Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-05
Melanie Ruelens, J. Wouters
The Covid-19 pandemic has brought to the fore significant shortcomings in global health governance. Faced with the rapid international spread of the virus, international actors unsuccessfully attempted a coordinated international response to tackle the Covid-19 outbreak and its far-reaching repercussions. The present article aims to shed light on certain flaws in the existing global health governance architecture that have thwarted both formal—the World Health Organization and the United Nations—and informal international actors—the Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty—in steering the international community through the current global health crisis. It first examines the actions taken by these actors during the Covid-19 pandemic and assesses why they fell short in steering a coordinated international response. Having identified individual states as the real culprits for the inadequate performance, the article discerns the underlying causes of individual states’ hindering of global health multilateralism. Subsequently, it underscores why global health multilateralism remains necessary in a post-Covid-19 world and which international actors should play an active role therein. To conclude, suggestions are given on how the global health governance architecture should be strengthened in a post-Covid-19 world.
{"title":"COVID-19 and the Trials and Tribulations of Global Health Governance","authors":"Melanie Ruelens, J. Wouters","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-05","url":null,"abstract":"The Covid-19 pandemic has brought to the fore significant shortcomings in global health governance. Faced with the rapid international spread of the virus, international actors unsuccessfully attempted a coordinated international response to tackle the Covid-19 outbreak and its far-reaching repercussions. The present article aims to shed light on certain flaws in the existing global health governance architecture that have thwarted both formal—the World Health Organization and the United Nations—and informal international actors—the Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty—in steering the international community through the current global health crisis. It first examines the actions taken by these actors during the Covid-19 pandemic and assesses why they fell short in steering a coordinated international response. Having identified individual states as the real culprits for the inadequate performance, the article discerns the underlying causes of individual states’ hindering of global health multilateralism. Subsequently, it underscores why global health multilateralism remains necessary in a post-Covid-19 world and which international actors should play an active role therein. To conclude, suggestions are given on how the global health governance architecture should be strengthened in a post-Covid-19 world.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43583024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-08
Sang-Chul Park
There is no doubt that global trade has contributed to rapid global economic growth over the last five decades. However, trade growth slowed after the global financial crisis; while it started to recover several years after the crisis, it has again declined since 2017 due to the trade conflict between the U.S. and China, as well as other major trade partners such as the European Union (EU), Japan and Korea. The Trump administration regarded the World Trade Organization (WTO) as acting contrary to U.S. economic interests and tried to limit its arbitration function to trade negotiations and conflicts occurring between corporations rather than states. Despite the U.S.’ attempt to weaken the WTO’s functions, the rest of the world has tried to restore the WTO’s role in free trade and multilateralism. To overcome U.S. unilateralism, many major economies have established mega free trade agreements (FTAs) such as the EU-Japan FTA, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The 15 states in the RCEP agreed to complete it in 2020, signing without the participation of India—the third largest economy in Asia— although it had been part of the negotiations since 2011. Despite the absence of India, the RCEP will be the largest mega FTA in the world, covering over 30% of global gross domestic product (GDP), and contributing to strengthened regional economic integration and growth. This article explores whether the RCEP can function properly in the absence of India and examines why India decided not to participate. Furthermore, it investigates and analyzes how the RCEP will develop without Indian participation. Last, it discusses how to set the relationship as a competitor with the CPTPP given the overlapping memberships of participating states.
{"title":"The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Without Indian Participation: Can It Work as a Mega FTA?","authors":"Sang-Chul Park","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-08","url":null,"abstract":"There is no doubt that global trade has contributed to rapid global economic growth over the last five decades. However, trade growth slowed after the global financial crisis; while it started to recover several years after the crisis, it has again declined since 2017 due to the trade conflict between the U.S. and China, as well as other major trade partners such as the European Union (EU), Japan and Korea. The Trump administration regarded the World Trade Organization (WTO) as acting contrary to U.S. economic interests and tried to limit its arbitration function to trade negotiations and conflicts occurring between corporations rather than states. Despite the U.S.’ attempt to weaken the WTO’s functions, the rest of the world has tried to restore the WTO’s role in free trade and multilateralism. To overcome U.S. unilateralism, many major economies have established mega free trade agreements (FTAs) such as the EU-Japan FTA, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The 15 states in the RCEP agreed to complete it in 2020, signing without the participation of India—the third largest economy in Asia— although it had been part of the negotiations since 2011. Despite the absence of India, the RCEP will be the largest mega FTA in the world, covering over 30% of global gross domestic product (GDP), and contributing to strengthened regional economic integration and growth. This article explores whether the RCEP can function properly in the absence of India and examines why India decided not to participate. Furthermore, it investigates and analyzes how the RCEP will develop without Indian participation. Last, it discusses how to set the relationship as a competitor with the CPTPP given the overlapping memberships of participating states.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48382632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-07
M. Rewizorski
Some scholars of global governance advocate rebalancing from global to national governance. They underline the incompatibility of global economic governance with democracies, which have the right to protect their social arrangements. They discern the fact that global (economic) governance is under heavy fire from a new vox populi, underscoring the socio-economic and cultural sources of their resentment and opposition to the liberal international order. While pointing at the timeliness of such argumentation, this article examines the fundamental problem with a sovereignty-related solution to the populist challenge. It lies in the fact that reconstituting global economic steering with a stronger emphasis on sovereignty may open the door for pursuing distinct national policies, which have blossomed during the Covid-19 pandemic and which not only overlap with populism but dismantle the benefits of international cooperation in the post-Covid-19 world. By asking about the role of the fragmented system of economic governance in inspiring populist resentment, this article creates an opportunity not only to address the challenges to global economic governance, but more specifically to reflect upon: the justification of decisive shifts toward national governance; risks which remain hidden for those discontented with economic globalization; and drafting an alternative solution, namely taking the middle way between hyper globalization and a more national policy.
{"title":"Between hyperglobalization and national policy. Is there a way to mitigate populist risks for global economic governance in the post-Covid-19 world?","authors":"M. Rewizorski","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-07","url":null,"abstract":"Some scholars of global governance advocate rebalancing from global to national governance. They underline the incompatibility of global economic governance with democracies, which have the right to protect their social arrangements. They discern the fact that global (economic) governance is under heavy fire from a new vox populi, underscoring the socio-economic and cultural sources of their resentment and opposition to the liberal international order. While pointing at the timeliness of such argumentation, this article examines the fundamental problem with a sovereignty-related solution to the populist challenge. It lies in the fact that reconstituting global economic steering with a stronger emphasis on sovereignty may open the door for pursuing distinct national policies, which have blossomed during the Covid-19 pandemic and which not only overlap with populism but dismantle the benefits of international cooperation in the post-Covid-19 world. By asking about the role of the fragmented system of economic governance in inspiring populist resentment, this article creates an opportunity not only to address the challenges to global economic governance, but more specifically to reflect upon: the justification of decisive shifts toward national governance; risks which remain hidden for those discontented with economic globalization; and drafting an alternative solution, namely taking the middle way between hyper globalization and a more national policy.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48497491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-02
Jonathan T. Fried
The article investigates the future role of the G20 in a post-pandemic digital world. The transformation of the world order and global governance is interconnected with three main trends: fragmentation, digitalization and socialization. The author underlines that these trends pose challenges for states both at the national and global levels. To effectively solve the accumulated problems, the joint work of international institutions and non-state actors is required.
{"title":"G20 Contributions to Global Economic Governance in the Post–Covid-19 Digital World","authors":"Jonathan T. Fried","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-02","url":null,"abstract":"The article investigates the future role of the G20 in a post-pandemic digital world. The transformation of the world order and global governance is interconnected with three main trends: fragmentation, digitalization and socialization. The author underlines that these trends pose challenges for states both at the national and global levels. To effectively solve the accumulated problems, the joint work of international institutions and non-state actors is required.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49531362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-03
Lamia Jamel, Abdelkader Mohamed Sghaier Derbali, A. Lamouchi, Ahmed K. Elnagar
The aim of this study is to highlight the key competitiveness elements that promote trade flows between the BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and those in Sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, we employ the econometrics of panel data during the period of study from 1995 to 2018. We apply the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator [1998] and we utilize Sargan’s [1958] over-identification test to confirm the validity of delayed variables in level and difference as instruments used in our estimations. The empirical findings of our study show that trade policy actions, high natural resource allocation and the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the participating countries promote this trade openness between BRICS and Sub-Saharan Africa economies. Additionally, African countries need to develop their industrial sector to export more high-value manufactured products.
{"title":"Trade Openness and Competitiveness: BRICS and Sub-Saharan Africa Countries","authors":"Lamia Jamel, Abdelkader Mohamed Sghaier Derbali, A. Lamouchi, Ahmed K. Elnagar","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-03","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this study is to highlight the key competitiveness elements that promote trade flows between the BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and those in Sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, we employ the econometrics of panel data during the period of study from 1995 to 2018. We apply the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator [1998] and we utilize Sargan’s [1958] over-identification test to confirm the validity of delayed variables in level and difference as instruments used in our estimations. The empirical findings of our study show that trade policy actions, high natural resource allocation and the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the participating countries promote this trade openness between BRICS and Sub-Saharan Africa economies. Additionally, African countries need to develop their industrial sector to export more high-value manufactured products.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42298995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-04
A. Morozkina, V. Skryabina
The informal BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is actively working to solve the most acute global problems. This is why opportunities for implementing the sustainable development goals (SDGs) at BRICS summits is a topic for urgent research. This article discusses the prospects for achieving SDG 17.11 by the least developed countries (LDCs) in the framework of mutual trade with BRICS. SDG 17.11, unlike other goals, was expected to be achieved in 2020, but World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates for 2018 showed that progress was too slow. Against the sharp drop in international trade in 2020 due to economic shutdowns, the implementation of this goal is especially high on the agenda. This article describes the current implementation of the SDG by BRICS. A general analysis of mutual trade between LDCs and BRICS shows the low involvement of least developed countries in trade with BRICS. The methodology for the study involves computations of two trade indices and the identification of new clusters of LDCs. The export propensity index and trade intensity index are calculated in order to identify the countries with the most promise to increase exports to BRICS. The authors selected 15 LDCs with prospects for trade development with BRICS – Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Tanzania, Zambia, Bhutan, Lesotho, Malawi and Solomon Islands. Among 34 other LDCs, the authors identify five clusters based on their economic structure, including the role played in their economies by official development assistance (ODA) and personal remittances. Clustering allows BRICS to provide targeted support to LDCs in order to increase their export potential through the most effective mechanisms for each economy.
{"title":"BRICS and Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Prospects for Trade with Least Developed Countries","authors":"A. Morozkina, V. Skryabina","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-04","url":null,"abstract":"The informal BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is actively working to solve the most acute global problems. This is why opportunities for implementing the sustainable development goals (SDGs) at BRICS summits is a topic for urgent research. This article discusses the prospects for achieving SDG 17.11 by the least developed countries (LDCs) in the framework of mutual trade with BRICS. SDG 17.11, unlike other goals, was expected to be achieved in 2020, but World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates for 2018 showed that progress was too slow. Against the sharp drop in international trade in 2020 due to economic shutdowns, the implementation of this goal is especially high on the agenda. This article describes the current implementation of the SDG by BRICS. A general analysis of mutual trade between LDCs and BRICS shows the low involvement of least developed countries in trade with BRICS. The methodology for the study involves computations of two trade indices and the identification of new clusters of LDCs. The export propensity index and trade intensity index are calculated in order to identify the countries with the most promise to increase exports to BRICS. The authors selected 15 LDCs with prospects for trade development with BRICS – Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Tanzania, Zambia, Bhutan, Lesotho, Malawi and Solomon Islands. Among 34 other LDCs, the authors identify five clusters based on their economic structure, including the role played in their economies by official development assistance (ODA) and personal remittances. Clustering allows BRICS to provide targeted support to LDCs in order to increase their export potential through the most effective mechanisms for each economy.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45372375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-06
I. Popova
Digitalization is one of the dominant processes in contemporary economic development, both on the national level and globally. The process of articulating and implementing digital economy policies is underway in the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and in 2017 the EAEU Strategic Directions for the Development of the Digital Agenda Until 2025 were adopted. Identifying the specificities and challenges of the digital agenda’s implementation in the context of integration processes in the region is the aim of this article. The study focuses on the interaction at the supranational level of decision-making within EAEU institutions, as well as the interaction of the national and supranational levels. The author concludes that the projects and initiatives are being implemented as a part of the agenda, albeit slowly. The other envisaged mechanisms require a much higher level of harmonization, for which EAEU leaders are not yet ready. The main features of the digital agenda’s implementation in the EAEU are the primacy of sovereignty, diverging levels of digitalization of members in both access to infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, project-based approaches to implementation, absence of a digital agenda in the EAEU Treaty and involvement of expert communities. Based on analysis of the legal and regulatory framework, the following recommendations can be made: an institutional and legal framework for the digital agenda should be established, coordination between the national and supranational levels should be improved, digital strategies should be adopted and synchronized in all member states, the selection and implementation of initiatives should be improved, best practices should be adopted, and cooperation with international organizations and theEuropean Union (EU) should be developed. For Russia, the development of a digital agenda within the EAEU and deepened integration (or development of cooperation) are necessary to ensure the realization of national interests in a priority region—the post-Soviet space—especially given the increasingly active developing regulatory influence of other actors, primarily the EU. Given the growing importance of digitalization as a driver of economic growth and the increasing competition for influence on the regulation of the digital economy, a priority for the Russian Federation should be to resolve the contradiction between the principle of primacy of sovereignty and the development of integration. A possible way out could be an approach based on ‘multi-speed integration,’ as tested in the EU. Another option could be a complete revision of the model of interaction with neighbours in the region.
{"title":"The Challenges of Implementing the EAEU’s Digital Agenda","authors":"I. Popova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-06","url":null,"abstract":"Digitalization is one of the dominant processes in contemporary economic development, both on the national level and globally. The process of articulating and implementing digital economy policies is underway in the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and in 2017 the EAEU Strategic Directions for the Development of the Digital Agenda Until 2025 were adopted. Identifying the specificities and challenges of the digital agenda’s implementation in the context of integration processes in the region is the aim of this article. The study focuses on the interaction at the supranational level of decision-making within EAEU institutions, as well as the interaction of the national and supranational levels. The author concludes that the projects and initiatives are being implemented as a part of the agenda, albeit slowly. The other envisaged mechanisms require a much higher level of harmonization, for which EAEU leaders are not yet ready. The main features of the digital agenda’s implementation in the EAEU are the primacy of sovereignty, diverging levels of digitalization of members in both access to infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, project-based approaches to implementation, absence of a digital agenda in the EAEU Treaty and involvement of expert communities. Based on analysis of the legal and regulatory framework, the following recommendations can be made: an institutional and legal framework for the digital agenda should be established, coordination between the national and supranational levels should be improved, digital strategies should be adopted and synchronized in all member states, the selection and implementation of initiatives should be improved, best practices should be adopted, and cooperation with international organizations and theEuropean Union (EU) should be developed. For Russia, the development of a digital agenda within the EAEU and deepened integration (or development of cooperation) are necessary to ensure the realization of national interests in a priority region—the post-Soviet space—especially given the increasingly active developing regulatory influence of other actors, primarily the EU. Given the growing importance of digitalization as a driver of economic growth and the increasing competition for influence on the regulation of the digital economy, a priority for the Russian Federation should be to resolve the contradiction between the principle of primacy of sovereignty and the development of integration. A possible way out could be an approach based on ‘multi-speed integration,’ as tested in the EU. Another option could be a complete revision of the model of interaction with neighbours in the region.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46882323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-09
I. Safranchuk, V. Zhornist, Alexander Nesmashnyy
This article reviews the key topics and debates in Hegemony and World Order: Reimagining Power in Global Politics(Routledge, 2020), edited by P. Dutkiewicz, T. Casier, J. A. Scholte. The volume covers several issues related to hegemony in contemporary politics from neo-liberal, realist, constructivist, neo-Gramscian, world-systems and postcolonial theoretical perspectives. The concept of “complex hegemony,” briefly evaluated in this review, and the analysis of the recent stage of globalization presented in the volume offer meaningful contributions to the theoretical debates. From a more practical perspective, Hegemony and World Order dwells on the future of world order and the prospects for alternative hegemonic projects, including those sponsored by China and Russia. Additionally, the hegemony of non-state actors in global governance is studied in detail. The review considers the ability of the leading states to execute complex hegemony and discuss the demand for hegemony in the context of the transformation of world order.
本文回顾了P. Dutkiewicz、T. Casier、J. A. Scholte主编的《霸权与世界秩序:重新构想全球政治中的权力》(Routledge, 2020)一书中的关键话题和争论。该卷涵盖了从新自由主义,现实主义,建构主义,新葛兰西,世界体系和后殖民理论角度与当代政治霸权有关的几个问题。在这篇评论中简要评价的“复杂霸权”概念,以及卷中提出的对全球化最新阶段的分析,为理论辩论提供了有意义的贡献。《霸权与世界秩序》一书从更现实的角度探讨了世界秩序的未来以及其他霸权计划的前景,包括中国和俄罗斯发起的霸权计划。此外,还详细研究了非国家行为体在全球治理中的霸权。本文考察了主要国家执行复杂霸权的能力,并讨论了世界秩序转型背景下的霸权需求。
{"title":"Hegemony and World Order: an overview of the concept “Hegemony as Complexity”","authors":"I. Safranchuk, V. Zhornist, Alexander Nesmashnyy","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-09","url":null,"abstract":"This article reviews the key topics and debates in Hegemony and World Order: Reimagining Power in Global Politics(Routledge, 2020), edited by P. Dutkiewicz, T. Casier, J. A. Scholte. The volume covers several issues related to hegemony in contemporary politics from neo-liberal, realist, constructivist, neo-Gramscian, world-systems and postcolonial theoretical perspectives. The concept of “complex hegemony,” briefly evaluated in this review, and the analysis of the recent stage of globalization presented in the volume offer meaningful contributions to the theoretical debates. From a more practical perspective, Hegemony and World Order dwells on the future of world order and the prospects for alternative hegemonic projects, including those sponsored by China and Russia. Additionally, the hegemony of non-state actors in global governance is studied in detail. The review considers the ability of the leading states to execute complex hegemony and discuss the demand for hegemony in the context of the transformation of world order.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41622079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-05
Fan Xuesong
Central Asia is extremely important for the security of Russia, China and the Eurasian region, both historically and at present. Unconventional security challenges, led by terrorism, extremism and separatism, which in the official Chinese rhetoric and official documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are designated as the ‘three forces of evil,’ pose a serious challenge to the security of China, Russia, the countries of Central Asia and Eurasia in general. Over the 20 years of the SCO’s history, proceeding from their ‘Shanghai spirit,’ the participating countries have created unique legislative and organizational mechanisms for a joint strike against the ‘three forces of evil,’ as well as mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral antiterrorist exercises. The most important of these is the Peace Mission joint exercise, which has been regularly held since 2005. These mechanisms of cooperation within the SCO embody the spirit of solidarity, mutual trust and cooperation, reflect the ability of the members of the organization to jointly counter the ‘three forces of evil’ and respond to related problems, and also symbolize the SCO’s determination to protect stability in the region and peace in the world. The organization has made a significant contribution to ensuring security in the region. Nevertheless, in the face of existing problems and new challenges such as potential competition and disagreements within the organization, problems with new members after the expansion of the membership, and also the ineffective functioning of some of the SCO’s security instruments, all SCO members need to strengthen their cooperation and open new ways for organizing the SCO to fulfil well its unique role to ensure security in the territory of SCO states and in Eurasia as a whole. The new model of relations—‘Russian-Chinese relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era’—that underlies the SCO gives the organization greater stability. The SCO is a unique organization on the territory of Eurasia and has both implemented an important innovation in the theory and practice of international relations and opened a new model of regional cooperation. Therefore, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that multilateral cooperation in the field of security will gradually deepen.
{"title":"Existing Mechanisms of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Their Problems Dealing With Non-traditional Security Challenges","authors":"Fan Xuesong","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-05","url":null,"abstract":"Central Asia is extremely important for the security of Russia, China and the Eurasian region, both historically and at present. Unconventional security challenges, led by terrorism, extremism and separatism, which in the official Chinese rhetoric and official documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are designated as the ‘three forces of evil,’ pose a serious challenge to the security of China, Russia, the countries of Central Asia and Eurasia in general. Over the 20 years of the SCO’s history, proceeding from their ‘Shanghai spirit,’ the participating countries have created unique legislative and organizational mechanisms for a joint strike against the ‘three forces of evil,’ as well as mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral antiterrorist exercises. The most important of these is the Peace Mission joint exercise, which has been regularly held since 2005. These mechanisms of cooperation within the SCO embody the spirit of solidarity, mutual trust and cooperation, reflect the ability of the members of the organization to jointly counter the ‘three forces of evil’ and respond to related problems, and also symbolize the SCO’s determination to protect stability in the region and peace in the world. The organization has made a significant contribution to ensuring security in the region. Nevertheless, in the face of existing problems and new challenges such as potential competition and disagreements within the organization, problems with new members after the expansion of the membership, and also the ineffective functioning of some of the SCO’s security instruments, all SCO members need to strengthen their cooperation and open new ways for organizing the SCO to fulfil well its unique role to ensure security in the territory of SCO states and in Eurasia as a whole. The new model of relations—‘Russian-Chinese relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era’—that underlies the SCO gives the organization greater stability. The SCO is a unique organization on the territory of Eurasia and has both implemented an important innovation in the theory and practice of international relations and opened a new model of regional cooperation. Therefore, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that multilateral cooperation in the field of security will gradually deepen.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42204627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-02
M. Larionova, A. Shelepov
The role of information and communications technology (ICT), high-speed communication infrastructure, digital content and the digital economy is expected to grow in the post-pandemic society. Simultaneously, competition for digital technologies and solutions and the contest to influence norms, standards and regulatory mechanisms is escalating. The new regulatory mechanisms and approaches are concurrently being shaped in the key international institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.This article presents analysis of the current cooperation on issues of digital economy regulation within the main international institutions. The study aims to assess the influence of the existing and emerging regulatory mechanisms on the balance of power between the key international actors.This assessment of the emerging mechanisms’ impact on the balance of power among international actors indicates that advantages and leverage capabilities accruing from them are distributed unevenly. The advanced members of the OECD and the G20 gain significant advantages, and there is a risk that the new mechanisms will consolidate the balance of power embodied by the Bretton Woods system, which has successfully resisted decades-long endeavors for its reform.However, regulation of the digital economy is not yet built as an established order. A window of opportunity was opened in 2020, not only to implement the G20’s 2008 pledge to reform the international financial and economic architecture, but also to build a new digital economy governance system, ensuring thatemerging markets and developing countries have a voice in decision-making commensurate with their weight in the global economy.The article is structured in three parts. The introduction presents the research questions and objectives and describes the parameters of comparative analysis and influence assessment criteria. The second section reviews the emerging mechanisms and instruments and reflects on their influence on the balance of power. The third section puts forward conclusions and recommendations for enhancing the influence of emerging markets and developing countries on the shaping and functioning of the emerging digital economy’s regulatory mechanisms.
{"title":"Emerging Regulation for the Digital Economy: Challenges and Opportunities for Multilateral Global Governance","authors":"M. Larionova, A. Shelepov","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-01-02","url":null,"abstract":"The role of information and communications technology (ICT), high-speed communication infrastructure, digital content and the digital economy is expected to grow in the post-pandemic society. Simultaneously, competition for digital technologies and solutions and the contest to influence norms, standards and regulatory mechanisms is escalating. The new regulatory mechanisms and approaches are concurrently being shaped in the key international institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.This article presents analysis of the current cooperation on issues of digital economy regulation within the main international institutions. The study aims to assess the influence of the existing and emerging regulatory mechanisms on the balance of power between the key international actors.This assessment of the emerging mechanisms’ impact on the balance of power among international actors indicates that advantages and leverage capabilities accruing from them are distributed unevenly. The advanced members of the OECD and the G20 gain significant advantages, and there is a risk that the new mechanisms will consolidate the balance of power embodied by the Bretton Woods system, which has successfully resisted decades-long endeavors for its reform.However, regulation of the digital economy is not yet built as an established order. A window of opportunity was opened in 2020, not only to implement the G20’s 2008 pledge to reform the international financial and economic architecture, but also to build a new digital economy governance system, ensuring thatemerging markets and developing countries have a voice in decision-making commensurate with their weight in the global economy.The article is structured in three parts. The introduction presents the research questions and objectives and describes the parameters of comparative analysis and influence assessment criteria. The second section reviews the emerging mechanisms and instruments and reflects on their influence on the balance of power. The third section puts forward conclusions and recommendations for enhancing the influence of emerging markets and developing countries on the shaping and functioning of the emerging digital economy’s regulatory mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46145214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}