Pub Date : 2020-11-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-03
V. Bartenev, A. Solomatin
In recent years there has been a steady growth of “multi-bilateral aid,” or voluntary earmarked contributions transferred by international donors through multilateral organizations. The World Bank Group’s financial intermediary funds (FIFs) and trust funds have gained an especially wide recognition and have been particularly instrumental in channelling aid to fragile states — a priority group of partners for achieving the United Nations’ sustainable development goals. But researchers have paid much less attention to FIFs than to trust funds.This article identifies characteristic features of World Bank IFIs as a multilateral mechanism to channel aid to politically unstable regions, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund (MENA TF) established in 2012 to support Arab countries undergoing political transitions as a result of the Arab Awakening. The introductory section examines the particularities, benefits and risks of establishing FIFs as multilateral mechanisms to transfer development assistance. These parameters are illustrated in subsequent sections which discuss the MENA TF’s establishment procedures, governance structure, and mobilization and allocation of funds.The article concludes that for each of the parties involved, hypothetically, World Bank FIFs are a quite convenient mechanism for supporting fragile states. However, the example of the MENA TF conclusively shows that everything depends on the concrete political context of their establishment and operation. In terms of some key parameters (establishment procedure, governance structure) the MENA TF mechanism is very similar to other funds of the same type, but its operation is strongly affected by challenges uncommon to the majority of FIFs, which are focused on more politically neutral sectors. These challenges stem from several factors, including the predominance of political decisions within the Deauville Partnership, a unique list of contributors, and a severity of discord among them given the drastic deterioration of the political climate in the Arab world and beyond in 2014. This not only disrupted plans to engage more donors and mobilize the planned amount of funds, but it also stipulated a visible politicization of aid allocation. Political risks which materialized in the MENA TF operations might occur in other FIFs focused on fragile states and situations. The establishment of additional multilateral mechanisms, thus, requires learning from experience and prioritizing risk assessment and mitigation.
{"title":"The World Bank Financial Intermediary Funds as a Multilateral Mechanism to Channel Assistance to Politically Unstable Regions: The Case of the Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund","authors":"V. Bartenev, A. Solomatin","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-03","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years there has been a steady growth of “multi-bilateral aid,” or voluntary earmarked contributions transferred by international donors through multilateral organizations. The World Bank Group’s financial intermediary funds (FIFs) and trust funds have gained an especially wide recognition and have been particularly instrumental in channelling aid to fragile states — a priority group of partners for achieving the United Nations’ sustainable development goals. But researchers have paid much less attention to FIFs than to trust funds.This article identifies characteristic features of World Bank IFIs as a multilateral mechanism to channel aid to politically unstable regions, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund (MENA TF) established in 2012 to support Arab countries undergoing political transitions as a result of the Arab Awakening. The introductory section examines the particularities, benefits and risks of establishing FIFs as multilateral mechanisms to transfer development assistance. These parameters are illustrated in subsequent sections which discuss the MENA TF’s establishment procedures, governance structure, and mobilization and allocation of funds.The article concludes that for each of the parties involved, hypothetically, World Bank FIFs are a quite convenient mechanism for supporting fragile states. However, the example of the MENA TF conclusively shows that everything depends on the concrete political context of their establishment and operation. In terms of some key parameters (establishment procedure, governance structure) the MENA TF mechanism is very similar to other funds of the same type, but its operation is strongly affected by challenges uncommon to the majority of FIFs, which are focused on more politically neutral sectors. These challenges stem from several factors, including the predominance of political decisions within the Deauville Partnership, a unique list of contributors, and a severity of discord among them given the drastic deterioration of the political climate in the Arab world and beyond in 2014. This not only disrupted plans to engage more donors and mobilize the planned amount of funds, but it also stipulated a visible politicization of aid allocation. Political risks which materialized in the MENA TF operations might occur in other FIFs focused on fragile states and situations. The establishment of additional multilateral mechanisms, thus, requires learning from experience and prioritizing risk assessment and mitigation.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47060468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-11
I. Popova
Oil export revenues still constitute a considerable part of the national budget, and influence the business cycle, in Russia as well as other oil-exporting countries. Therefore, the identification of the main factors influencing oil prices, an adequate assessment of their significance, as well as a forecast of market developments and possible actions in the international arena are necessary for competent public policy planning and realistic evidence-based budgeting. The activities of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are traditionally considered among the main geopolitical factors that significantly influence oil price dynamics.Although at present it is too early to make a full-fledged impact assessment for all factors that influenced oil prices during the current crisis, the first attempts are already being made through situation analyses and academic articles in peer-reviewed journals. However, an analysis of the available studies carried out since the end of the 1960s for all cases of significant oil price fluctuations helps systematize existing findings and answer the following research question: under what circumstances do geopolitical factors play a defining role, and when is their influence extremely limited or completely absent? The goal of this analysis is to identify and generalize the main trends in the oil market and relevant academic research, as well as to clarify OPEC’s role in the current stage of the oil market’s development.Based on this analysis several conclusions are drawn. First, geopolitical factors had varying significance in oil price dynamics depending on the historic period: in the 1960s and 1970s, the influence was determinative; it then started to weaken and became less important compared to economic variables (especially on the demand side). Second, a key feature of the influence of geopolitical factors on the oil market is indirectness: expectations about future events that theoretically could lead to changes in market conditions, primarily oil supply, have a greater impact on prices than the events themselves. Third, OPEC (+) activities and the political processes taking place among its members are still the most significant geopolitical factors affecting the oil market. Moreover, OPEC’s influence as a cartel has been steadily declining since the 1980s. It has lost price-setting power, and now its major function is the adjustment of market-defined prices. Finally, OPEC’s influence has decreased due to several major factors: oil market transformation from the sale of commodities to the sale of financial products, the shale revolution, the development of production in non-OPEC countries that, in case of the United States, are also the largest consumers, and the development of alternative energy and renewable sources.The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme
{"title":"Geopolitical Factors and Their Role in the Development of the International Oil Market: A Literature Review","authors":"I. Popova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-11","url":null,"abstract":"Oil export revenues still constitute a considerable part of the national budget, and influence the business cycle, in Russia as well as other oil-exporting countries. Therefore, the identification of the main factors influencing oil prices, an adequate assessment of their significance, as well as a forecast of market developments and possible actions in the international arena are necessary for competent public policy planning and realistic evidence-based budgeting. The activities of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are traditionally considered among the main geopolitical factors that significantly influence oil price dynamics.Although at present it is too early to make a full-fledged impact assessment for all factors that influenced oil prices during the current crisis, the first attempts are already being made through situation analyses and academic articles in peer-reviewed journals. However, an analysis of the available studies carried out since the end of the 1960s for all cases of significant oil price fluctuations helps systematize existing findings and answer the following research question: under what circumstances do geopolitical factors play a defining role, and when is their influence extremely limited or completely absent? The goal of this analysis is to identify and generalize the main trends in the oil market and relevant academic research, as well as to clarify OPEC’s role in the current stage of the oil market’s development.Based on this analysis several conclusions are drawn. First, geopolitical factors had varying significance in oil price dynamics depending on the historic period: in the 1960s and 1970s, the influence was determinative; it then started to weaken and became less important compared to economic variables (especially on the demand side). Second, a key feature of the influence of geopolitical factors on the oil market is indirectness: expectations about future events that theoretically could lead to changes in market conditions, primarily oil supply, have a greater impact on prices than the events themselves. Third, OPEC (+) activities and the political processes taking place among its members are still the most significant geopolitical factors affecting the oil market. Moreover, OPEC’s influence as a cartel has been steadily declining since the 1980s. It has lost price-setting power, and now its major function is the adjustment of market-defined prices. Finally, OPEC’s influence has decreased due to several major factors: oil market transformation from the sale of commodities to the sale of financial products, the shale revolution, the development of production in non-OPEC countries that, in case of the United States, are also the largest consumers, and the development of alternative energy and renewable sources.The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48659903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-12
V. Viver
The article discusses modern Eurasian integration - regional processes of unification in the post-Soviet space, in which Russia plays a guiding role. Despite the declaration by the American establishment of the importance of the Eurasian macro region and the deep involvement of the United States in the region’s affairs, the American foreign policy discourse clearly shows a lack of interest on the part of the expert community in integration in the post-Soviet space against the backdrop of Washington’s assistance in integration processes in other regions of the world. In this regard, the purpose of the article is to analyze the current practice of coverage in the American scientific and academic discourse of Eurasian integration processes with the active role of Russia. Based on the opinion of American experts from centrist, liberal and conservative think tanks, it is planned to determine the place of Eurasian integration issues in the American foreign policy discourse, to determine the dynamics of changes in the process of coverage of Eurasian integration by the American expert community, and to outline the nature of the assessments of American experts on Eurasian integration projects.
{"title":"Eurasian Integration in the American Scientific-Academic Discourse","authors":"V. Viver","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-12","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses modern Eurasian integration - regional processes of unification in the post-Soviet space, in which Russia plays a guiding role. Despite the declaration by the American establishment of the importance of the Eurasian macro region and the deep involvement of the United States in the region’s affairs, the American foreign policy discourse clearly shows a lack of interest on the part of the expert community in integration in the post-Soviet space against the backdrop of Washington’s assistance in integration processes in other regions of the world. In this regard, the purpose of the article is to analyze the current practice of coverage in the American scientific and academic discourse of Eurasian integration processes with the active role of Russia. Based on the opinion of American experts from centrist, liberal and conservative think tanks, it is planned to determine the place of Eurasian integration issues in the American foreign policy discourse, to determine the dynamics of changes in the process of coverage of Eurasian integration by the American expert community, and to outline the nature of the assessments of American experts on Eurasian integration projects.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43029256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-05
V. Izotov, Tatyana A Meshkova, A. Teplov
В работе проведено комплексное исследование различных аспектов финансовой интеграции Евразийского экономического союза (ЕАЭС) на современном этапе развития. С точки зрения интересов России и с учетом её председательства в ЕАЭС в 2018 г. анализируются как возможности и перспективы, так риски и ограничения. Авторы приходят к выводу о необходимости дальнейшего углубление финансовой интеграции, которая способна дать мощный системный эффект и достичь нескольких взаимосвязанных целей, в том числе, придать новый импульс евразийской интеграции и преодолеть относительную стагнацию вследствие исчерпания естественных интеграционных эффектов «стартового этапа» ЕАЭС. При этом авторы исходят из положения о совпадающих интересах (в абсолютном большинстве случаев) всех стран Союза в финансовом интеграционном сегменте. Подчеркивается, что успех евразийского проекта может обеспечить многосторонний подход с акцентом на согласованные действия, в результате которых выгоды от финансовой интеграции получают все участники ЕАЭС как по отдельности, так и вместе взятые.В статье проведен глубокий анализ нормативных документов Евразийской экономической комиссии (ЕЭК), дано сопоставление по ряду параметров финансовой интеграции с другими интеграционными объединениями (ЕС, АСЕАН). С учетом полученных данных рекомендуются наиболее перспективные направления финансовой интеграции в среднесрочной перспективе, с учетом обязательств стран ЕАЭС. Перечень приоритетных мерпо развитию интеграционного сотрудничества в области создания единого финансового рынка представлен в двух измерениях - наднациональном (для ЕАЭС) и государственном (для России).Статья написана в рамках проекта «Анализ перспективных направлений развития евразийской интеграции с учетом стратегических задач социально-экономического развития Российской Федерации и задач российского председательства в ЕАЭС в 2018 году», выполняемого в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2018 г.
{"title":"Creating a Common EAEU Financial Market: Opportunities and Limitations From the Perspective of Russia’s National Interests","authors":"V. Izotov, Tatyana A Meshkova, A. Teplov","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-05","url":null,"abstract":"В работе проведено комплексное исследование различных аспектов финансовой интеграции Евразийского экономического союза (ЕАЭС) на современном этапе развития. С точки зрения интересов России и с учетом её председательства в ЕАЭС в 2018 г. анализируются как возможности и перспективы, так риски и ограничения. Авторы приходят к выводу о необходимости дальнейшего углубление финансовой интеграции, которая способна дать мощный системный эффект и достичь нескольких взаимосвязанных целей, в том числе, придать новый импульс евразийской интеграции и преодолеть относительную стагнацию вследствие исчерпания естественных интеграционных эффектов «стартового этапа» ЕАЭС. При этом авторы исходят из положения о совпадающих интересах (в абсолютном большинстве случаев) всех стран Союза в финансовом интеграционном сегменте. Подчеркивается, что успех евразийского проекта может обеспечить многосторонний подход с акцентом на согласованные действия, в результате которых выгоды от финансовой интеграции получают все участники ЕАЭС как по отдельности, так и вместе взятые.В статье проведен глубокий анализ нормативных документов Евразийской экономической комиссии (ЕЭК), дано сопоставление по ряду параметров финансовой интеграции с другими интеграционными объединениями (ЕС, АСЕАН). С учетом полученных данных рекомендуются наиболее перспективные направления финансовой интеграции в среднесрочной перспективе, с учетом обязательств стран ЕАЭС. Перечень приоритетных мерпо развитию интеграционного сотрудничества в области создания единого финансового рынка представлен в двух измерениях - наднациональном (для ЕАЭС) и государственном (для России).Статья написана в рамках проекта «Анализ перспективных направлений развития евразийской интеграции с учетом стратегических задач социально-экономического развития Российской Федерации и задач российского председательства в ЕАЭС в 2018 году», выполняемого в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2018 г.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47065124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-09
Marcos Degaut
Based on the premise that each country has a particular way of interpreting and reacting to international events, the study of strategic culture provides an important analytical tool for understanding and explaining how countries see the world and what drives their foreign policy practices and preferences. Considering that the rise of emerging powers has the potential to affect the balance of power in the international system, this article examines and compares the strategic culture of two of the most important emerging countries in the world, Brazil and India. While apparently exhibiting completely different patterns of strategic thinking, which have led them to pursue different approaches to reach their objectives, these two states share a belief that they are predestined to “greatness,” to play a more significant role in their regional contexts, and to become major stakeholders in global affairs. As the largest countries in their respective regions, Brazil and India can help to shape the future of Latin America and South Asia. Their international behaviour can not only condition the foreign, security and domestic policies and strategies of their neighbours but also impact the ambitions of extra-regional powers with a stake in those regions. Analyzing the strategic culture of these two countries can therefore help policymakers and scholars to understand the rationale for their perceptions and ambitions, what influences and drives their foreign and security policies, how they see the world and why they behave the way they do.
{"title":"Leaping Jaguar, Crouching Tiger: Comparing the Strategic Culture of Brazil and India","authors":"Marcos Degaut","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-09","url":null,"abstract":"Based on the premise that each country has a particular way of interpreting and reacting to international events, the study of strategic culture provides an important analytical tool for understanding and explaining how countries see the world and what drives their foreign policy practices and preferences. Considering that the rise of emerging powers has the potential to affect the balance of power in the international system, this article examines and compares the strategic culture of two of the most important emerging countries in the world, Brazil and India. While apparently exhibiting completely different patterns of strategic thinking, which have led them to pursue different approaches to reach their objectives, these two states share a belief that they are predestined to “greatness,” to play a more significant role in their regional contexts, and to become major stakeholders in global affairs. As the largest countries in their respective regions, Brazil and India can help to shape the future of Latin America and South Asia. Their international behaviour can not only condition the foreign, security and domestic policies and strategies of their neighbours but also impact the ambitions of extra-regional powers with a stake in those regions. Analyzing the strategic culture of these two countries can therefore help policymakers and scholars to understand the rationale for their perceptions and ambitions, what influences and drives their foreign and security policies, how they see the world and why they behave the way they do.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49659090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-04
K. Bondarenko
The advent of the new coronavirus hinders the fragile welfare of migrant workers. Those economic sectors with a large migrant workforce appear to be those hit hardest during the lockdown, resulting in surge in migrant unemployment and a plunge in the volume of remittances. This has become yet another factor putting pressure on the gross domestic product (GDP) growth, balance of payments, and budgets of countries that are net remittance recipients, while also triggering rising poverty levels. This paper evaluates the impact of the current pandemic (and respective economic downturn) on remittance inflows to recipient countries and tackles the potential contribution that international financial institutions could make to alleviate the adverse economic aftermath. In Central Asia and Southern Caucuses (except Azerbaijan) emergency financing granted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank covers 9–20% of the overall size of the annual remittances received. This financial support could be rendered insufficient due to the sharp decrease in the volume of remittances, decline in tourism revenue, and weakening economic activity, while the poor quality of state institutions may hinder the efficient distribution of accumulated resources. In Europe, the IMF and the World Bank provided approximately $7.7 billion in financing to low- and middle-income countries for such purposes as economic stabilization, support for population welfare, and financing of internal/external deficit, of which $5 billion is represented by the new Ukraine-IMF Stand-By Agreement. With the exception of Ukraine, Macedonia, and Bulgaria (the latter having received no loans/grants so far), the cover index for European remittance-recipients stands within a range of 2–18% over 2019 remittance inflows.Therefore, it is most feasible that the current 2020 GDP growth forecasts made by the IMF, the World Bank, and local governments are inaccurate in the light of the insufficient financial support provided by international financial organizations. Additional pressure on the GDP figures might stem from further extension and/or toughening of the lockdown period, as well as from uncertainty regarding the revival of regular business activity and the timeline for resuming migrant remittances.
{"title":"The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of Remittance Recipient Countries","authors":"K. Bondarenko","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-04","url":null,"abstract":"The advent of the new coronavirus hinders the fragile welfare of migrant workers. Those economic sectors with a large migrant workforce appear to be those hit hardest during the lockdown, resulting in surge in migrant unemployment and a plunge in the volume of remittances. This has become yet another factor putting pressure on the gross domestic product (GDP) growth, balance of payments, and budgets of countries that are net remittance recipients, while also triggering rising poverty levels. This paper evaluates the impact of the current pandemic (and respective economic downturn) on remittance inflows to recipient countries and tackles the potential contribution that international financial institutions could make to alleviate the adverse economic aftermath. In Central Asia and Southern Caucuses (except Azerbaijan) emergency financing granted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank covers 9–20% of the overall size of the annual remittances received. This financial support could be rendered insufficient due to the sharp decrease in the volume of remittances, decline in tourism revenue, and weakening economic activity, while the poor quality of state institutions may hinder the efficient distribution of accumulated resources. In Europe, the IMF and the World Bank provided approximately $7.7 billion in financing to low- and middle-income countries for such purposes as economic stabilization, support for population welfare, and financing of internal/external deficit, of which $5 billion is represented by the new Ukraine-IMF Stand-By Agreement. With the exception of Ukraine, Macedonia, and Bulgaria (the latter having received no loans/grants so far), the cover index for European remittance-recipients stands within a range of 2–18% over 2019 remittance inflows.Therefore, it is most feasible that the current 2020 GDP growth forecasts made by the IMF, the World Bank, and local governments are inaccurate in the light of the insufficient financial support provided by international financial organizations. Additional pressure on the GDP figures might stem from further extension and/or toughening of the lockdown period, as well as from uncertainty regarding the revival of regular business activity and the timeline for resuming migrant remittances.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43569860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-02
Chokri Zehri
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, international financial institutions have changed their views on the benefits of capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to publicly express support for what have traditionally been referred to as “capital controls.” The impacts of restrictions on capital flows have, unfortunately, still not been established, and capital controls create distortions if they remain in place indefinitely. The present study uses quarterly data on capital controls in 25 emerging economies over the period between 2000 and 2016. Through an examination of a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) with variance decomposition and impulse-response functions analysis, the study provides further evidence of some domestic effects of restrictions on capital flows. The results show that restrictions were more effective following the 2008 financial crisis and allowed for more monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability. Unexpectedly, the findings do not show any significant impact on international reserves accumulation. The study highlights the necessity of following the international financial organizations’ guidelines to well manage external capital flows and to better coordinate macroeconomic policies in the hope of finding an optimal policy mix.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-03-07
T. Eskelinen, Matti Ylönen
The contemporary world continues to suffer from a number of social problems that are global in scope but impact the Global South disproportionately. While broad and coordinated policy responses to overcome these problems exist, such policies are not shaped solely by the political will to address the problems. On the contrary, their content largely depends on how societies in general and the social problems in particular are routinely explained and conceptualized. We refer to these as explanatory tendencies or paradigms of explanation. As complex problems always have multiple root causes with long causal chains, explanations of these causes necessarily involve some assumptions about relevant causalities. Typically, the main choice in explaining international politics relates to the extent to which social phenomena should be explained by domestic institutions, decisions and events.Social science in general has been noted to have a bias toward a “nationalist” approach to explanation [Beck, 2007; Brenner, 1999; Gore, 1993; Pogge, 2002]. This means treating the state as the primary and even sufficient object of analysis, so that problems are explained by the malfunctioning institutions and misinformed policies of states. Such explanatory biases become naturalized in everyday politics and social analysis [Amin, 2004]. While this has been widely discussed as an epistemological issue, the interplay between international organizations and explanatory tendencies has received less attention. The present article addresses this gap. We argue that explanatory tendencies and biases should not be treated exclusively as an epistemological matter. They need to be accompanied by an analysis of the role of international organizations as both influenced by an explanatory tendency and upholding it. Paradigms of explanation are reflected in the priorities and relative powers of international organizations, as their very structure can reflect particular explanatory tendencies. As an example, we will use the ascent and descent of the United Nations work on the power of multinational enterprises.
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Pub Date : 2020-08-13DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2020-02-01
M. Larionova, J. Kirton
Assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on international institutions and international relations is essential for shaping global governance for the post COVID crisis world. The authors review the actions of the key international institutions in response to the pandemic undertaken in January-March 2020 reflecting on three questions. First, were the actions undertaken by the international institutions adequate, coordinated and timely? Second, could the outbreak have been contained if the global governance system was not in a state of severe strain, with many of the gaps exposed and reforms promised in the wake of the 2009 financial and economic crisis unfulfilled, its key causes unaddressed and unilateralism rising among its key members? In addition, was the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated by the crisis of multilateralism? Third, and most difficult, what is the future of global governance after the COVID-19 crisis ends? The analysis of international institutions performance three months into the crisis leads to authors to conclude that there have been inadequate actions to produce a timely, coordinated international response from all the major multilateral organizations and from the newer plurilateral summit institutions of the BRICS, G7 and G20. The failure of these global governance institutions was due not only to the severe strains from leading members’ unilateralism and competition, but from the very architecture designed in 1945 that now poorly matches intensely globalized world. Global governance in the post COVID world should not descend into the old war-prone balance of power, nor flow from a new Bretton Woods-San Francisco as in 1944-1945 but from an intensification and expansion of G20 governance that will generate and coordinate more comprehensive, stronger multilateral organizations for the benefit of all.
{"title":"Global Governance After the COVID-19 Crisis","authors":"M. Larionova, J. Kirton","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2020-02-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2020-02-01","url":null,"abstract":"Assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on international institutions and international relations is essential for shaping global governance for the post COVID crisis world. The authors review the actions of the key international institutions in response to the pandemic undertaken in January-March 2020 reflecting on three questions. First, were the actions undertaken by the international institutions adequate, coordinated and timely? Second, could the outbreak have been contained if the global governance system was not in a state of severe strain, with many of the gaps exposed and reforms promised in the wake of the 2009 financial and economic crisis unfulfilled, its key causes unaddressed and unilateralism rising among its key members? In addition, was the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated by the crisis of multilateralism? Third, and most difficult, what is the future of global governance after the COVID-19 crisis ends? The analysis of international institutions performance three months into the crisis leads to authors to conclude that there have been inadequate actions to produce a timely, coordinated international response from all the major multilateral organizations and from the newer plurilateral summit institutions of the BRICS, G7 and G20. The failure of these global governance institutions was due not only to the severe strains from leading members’ unilateralism and competition, but from the very architecture designed in 1945 that now poorly matches intensely globalized world. Global governance in the post COVID world should not descend into the old war-prone balance of power, nor flow from a new Bretton Woods-San Francisco as in 1944-1945 but from an intensification and expansion of G20 governance that will generate and coordinate more comprehensive, stronger multilateral organizations for the benefit of all.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48647786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-01DOI: 10.17323/19967845-2020-02-09
Портанский Алексей Павлович, Судакова Юлия Михайловна, Ларионов Александр Витальевич
В статье рассматриваются различные подходы, позволяющие спрогнозировать начало нового мирового финансового кризиса. К концу 2019 г. значительная часть аналитических агентств, а также прогнозы международных организаций свидетельствовали о высокой степени вероятности начала нового мирового финансового кризиса в 2020 - начале 2021 гг. Систематизируются основные прогнозы аналитических агентств в отношении роста мировой экономики, а также рассматриваются различные теоретические концепции, применение которых позволяет выявить симптомы надвигающегося мирового финансового кризиса. В конечном счете исследование предлагает возможность минимизации негативного воздействия от кризисных явлений для России. В связи с начавшейся весной 2020 г. пандемией коронавируса сделаны предварительные оценки вероятного ущерба для мировой экономики и перспектив ее восстановления.
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