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Frontmatter Frontmatter
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-frontmatter2
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引用次数: 0
R. D. Ingthorsson: McTaggart’s Paradox 英格索森:麦克塔格特的悖论
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2015
L. Nathan Oaklander
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引用次数: 0
Maximality, Function, and the Many 极大性、函数和许多
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2016
R. Francescotti
Abstract In the region where some cat sits, there are many very cat-like items that are proper parts of the cat (or otherwise mereologically overlap the cat), but which we are inclined to think are not themselves cats, e.g. all of Tibbles minus the tail. The question is, how can something be so cat-like without itself being a cat. Some have tried to answer this “Problem of the Many” (a problem that arises for many different kinds of things we regularly encounter, including desks, persons, rocks, and clouds) by relying on a mereological maximality principle, according to which, something cannot be a member of a kind K if it is a large proper part of, or otherwise greatly mereologically overlaps, a K. It has been shown, however, that a maximality constraint of this type, i.e. one that restricts mereological overlap, is open to strong objections. Inspired by the insights of, especially, Sutton and Madden, I develop a type of functional-maximality principle that avoids these objections (and has other merits), and thereby provides a better answer to the Problem of the Many.
摘要在一些猫坐的地方,有很多非常像猫的东西是猫的固有部分(或者在其他方面与猫表面上重叠),但我们倾向于认为它们本身不是猫,例如所有的蒂布尔斯都没有尾巴。问题是,如果一件事本身不是猫,它怎么会如此像猫。一些人试图通过表面最大性原则来回答这个“多人问题”(这个问题是我们经常遇到的许多不同种类的东西,包括桌子、人、岩石和云),根据这个原则,如果某个东西是K的一个很大的适当部分,或者在其他方面与K有很大的表面重叠,它就不可能是K的成员,然而,这种类型的最大限度约束,即限制语义重叠的约束,可能会遭到强烈反对。特别是在Sutton和Madden的见解的启发下,我发展了一种功能最大性原则,该原则避免了这些反对意见(并具有其他优点),从而为多人问题提供了更好的答案。
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引用次数: 1
A Uniform, Concretist Metaphysics for Linguistic Types 统一的、具体的语言类型形而上学
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2014
Giorgio Lando
Abstract I argue that it is not acceptable to restrict the claim that linguistic types are concrete entities (type-concretism) to some categories of linguistic types (such as words or proper names), while at the same time conceding that other categories of linguistic types (such as sentence types) are abstract entities. Moreover, I suggest a way in which type-concretism can be extended to every linguistic type, thereby responding to the so-called productivity objection to type-concretism, according to which, whenever tokens of a type t are produced in different, causally isolated circumstances, then t needs to be identified by a certain form or structure. This extension of type-concretism detaches type-concretism from so-called originalism and gives rules a prominent role in type-concretism.
本文认为,将语言类型是具体实体的主张(类型-具体主义)局限于语言类型的某些范畴(如词或专有名称),同时承认语言类型的其他范畴(如句子类型)是抽象实体,这是不可接受的。此外,我提出了一种方法,使类型具体主义可以扩展到每一种语言类型,从而回应所谓的对类型具体主义的生产力反对,根据这种反对,每当类型t的符号在不同的、因果孤立的情况下产生时,那么t需要通过某种形式或结构来识别。这种类型具体主义的延伸使类型具体主义脱离了所谓的原旨主义,并使规则在类型具体主义中占有突出地位。
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引用次数: 2
A Reply to Mellor’s “Propensities and Possibilities” 对梅勒“倾向与可能性”的回答
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2011
R. Stenwall, J. Persson, N. Sahlin
We would like to thank D. H. Mellor for taking time to comment on our paper “A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and The Propensity Theorist” (Stenwall, Persson & Sahlin 2018).
我们要感谢D. H. Mellor花时间评论我们的论文“对客观不确定性和倾向理论家的新挑战”(Stenwall, Persson & Sahlin 2018)。
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引用次数: 0
The Aristotelian Context of the Existence-Essence Distinction in De Ente Et Essentia 论“存在与本质”中存在与本质区别的亚里士多德语境
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2012
A. Brook
Abstract This paper explores the Aristotelian context of the real distinction between existence and essence thought to be posited in Thomas Aquinas’ early work De Ente Et Essentia. In doing so, the paper situates its own position in the context of contemporary scholarship and in relation to the contemporary trend to downplay Aristotle’s influence in Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy. The paper argues that re-reading De Ente Et Essentia in this way sheds new light on some of the crucial debates in contemporary Thomist scholarship, particularly with respect to the analogous relation between potency and act: essence and existence, the distinction between conceptual and causal explanation, and the relationship between philosophy and theology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.
摘要本文探讨了托马斯·阿奎那早期作品《本质与存在》中关于存在与本质真正区别的亚里士多德语境。在这样做的过程中,本文将自己的立场放在当代学术的背景下,并结合当代趋势来淡化亚里士多德对托马斯·阿奎那哲学的影响。本文认为,以这种方式重读《本质论》,可以为当代托米斯学术中的一些关键争论提供新的线索,特别是关于效力与行为之间的类似关系:本质与存在,概念解释与因果解释之间的区别,以及托马斯·阿奎那思想中哲学与神学之间的关系。
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引用次数: 0
Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge 比喻和知识的一些本体论前提
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2013
R. Scott Smith
Abstract Many have written about trope ontology, but relatively few have considered its implications for some of the ontological conditions needed for us to have knowledge. I explore the resources of trope ontology to meet those conditions. With J. P. Moreland, I argue that, being simple, we can eliminate tropes’ qualitative contents without ontological loss, resulting in bare individuators. Then I extend Moreland’s argument, arguing that tropes undermine some of the needed ontological conditions for knowledge. Yet, we do know many things, and trope nominalists presuppose that too. Therefore, I consider three counter-arguments, starting with David Lewis’s rebuttal based on appeal to brute facts. Second, I explore Jeffrey Brower’s recent proposal as a possible solution. Last, I consider Robert Garcia’s recent distinction between module and modifier tropes, to see if it can be of assistance. I conclude, however, that trope nominalism cannot preserve some of the needed ontology to have knowledge.
摘要许多人都写过比喻本体论,但相对较少的人考虑过它对我们获得知识所需的一些本体论条件的影响。为了满足这些条件,我探索了比喻本体论的资源。与J·P·莫兰德一起,我认为,简单地说,我们可以在不损失本体论的情况下消除比喻的定性内容,从而产生裸露的个体。然后,我扩展了莫兰德的论点,认为比喻破坏了知识所需的一些本体论条件。然而,我们确实知道很多事情,而比喻唯名论者也预设了这一点。因此,我考虑了三个反驳,首先是大卫·刘易斯基于对残酷事实的上诉进行的反驳。其次,我探讨了Jeffrey Brower最近提出的一个可能的解决方案。最后,我考虑一下Robert Garcia最近对模块和修饰语比喻的区分,看看它是否有帮助。然而,我的结论是,比喻唯名论不能保留一些拥有知识所需的本体论。
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引用次数: 2
Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation 中性主义、自然主义与涌现:对康柏实例化理论的批判性考察
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2017
Peter Forrest
Abstract In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason to accept and their opponents have reason to reject. So, neutralism is not neutral on the topic of whether properties are universals. Nor is Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation as naturalistic as he claims. I argue that although compatible with Ontological Naturalism, his theory provides a precedent for the non-naturalistic emergence of mental properties. Finally, I argue that because his theory requires a simple physics it presupposes a more rationalist epistemology than that of Methodological Naturalism.
在他的《属性是特殊的、普遍的还是两者都不是?》哈维尔·坎帕认为,科学而不是形而上学解释了属性是如何实例化的。我接受这个结论,前提是物理学可以用相当少的原始谓词来陈述。此外,他用他的实例化科学理论来为中立主义辩护,他的论点是,属性和它们的实例之间的“联系”既不意味着属性是特殊的,也不意味着它们是普遍的。我认为,中立主义是这样一种命题,即关于共相的现实主义者有独立的理由接受它们,而它们的反对者有理由拒绝它们。所以,中性主义在属性是否为共相的问题上并不中立。康帕的实例化理论也不像他声称的那样自然主义。我认为,尽管他的理论与本体论自然主义相容,但他的理论为精神属性的非自然出现提供了一个先例。最后,我认为,因为他的理论需要一个简单的物理学,它预设了一个比方法论自然主义更理性的认识论。
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引用次数: 2
Propensities and Possibilities 倾向与可能性
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-04-24 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2002
D. Mellor
Abstract This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.
摘要本文是对《形而上学》最近发表的一篇论文的回应,该论文主张“无限制的现实主义”,认为现实世界包含了倾向的未实现的可能结果。我认为,现实世界可以容纳机会倾向理论,而不包括未实现的可能性。
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引用次数: 1
Persistence Conditions and Identity 持久性条件和身份
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-04-24 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-2005
J. Biro
Abstract Pluralists believe that there are cases of distinct but spatio-temporally coinciding things. The statue goes, the piece of clay remains: differing persistence conditions, different things. Yet while both are with us, they are obviously in the same place. The argument rests on two assumptions: that statues have their shape essentially and that pieces of clay do not. Only if we make both does the conclusion follow. Here I suggest that while both assumptions are plausible on their face, each may be questioned. Given this, we are not forced to accept their conjunction and can thus avoid the counter-intuitive conclusion it entails.
抽象多元主义者认为,存在不同但在时空上重合的事物。雕像走了,那块粘土留下了:不同的保存条件,不同的东西。然而,虽然两者都和我们在一起,但它们显然是在同一个地方。这个论点基于两个假设:雕像本质上有其形状,而粘土块则没有。只有两者都做了,才能得出结论。在这里,我认为,虽然这两种假设表面上都是合理的,但每一种都可能受到质疑。鉴于此,我们不必被迫接受它们的结合,从而可以避免由此产生的反直觉的结论。
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引用次数: 1
期刊
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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