Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-10
A. Portanskiy, Evgeniy Galchenko
This article begins with a brief discussion of the background of the USSR/Russia rapprochement with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) and some of the acute problems of the negotiation process. It is argued that the Russian Federation has received acceptable, balanced conditions of membership. The advantages gained during the first years of WTO membership are listed, both for the national economy and in the foreign arena. However, it is shown that, 10 years later, the benefits of membership are significantly lower in comparison with initial projections. This gap is attributed to the state of the Russian economy and the extinction of the continuing economic model based on the extraction and export of raw materials. The Russian economy needs real structural reforms and modernization, which would change the structure of exports in favour of finished products and modern services. Only in this case can the benefits of WTO membership increase significantly, justifying the original forecast. The article concludes with a discussion of current challenges in the world economy and trade, the crisis experienced by the WTO, and the active position of the Russian Federation on the future reform of the WTO.
{"title":"Ten Years Ago, the World Trade Organization Opened Its Doors to Russia","authors":"A. Portanskiy, Evgeniy Galchenko","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-10","url":null,"abstract":"This article begins with a brief discussion of the background of the USSR/Russia rapprochement with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) and some of the acute problems of the negotiation process. It is argued that the Russian Federation has received acceptable, balanced conditions of membership. The advantages gained during the first years of WTO membership are listed, both for the national economy and in the foreign arena. However, it is shown that, 10 years later, the benefits of membership are significantly lower in comparison with initial projections. This gap is attributed to the state of the Russian economy and the extinction of the continuing economic model based on the extraction and export of raw materials. The Russian economy needs real structural reforms and modernization, which would change the structure of exports in favour of finished products and modern services. Only in this case can the benefits of WTO membership increase significantly, justifying the original forecast. The article concludes with a discussion of current challenges in the world economy and trade, the crisis experienced by the WTO, and the active position of the Russian Federation on the future reform of the WTO.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46972519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-04
Marco Siddi
In this article the main aspects of the European Green Deal proposed by the European Commission in December 2019 are analyzed, putting the Green Deal into the broader context of European Union (EU) climate governance in order to assess whether and how it advances the EU’s climate agenda. Four broad and interrelated categories to evaluate the Green Deal are proposed. Its performance depends on whether it is and will remain a policy priority, despite the COVID-19 emergency and the ensuing economic crisis. Second, successful implementation depends on adequate financial endowment, including the shift of public funding from hydrocarbons to renewables and energy efficiency in post-pandemic economic programmes. The legal competence of EU institutions to coordinate and enforce the implementation of the Green Deal is also essential, as highlighted by ongoing discussions concerning governance to achieve zero net emissions by 2050. Furthermore, international cooperation with third partners on issues such as border carbon adjustment, technology transfers, and green industry will influence both the implementation of the Green Deal in the EU and the contribution of other major emitters to the climate agenda. The impact of the European Green Deal on EU-Russia relations is also investigated. In this respect, it is argued that the Green Deal poses a serious challenge to the traditional pattern of EU-Russia energy trade, which has been dominated by fossil fuels. However, the Green Deal also offers new avenues for cooperation and for a more sustainable EU-Russia energy relationship.
{"title":"A Green Revolution? A Tentative Assessment of the European Green Deal","authors":"Marco Siddi","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-04","url":null,"abstract":"In this article the main aspects of the European Green Deal proposed by the European Commission in December 2019 are analyzed, putting the Green Deal into the broader context of European Union (EU) climate governance in order to assess whether and how it advances the EU’s climate agenda. Four broad and interrelated categories to evaluate the Green Deal are proposed. Its performance depends on whether it is and will remain a policy priority, despite the COVID-19 emergency and the ensuing economic crisis. Second, successful implementation depends on adequate financial endowment, including the shift of public funding from hydrocarbons to renewables and energy efficiency in post-pandemic economic programmes. The legal competence of EU institutions to coordinate and enforce the implementation of the Green Deal is also essential, as highlighted by ongoing discussions concerning governance to achieve zero net emissions by 2050. Furthermore, international cooperation with third partners on issues such as border carbon adjustment, technology transfers, and green industry will influence both the implementation of the Green Deal in the EU and the contribution of other major emitters to the climate agenda. The impact of the European Green Deal on EU-Russia relations is also investigated. In this respect, it is argued that the Green Deal poses a serious challenge to the traditional pattern of EU-Russia energy trade, which has been dominated by fossil fuels. However, the Green Deal also offers new avenues for cooperation and for a more sustainable EU-Russia energy relationship.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44646477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-09
M. Bratersky, A. Skriba, Arina Sapogova
In this article, the prospects or changing the status of unrecognized states in Greater Eurasia are analyzed. Status and recognition are close but distinct categories in international relations (IR) theory and international law. Status defines a state’s rank in the hierarchical international system. Recognition is a different category; legally, it defines whether other states recognize a particular state as fully established and sovereign. Sovereignty is a third category related to the issue of recognition but not equal to it since it includes internal and external (international) sovereignty. There are examples of sovereign states that effectively control their territories and collect taxes, but which are not recognized as sovereign by other states. The analysis in this article focuses on whether an unrecognized state can strengthen its status and improve its position in the international system. It is argued that this is possible, and that the absence of international recognition should not be regarded as an unsurpassable impediment to the economic development of the country.
{"title":"The Struggle for Recognition or Enhancement of Satus: Conditions for the Stability and Development of Unrecognized States Using the Example of Eurasia","authors":"M. Bratersky, A. Skriba, Arina Sapogova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-09","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the prospects or changing the status of unrecognized states in Greater Eurasia are analyzed. Status and recognition are close but distinct categories in international relations (IR) theory and international law. Status defines a state’s rank in the hierarchical international system. Recognition is a different category; legally, it defines whether other states recognize a particular state as fully established and sovereign. Sovereignty is a third category related to the issue of recognition but not equal to it since it includes internal and external (international) sovereignty. There are examples of sovereign states that effectively control their territories and collect taxes, but which are not recognized as sovereign by other states. The analysis in this article focuses on whether an unrecognized state can strengthen its status and improve its position in the international system. It is argued that this is possible, and that the absence of international recognition should not be regarded as an unsurpassable impediment to the economic development of the country.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46732204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-06
M. Larionova
The European Union (EU) aspires to become a global climate power. Climate neutrality became the guiding principle, the goal, and the pillar of the EU’s external policy after the Green Deal endorsement. The Green Deal is internationalized through a system of external policy instruments, including financial, trade and investment mechanisms, carbon border adjustment and emission trading, agreements with other countries, development support, and promotion of the EU’s regulation and standards through cooperation in international institutions. The normative documents and proposals on the key initiatives have been put forward, and the formats and plans for implementation are being discussed and defined. In this context, it is important to analyze the EU’s initiatives for internationalization of green transformation goals and to identify risks and opportunities related to their implementation. This article reviews the array of external policy instruments and initiatives deployed by the EU: the new trade policy of “open strategic autonomy” and the initiative on trade and sustainable development in the World Trade Organization (WTO); the framework for the screening of foreign direct investments and the taxonomy of environmentally sustainable investment and economic activity; new approaches to energy security and the building of global energy markets, including norms and standards for hydrogen markets; and the new neighbourhood policy, including the new strategy for Central Asia and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. Given the initial stage of the initiative’s implementation, the study focuses on the adopted documents and planned actions. The author assesses the potential impact of climate policy internationalization instruments on EU-Russia economic cooperation and on EU leadership in shaping global climate governance. The author asserts that a number of instruments bear risks for the Russian Federation’s economic projects and proposes recommendations for abating them. With regard to global governance, the EU’s commitment to integrate climate goals into the global agenda may serve as a bridge for inclusive governance. At the same time, the EU’s determination to impose its priorities through carrot and stick incentives, including through economic measures, on partners not sharing the EU’s approach may be destructive. The author concludes that the EU’s capacity to build constructive engagement with partners will be a test of the EU’s real leadership. Given that the Green Deal’s external dimension is intended not only to promote EU priorities and values, but also to advance the global public good, controversies arise with regard to the instruments, not the goals. Thus, it is in the interests of Russia, as well as other partners directly affected, not to oppose the export of the EU’s climate policy, but to cooperate to mitigate unintended consequences of its deployment and to shape inclusive global governance.
{"title":"The EU’s Policies for the Green Deal Internationalization","authors":"M. Larionova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-06","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) aspires to become a global climate power. Climate neutrality became the guiding principle, the goal, and the pillar of the EU’s external policy after the Green Deal endorsement. The Green Deal is internationalized through a system of external policy instruments, including financial, trade and investment mechanisms, carbon border adjustment and emission trading, agreements with other countries, development support, and promotion of the EU’s regulation and standards through cooperation in international institutions. The normative documents and proposals on the key initiatives have been put forward, and the formats and plans for implementation are being discussed and defined. In this context, it is important to analyze the EU’s initiatives for internationalization of green transformation goals and to identify risks and opportunities related to their implementation. This article reviews the array of external policy instruments and initiatives deployed by the EU: the new trade policy of “open strategic autonomy” and the initiative on trade and sustainable development in the World Trade Organization (WTO); the framework for the screening of foreign direct investments and the taxonomy of environmentally sustainable investment and economic activity; new approaches to energy security and the building of global energy markets, including norms and standards for hydrogen markets; and the new neighbourhood policy, including the new strategy for Central Asia and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. Given the initial stage of the initiative’s implementation, the study focuses on the adopted documents and planned actions. The author assesses the potential impact of climate policy internationalization instruments on EU-Russia economic cooperation and on EU leadership in shaping global climate governance. The author asserts that a number of instruments bear risks for the Russian Federation’s economic projects and proposes recommendations for abating them. With regard to global governance, the EU’s commitment to integrate climate goals into the global agenda may serve as a bridge for inclusive governance. At the same time, the EU’s determination to impose its priorities through carrot and stick incentives, including through economic measures, on partners not sharing the EU’s approach may be destructive. The author concludes that the EU’s capacity to build constructive engagement with partners will be a test of the EU’s real leadership. Given that the Green Deal’s external dimension is intended not only to promote EU priorities and values, but also to advance the global public good, controversies arise with regard to the instruments, not the goals. Thus, it is in the interests of Russia, as well as other partners directly affected, not to oppose the export of the EU’s climate policy, but to cooperate to mitigate unintended consequences of its deployment and to shape inclusive global governance.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44268203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-12
I. Popova
The European Union (EU) is trying to increase its influence on the international regulation of the digital economy through domestic and foreign policy initiatives. The EU’s digital strategy, adopted in 2020, envisages measures to further consolidate the single digital market and promote EU standards and regulation internationally. The main goal of the strategy is to ensure the EU’s digital sovereignty. This objective is at the core of policy measures in three priority areas: the elimination of remaining barriers in the internal market, the development of advanced technologies, and the safeguarding of the rights, freedoms and development of democracy in Europe. These three strategic priorities determine sectoral policies: 5/6G development, high performing computers, regulation of digital markets and platforms, cybersecurity, and data governance. The EU uses regulatory, economic, institutional, networking, and foreign policy instruments and mechanisms to achieve its objectives in specific policy areas. Regulation includes further raising standards for personal data protection and consumer rights, control over digital platforms, laying down a legal framework for the development of cutting-edge technologies, attracting investments, and allocating the EU’s own resources to potentially occupy niches in international markets in the future, all of which will strengthen the EU’s claim to leadership in regulating the digital economy and ensure its digital sovereignty. Foreign policy mechanisms are an important part of the toolkit and include a developed European diplomacy, established ties through the Neighbourhood Policy, and the conditionality of development aid.
{"title":"The European Union’s Toolkit for the Regulation of the Digital Economy (analytical review)","authors":"I. Popova","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-12","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) is trying to increase its influence on the international regulation of the digital economy through domestic and foreign policy initiatives. The EU’s digital strategy, adopted in 2020, envisages measures to further consolidate the single digital market and promote EU standards and regulation internationally. The main goal of the strategy is to ensure the EU’s digital sovereignty. This objective is at the core of policy measures in three priority areas: the elimination of remaining barriers in the internal market, the development of advanced technologies, and the safeguarding of the rights, freedoms and development of democracy in Europe. These three strategic priorities determine sectoral policies: 5/6G development, high performing computers, regulation of digital markets and platforms, cybersecurity, and data governance. The EU uses regulatory, economic, institutional, networking, and foreign policy instruments and mechanisms to achieve its objectives in specific policy areas. Regulation includes further raising standards for personal data protection and consumer rights, control over digital platforms, laying down a legal framework for the development of cutting-edge technologies, attracting investments, and allocating the EU’s own resources to potentially occupy niches in international markets in the future, all of which will strengthen the EU’s claim to leadership in regulating the digital economy and ensure its digital sovereignty. Foreign policy mechanisms are an important part of the toolkit and include a developed European diplomacy, established ties through the Neighbourhood Policy, and the conditionality of development aid.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48506760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-08
H. Khan, Siti Rahyla Rahmat
The study examines the dynamic relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, economic growth, and environmental degradation and investigates the long-run validity of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) for selected Asian countries over the period 1990–2019. Additionally, this study aims to discover the longrun impact of energy consumption, globalization, and population density on environmental degradation by employing a panel cointegration approach, fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS), and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS). The findings provide clear evidence of the existence of EKC and PHH in Asian countries for the period 1990–2019 in the long run. The findings reveal that economic growth has a highly significant and positive role in depleting environmental quality, but this effect gets reversed in the long run as, after a certain turning point, economic growth increases, and the quality of the environment gets better. Moreover, FDI inflows and energy consumption have a positive long-run impact on CO2 emissions, thus contributing to environmental degradation. The study recommends that governments and policymakers should strategically devise and implement CO2 reduction policies, such as carbon pricing, to encourage economic growth and to improve the quality of the environment, with the ultimate goal being to achieve sustainable development. Moreover, the use of cleaner energy should be promoted, and innovations and technological developments should be encouraged for hydropower, wind power, solar energy and other facilities around the world.
{"title":"Investigating the Dynamic Impact of FDI Inflows and Economic Growth on Environmental Degradation: Evidence From FMOLS and DOLS for Selected Asian Countries","authors":"H. Khan, Siti Rahyla Rahmat","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-03-08","url":null,"abstract":"The study examines the dynamic relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, economic growth, and environmental degradation and investigates the long-run validity of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) for selected Asian countries over the period 1990–2019. Additionally, this study aims to discover the longrun impact of energy consumption, globalization, and population density on environmental degradation by employing a panel cointegration approach, fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS), and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS). The findings provide clear evidence of the existence of EKC and PHH in Asian countries for the period 1990–2019 in the long run. The findings reveal that economic growth has a highly significant and positive role in depleting environmental quality, but this effect gets reversed in the long run as, after a certain turning point, economic growth increases, and the quality of the environment gets better. Moreover, FDI inflows and energy consumption have a positive long-run impact on CO2 emissions, thus contributing to environmental degradation. The study recommends that governments and policymakers should strategically devise and implement CO2 reduction policies, such as carbon pricing, to encourage economic growth and to improve the quality of the environment, with the ultimate goal being to achieve sustainable development. Moreover, the use of cleaner energy should be promoted, and innovations and technological developments should be encouraged for hydropower, wind power, solar energy and other facilities around the world.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45331785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-03
J. Kirton, Brittaney Warren
How well and why have Group of 20 (G20) summits advanced Agenda 2030’s sustainable development goals (SDGs) in a synergistic way, with climate change and digitization at the core? An answer to this urgent, indeed existential, question comes from a systematic analysis of G20 summit governance of the SDGs, climate change and digitization to assess the ambition and appropriateness of advances within each pillar and the synergistic links among them. This analysis examines G20 governance of the SDGs, sustainable development, climate change and digitization across the major dimensions of performance and evaluates how performance has changed and become synergistic with the advent of the SDGs in 2015 and the shock of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020. The latter has shown the need to prevent global ecological crises and spurred the digitization of the economy, society and health. Yet, G20 summit governance has largely remained in separate silos, doing little to use the digital revolution to address climate change or reach the SDGs. This highlights the need for G20 leaders to forge links at their future summits by mainstreaming the SDGs and mobilizing the digital revolution and climate action for future health and well-being.
{"title":"From Silos to Synergies: G20 Governance of the SDGs, Climate Change & Digitalization","authors":"J. Kirton, Brittaney Warren","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-03","url":null,"abstract":"How well and why have Group of 20 (G20) summits advanced Agenda 2030’s sustainable development goals (SDGs) in a synergistic way, with climate change and digitization at the core? An answer to this urgent, indeed existential, question comes from a systematic analysis of G20 summit governance of the SDGs, climate change and digitization to assess the ambition and appropriateness of advances within each pillar and the synergistic links among them. This analysis examines G20 governance of the SDGs, sustainable development, climate change and digitization across the major dimensions of performance and evaluates how performance has changed and become synergistic with the advent of the SDGs in 2015 and the shock of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020. The latter has shown the need to prevent global ecological crises and spurred the digitization of the economy, society and health. Yet, G20 summit governance has largely remained in separate silos, doing little to use the digital revolution to address climate change or reach the SDGs. This highlights the need for G20 leaders to forge links at their future summits by mainstreaming the SDGs and mobilizing the digital revolution and climate action for future health and well-being.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48779851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-06
Michael Motala
Over the past decade, international tax governance has evolved with bewildering speed in response to the challenges of digitalization and widespread corporate tax avoidance. Since the launch of the Group of 20 (G20)-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative in 2012, 135 countries and 14 international organizations have joined the BEPS Inclusive Framework, committing to implement new global standards on corporate tax, which has already been lauded as a revolution in the architecture of international tax law and policy. Even further expanding the scope of the OECD’s work on international taxation in a landmark announcement in March 2021, the U.S. administration further proposed imposing a global minimum corporate tax at a rate of 21% to be implemented through an international agreement by mid-2021. If the new OECD initiative is agreed, will the plan to implement a minimum corporate tax be fully implemented by G20 members, and if so, will it do enough to address the tax challenges of digitalization embodied in corporate tax arbitrage? Although the evidence suggests legislative and public policy compliance is likely to be high among G20 members, this article argues the minimum tax initiative is unlikely to go far enough to address deficiencies in global tax dispute resolution, which are extremely germane to the success of the proposed minimum tax. As explained in this article, U.S. leaders and global policymakers must enhance the mutual agreement procedure (MAP), a cornerstone of tax dispute resolution, given a growing body of tax litigation in investment law that threatens the implementation of BEPS 2.0. To do so, global policymakers must also reconcile the conflict of norms between tax sovereignty and investor protection contained in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) regime. Only by addressing the conflict between the principles of tax sovereignty and investor protection can they prevent a tidal wave of investor disputes that will challenge the implementation of the minimum tax through national tax laws.
{"title":"Tax Sovereignty and Investor Protection: Why the Proposed Global Minimum Tax Is not the Final Frontier for Corporate Tax Arbitrage","authors":"Michael Motala","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-06","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, international tax governance has evolved with bewildering speed in response to the challenges of digitalization and widespread corporate tax avoidance. Since the launch of the Group of 20 (G20)-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative in 2012, 135 countries and 14 international organizations have joined the BEPS Inclusive Framework, committing to implement new global standards on corporate tax, which has already been lauded as a revolution in the architecture of international tax law and policy. Even further expanding the scope of the OECD’s work on international taxation in a landmark announcement in March 2021, the U.S. administration further proposed imposing a global minimum corporate tax at a rate of 21% to be implemented through an international agreement by mid-2021. If the new OECD initiative is agreed, will the plan to implement a minimum corporate tax be fully implemented by G20 members, and if so, will it do enough to address the tax challenges of digitalization embodied in corporate tax arbitrage? Although the evidence suggests legislative and public policy compliance is likely to be high among G20 members, this article argues the minimum tax initiative is unlikely to go far enough to address deficiencies in global tax dispute resolution, which are extremely germane to the success of the proposed minimum tax. As explained in this article, U.S. leaders and global policymakers must enhance the mutual agreement procedure (MAP), a cornerstone of tax dispute resolution, given a growing body of tax litigation in investment law that threatens the implementation of BEPS 2.0. To do so, global policymakers must also reconcile the conflict of norms between tax sovereignty and investor protection contained in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) regime. Only by addressing the conflict between the principles of tax sovereignty and investor protection can they prevent a tidal wave of investor disputes that will challenge the implementation of the minimum tax through national tax laws.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49081056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-10
Mark Leonard, J. Pisani-Ferry, J. Shapiro, S. Tagliapietra, Guntram Wolf
The European Green Deal is a plan to decarbonise the EU economy by 2050, revolutionise the EU’s energy system, profoundly transform the economy and inspire efforts to combat climate change. But the plan will also have profound geopolitical repercussions. The Green Deal will affect geopolitics through its impact on the EU energy balance and global markets; on oil and gas-producing countries in the EU neighbourhood; on European energy security; and on global trade patterns, notably via the carbon border adjustment mechanism. At least some of these changes are likely to impact partner countries adversely. The EU needs to wake up to the consequences abroad of its domestic decisions. It should prepare to help manage the geopolitical aspects of the European Green Deal. Relationships with important neighbourhood countries such as Russia and Algeria, and with global players including the United States, China and Saudi Arabia, are central to this effort, which can be structured around seven actions: 1) Help neighbouring oil and gas-exporting countries manage the repercussions of the European Green Deal. The EU should engage with these countries to foster their economic diversification, including into renewable energy and green hydrogen that could in the future be exported to Europe; 2) Improve the security of critical raw materials supply and limit dependence, first and foremost on China. Essential measures include greater supply diversification, increased recycling volumes and substitution of critical materials; 3) Work with the US and other partners to establish a ‘climate club’ whose members will apply similar carbon border adjustment measures. All countries, including China, would be welcome to join if they commit to abide by the club's objectives and rules; 4) Become a global standard-setter for the energy transition, particularly in hydrogen and green bonds. Requiring compliance with strict environmental regulations as a condition to access the EU market will be strong encouragement to go green for all countries; 5) Internationalise the European Green Deal by mobilising the EU budget, the EU Recovery and Resilience Fund, and EU development policy; 6) Promote global coalitions for climate change mitigation, for example through a global coalition for the permafrost, which would fund measures to contain the permafrost thaw; 7) Promote a global platform on the new economics of climate action to share lessons learned and best practices.
{"title":"The geopolitics of the European Green Deal","authors":"Mark Leonard, J. Pisani-Ferry, J. Shapiro, S. Tagliapietra, Guntram Wolf","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-10","url":null,"abstract":"The European Green Deal is a plan to decarbonise the EU economy by 2050, revolutionise the EU’s energy system, profoundly transform the economy and inspire efforts to combat climate change. But the plan will also have profound geopolitical repercussions. The Green Deal will affect geopolitics through its impact on the EU energy balance and global markets; on oil and gas-producing countries in the EU neighbourhood; on European energy security; and on global trade patterns, notably via the carbon border adjustment mechanism. At least some of these changes are likely to impact partner countries adversely. The EU needs to wake up to the consequences abroad of its domestic decisions. It should prepare to help manage the geopolitical aspects of the European Green Deal. Relationships with important neighbourhood countries such as Russia and Algeria, and with global players including the United States, China and Saudi Arabia, are central to this effort, which can be structured around seven actions: 1) Help neighbouring oil and gas-exporting countries manage the repercussions of the European Green Deal. The EU should engage with these countries to foster their economic diversification, including into renewable energy and green hydrogen that could in the future be exported to Europe; 2) Improve the security of critical raw materials supply and limit dependence, first and foremost on China. Essential measures include greater supply diversification, increased recycling volumes and substitution of critical materials; 3) Work with the US and other partners to establish a ‘climate club’ whose members will apply similar carbon border adjustment measures. All countries, including China, would be welcome to join if they commit to abide by the club's objectives and rules; 4) Become a global standard-setter for the energy transition, particularly in hydrogen and green bonds. Requiring compliance with strict environmental regulations as a condition to access the EU market will be strong encouragement to go green for all countries; 5) Internationalise the European Green Deal by mobilising the EU budget, the EU Recovery and Resilience Fund, and EU development policy; 6) Promote global coalitions for climate change mitigation, for example through a global coalition for the permafrost, which would fund measures to contain the permafrost thaw; 7) Promote a global platform on the new economics of climate action to share lessons learned and best practices.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44799856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-09
V. Zuev, E. Ostrovskaya, E. Vasilyeva
n the last decades, the importance of trade in services in global trade flows has grown from strength to strength. This trend has stimulated the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements aimed at ensuring equal and fair access for service providers to foreign markets. The states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are no exceptions to this global trend and strive to ensure free trade in services with foreign partners as a part of trade policies. This article analyzes theoretical and practical aspects of implementing the provisions on trade in services of the free trade agreement (FTA) between the EAEU and Vietnam, specifically applied to Russia and Vietnam. The results of the agreement’s implementation are instrumental in formulating the main contributions of the strategy that will increase the efficiency of future agreements on trade in services between the EAEU and foreign partners. The following strategy has already been applied to the example of service sector cooperation between Russia and Singapore. The emphasis of the study is quite universal, and the contributions of the strategy are applicable to other regional associations.
{"title":"The Trade Service Agreement Between Vietnam and the EAEU and the Formation of Negotiation Strategies on New Agreements in the Service Sector: The First Results","authors":"V. Zuev, E. Ostrovskaya, E. Vasilyeva","doi":"10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-02-09","url":null,"abstract":"n the last decades, the importance of trade in services in global trade flows has grown from strength to strength. This trend has stimulated the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements aimed at ensuring equal and fair access for service providers to foreign markets. The states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are no exceptions to this global trend and strive to ensure free trade in services with foreign partners as a part of trade policies. This article analyzes theoretical and practical aspects of implementing the provisions on trade in services of the free trade agreement (FTA) between the EAEU and Vietnam, specifically applied to Russia and Vietnam. The results of the agreement’s implementation are instrumental in formulating the main contributions of the strategy that will increase the efficiency of future agreements on trade in services between the EAEU and foreign partners. The following strategy has already been applied to the example of service sector cooperation between Russia and Singapore. The emphasis of the study is quite universal, and the contributions of the strategy are applicable to other regional associations.","PeriodicalId":42976,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsii-International Organisations Research Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48284446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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