Abstract Within the metaphysics of quantity, the debate rages between Absolutism and Comparativism. In retrospect, Armstrong appears to be an absolutist, for he claims that magnitudes like being 1 kg in mass are intrinsic properties of particulars, in virtue of which relations like being twice as massive as hold. More importantly, his theory is an instance of what I call ‘Radical Absolutism’ (and the only on the market), for he does not merely argue that relations are grounded in magnitudes, but also (and quite admirably) tries to explain how they “flow from” (his words) the intrinsic features of magnitudes. The goal of the paper is not to support his theory, but to better understand why it fails, and why this must be of concern to contemporary absolutists.
{"title":"On Armstrong’s Radical Absolutism","authors":"Julien Tricard","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Within the metaphysics of quantity, the debate rages between Absolutism and Comparativism. In retrospect, Armstrong appears to be an absolutist, for he claims that magnitudes like being 1 kg in mass are intrinsic properties of particulars, in virtue of which relations like being twice as massive as hold. More importantly, his theory is an instance of what I call ‘Radical Absolutism’ (and the only on the market), for he does not merely argue that relations are grounded in magnitudes, but also (and quite admirably) tries to explain how they “flow from” (his words) the intrinsic features of magnitudes. The goal of the paper is not to support his theory, but to better understand why it fails, and why this must be of concern to contemporary absolutists.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"95 - 115"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48880936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Retraction of: Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection","authors":"Ekin Erkan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-2000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-2000","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43773205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This is a brief exploration of the notion of an objective fact. The form of objectivity at issue is distinct from epistemic objectivity or objectivity about truth. It is an ontological form of objectivity. Objective facts may obtain whether or not we know, believe or are aware of them. They depend upon objects, for example, on the properties that objects have or the relationships into which objects enter. Setting scepticism to one side, there is a perfectly mundane sense in which we may come to have knowledge or fail to have knowledge of such facts. We must perceive objective facts from a perspective, but this does not enter into the facts. Nor does the fact that we must describe facts using language mean that facts are language-dependent.
{"title":"Objective Facts","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This is a brief exploration of the notion of an objective fact. The form of objectivity at issue is distinct from epistemic objectivity or objectivity about truth. It is an ontological form of objectivity. Objective facts may obtain whether or not we know, believe or are aware of them. They depend upon objects, for example, on the properties that objects have or the relationships into which objects enter. Setting scepticism to one side, there is a perfectly mundane sense in which we may come to have knowledge or fail to have knowledge of such facts. We must perceive objective facts from a perspective, but this does not enter into the facts. Nor does the fact that we must describe facts using language mean that facts are language-dependent.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"117 - 121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44833536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution theory of persons explains the relationship between persons and their bodies. Baker’s theory can explain the ontological status of persons. However, her explanation of the distinction between persons and their bodies faces a problem. In this paper, first, I show that her account, in fact, does not amount to a real distinction between persons and their bodies. Then, by discussing the notion of ‘derivatively having property,’ I propose a notion of constitution which is compatible with the idea that persons and their bodies are, ontologically speaking, distinct entities. This notion of constitution helps us to avoid both the problem of too many minds and the problem of substance dualism.
{"title":"The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies","authors":"M. R. Tahmasbi","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution theory of persons explains the relationship between persons and their bodies. Baker’s theory can explain the ontological status of persons. However, her explanation of the distinction between persons and their bodies faces a problem. In this paper, first, I show that her account, in fact, does not amount to a real distinction between persons and their bodies. Then, by discussing the notion of ‘derivatively having property,’ I propose a notion of constitution which is compatible with the idea that persons and their bodies are, ontologically speaking, distinct entities. This notion of constitution helps us to avoid both the problem of too many minds and the problem of substance dualism.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"307 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41780362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.
{"title":"The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing","authors":"D. Goswick","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"73 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42153965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the various entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I seek to utilise the explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne within a specific metaphysical context, a ground-theoretic context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of grounding. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have a further reason to believe in the existence of God.
{"title":"Grounding and the Existence of God","authors":"J. Sijuwade","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the various entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I seek to utilise the explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne within a specific metaphysical context, a ground-theoretic context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of grounding. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have a further reason to believe in the existence of God.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"193 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46524329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.
{"title":"The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense","authors":"Mark Maller","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"37 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44362770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.
{"title":"A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism","authors":"O. Bondar","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"27 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49576084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I propose that constitution is a case of composition in which, for example, the lump of clay composes the statue. In other words, we can reduce constitution to composition. Composition does all of the work that we want from an account of constitution, and we do not need two separate relations. Along the way, I offer reasons to reject weak supplementation.
{"title":"Reducing Constitution to Composition","authors":"Catherine C. R. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I propose that constitution is a case of composition in which, for example, the lump of clay composes the statue. In other words, we can reduce constitution to composition. Composition does all of the work that we want from an account of constitution, and we do not need two separate relations. Along the way, I offer reasons to reject weak supplementation.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"81 - 94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43378149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Drawing from a Sellarsian realist-naturalist epistemology, we trace different levels of cognitive hierarchy procedures through which a representational system learns to update its own states and improve its ‘map-making’ capabilities from pre-conscious operations which modulate base-localization functions, to patterns of epistemic revision and integration at the conceptual and theoretical levels, producing a nomological double of its world. We show how ontological theorization becomes diachronically coordinated with and constrained by empirical science, and how the formal-quantitative kernel of scientific theories corresponds to qualitative-conceptual determinations at the structural level. Following Johanna Seibt’s characterization of ontology as a theory of categorial inference, we trace the preservation of inferential semantic structure across ontological theories in relation to model languages and provide provisional indications to coordinate Seibt’s account with a convergent realist assessment of systematic modeling, defining the epistemological conditions for articulating the preservation of formal structure in theories toward a limit-point of enquiry.
{"title":"Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection","authors":"Ekin Erkan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Drawing from a Sellarsian realist-naturalist epistemology, we trace different levels of cognitive hierarchy procedures through which a representational system learns to update its own states and improve its ‘map-making’ capabilities from pre-conscious operations which modulate base-localization functions, to patterns of epistemic revision and integration at the conceptual and theoretical levels, producing a nomological double of its world. We show how ontological theorization becomes diachronically coordinated with and constrained by empirical science, and how the formal-quantitative kernel of scientific theories corresponds to qualitative-conceptual determinations at the structural level. Following Johanna Seibt’s characterization of ontology as a theory of categorial inference, we trace the preservation of inferential semantic structure across ontological theories in relation to model languages and provide provisional indications to coordinate Seibt’s account with a convergent realist assessment of systematic modeling, defining the epistemological conditions for articulating the preservation of formal structure in theories toward a limit-point of enquiry.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44160986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}