducive to the development of sovereignty and even democracy in poor countries, thereby avoiding problems of infringement that many humanitarian poverty alleviation efforts encounter. Finally, my justification for compatriot partiality complies with the implicit cosmopolitan commitment to the realizability of global justice theories. Article first published online: 9 NOV 2015","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"10 1","pages":"27-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current international asylum regime recognizes only persecuted persons as rightful asylum applicants. The Geneva Convention and Protocol enumerate specific grounds upon which persecution is recognized. Claimants who cannot demonstrate a real risk of persecution based on one of the recognized grounds are unlikely to be granted asylum. This paper aims to relate real-world practices to normative theories, asking whether the Convention’s restricted preference towards persecuted persons is normatively justified. I intend to show that the justifications of the persecution criterion also apply to grounds currently lacking recognition. My main concern will be persecution on the grounds of gender. The first section introduces the dominant standpoints in theories of asylum, which give different answers to the question of who should be granted asylum, based on different normative considerations. Humanitarian theories base their claims on the factual neediness of asylum-seekers, holding that whoever is in grave danger of harm or deprivation should be granted asylum. Political theories base their justifications on conceptions of legitimacy and membership, holding that whoever has been denied membership in their original state should be granted asylum. Under political theories, Matthew Price’s theory will be discussed, which provides a normative justification of the currently recognized persecution criterion. The second section provides a descriptive definition of persecution based on Kuosmanen (2014), and evaluates the normative relevance of the different elements of this definition based on the theories presented previously. The third section is devoted to the examination of the normative justifiability of the nexus clause’s exclusive list of the bases (grounds) upon which persons might be persecuted. The section argues that while the clause does not recognize that persecution might be based on gender, in fact many women experience harms based on gender that fulfil all the normatively relevant definitive conditions constituting persecution. The conclusion shows that although the current law’s preferences towards the persecuted are justifiable, the nexus clause’s limiting enumeration of grounds is not. This applies especially to the exclusion of gender as grounds for granting asylum. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015
{"title":"Should she be granted asylum? Examining the justifiability of the persecution criterion and nexus clause in asylum law","authors":"N. Nogradi","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1922","url":null,"abstract":"The current international asylum regime recognizes only persecuted persons as rightful asylum applicants. The Geneva Convention and Protocol enumerate specific grounds upon which persecution is recognized. Claimants who cannot demonstrate a real risk of persecution based on one of the recognized grounds are unlikely to be granted asylum. This paper aims to relate real-world practices to normative theories, asking whether the Convention’s restricted preference towards persecuted persons is normatively justified. I intend to show that the justifications of the persecution criterion also apply to grounds currently lacking recognition. My main concern will be persecution on the grounds of gender. The first section introduces the dominant standpoints in theories of asylum, which give different answers to the question of who should be granted asylum, based on different normative considerations. Humanitarian theories base their claims on the factual neediness of asylum-seekers, holding that whoever is in grave danger of harm or deprivation should be granted asylum. Political theories base their justifications on conceptions of legitimacy and membership, holding that whoever has been denied membership in their original state should be granted asylum. Under political theories, Matthew Price’s theory will be discussed, which provides a normative justification of the currently recognized persecution criterion. The second section provides a descriptive definition of persecution based on Kuosmanen (2014), and evaluates the normative relevance of the different elements of this definition based on the theories presented previously. The third section is devoted to the examination of the normative justifiability of the nexus clause’s exclusive list of the bases (grounds) upon which persons might be persecuted. The section argues that while the clause does not recognize that persecution might be based on gender, in fact many women experience harms based on gender that fulfil all the normatively relevant definitive conditions constituting persecution. The conclusion shows that although the current law’s preferences towards the persecuted are justifiable, the nexus clause’s limiting enumeration of grounds is not. This applies especially to the exclusion of gender as grounds for granting asylum. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"12 1","pages":"41-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the ethical challenges involved in the ways public representation structures our experiences of atrocities and facilitates an adequate awareness of and response towards the suffering of others. It points out that such an analysis should not exhaust itself in answering what makes public representations of human suffering ethically suspicious and intolerable, but should rather extend this task by clarifying how the public forms sentiments about their social and political reality by elucidating under which conditions public representation promotes broader political agendas. One of the central tenets of human rights advocacy is the widespread conviction that exposure to images and stories of human rights abuse has a mobilizing effect on western audience(s) whose exposure to such knowledge can motivate them to intervene and prevent future atrocities. In order to assess the basic implications of such a conviction we must answer at least three principal clusters of questions. First, how do public representations of atrocities affect individuals and their capacities to conceive and respond to social injustices and the suffering of others? Under what circumstances may agents respond effectively to shocking content? Second , how do social powers operate within the field of perception in order to control how the viewing public is affected? And how do these effects inform and galvanize political support or opposition regarding concrete historical events? Finally, what can be said about the responsibilities of visual representation? Whose agency is it that images inform, and what reforms are necessary to make representations of suffering ethically effective means to encourage better acknowledgment of individual and collective responsibilities that would motivate the public to meet its moral and political obligations? This paper ultimately suggests that in order for politically implicated images to have an immediate critical effect on individuals and their agency, they need to cultivate alternative modes of perception. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015
{"title":"Lives rendered invisible: Bearing witness to human suffering","authors":"Mladjo Ivanovic","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1919","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the ethical challenges involved in the ways public representation structures our experiences of atrocities and facilitates an adequate awareness of and response towards the suffering of others. It points out that such an analysis should not exhaust itself in answering what makes public representations of human suffering ethically suspicious and intolerable, but should rather extend this task by clarifying how the public forms sentiments about their social and political reality by elucidating under which conditions public representation promotes broader political agendas. One of the central tenets of human rights advocacy is the widespread conviction that exposure to images and stories of human rights abuse has a mobilizing effect on western audience(s) whose exposure to such knowledge can motivate them to intervene and prevent future atrocities. In order to assess the basic implications of such a conviction we must answer at least three principal clusters of questions. First, how do public representations of atrocities affect individuals and their capacities to conceive and respond to social injustices and the suffering of others? Under what circumstances may agents respond effectively to shocking content? Second , how do social powers operate within the field of perception in order to control how the viewing public is affected? And how do these effects inform and galvanize political support or opposition regarding concrete historical events? Finally, what can be said about the responsibilities of visual representation? Whose agency is it that images inform, and what reforms are necessary to make representations of suffering ethically effective means to encourage better acknowledgment of individual and collective responsibilities that would motivate the public to meet its moral and political obligations? This paper ultimately suggests that in order for politically implicated images to have an immediate critical effect on individuals and their agency, they need to cultivate alternative modes of perception. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2015","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"10 1","pages":"59-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70780953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Focusing on the basic structure as the subject of justice has tended to lead theorists to make a choice: either there is no global basic structure and therefore obligations of justice remain domestic only (the statist position) or there is sufficient institutional basis at the global level to warrant affirming a basic structure global in scope, meaning that duties of justice must also be global (the cosmopolitan position). Recent literature, however, has pointed out that this might be a false choice between denying and asserting the existence of a global basic structure. There are two main claims that I make in this paper. First, I claim that on a Rawlsian understanding of the basic structure, justice does not require one before its demands arise, but rather that under certain conditions, justice can require that a basic structure be established as an essential part of fulfilling its demands. This has the benefit of not restricting the scope of justice to the domestic sphere. Thus, the second claim is about determining, from a practice-dependent, non-ideal starting point, what those “certain conditions” are. Specifically, I argue that when currently existing global institutions begin impacting on the freedom of individuals to interact against a fair backdrop and pervasively impact on life chances, then the demands of justice will arise and we will need to establish a global basic structure. This paper, then, also has implications for the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, because I argue that the best way to globalize the basic structure is to begin from a non-ideal starting point. Article first published online: 9 NOV 2015
{"title":"A non-ideal global basic structure","authors":"S. Martin","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1924","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing on the basic structure as the subject of justice has tended to lead theorists to make a choice: either there is no global basic structure and therefore obligations of justice remain domestic only (the statist position) or there is sufficient institutional basis at the global level to warrant affirming a basic structure global in scope, meaning that duties of justice must also be global (the cosmopolitan position). Recent literature, however, has pointed out that this might be a false choice between denying and asserting the existence of a global basic structure. There are two main claims that I make in this paper. First, I claim that on a Rawlsian understanding of the basic structure, justice does not require one before its demands arise, but rather that under certain conditions, justice can require that a basic structure be established as an essential part of fulfilling its demands. This has the benefit of not restricting the scope of justice to the domestic sphere. Thus, the second claim is about determining, from a practice-dependent, non-ideal starting point, what those “certain conditions” are. Specifically, I argue that when currently existing global institutions begin impacting on the freedom of individuals to interact against a fair backdrop and pervasively impact on life chances, then the demands of justice will arise and we will need to establish a global basic structure. This paper, then, also has implications for the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, because I argue that the best way to globalize the basic structure is to begin from a non-ideal starting point. Article first published online: 9 NOV 2015","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"41 8 1","pages":"11-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the following interview, Pogge focuses his attention on the situation in Brazil, a country that he says can exert its increasing influence on the design of global institutions. He anticipates the challenges coming for Brazil in combating poverty and gender disparities. He discusses the positive and negative aspects of the Bolsa Familia programme, and he suggests that the government should extend its benefits to a larger proportion of the population in order to gain more support from the public. He believes the Bolsa Familia programme is well-designed and that its implementation is essential to mitigating the absurd inequalities that so strongly polarize society and jeopardize democracy in Brazil. To distribute resources to the poor is not a question of charity, as it was considered in the old days, he explains. He finds no justification for affluent Brazilians to control all the country’s resources while the poor are deprived of their fair share. Pogge is also concerned that, owing to increasing capital mobility, globalization will tend to benefit Brazil’s rich, who also find it much easier to evade taxes. Therefore, in addition to the intervention of social programmes, Pogge recommends that the Brazilian government ensure that the country’s wealth is properly taxed and distributed.
{"title":"Stand against Poverty: An Interview with Thomas Pogge","authors":"Melina Duarte","doi":"10.5324/eip.v10i2.1931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/eip.v10i2.1931","url":null,"abstract":"In the following interview, Pogge focuses his attention on the situation in Brazil, a country that he says can exert its increasing influence on the design of global institutions. He anticipates the challenges coming for Brazil in combating poverty and gender disparities. He discusses the positive and negative aspects of the Bolsa Familia programme, and he suggests that the government should extend its benefits to a larger proportion of the population in order to gain more support from the public. He believes the Bolsa Familia programme is well-designed and that its implementation is essential to mitigating the absurd inequalities that so strongly polarize society and jeopardize democracy in Brazil. To distribute resources to the poor is not a question of charity, as it was considered in the old days, he explains. He finds no justification for affluent Brazilians to control all the country’s resources while the poor are deprived of their fair share. Pogge is also concerned that, owing to increasing capital mobility, globalization will tend to benefit Brazil’s rich, who also find it much easier to evade taxes. Therefore, in addition to the intervention of social programmes, Pogge recommends that the Brazilian government ensure that the country’s wealth is properly taxed and distributed.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"83 1","pages":"91-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The world we inhabit is surrounded by ‘coded objects’ from credit cards to airplanes to telephones (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Sadly the governance mechanisms of many of these technologies are only poorly understood, leading to the common premise that such technologies are ‘neutral’ (Brey 2005; Winner 1980), thereby obscuring normative and power-related consequences of their design (Bauman et al. 2014; Denardis 2012). In order to unpack supposedly neutral technologies, the following paper will try and foreground two of key questions around the technologies used on the global Internet: 1) how are content regulatory regimes governed and 2) how are the algorithms embedded in software governed? The following paper will explore these two aspects in turn, before drawing conclusions on understanding the normative frameworks embedded in technological systems. Article first published online: 22 MARCH 2016
我们所居住的世界被从信用卡到飞机再到电话的“编码对象”所包围(Kitchin and Dodge 2011)。可悲的是，人们对这些技术的治理机制知之甚少，导致人们普遍认为这些技术是“中立的”(Brey 2005;获奖者1980年)，从而模糊了其设计的规范性和权力相关后果(Bauman et al. 2014;Denardis 2012)。为了揭示所谓的中立技术，下面的论文将尝试并提出围绕全球互联网上使用的技术的两个关键问题:1)如何管理内容监管制度和2)如何管理软件中的嵌入式算法?在得出理解技术系统中嵌入的规范框架的结论之前，本文将依次探讨这两个方面。文章首次在线发布:2016年3月22日
{"title":"Algorithmic regulation and the global default: Shifting norms in Internet technology","authors":"B. Wagner","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I1.1961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I1.1961","url":null,"abstract":"The world we inhabit is surrounded by ‘coded objects’ from credit cards to airplanes to telephones (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Sadly the governance mechanisms of many of these technologies are only poorly understood, leading to the common premise that such technologies are ‘neutral’ (Brey 2005; Winner 1980), thereby obscuring normative and power-related consequences of their design (Bauman et al. 2014; Denardis 2012). In order to unpack supposedly neutral technologies, the following paper will try and foreground two of key questions around the technologies used on the global Internet: 1) how are content regulatory regimes governed and 2) how are the algorithms embedded in software governed? The following paper will explore these two aspects in turn, before drawing conclusions on understanding the normative frameworks embedded in technological systems. Article first published online: 22 MARCH 2016","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"10 1","pages":"5-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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