Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-11
M. Larionova
The Group of 20 (G20) brought together leaders of the key advanced and emerging market countries to manage the 2007–08 financial and economic crises, reform the international architecture, devise a new global consensus, ensure recovery, and promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Established as an anti-crisis mechanism and designated by its members as a premier forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 transformed into a global governance hub. Since its first summit, the G20 has generated high expectations and has become a subject of research and assessment for analysts, mass media, and the general public. Each summit’s deliberations, decisions, and engagements have been scrutinized. Critics of the G20 claim it has lost relevance and was not capable of responding to the degradation of multilateralism, or the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis it induced. In this article, the logic of historical institutionalism is applied to explore the confluence of dynamics in the G20’s evolution: demand for G20 leadership; agenda expansion and institutionalization; and legitimation, accountability, and engagements. It is concluded that the G20 changed global governance trends, creating a more inclusive global governance that integrates the G20’s own extensive and diverse cooperation networks with the networks of the other international institutions and engagement groups involved in G20 policy processes. The networked governance, alongside the rotating presidency, the Troika, and various outreach mechanisms, augment the G20’s authority and reduce the legitimacy gap perception. The benefits from the early decisions, established and expanding agenda, patterns of engagement, cognitive scripts, embedded ideas, and internalized norms became strong endogenous sources of stability, reinforced in positive feedback loops. Despite tensions between members, the value that the G20 provides and the global public goods it generates, real and expected returns, constitute significant incentives for the G20’s continued engagement, sustain its evolving dynamics, and consolidate its path-dependency. The downside of the G20’s resilience is its inability to undertake innovative initiatives in the wake of COVID-19 or to provide the powerful leadership the world needed to overcome the pandemic and the related economic and social crises. Notwithstanding these failures, the G20 remains the crucial hub of contemporary global economic governance. However, the lock-in may entail the risk of losing relevance to other institutions.
{"title":"A Brief History of the G20 Institutional Dynamics (2008-2021)","authors":"M. Larionova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-11","url":null,"abstract":"The Group of 20 (G20) brought together leaders of the key advanced and emerging market countries to manage the 2007–08 financial and economic crises, reform the international architecture, devise a new global consensus, ensure recovery, and promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Established as an anti-crisis mechanism and designated by its members as a premier forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 transformed into a global governance hub. Since its first summit, the G20 has generated high expectations and has become a subject of research and assessment for analysts, mass media, and the general public. Each summit’s deliberations, decisions, and engagements have been scrutinized. Critics of the G20 claim it has lost relevance and was not capable of responding to the degradation of multilateralism, or the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis it induced. In this article, the logic of historical institutionalism is applied to explore the confluence of dynamics in the G20’s evolution: demand for G20 leadership; agenda expansion and institutionalization; and legitimation, accountability, and engagements. It is concluded that the G20 changed global governance trends, creating a more inclusive global governance that integrates the G20’s own extensive and diverse cooperation networks with the networks of the other international institutions and engagement groups involved in G20 policy processes. The networked governance, alongside the rotating presidency, the Troika, and various outreach mechanisms, augment the G20’s authority and reduce the legitimacy gap perception. The benefits from the early decisions, established and expanding agenda, patterns of engagement, cognitive scripts, embedded ideas, and internalized norms became strong endogenous sources of stability, reinforced in positive feedback loops. Despite tensions between members, the value that the G20 provides and the global public goods it generates, real and expected returns, constitute significant incentives for the G20’s continued engagement, sustain its evolving dynamics, and consolidate its path-dependency. The downside of the G20’s resilience is its inability to undertake innovative initiatives in the wake of COVID-19 or to provide the powerful leadership the world needed to overcome the pandemic and the related economic and social crises. Notwithstanding these failures, the G20 remains the crucial hub of contemporary global economic governance. However, the lock-in may entail the risk of losing relevance to other institutions.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41437078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-02
Andrew Cooper
BRICS has commonly been framed through a strictly economic perspective, with a focus on the growth patterns of the individual members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Viewed in this fashion, the grouping is judged in a negative manner, with a sense of disappointment and frustration. Yet, framed in a wider diplomatic context, the image of BRICS is quite different, with an accent on several features that cast a more positive interpretation. BRICS: A Very Short Introduction highlighted these features in 2016. And, notwithstanding some unanticipated developments that exaggerated the differences—and tensions— between the members of BRICS, it is the staying power and pattern of evolution in a creative fashion of the BRICS club that stands out. Although overshadowed by other multilateral institutions, the achievements of the New Development Bank (NDB) should not be downplayed. Moreover, BRICS has developed problem (or even crisis) management techniques. As with other informal institutions with club-like attributes, some of these tensions were dealt with by avoiding issues that divided the members. Over time, though, this template has been complemented by more active forms of problem-solving relating to internal differences.
{"title":"Reframing the Debate over BRICS Beyond its Conceptual Origins","authors":"Andrew Cooper","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-02","url":null,"abstract":"BRICS has commonly been framed through a strictly economic perspective, with a focus on the growth patterns of the individual members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Viewed in this fashion, the grouping is judged in a negative manner, with a sense of disappointment and frustration. Yet, framed in a wider diplomatic context, the image of BRICS is quite different, with an accent on several features that cast a more positive interpretation. BRICS: A Very Short Introduction highlighted these features in 2016. And, notwithstanding some unanticipated developments that exaggerated the differences—and tensions— between the members of BRICS, it is the staying power and pattern of evolution in a creative fashion of the BRICS club that stands out. Although overshadowed by other multilateral institutions, the achievements of the New Development Bank (NDB) should not be downplayed. Moreover, BRICS has developed problem (or even crisis) management techniques. As with other informal institutions with club-like attributes, some of these tensions were dealt with by avoiding issues that divided the members. Over time, though, this template has been complemented by more active forms of problem-solving relating to internal differences.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45634938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-09
E. Arlyapova, E. Ponomareva, Dushan Prorokovich
In this paper, the development and status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Western Balkans is examined. NATO’s regional expansion can be considered a part of the general expansion of NATO to the East. Unhindered eastward progress lasted until 2006, when Russia came back on the Balkan scene with the strategic South Stream pipeline project. The unexpected appearance of a new actor led to an intensification of NATO’s membership expansion process. Further, Russia’s presence indirectly initiated other meaningful events on the peninsula, such as the self-declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Today, Russia remains the primary irritant for NATO and collective western policy on the Balkans. Allies put considerable pressure on regional actors to avoid closer economic and political ties with Moscow. There are apparent efforts underway to bring all kinds of interaction with the Russian Federation under overall control. Since 2014, local NATO members and candidates have pursued strongly pronounced anti-Russian policy. Russia relies on its traditionally strong relationship with the Balkan states. Moscow brings an alternative model of economic cooperation and development. Both bids raise questions. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has not proven its viability and effectiveness in either the medium- or the long-term perspective; regardless, it competes with a highly desired but elusive European Union (EU) membership. All this together requires more efforts from NATO and the West to maintain a dominating role and position in the region; it downgrades previously achieved capabilities in terms of global governance on the Balkan scene.
{"title":"NATO’s Capabilities in Global Governance: On the Balkan Scene","authors":"E. Arlyapova, E. Ponomareva, Dushan Prorokovich","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-09","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, the development and status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Western Balkans is examined. NATO’s regional expansion can be considered a part of the general expansion of NATO to the East. Unhindered eastward progress lasted until 2006, when Russia came back on the Balkan scene with the strategic South Stream pipeline project. The unexpected appearance of a new actor led to an intensification of NATO’s membership expansion process. Further, Russia’s presence indirectly initiated other meaningful events on the peninsula, such as the self-declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Today, Russia remains the primary irritant for NATO and collective western policy on the Balkans. Allies put considerable pressure on regional actors to avoid closer economic and political ties with Moscow. There are apparent efforts underway to bring all kinds of interaction with the Russian Federation under overall control. Since 2014, local NATO members and candidates have pursued strongly pronounced anti-Russian policy. Russia relies on its traditionally strong relationship with the Balkan states. Moscow brings an alternative model of economic cooperation and development. Both bids raise questions. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has not proven its viability and effectiveness in either the medium- or the long-term perspective; regardless, it competes with a highly desired but elusive European Union (EU) membership. All this together requires more efforts from NATO and the West to maintain a dominating role and position in the region; it downgrades previously achieved capabilities in terms of global governance on the Balkan scene.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41987682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-04
A. Ignatov
The key features of the modern Internet governance system are its decentralized structure, inhomogeneous internal “geography,” and the diverse nature of its decision-making actors. These factors determine the complexity of the decision-making process on Internet governance-related issues. Under these conditions, the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa is viewed as a suitable platform to establish a common ground and align the interests of the participating countries on five key spheres of Internet governance: infrastructure development, legal matters, economic issues, development, and social and cultural perspectives. The goal of this article is to study BRICS’ approach to Internet governance. The study presents an analysis of the BRICS countries’ priorities regarding Internet governance and incorporates a panel data on BRICS’ commitments and decisions regarding the issue. Several conclusions on the BRICS approach to Internet governance were drawn: the most prominent sphere for BRICS cooperation is digital infrastructure development; considerable discrepancies exist among the BRICS states regarding managing Internet content that contribute to a lack of concrete decisions on social and cultural aspects of Internet governance; there is a step-by-step convergence of the BRICS counterterrorism and counter-extremism agenda with a broader issue of cybersecurity. The author assumes that the infrastructure component dominates the BRICS Internet governance discussion due to China’s influence, which gives it the potential to be one of the key players and agenda-setters within BRICS, along with Russia. Steady incorporation of the counterterrorism and counter-extremism agenda into the cybersecurity discussion is strongly supported by Russia, in keeping with its declared national priorities regarding Internet governance. In the author’s opinion, it would be problematic for BRICS to reach a collective decision regarding Internet content governance given the conflict of interests among the participating countries revealed by this analysis.
{"title":"The BRICS Agenda on the Internet Governance","authors":"A. Ignatov","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-04","url":null,"abstract":"The key features of the modern Internet governance system are its decentralized structure, inhomogeneous internal “geography,” and the diverse nature of its decision-making actors. These factors determine the complexity of the decision-making process on Internet governance-related issues. Under these conditions, the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa is viewed as a suitable platform to establish a common ground and align the interests of the participating countries on five key spheres of Internet governance: infrastructure development, legal matters, economic issues, development, and social and cultural perspectives. The goal of this article is to study BRICS’ approach to Internet governance. The study presents an analysis of the BRICS countries’ priorities regarding Internet governance and incorporates a panel data on BRICS’ commitments and decisions regarding the issue. Several conclusions on the BRICS approach to Internet governance were drawn: the most prominent sphere for BRICS cooperation is digital infrastructure development; considerable discrepancies exist among the BRICS states regarding managing Internet content that contribute to a lack of concrete decisions on social and cultural aspects of Internet governance; there is a step-by-step convergence of the BRICS counterterrorism and counter-extremism agenda with a broader issue of cybersecurity. The author assumes that the infrastructure component dominates the BRICS Internet governance discussion due to China’s influence, which gives it the potential to be one of the key players and agenda-setters within BRICS, along with Russia. Steady incorporation of the counterterrorism and counter-extremism agenda into the cybersecurity discussion is strongly supported by Russia, in keeping with its declared national priorities regarding Internet governance. In the author’s opinion, it would be problematic for BRICS to reach a collective decision regarding Internet content governance given the conflict of interests among the participating countries revealed by this analysis.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46343965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-07
E. Katkova, A. Eremin
In the "new era" of China’s foreign policy based on the concept of major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, Beijing has begun to change its attitude toward Latin America. In 2018, Xi Jinping officially invited Latin American countries to participate in the construction of the Belt and Road initiative, thereby bringing the region into the sphere of its global interests. This article is devoted to the study of the main directions of cooperation between China and the Latin American states and changes in the forms and instruments of Beijing's policy toward the region. The authors analyze the degree of involvement of Latin American states in the BRI and consider pros and cons of increasing China's influence in the region. The provisions of power transition theory form the methodological basis of the work, through the prism of which the U.S. factor in Sino-Latin American relations is examined. The final part of the article is devoted to the challenges facing Washington from the growing influence of China in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region.
{"title":"hina's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean at the present stage","authors":"E. Katkova, A. Eremin","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-07","url":null,"abstract":"In the \"new era\" of China’s foreign policy based on the concept of major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, Beijing has begun to change its attitude toward Latin America. In 2018, Xi Jinping officially invited Latin American countries to participate in the construction of the Belt and Road initiative, thereby bringing the region into the sphere of its global interests. This article is devoted to the study of the main directions of cooperation between China and the Latin American states and changes in the forms and instruments of Beijing's policy toward the region. The authors analyze the degree of involvement of Latin American states in the BRI and consider pros and cons of increasing China's influence in the region. The provisions of power transition theory form the methodological basis of the work, through the prism of which the U.S. factor in Sino-Latin American relations is examined. The final part of the article is devoted to the challenges facing Washington from the growing influence of China in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49408417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-01
J. Kirton, M. Larionova
At the first BRIC(S) summit in 2009, leaders of the major emerging market countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) from different continents committed to build a democratic and transparent economic architecture, support the efforts of the Group of 20 (G20) to reform the international financial institutions, restore growth, and deepen intra-group cooperation. Since then, views expressed in the literature on BRICS (expanded to include South Africa in 2010) have ranged from the harsh dismissal of BRICS as a meaningless investment banker’s acronym to its identification as a new power centre with a profound impact on the global economic order. The authors offer an updated, systematic assessment of BRICS’ evolving institutional dynamics, performance, and contribution to cooperation among its members, and to global governance as a whole. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, they identify the major achievements of each of the BRICS’ 13 annual summits through the three five-year hosting cycles, the leaders’ agreements on 933 collective commitments, and their countries’ compliance with them at a level of 77% overall. Further, they highlight the expansion of the group’s agenda into 34 subjects, the process of building the intra-BRICS institutions with the New Development Bank (NDB) as its hallmark, and its extensive second track networks including Business, Think Tanks and Academic, Trade Unions, Parliamentarian, Youth and Civil BRICS. In its first 15 years, BRICS expanded and sustained its institutional dynamics, depth, and performance despite external and domestic challenges, tensions between the members, and the unprecedented tests of the COVID19 pandemic and the ensuing socio-economic crises since 2020. Established as a dialogue and policy coordination forum, it matured into a transregional governance institution with a comprehensive political-security, socio-economic, and people-to-people agenda. Its dense institutional networks, flexibility, continuity, and foundational principle of moving forward only on issues acceptable to all members were vital factors for BRICS’ resilience and evolution. Although broadening its agenda inhibited deepening cooperation, there was considerable continuity across the annual presidencies. Progress on intra-BRICS cooperation was more tangible than that on international architecture reform, despite the group’s unwavering commitment to an equitable international order. Its consensus-based working methods sometimes constrained the group’s leadership. However, BRICS proved its value as a platform for facilitating its members’ bilateral relations and convergence in approaches, promoting their role in global governance, and advancing a more inclusive, representative, and effective international institutional system.
{"title":"The First Fifteen Years of the BRICS","authors":"J. Kirton, M. Larionova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-01","url":null,"abstract":"At the first BRIC(S) summit in 2009, leaders of the major emerging market countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) from different continents committed to build a democratic and transparent economic architecture, support the efforts of the Group of 20 (G20) to reform the international financial institutions, restore growth, and deepen intra-group cooperation. Since then, views expressed in the literature on BRICS (expanded to include South Africa in 2010) have ranged from the harsh dismissal of BRICS as a meaningless investment banker’s acronym to its identification as a new power centre with a profound impact on the global economic order. The authors offer an updated, systematic assessment of BRICS’ evolving institutional dynamics, performance, and contribution to cooperation among its members, and to global governance as a whole. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, they identify the major achievements of each of the BRICS’ 13 annual summits through the three five-year hosting cycles, the leaders’ agreements on 933 collective commitments, and their countries’ compliance with them at a level of 77% overall. Further, they highlight the expansion of the group’s agenda into 34 subjects, the process of building the intra-BRICS institutions with the New Development Bank (NDB) as its hallmark, and its extensive second track networks including Business, Think Tanks and Academic, Trade Unions, Parliamentarian, Youth and Civil BRICS. In its first 15 years, BRICS expanded and sustained its institutional dynamics, depth, and performance despite external and domestic challenges, tensions between the members, and the unprecedented tests of the COVID19 pandemic and the ensuing socio-economic crises since 2020. Established as a dialogue and policy coordination forum, it matured into a transregional governance institution with a comprehensive political-security, socio-economic, and people-to-people agenda. Its dense institutional networks, flexibility, continuity, and foundational principle of moving forward only on issues acceptable to all members were vital factors for BRICS’ resilience and evolution. Although broadening its agenda inhibited deepening cooperation, there was considerable continuity across the annual presidencies. Progress on intra-BRICS cooperation was more tangible than that on international architecture reform, despite the group’s unwavering commitment to an equitable international order. Its consensus-based working methods sometimes constrained the group’s leadership. However, BRICS proved its value as a platform for facilitating its members’ bilateral relations and convergence in approaches, promoting their role in global governance, and advancing a more inclusive, representative, and effective international institutional system.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41314336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-08
S. Bokeriya
A strong partnership between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) is essential to achieving strategic convergence and coherence as well as effective solutions to complex peace and security challenges in Africa. In this article, the author examines the UN-AU peacekeeping nexus through research onpeacekeeping operations in Africaand analyzesthe key challenges in the UN-AU partnership for peacekeeping, including:the lack of clear regulation of actions in conflict despite attempts to develop common approaches to peacekeeping by the UN and the AU; the necessity of establishing equal, full and constructive participation of women in the peacekeeping process; and the problems in the relationship between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Peace and Security Council of the AU. The main objective of this article isto analyze the institutional structure of the African peace and security architecture, the evolution of the UN-AU partnership through the implementation of joint peacekeeping missions, and the challenges to their cooperation, as well as to assess the effectiveness of UN-AU cooperation. Based on a structural analysis of the African security architecture, quantitative methods of assessment,and comparative analysis of the UN and the AU statistics on partnership peacekeeping, as well as onwomen’s participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa from 2003 to 2019, and the voting patterns of the A3 (Niger, South Africa and Tunisia) countries to UNSC resolutions on African peacekeeping, the author concludes that there is a direct correlation between the deteriorating security situation in Africa and the level of strategic partnership between the UN and the AU, and that, in the long term, the priority will be to help national governments to prevent the causes of conflicts, which will make it possible to take into account the local specificities of African states in resolving and preventing conflicts.
{"title":"The UN-AU Partnership in Peacekeeping: Tendencies and Problems","authors":"S. Bokeriya","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-08","url":null,"abstract":"A strong partnership between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) is essential to achieving strategic convergence and coherence as well as effective solutions to complex peace and security challenges in Africa. In this article, the author examines the UN-AU peacekeeping nexus through research onpeacekeeping operations in Africaand analyzesthe key challenges in the UN-AU partnership for peacekeeping, including:the lack of clear regulation of actions in conflict despite attempts to develop common approaches to peacekeeping by the UN and the AU; the necessity of establishing equal, full and constructive participation of women in the peacekeeping process; and the problems in the relationship between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Peace and Security Council of the AU. The main objective of this article isto analyze the institutional structure of the African peace and security architecture, the evolution of the UN-AU partnership through the implementation of joint peacekeeping missions, and the challenges to their cooperation, as well as to assess the effectiveness of UN-AU cooperation. Based on a structural analysis of the African security architecture, quantitative methods of assessment,and comparative analysis of the UN and the AU statistics on partnership peacekeeping, as well as onwomen’s participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa from 2003 to 2019, and the voting patterns of the A3 (Niger, South Africa and Tunisia) countries to UNSC resolutions on African peacekeeping, the author concludes that there is a direct correlation between the deteriorating security situation in Africa and the level of strategic partnership between the UN and the AU, and that, in the long term, the priority will be to help national governments to prevent the causes of conflicts, which will make it possible to take into account the local specificities of African states in resolving and preventing conflicts.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43058448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-03
A. Wang
The BRICS is an international summit institution that provides a platform for the world’s leading emerging economies to discuss issues of global governance from a development-centered perspective. This article examines of China’s leadership role in the BRICS, drawing on quantitative indicators of China’s performance within the BRICS since its first summit in 2009, to the most recent summit in 2021. This arti cle also develops a model of leadership based on quantitative performance measures of deliberation, decision-making, and compliance. This analysis shows that China is predominantly a facilitative and exemplary leader. Its leadership focuses on shaping BRICS discussions on its priority subjects, particularly development and macroeconomics, in addition to leading by positive example through achieving high compliance with its summit commitments.
{"title":"China’s Leadership in BRICS Governance","authors":"A. Wang","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-03","url":null,"abstract":"The BRICS is an international summit institution that provides a platform for the world’s leading emerging economies to discuss issues of global governance from a development-centered perspective. This article examines of China’s leadership role in the BRICS, drawing on quantitative indicators of China’s performance within the BRICS since its first summit in 2009, to the most recent summit in 2021. This arti cle also develops a model of leadership based on quantitative performance measures of deliberation, decision-making, and compliance. This analysis shows that China is predominantly a facilitative and exemplary leader. Its leadership focuses on shaping BRICS discussions on its priority subjects, particularly development and macroeconomics, in addition to leading by positive example through achieving high compliance with its summit commitments.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49017413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-04-04
A. Sakharov
The purpose of this article is to check Russia’s strategic planning system and anti-crisis measures against the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by monitoring the documents for policy objectives directly or indirectly corresponding to the targets of the sustainable development goals (SDG); comparing the indicators present in the Russian documents with those in the 2030 Agenda; assessing the impact of anti-crisis measures on the sustainable development outlook in the country; and tracing the changes present in the latest socio-economic development initiatives of the Russian government. The scope of the study in terms of the number of documents analyzed was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Federal Law No. 172-FZ On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation, and includes a vast array of federal strategies, sectoral strategic planning documents, national and federal projects, state programmes, the 2020 Presidential Decree No. 474 On the National Development Goals of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2030 and its auxiliary documents, as well as other ad hoc anti-crisis planning instruments, such as the 2020 Nationwide Action Plan. The results of the analysis make it possible to trace the paradigm shift in Russia’s decision-making toward incorporating more elements of the sustainability discourse characteristic of the 2030 Agenda and other multilateral arrangements, particularly in regard to climate change and environment, taking place in 2020–21.
{"title":"Sustainable recovery – challenges and opportunities for Russia","authors":"A. Sakharov","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-04-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-04-04","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to check Russia’s strategic planning system and anti-crisis measures against the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by monitoring the documents for policy objectives directly or indirectly corresponding to the targets of the sustainable development goals (SDG); comparing the indicators present in the Russian documents with those in the 2030 Agenda; assessing the impact of anti-crisis measures on the sustainable development outlook in the country; and tracing the changes present in the latest socio-economic development initiatives of the Russian government. The scope of the study in terms of the number of documents analyzed was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Federal Law No. 172-FZ On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation, and includes a vast array of federal strategies, sectoral strategic planning documents, national and federal projects, state programmes, the 2020 Presidential Decree No. 474 On the National Development Goals of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2030 and its auxiliary documents, as well as other ad hoc anti-crisis planning instruments, such as the 2020 Nationwide Action Plan. The results of the analysis make it possible to trace the paradigm shift in Russia’s decision-making toward incorporating more elements of the sustainability discourse characteristic of the 2030 Agenda and other multilateral arrangements, particularly in regard to climate change and environment, taking place in 2020–21.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42841317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-04-01
Jiejin Zhu, Xinyu Hu
During its first five years of operation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is becoming more and more similar to traditional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in terms of operational goals, business area, and environmental and social standards. Why has the AIIB, the newest type of multilateral development bank (MDB) initiated by an emerging economy, undergone institutional isomorphism? Based on the socialization theory, this paper argues that the institutional environment in which the AIIB is operating has a strong influence on AIIB’s institution-building, mainly through the coercive, mimetic, and normative institutional isomorphic processes. On coercion, the pressures from European donors, international credit rating agencies, and global civil society have resulted in the AIIB’s institutional isomorphism. On mimicking, the social uncertainty of the relationship between the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative and the technical uncertainty of infrastructure projects have triggered the AIIB’s institutional isomorphism. On normativeness, the similar educational backgrounds and working experience of the AIIB’s staff and active interactions among the MDB family members have caused the AIIB’s institutional isomorphism. The paper concludes that the international institutional environment might hamper emerging economies’ capabilities of institutional innovation.
{"title":"Back to the Iron Cage? Institutional Isomorphism of the AIIB","authors":"Jiejin Zhu, Xinyu Hu","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-04-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-04-01","url":null,"abstract":"During its first five years of operation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is becoming more and more similar to traditional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in terms of operational goals, business area, and environmental and social standards. Why has the AIIB, the newest type of multilateral development bank (MDB) initiated by an emerging economy, undergone institutional isomorphism? Based on the socialization theory, this paper argues that the institutional environment in which the AIIB is operating has a strong influence on AIIB’s institution-building, mainly through the coercive, mimetic, and normative institutional isomorphic processes. On coercion, the pressures from European donors, international credit rating agencies, and global civil society have resulted in the AIIB’s institutional isomorphism. On mimicking, the social uncertainty of the relationship between the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative and the technical uncertainty of infrastructure projects have triggered the AIIB’s institutional isomorphism. On normativeness, the similar educational backgrounds and working experience of the AIIB’s staff and active interactions among the MDB family members have caused the AIIB’s institutional isomorphism. The paper concludes that the international institutional environment might hamper emerging economies’ capabilities of institutional innovation.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42101698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}