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Relations in the Metaphysics of Science 科学形而上学中的关系
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-21 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0013
Stavros Ioannidis, S. Psillos, Elina Pechlivanidi
Abstract In this paper we examine the status of relations in two prominent views in metaphysics of science, i.e. dispositionalism and structuralism, and argue that the current consensus about the metaphysics of relations, according to which relations are to be viewed as internal and as constituting no addition of being over and above their relata, needs to be re-examined. After discussing what we call internalism and externalism about relations, we show that dispositionalism and structuralism lead to opposite but equally controversial accounts of the metaphysics of relations. While we criticise some widespread versions of those views, we identify versions of dispositionalism and structuralism that we deem more promising. A core feature of both of these more promising variants is an externalist view about relations. Against the current internalist consensus, we claim that a version of externalism about relations is the view that best combines metaphysical rigour with a naturalistic stance.
在本文中,我们考察了关系在科学形而上学的两个突出观点,即配置主义和结构主义中的地位,并认为目前关于关系形而上学的共识需要重新审视,根据这种共识,关系被视为内部的,并且不构成超出或超越其关系的附加。在讨论了我们所谓的关于关系的内部主义和外部主义之后,我们表明,配置主义和结构主义导致了相反但同样有争议的关系形而上学的说法。虽然我们批评了这些观点的一些普遍版本,但我们确定了我们认为更有希望的配置主义和结构主义版本。这两种更有希望的变体的一个核心特征是关于关系的外在主义观点。与当前的内部主义共识相反,我们声称,关于关系的外部主义的一个版本是最好地结合了形而上学的严谨性和自然主义立场的观点。
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引用次数: 0
Events and Modes 事件和模式
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-10 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0047
Michele Paolini Paoletti
Abstract I shall refine in this article Jaegwon Kim’s theory of events by appealing to modes, i.e., particular properties that also depend on their ‘bearers’ for their identity. Events will turn out to be occurrent modes, i.e., relational modes having further modes and times as their relata. In Section 1 I shall briefly present Kim’s theory and some difficulties that affect it. In Section 2, after having made some preliminary assumptions on modes and universals, I shall introduce occurrent modes. In Section 3 I shall show how my theory can deal with the difficulties discussed in Section 1.
摘要我将在这篇文章中通过诉诸模式来完善金的事件理论,即也依赖于其身份“承载者”的特定属性。事件将被证明是发生模式,即具有进一步模式和时间作为其关系的关系模式。在第一节中,我将简要介绍金的理论以及影响它的一些困难。在第二节中,在对模式和普遍性做了一些初步假设之后,我将介绍发生模式。在第3节中,我将展示我的理论如何应对第1节中讨论的困难。
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引用次数: 0
In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations 赞美外在主义?斯波尔丁,杜威,与关系逻辑
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0002
M. Neuber
Abstract The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate over ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations is well explored, as far as its course in Britain is concerned. F. H. Bradley’s idealistic internalism, on the one hand, and Bertrand Russell’s realistic externalism, on the other, were at the center of this debate. Less well known, however, is that there was also a discussion about relations in the United States at the time. The central figures in this discussion were Edward Gleason Spaulding and John Dewey. Like Russell, Spaulding advocated a realist-inspired externalism, while Dewey criticized this viewpoint from a pragmatist perspective. The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct the exchange between Spaulding and Dewey and to elaborate the specifics of this exchange. In doing so it will emerge, among other things, (1) that, in contrast to Bradley’s idealist rejection of externalism, Dewey’s pragmatist attempt at a refutation was more in line with common sense and science and (2) that Spaulding’s version of externalism differed markedly from Russell’s in its strong empirical orientation. Overall, an undeservedly forgotten chapter in the history of early twentieth-century American philosophy is revisited and reassessed.
19世纪末和20世纪初关于“内部”和“外部”关系的争论在英国得到了很好的探讨。f·h·布拉德利的理想主义的内在主义,和伯特兰·罗素的现实主义的外在主义,是这场争论的中心。然而,鲜为人知的是,当时在美国也有一场关于双边关系的讨论。这场讨论的核心人物是爱德华·格里森·斯波尔丁和约翰·杜威。与罗素一样,斯波尔丁主张一种现实主义的外在主义,而杜威则从实用主义的角度对这种观点进行了批判。本文的目的是重建斯波尔丁和杜威之间的交流,并详细阐述这种交流的细节。在这样做的过程中,除了其他事情之外,(1)与布拉德利对外部主义的唯心主义拒绝相反,杜威的实用主义反驳尝试更符合常识和科学;(2)斯波尔丁的外部主义版本在其强烈的经验取向方面与罗素的明显不同。总的来说,20世纪早期美国哲学史上一个不应该被遗忘的章节被重新审视和重新评估。
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引用次数: 3
Presentism & Passage 现代主义与通道
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0052
Paul R. Daniels
Abstract According to the presentist, only the present moment exists and, as time passes, what’s present changes. However some argue that, if only one moment exists, the presentist cannot explain the passage of time. While the presentist historically appeals to surrogates—proxies which exist in the present but play the role of non-existent past times—to evade this sort of worry, the appeal to surrogates has come under renewed attack from Lisa Leininger. But hope is not lost for the presentist. I argue that presentists do have the resources available to address the underlying issue Leininger articulates. Moreover, there’s disagreement amongst presentists about which version of presentism is best. For instance, David Ingram has recently argued that thisness presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism because it’s able to handle certain problems other versions of presentism cannot. However, I argue that this assessment is premature. More specifically, I argue that Ingram’s response to an objection from Lisa Leininger fails to address the core issue she raises. Consequently, I argue that presentists shouldn’t embrace thisness presentism just yet. In this way, my aims here are to: sharpen Leininger’s objection, highlight tenable presentist replies to it, and advance the discussion about which version of presentism should be favoured.
根据现在时论者的观点,只有当下存在,而随着时间的流逝,当下的东西也会发生变化。然而,一些人认为,如果只存在一个时刻,现在论者无法解释时间的流逝。虽然现在主义者在历史上求助于代理人——存在于现在,但扮演着不存在的过去的角色的代理人——来逃避这种担忧,但对代理人的呼吁遭到了丽莎·莱宁格(Lisa Leininger)的新一轮攻击。但对于现在主义者来说,希望并没有丧失。我认为,现在的人确实有资源来解决莱宁格所阐述的潜在问题。此外,存在主义者对于哪一种存在主义是最好的存在主义也存在分歧。例如,大卫·英格拉姆(David Ingram)最近提出,这种存在主义比其他版本的存在主义更可取,因为它能够处理某些其他版本的存在主义无法解决的问题。然而,我认为这种评估为时过早。更具体地说,我认为英格拉姆对丽莎·莱宁格(Lisa Leininger)反对意见的回应未能解决她提出的核心问题。因此,我认为,现在还不应该接受这种现在主义。通过这种方式,我在这里的目的是:强化莱宁格的反对意见,强调站得住脚的现在主义对此的回应,并推进关于应该支持哪种版本的现在主义的讨论。
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引用次数: 1
A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem 身心自拓扑:从身心问题建模中寻找答案
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0016
Christopher Morgan
Abstract The mind-body problem is intuitively familiar, as mental and physical entities mysteriously interact. However, difficulties arise when intertwining concepts of the self with mental and physical traits. To avoid confusion, I propose instead focusing on three categories, with the mental matching the mind and physical the body with respect to raw inputs and outputs. The third category, the self, will experience and measure the others. With this new classification, we can see difficulties clearly, specifically five questions covering interaction and correlation. We break down the problem using both existing theories and a hypercube topology representing the solution. We show any satisfactory theory must explain both spatial interaction and content correlation, and that we cannot escape our topology, whatever our preferred fundamental substance and mind-body movement permutation. We conclude by looking outside the hypercube, noting how solutions such as existential monism, priority monism, and will-based cosmic-idealism avoid the dangers involved.
精神-身体问题在直觉上是熟悉的,因为精神和身体实体神秘地相互作用。然而,当自我概念和心理和身体特征交织在一起时,就会出现困难。为了避免混淆,我建议将重点放在三个类别上,在原始输入和输出方面,精神与精神相匹配,身体与身体相匹配。第三类,自我,将体验和衡量他人。有了这个新的分类,我们可以清楚地看到困难,特别是涉及互动和相关性的五个问题。我们使用现有的理论和表示解决方案的超立方体拓扑来分解这个问题。我们证明,任何令人满意的理论都必须解释空间相互作用和内容相关性,并且我们不能逃避我们的拓扑结构,无论我们喜欢什么基本物质和身心运动排列。最后,我们在超立方体之外观察,注意到存在主义一元论、优先一元论和基于意志的宇宙唯心主义等解决方案是如何避免所涉及的危险的。
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引用次数: 0
Fictional Universal Realism 虚构的普遍现实主义
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-05-31 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0049
J. Goodman
Abstract Certain realists about properties and relations identify them with universals. Furthermore, some hold that for a wide range of meaningful predicates, the semantic contribution to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which those predicates figure is the universal expressed by the predicate. I here address ontological issues raised by predicates first introduced to us via works of fiction and whether the universal realist should accept that any such predicates express universals. After assessing arguments by Braun, D. (2015. “Wondering about Witches.” In Fictional Objects, edited by S. Brock, and , A. Everett, 71–113. Oxford: Oxford University Press) and Sawyer, S. (2015. “The Importance of Fictional Properties.” In Fictional Objects, edited by S. Brock, and A. Everett, 208–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press) for fictional universal anti-realism, I propose a novel, Kripke-inspired argument for the same conclusion. I ultimately defend the claim that while this argument presents the strongest case for fictional universal anti-realism, it is nonetheless unsound. I conclude that nothing stands in the way of accepting that some fictional predicates express fictional universals.
某些关于性质和关系的现实主义者把它们等同于共相。此外,一些人认为,对于大范围的有意义谓词,这些谓词所在的句子对所表达的命题的语义贡献是谓词所表达的全称。我在这里讨论由谓词引起的本体论问题这些谓词最初是通过小说作品引入我们的以及普遍现实主义是否应该接受任何这样的谓词表达共相。在评估了Braun, D.(2015)的论点之后。“在想女巫的事。”《虚构的物体》,S.布洛克和A.埃弗雷特编辑,71-113页。牛津:牛津大学出版社),索耶(2015)。“虚构财产的重要性。”《虚构的物体》,S.布洛克和A.埃弗雷特编辑,2008 - 29页。牛津:牛津大学出版社)对于虚构的普遍反现实主义,我提出了一个小说,克里普克启发的论点来得出同样的结论。我最终捍卫的主张是,尽管这一论点为虚构的普遍反现实主义提供了最有力的证据,但它仍然是不合理的。我的结论是,没有什么能阻止我们接受一些虚构的谓词表达虚构的共相。
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引用次数: 1
Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts: Zalta’s Theory of Intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s Notion of Quasi-encoding 可想象语境中的编码:Zalta意向性理论与Bourgeois-Gironde准编码概念之比较
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-05-30 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0027
Valentina Luporini
Abstract In (Bourgeois-Gironde, S. 2004. “On Zalta’s Notion of Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts.” Metaphysica 5), the author proposes a survey of Zalta’s Object Theory (Zalta, E. N. 1983. Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company; Zalta, E. N. 1988. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge: MIT Press) and, more specifically, of the Modal Axiom of Encoding (MAE). MAE claims that if something x possibly encodes a property F, then x necessarily encodes F. According to Bourgeois-Gironde, MAE fails to account for intentional phenomena which occur in conceivability-contexts. His solution is based on the notion of quasi-encoding: x quasi-encodes F iff x possibly encodes F. In this paper, I show that Bourgeois-Gironde’s concern is misguided and that Zalta’s framework captures the conceivability-phenomena at issue by modeling Husserl’s notion of Noemata. I then argue that his solution is superior to Bourgeois-Gironde’s. The philosophical significance of such a discussion nonetheless goes well beyond the debate between these two authors. Indeed, Zalta’s theory of Noemata is only sketched and needs to be further explored to see, on the one hand, whether and how Object Theory successfully describes the behavior of objects in conceivability-contexts, and, on the other hand, to test the efficacy of its primitive notions that are – as the contemporary debate on Neomeinongianism largely shows – anything but uncontroversial.
[摘要]《资产阶级-吉伦特》,2004。“论萨尔塔在可想象语境中的编码概念”在《形而上学》第五章中,作者对扎尔塔的客体理论(Zalta, E. N. 1983)进行了考察。抽象对象:公理化形而上学导论。多德雷赫特:雷德尔出版公司;Zalta, E. N. 1988。内涵逻辑和意向性形而上学。剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社),更具体地说,是编码模态公理(MAE)。MAE声称,如果某物x可能编码属性F,那么x必然编码F。根据Bourgeois-Gironde的观点,MAE不能解释发生在可想象情境中的有意现象。他的解决方案是基于准编码的概念:x准编码F, x可能编码F。在本文中,我表明布尔乔亚-吉伦特的关注是被误导的,Zalta的框架通过模拟胡塞尔的Noemata概念来捕捉争议的可想象现象。我认为他的解决方案优于资产阶级吉伦特的解决方案。然而,这种讨论的哲学意义远远超出了这两位作者之间的争论。事实上,Zalta的Noemata理论只是一个草图,需要进一步的探索,一方面,对象理论是否以及如何成功地描述了可想象环境中的对象行为,另一方面,测试其原始概念的有效性-正如当代关于新美诺尼主义的辩论在很大程度上表明-任何事情都是没有争议的。
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引用次数: 0
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God 模态形而上学与上帝的存在
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-05-13 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0036
J. Sijuwade
Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds, posited by David K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. This assessment will be carried out within the (modified) explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne, which will lead to the conclusion that the existence of God provides a true fundamental explanation for these specific entities. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we have another good abductive argument for God’s existence and grounds for affirming a weaker form of the principle of methodological naturalism in our metaphysical theorising.
在这篇文章中,我试图评估有神论在多大程度上可以为大卫·k·刘易斯和阿尔文·普兰廷加提出的具体和抽象的无限多元可能世界的存在提供真正的基本解释。有神论声称存在一位上帝。这种评估将在Richard Swinburne的(修改的)解释框架内进行,这将导致上帝的存在为这些具体实体提供了真正的基本解释的结论。因此,考虑到这种解释的真实性,我们就有了另一个很好的关于上帝存在的溯因论证,并有理由在我们的形而上学理论化中肯定一种较弱形式的方法论自然主义原则。
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引用次数: 1
The Dead Past Dilemma 逝去的过去的困境
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0025
Robert E. Pezet
Abstract A temporal levels structure for temporal metaphysics is outlined and employed to convey a dilemma threatening the temporal collapse of Growing-Block Theories to their meta-temporal level. The outline further explains how Presentism occupies a privileged (default) position in that temporal levels structure. Moreover, that dilemma relies crucially on the acceptance of productive causation as explaining additions to the growing block, for which it is argued any reasonable growing-block theory should incorporate. The dilemma’s first horn considers growing-block theories where productive causes are only so when present; the second, growing-block theories where productive causes continue being so when past. Either way, growing-block theory collapses into Accruing-Present Theory: whereby all entities survive into succeeding present “blocks” of existents. It is argued, the presentness of surviving entities undermines their intended theoretical role, undercutting motivations for believing accruing-present theses. Ultimately, I recommend rejection of both growing-block and accruing-present theses based on these explanatory inadequacies.
摘要:本文概述了时间形而上学的时间层次结构,并运用该结构将生长块理论的时间崩溃威胁传达到其元时间层次。大纲进一步解释了当下主义如何在时间层次结构中占据特权(默认)地位。此外,这种困境主要依赖于对生产性因果关系的接受,因为生产性因果关系可以解释增长块的增加,有人认为任何合理的增长块理论都应该包含生产性因果关系。两难困境的第一个角考虑的是增长障碍理论,其中生产原因只有在存在时才会存在;第二种是增长阻滞理论,即生产原因在过去后继续存在。无论哪种方式,成长块理论都将瓦解为累积-现在理论:即所有实体都将生存到后续的存在“块”中。有人认为,幸存实体的存在破坏了它们预期的理论作用,削弱了相信累积存在论点的动机。最后,基于这些解释的不足,我建议拒绝增长型和累积型论文。
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引用次数: 0
Frontmatter
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-frontmatter1
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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