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On Armstrong’s Radical Absolutism 论阿姆斯特朗的激进专制主义
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0039
Julien Tricard
Abstract Within the metaphysics of quantity, the debate rages between Absolutism and Comparativism. In retrospect, Armstrong appears to be an absolutist, for he claims that magnitudes like being 1 kg in mass are intrinsic properties of particulars, in virtue of which relations like being twice as massive as hold. More importantly, his theory is an instance of what I call ‘Radical Absolutism’ (and the only on the market), for he does not merely argue that relations are grounded in magnitudes, but also (and quite admirably) tries to explain how they “flow from” (his words) the intrinsic features of magnitudes. The goal of the paper is not to support his theory, but to better understand why it fails, and why this must be of concern to contemporary absolutists.
摘要在数量形而上学中,绝对主义和比较主义之间的争论愈演愈烈。回想起来,阿姆斯特朗似乎是一个绝对主义者,因为他声称质量为1公斤这样的震级是细节的内在性质,因此质量是其两倍这样的关系成立。更重要的是,他的理论是我所说的“激进绝对主义”的一个例子(也是市场上唯一的理论),因为他不仅认为关系是以数量为基础的,而且(非常令人钦佩)试图解释它们是如何“从”(他的话)数量的内在特征“流出来的”。本文的目的不是支持他的理论,而是更好地理解为什么它失败了,以及为什么这必须引起当代专制主义者的关注。
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引用次数: 0
Retraction of: Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection 塞布特的范畴推理过程本体论——论法理化与范畴投射
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-23 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-2000
Ekin Erkan
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引用次数: 0
Objective Facts 客观事实
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-22 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0042
H. Sankey
Abstract This is a brief exploration of the notion of an objective fact. The form of objectivity at issue is distinct from epistemic objectivity or objectivity about truth. It is an ontological form of objectivity. Objective facts may obtain whether or not we know, believe or are aware of them. They depend upon objects, for example, on the properties that objects have or the relationships into which objects enter. Setting scepticism to one side, there is a perfectly mundane sense in which we may come to have knowledge or fail to have knowledge of such facts. We must perceive objective facts from a perspective, but this does not enter into the facts. Nor does the fact that we must describe facts using language mean that facts are language-dependent.
这是对客观事实概念的简要探讨。这里所讨论的客观性的形式不同于认识的客观性或关于真理的客观性。它是客观性的一种本体论形式。无论我们是否知道、是否相信、是否意识到,客观事实是可以获得的。它们依赖于对象,例如对象所具有的属性或对象所进入的关系。撇开怀疑主义不谈,有一种完全世俗的意义,在这种意义上,我们可以对这些事实有认识,也可以不认识。我们必须从一个角度来看待客观事实,但这并没有进入事实。我们必须用语言描述事实这一事实也不意味着事实依赖于语言。
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引用次数: 1
The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies 人与身体的本体论区别
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-22 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0018
M. R. Tahmasbi
Abstract Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution theory of persons explains the relationship between persons and their bodies. Baker’s theory can explain the ontological status of persons. However, her explanation of the distinction between persons and their bodies faces a problem. In this paper, first, I show that her account, in fact, does not amount to a real distinction between persons and their bodies. Then, by discussing the notion of ‘derivatively having property,’ I propose a notion of constitution which is compatible with the idea that persons and their bodies are, ontologically speaking, distinct entities. This notion of constitution helps us to avoid both the problem of too many minds and the problem of substance dualism.
林恩·鲁德尔·贝克的人格构成理论解释了人与身体的关系。贝克的理论可以解释人的本体论地位。然而,她对人和身体之间区别的解释面临一个问题。在这篇论文中,首先,我表明她的描述,事实上,并不等于一个真正的区分人与他们的身体。然后,通过讨论“衍生地拥有财产”的概念,我提出了一个宪法的概念,这个概念与个人和他们的身体在本体论上是不同的实体的观点是相容的。这个构成的概念帮助我们避免了太多思想的问题和物质二元论的问题。
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引用次数: 0
The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing 逻辑在形而上学理论化中的作用
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-16 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0032
D. Goswick
Abstract Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.
形而上学中最突出的讨论大多毫无争议地假设我们的形而上学理论化应该受到经典逻辑的约束。我分析了为什么会出现这种情况,然后认为不应该出现这种情况。也就是说,我认为我们不应该把形而上学的理论化,置于经典逻辑的约束之下。
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引用次数: 0
Grounding and the Existence of God 根基与上帝的存在
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-16 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0029
J. Sijuwade
Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the various entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I seek to utilise the explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne within a specific metaphysical context, a ground-theoretic context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of grounding. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have a further reason to believe in the existence of God.
在这篇文章中,我试图评估有神论在多大程度上可以为在现实的分层结构中连接各种实体的基础关系的实例化提供真正的基本解释。有神论声称有一个上帝。更准确地说,我试图在一个特定的形而上学语境中利用理查德·斯威本的解释框架,一个基于理论的语境,这将使我能够为基于的存在发展出一个真正的基本解释。因此,鉴于这种解释的真实性,我们将有进一步的理由相信上帝的存在。
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引用次数: 1
The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense 自由意志的邪恶:普兰廷加的可疑辩护
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-09 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0022
Mark Maller
Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.
Alvin Plantinga对邪恶问题的自由意志辩护(FWD)是一个有争议的重要尝试,它确定地表明道德邪恶与上帝的全能和全知是相容和正当的。我同意批评人士的观点,他们认为这是站不住脚的,FWD失败了。本文通过分析普兰丁加在《上帝、自由与邪恶》中的预设和反对假设,提出新的批评。值得注意的是,他的有限的全能概念和可能世界理论缺乏严谨的论证,并且主观地偏向于不相关的弱例子。我的本体论可能世界理论(可能条件时间线)表明,全能的上帝很可能必然存在于某些世界,但也许不是这个世界。全能是完全和绝对的,应该意味着自由的意志,以实现所有世界的上帝选择。基于模态逻辑猜想,Plantinga关于上帝对未来反事实的无所不知的立场是不可信的。
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引用次数: 0
A Short Argument against Truthmaker Maximalism 反对Truthmaker极大主义的短论
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-11-22 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0017
O. Bondar
Abstract Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.
摘要Mark Jago为真理制造者最大主义提出了一个简短的惠誉式论点,即每个真理都有一个真理制造者。作为对Jago的回应,Trueman认为惠誉式的推理可以让我们证明相反的情况——没有真相可以证明真相。在这篇文章中,我们考虑了贾戈的真理最大主义和特鲁曼的真理虚无主义之间的争论。此外,我们还介绍了一个简短的格林风格的论点,反对贾戈的真理制造者最大主义。
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引用次数: 0
Reducing Constitution to Composition 将构成还原为组成
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-11-22 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0030
Catherine C. R. Sutton
Abstract I propose that constitution is a case of composition in which, for example, the lump of clay composes the statue. In other words, we can reduce constitution to composition. Composition does all of the work that we want from an account of constitution, and we do not need two separate relations. Along the way, I offer reasons to reject weak supplementation.
摘要:我认为构成是构成的一个例子,例如,粘土块构成了雕像。换句话说,我们可以将构成还原为组成。构成做了所有我们想从构成的解释中得到的工作,我们不需要两个独立的关系。在此过程中,我提供了拒绝弱补充的理由。
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引用次数: 2
Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection 赛伯特范畴推理的过程本体论——论Nomological公理化与范畴投影
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0003
Ekin Erkan
Abstract Drawing from a Sellarsian realist-naturalist epistemology, we trace different levels of cognitive hierarchy procedures through which a representational system learns to update its own states and improve its ‘map-making’ capabilities from pre-conscious operations which modulate base-localization functions, to patterns of epistemic revision and integration at the conceptual and theoretical levels, producing a nomological double of its world. We show how ontological theorization becomes diachronically coordinated with and constrained by empirical science, and how the formal-quantitative kernel of scientific theories corresponds to qualitative-conceptual determinations at the structural level. Following Johanna Seibt’s characterization of ontology as a theory of categorial inference, we trace the preservation of inferential semantic structure across ontological theories in relation to model languages and provide provisional indications to coordinate Seibt’s account with a convergent realist assessment of systematic modeling, defining the epistemological conditions for articulating the preservation of formal structure in theories toward a limit-point of enquiry.
摘要从Sellarsian现实主义自然主义认识论出发,我们追溯了不同层次的认知层次程序,通过这些程序,表征系统学会更新自己的状态,并从调节基础定位功能的前意识操作中提高其“地图制作”能力,在概念和理论层面的认识修正和整合模式,产生了其世界的法理双重。我们展示了本体论理论如何与经验科学进行历时性协调和约束,以及科学理论的形式定量内核如何与结构层面的定性概念决定相对应。继Johanna Seibt将本体论描述为范畴推理理论之后,我们追踪了与模型语言相关的本体论中推理语义结构的保留,并提供了临时指示,以协调Seibt的叙述与系统建模的趋同现实主义评估,定义了阐明在理论中保持形式结构以达到探究的极限的认识论条件。
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Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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