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The Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism 反对永恒主义的超越现象学论证
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0045
László Bernáth, D. Inan
Abstract In this paper, we argue against eternalism on the basis of certain phenomenological considerations regarding our experiential life in a relatively novel way. Contrary to well-known phenomenological arguments that attempt to refute tenseless theories of time, our argument that we call the Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism is against both tenseless and tensed versions of eternalism. The argument is based on the fact that one experiences a phenomenological succession of experiences, and it shows that perdurantist forms of eternalism have to either deny this fact or should embrace ad hoc and metaphysically implausible assumptions about the nature of the mind. As we argue, neither of these options seems to be too promising.
在本文中,我们以一种相对新颖的方式,基于对我们经验生活的某些现象学思考来反对永恒论。与试图反驳无时态时间理论的著名现象学论证相反,我们的论证,我们称之为反对永恒论的先验现象学论证,既反对永恒论的无时态版本,也反对永恒论的紧张版本。这个论点是基于这样一个事实,即一个人经历了一系列现象学上的经历,它表明,永恒主义的持久形式要么否认这一事实,要么应该接受关于心灵本质的临时和形而上学上不可信的假设。正如我们所说,这两种选择似乎都不太有希望。
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引用次数: 0
Why is Presentism Intuitive? 为什么呈现主义是直觉的?
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0011
Ernesto Graziani
Abstract Presentism is, roughly, the ontological view that only the present exists. Among the philosophers engaged in the metaphysics of time there is wide agreement that presentism is intuitive (or commonsensical) and that its intuitiveness counts as evidence in its favour. My contribution has two purposes: first, defending the view that presentism is intuitive from some recent criticisms; second, putting forth a genealogical (or debunking) argument aimed at depriving presentism’s intuitiveness of the evidential value commonly granted to it.
抽象存在论大致上是一种本体论观点,认为只有当下才存在。在从事时间形而上学的哲学家中,人们普遍认为存在论是直观的(或常识性的),它的直觉性是对它有利的证据。我的贡献有两个目的:第一,从最近的一些批评中捍卫存在主义是直观的观点;其次,提出了一个系谱论(或揭穿)论点,旨在剥夺呈现主义的直觉性通常赋予它的证据价值。
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引用次数: 0
A Mereological Study of Lowe’s Constituting Parthood Theory Lowe构形单亲理论的心理学研究
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0023
G. Sciacca
Abstract Late Lowe’s metaphysics of material objects is an interesting multi-thingist theory that still attracts interest from various authors. The core idea is that if x materially constitutes y, the x is a proper part of y. I discuss some mereological issues that arise from the approach and propose a revision of the mereology associated. Particularly, I examine the tenability of a number of supplementation principles and conclude that just one may serve the theory adequately. Still, the endorsement of such a principle does not come for free. Successively, I address the derivability of an important extensionality theorem and conclude that the theorem must be taken as an axiom in the mereology at stake. Lastly, I discuss two notable definitions of mereological fusions to assess which one best suits the present theory. The result is that authors sharing Lowe’s multi-thingist conception of material objects can still enjoy a moderately strong mereology.
摘要晚期洛的物质对象形而上学是一种有趣的多物主义理论,至今仍吸引着众多作者的兴趣。核心思想是,如果x实质上构成y,则x是y的适当部分。我讨论了该方法产生的一些语汇学问题,并提出了对相关语汇学的修订。特别是,我研究了一些补充原则的成立性,并得出结论,只有一个可以充分地为理论服务。尽管如此,对这一原则的认可并不是免费的。接下来,我讨论了一个重要的可拓性定理的可导性,并得出结论,该定理必须被视为关系到语义的公理。最后,我讨论了语汇融合的两个显著定义,以评估哪一个最适合目前的理论。其结果是,分享Lowe关于物质对象的多物主义概念的作者仍然可以享受到适度强烈的修辞。
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引用次数: 0
A Modal Contextualist Account of Essentialist Claims as a Response to Kit Fine 对本质主义主张的模态语境主义解释——对Kit Fine的回应
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-18 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0001
Cristina Nencha
Abstract Kit Fine advanced a remarkable objection to the Modal Account of Essentialism. Fine’s concern is commonly thought to have put the modal account in serious jeopardy. I believe that Fine’s objection is mainly based on two intuitions. As a reaction to Fine’s argument, while many scholars have abandoned the modal account, others have attempted to save it. The main strategy in the last direction consists in adding to the modal criterion a condition that is supposed to hold universally. For different reasons, this strategy ends up rejecting part of the first Fine’s intuition. I believe that a modal contextualist approach to essentialist claims, through the addition of a ‘particularist’ condition to the modal criterion, can provide an interesting alternative for those who wish to maintain a modal approach to essentialism. I will show that this approach, while rejecting the second Finean intuition, is able to account for his first intuition.
摘要Kit Fine对本质主义的模态解释提出了一个显著的反对意见。Fine的担忧通常被认为使模态解释处于严重的危险之中。我认为Fine的反对主要基于两种直觉。作为对Fine的论点的回应,虽然许多学者已经放弃了模态解释,但其他人试图挽救它。最后一个方向的主要策略是在模态判据中加入一个假定普遍成立的条件。由于不同的原因,这一策略最终否定了第一个费恩的部分直觉。我相信,对本质主义主张的模态语境主义方法,通过在模态标准中添加“特殊主义”条件,可以为那些希望保持对本质主义的模态方法的人提供一个有趣的选择。我将证明,这种方法在拒绝第二种直觉的同时,能够解释他的第一种直觉。
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引用次数: 0
Heraclitean Flux Metaphysics 赫拉克利特通量形而上学
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-05 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0028
A. D. Bassford
Abstract This essay offers an original interpretation and defense of the doctrine of flux, as it is presented in Plato’s Theaetetus. The methodology of the paper’s analysis is in the style of rational reconstruction, and it is highly analytic in scope, in the sense that I will focus on the text itself, and only on certain parts of it too, while ignoring the rest of Plato’s extensive corpus, and without worrying about whether, how, and to what extent the interpretation of the view coheres well with the other elements of the secret doctrine view discussed in the dialogue, as well. In the first part of the essay, I’ll offer my interpretation of the doctrine. Then, in the second part of the essay, I’ll examine two potential criticisms of the doctrine, including Socrates’s infamous linguistic paradox, and show how my interpretation of Heraclitean flux metaphysics is able to circumvent both.
摘要本文对柏拉图的《泰阿泰德》中提出的流变学说进行了原创性的解释和辩护。论文的方法论的分析是风格的理性重建,这是高度的分析范围,在这个意义上,我将专注于文本本身,也只有在某些地区,而忽略其他的柏拉图的大规模语料库,而不用担心是否,如何以及在多大程度上观点一致的解释与其他元素的秘密学说观点讨论的对话。在这篇文章的第一部分,我将提供我对这一学说的解释。然后,在这篇文章的第二部分,我将研究对这一学说的两种潜在批评,包括苏格拉底臭名昭著的语言悖论,并展示我对赫拉克利特流变形而上学的解释如何能够规避这两种批评。
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引用次数: 0
Frontmatter 头版头条
0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-frontmatter1
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引用次数: 0
Sentences Apparently About Composite Objects: True Even Without Composite Objects 关于复合宾语的句子:即使没有复合宾语也是如此
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-30 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0008
Savvas Ioannou
Abstract A compositional nihilist believes that the only objects that exist are simples. However, a non-nihilist believes in the existence of composite objects and challenges the nihilist to explain why there are true sentences about chairs, tables, etc., if composite objects do not exist. Different nihilist views have been suggested to explain this (the paraphrase strategy and the truthmaker theory), but I believe that they are unsuccessful (either they do not successfully paraphrase every sentence apparently about composite objects, or they are not precise about the truthmakers of those sentences). I will suggest that a new truthmaker theory, which uses resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy, can give such an explanation and does not face the problems of other theories. Therefore, we have a good reason to accept this truthmaker theory as the best nihilist way to accommodate sentences apparently about composite objects.
构图虚无主义者认为唯一存在的对象是简单的。然而,非虚无主义者相信复合物体的存在,并挑战虚无主义者解释,如果复合物体不存在,为什么会有关于椅子、桌子等的真句。人们提出了不同的虚无主义观点来解释这一点(意译策略和真理制造者理论),但我认为他们是不成功的(要么他们没有成功地意译每一个关于复合物体的句子,要么他们没有准确地说明这些句子的真理制造者)。我将提出一种新的truthmaker理论,它利用了Cameron的truthmaker理论和van Inwagen的释义策略的资源,可以给出这样的解释,并且不会面临其他理论的问题。因此,我们有一个很好的理由接受这个造真者理论作为最好的虚无主义方式来容纳显然是关于复合对象的句子。
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引用次数: 0
A Defense on the Usefulness of ‘Big-G’ Grounding 为“大g”接地的有用性辩护
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-10-18 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0053
Markel Kortabarria
Abstract Contemporary metaphysics has undergone a change of perspective due to the irruption of Grounding in discussions of metaphysical dependence. Proponents argue that Grounding is the primitive relationship of determination underlying many of the traditionally posited idioms of metaphysical dependence. In a recent line of scepticism Jessica Wilson has argued that the inability of the notion to be informatively effective regarding substantial matters of metaphysical determination renders it useless in the face of theoretical work. To supply this lack of informativeness proponents must resort to the already available set of specific ‘small-g’ relations, which renders the formulation of ‘big-G’ Grounding pre-theoretically unmotivated. In response two motivations are said to remain: The priority and unity arguments. Wilson insists that neither of these motivations succeeds in establishing ‘big-G’ Grounding as theoretically useful. I argue that none of Wilson’s critiques succeeds in establishing eliminative scepticism.
摘要当代形而上学在讨论形而上学的依赖性时,由于“基础”的介入,经历了一场视角的转变。支持者认为,基础是决定的原始关系,是许多形而上学依赖的传统成语的基础。在最近的一系列怀疑主义中,杰西卡·威尔逊(Jessica Wilson)认为,概念在形而上学决定的实质性问题上无法提供有效的信息,这使得它在面对理论工作时毫无用处。为了弥补这种信息性的缺乏,支持者必须求助于已经可用的一组特定的“小g”关系,这使得“大g”基础的公式在理论之前没有动力。作为回应,据说仍然存在两个动机:优先和统一的论点。威尔逊坚持认为,这两种动机都不能证明“大g”基础理论在理论上是有用的。我认为威尔逊的批评没有一个成功地建立了排除怀疑主义。
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引用次数: 0
Ontology Generator 本体生成器
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-10-18 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0015
Alik Pelman
Abstract The paper proposes a simple method for constructing ontological theories—an ‘ontology generator’. It shows that such a generator manages to produce major existing ontological theories, e.g., Realism, Nominalism, Trope theory, Bundle theory, Perdurantism, Endurantism, Possibilism, Actualism and more. It thus turns out, surprisingly, that all these seemingly unrelated different ontological theories that were designed by thinkers hundreds of years apart, can all be generated using the same simple mechanism. Moreover, this same generator manages to produce entirely novel ontological theories, that fare no worse than existing ones in meeting the same common metaphysical challenges.
摘要本文提出了一种构造本体论的简单方法——“本体生成器”。它表明,这样一个生成器成功地产生了现有的主要本体论理论,如现实主义、名义主义、托普理论、捆绑理论、持久主义、极限主义、可能性主义、现实主义等等。因此,令人惊讶的是,所有这些看似无关的不同本体论理论,都是由相隔数百年的思想家设计的,都可以使用相同的简单机制产生。此外,同一个生成器成功地产生了全新的本体论理论,在应对同样常见的形而上学挑战方面,这些理论并不比现有理论差。
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引用次数: 0
Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects? 因果能力能导致它们的结果吗?
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0001
Andrea Raimondi
Abstract Causal Dispositionalism provides an account of causation based on an ontology of causal powers, properties with causal essence. According to the account, causation can be analysed in terms of the interaction of powers and its subsequent production of their effect. Recently, Baltimore, J. A. (2022. “Dispositionalism, Causation, and the Interaction Gap.” Erkenntnis 87: 677–92) has raised a challenge against two competing approaches, the compositional view (CV) and the mutual manifestation view (MMV), to explain what makes powers interactive – the interaction gap. In this paper, we raise the challenge of explaining what makes powers productive – the production gap. While Baltimore’s verdict is tentatively favouring (MMV), we find both approaches wanting. Our conclusion is that Causal Dispositionalists should take Baltimore’s and our critique seriously. Powers cannot cause their effects just by bearing the name “causal”. To deserve their names, more metaphysical details are needed.
摘要因果处置论提供了一种基于因果权力本体论的因果关系解释,具有因果本质的性质。根据这一说法,因果关系可以从权力的相互作用及其随后产生的效果来分析。最近,巴尔的摩,J.A.(2022。“处置论、因果关系和互动鸿沟”。Erkenntnis 87:677-92)对两种相互竞争的方法提出了挑战,即组成观(CV)和相互表现观(MMV),以解释权力互动的原因——互动鸿沟。在这篇论文中,我们提出了一个挑战,即解释是什么使权力具有生产力——生产差距。虽然巴尔的摩的判决暂时偏向(MMV),但我们发现这两种方法都不可取。我们的结论是,因果处置主义者应该认真对待巴尔的摩和我们的批评。权力不能仅仅以“因果”的名义造成其影响。要想名副其实,还需要更多形而上学的细节。
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引用次数: 0
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Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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