Among the defining characteristics of moral cosmopolitanism are the convictions that personal relations, membership in social or political organizations like local communities or nation-states are insignificant for agents when determining their scope of moral concern. The moral scope is unlimited and the moral duties reach globally. Following up observations made by Onora O’Neill and others, it is argued that Singer’s model needs a complementary tool to allocate duties. That tool can be found by supplementing the agent centered perspective of the model with a regard for the social and institutional circles encompassing right holders. Instead of focusing on the duty holder, I suggest that the cosmopolitan’s “ultimate unit of moral concern” – here, the claimholder is regarded central. Thus, Singer’s cosmological model is kept, but in a rights-based methodological approach for allocating duties. Methodologically, what needs to be investigated is whether the scope of legitimate moral claims expands from the agent for the same reasons that the circle of moral concern expands from Singer’s agent.
{"title":"The distant moral agent","authors":"Tom Andreassen","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V11I2.1988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V11I2.1988","url":null,"abstract":"Among the defining characteristics of moral cosmopolitanism are the convictions that personal relations, membership in social or political organizations like local communities or nation-states are insignificant for agents when determining their scope of moral concern. The moral scope is unlimited and the moral duties reach globally. Following up observations made by Onora O’Neill and others, it is argued that Singer’s model needs a complementary tool to allocate duties. That tool can be found by supplementing the agent centered perspective of the model with a regard for the social and institutional circles encompassing right holders. Instead of focusing on the duty holder, I suggest that the cosmopolitan’s “ultimate unit of moral concern” – here, the claimholder is regarded central. Thus, Singer’s cosmological model is kept, but in a rights-based methodological approach for allocating duties. Methodologically, what needs to be investigated is whether the scope of legitimate moral claims expands from the agent for the same reasons that the circle of moral concern expands from Singer’s agent.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"45-63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46473984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For many years, some urban architecture has aimed to exclude unwanted groups of people from some locations. This type of architecture is called "defensive" or "hostile" architecture and includes be ...
{"title":"Hostile urban architecture: A critical discussion of the seemingly offensive art of keeping people away","authors":"Karl de Fine Licht","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V11I2.2052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V11I2.2052","url":null,"abstract":"For many years, some urban architecture has aimed to exclude unwanted groups of people from some locations. This type of architecture is called \"defensive\" or \"hostile\" architecture and includes be ...","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"27-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43405704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We think about personal relationships in two distinct ways. The first focuses on relationships between blood relatives: parents and their children, siblings, and perhaps first cousins. The second focuses on intimacy: relationships where each individual is honest to and trusting of the other; each cares for the other and seeks the other’s company. In this article I ask how these two conceptions are, can be, or should be linked. Should we strive to make all relationships with kin intimate? Even if the answer is a qualified “No,” does that mean relationships with kin are not valuable? I offer some tentative answers to these questions. Despite its limitations, I hope this provides a framework from which future exploration of these issues might profitably begin.
{"title":"Kinship and intimacy","authors":"H. Lafollette","doi":"10.5324/eip.v11i1.2244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/eip.v11i1.2244","url":null,"abstract":"We think about personal relationships in two distinct ways. The first focuses on relationships between blood relatives: parents and their children, siblings, and perhaps first cousins. The second focuses on intimacy: relationships where each individual is honest to and trusting of the other; each cares for the other and seeks the other’s company. In this article I ask how these two conceptions are, can be, or should be linked. Should we strive to make all relationships with kin intimate? Even if the answer is a qualified “No,” does that mean relationships with kin are not valuable? I offer some tentative answers to these questions. Despite its limitations, I hope this provides a framework from which future exploration of these issues might profitably begin.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"33-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45494811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that using a traditional biological account of parenthood causes problems for determining who counts as a parent for the purposes of filial obligations in alternative family structures. I then argue that a better way to understand parenthood is as a role. People who fill the role of parents are parents, regardless of their biological ties to a child. Next, I argue that children can have more than two parents and so can have filial obligations to more than two people. I then demonstrate that understanding parenthood as a role allows us to correctly account for who should be a parent in cases of adoption, surrogacy, and extended families. In the final section I discuss three related worries about allowing a child to have more than two parents.
{"title":"Who counts as a parent for the purposes of filial obligations","authors":"Cameron Fenton","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V11I1.2245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V11I1.2245","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that using a traditional biological account of parenthood causes problems for determining who counts as a parent for the purposes of filial obligations in alternative family structures. I then argue that a better way to understand parenthood is as a role. People who fill the role of parents are parents, regardless of their biological ties to a child. Next, I argue that children can have more than two parents and so can have filial obligations to more than two people. I then demonstrate that understanding parenthood as a role allows us to correctly account for who should be a parent in cases of adoption, surrogacy, and extended families. In the final section I discuss three related worries about allowing a child to have more than two parents.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"17-32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45447971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current environment of business and financial corruption in Spain has increased in recent years. In order to reduce the scope of this problem, the Spanish Criminal Code (L.O. 1/2015) has introduced codes of conduct and ethics to encourage a new culture of respecting laws for companies and employees. An Educational Innovation Group at the University of Extremadura has proposed a cross-sectional model to study ethics, in an effort to address concerns about the consequences of illegal acts in society and companies. Students in Business, Finance and Accounting are required to practice ethical decision-making through court judgments in order to develop “ethical competences”. These competences are included in the European Higher Education Area and the Official University Education in Spain, specifically in the Royal Decree 1393/2007, of 29 October through cross-sectional competences within the academic programmes. The results of the study show that a high percentage of students validate this methodology as a way of improving ethical decision-making skills at University that will be applied to future business practices.
近年来，西班牙目前的商业和金融腐败环境有所增加。为了减少这一问题的范围，西班牙刑法(L.O. 1/2015)引入了行为和道德准则，以鼓励尊重公司和员工法律的新文化。埃斯特雷马杜拉大学(University of Extremadura)的一个教育创新小组提出了一个研究伦理的横截面模型，以解决人们对社会和公司非法行为后果的担忧。商业、金融和会计专业的学生需要通过法庭判决实践道德决策，以培养“道德能力”。这些能力包括在欧洲高等教育区和西班牙的官方大学教育中，特别是在10月29日的1393/2007号皇家法令中，通过学术课程中的横向能力。研究结果表明，很高比例的学生将这种方法作为提高大学道德决策技能的一种方式，并将其应用于未来的商业实践。
{"title":"Teaching ethics through court judgments in Finance, Accounting, Economics and Business","authors":"R. Ramírez","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V11I1.1938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V11I1.1938","url":null,"abstract":"The current environment of business and financial corruption in Spain has increased in recent years. In order to reduce the scope of this problem, the Spanish Criminal Code (L.O. 1/2015) has introduced codes of conduct and ethics to encourage a new culture of respecting laws for companies and employees. An Educational Innovation Group at the University of Extremadura has proposed a cross-sectional model to study ethics, in an effort to address concerns about the consequences of illegal acts in society and companies. Students in Business, Finance and Accounting are required to practice ethical decision-making through court judgments in order to develop “ethical competences”. These competences are included in the European Higher Education Area and the Official University Education in Spain, specifically in the Royal Decree 1393/2007, of 29 October through cross-sectional competences within the academic programmes. The results of the study show that a high percentage of students validate this methodology as a way of improving ethical decision-making skills at University that will be applied to future business practices.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"61-87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46938477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The family is commonly regarded as being an important social institution. In several policy areas, evidence can be found that the family is treated as an entity towards which others can have moral ...
{"title":"The moral status of the (nuclear) family","authors":"D. Cutas, A. Smajdor","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V11I1.2250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V11I1.2250","url":null,"abstract":"The family is commonly regarded as being an important social institution. In several policy areas, evidence can be found that the family is treated as an entity towards which others can have moral ...","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"5-15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41455050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
{"title":"Value and growth: Rethinking basic concepts in Lockean liberalism","authors":"J. Bailey, M. Thorseth","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V11I1.1967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V11I1.1967","url":null,"abstract":"This is an open access article distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"107-129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49030968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consequentialism is a moral philosophy that maintains that the moral worth of an action is determined by the consequences it has for the welfare of a society. Consequences of model design are a part of the model lifecycle that is often neglected. This paper investigates the issue using system dynamics modeling as an example. Since a system dynamics model is a product of the modeler’s design decisions, the modeler should consider the life cycle consequences of using the model. Seen from a consequentialist perspective, the consequences of policies developed from system dynamics models determine the model’s moral value (ethical/unethical). This concept is explored by discussing model uncertainty from an engineering perspective. In this perspective, the ethical considerations shift from the behavior of the modeler (and away from validation) to the model itself and the model’s inherent uncertainty. When the ethical considerations are taken away from the modeler and directed to what the model does, the ethical boundaries extend beyond the proximity of the model. This discussion renews the ethics conversation in system dynamics by considering this shift in philosophical perspective, and investigates how consequentialist moral philosophy applies to the modeling process and in communicating with decision-makers. A model of social assistance in Norway in the context of immigration pressures illustrates some possibilities for addressing these ethical concerns. This paper argues for an ethical framework, or at the very least, an ethical conversation within the field of system dynamics. Article first published online: 25 FEB 2017
{"title":"Beyond proximity: Consequentialist Ethics and System Dynamics","authors":"E. Palmer","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V11I1.1978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V11I1.1978","url":null,"abstract":"Consequentialism is a moral philosophy that maintains that the moral worth of an action is determined by the consequences it has for the welfare of a society. Consequences of model design are a part of the model lifecycle that is often neglected. This paper investigates the issue using system dynamics modeling as an example. Since a system dynamics model is a product of the modeler’s design decisions, the modeler should consider the life cycle consequences of using the model. Seen from a consequentialist perspective, the consequences of policies developed from system dynamics models determine the model’s moral value (ethical/unethical). This concept is explored by discussing model uncertainty from an engineering perspective. In this perspective, the ethical considerations shift from the behavior of the modeler (and away from validation) to the model itself and the model’s inherent uncertainty. When the ethical considerations are taken away from the modeler and directed to what the model does, the ethical boundaries extend beyond the proximity of the model. This discussion renews the ethics conversation in system dynamics by considering this shift in philosophical perspective, and investigates how consequentialist moral philosophy applies to the modeling process and in communicating with decision-makers. A model of social assistance in Norway in the context of immigration pressures illustrates some possibilities for addressing these ethical concerns. This paper argues for an ethical framework, or at the very least, an ethical conversation within the field of system dynamics. Article first published online: 25 FEB 2017","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"11 1","pages":"89-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46808253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
{"title":"Ethical implications of co-benefits rationale within climate change mitigation strategy","authors":"R. V. Oliveira, M. Thorseth","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1942","url":null,"abstract":"This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"37 1","pages":"141-170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70780992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this interview, Tove Pettersen argues for a novel understanding of the relationship between care and justice that would reconcile these two values.
在这次采访中，托夫·彼得森主张对关怀和正义之间的关系进行一种新颖的理解，以调和这两种价值观。
{"title":"On Reconciling Care and Justice: An Interview with Tove Pettersen","authors":"Tomasz Jarymowicz","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V10I2.1930","url":null,"abstract":"In this interview, Tove Pettersen argues for a novel understanding of the relationship between care and justice that would reconcile these two values.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"10 1","pages":"119-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70781232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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