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A “Nouvelle Métaphysique Thomiste” or Simply Neo-Cayetanism? “新托马斯形而上学”还是简单的新卡耶坦主义?
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0017
Manuel Alejandro Serra Pérez
Abstract For one of the current scholars of Thomism, Serge T. Bonino, research on Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of being has polarized into two tendencies, the axis of which is the Dominican Thomistic school. One of them is represented by the harsh criticisms that the French medievalist Étienne Gilson made of the positions of this school. The second, on the other hand, is characterized by a staunch defense of the theses of the main commentators of this school. During the 20th century, one of Gilson’s students, the Canadian Lawrence Dewan, openly opposed Gilsonian Thomism on the basis of the traditional interpretation. Today, some of his students consider this Dewanian proposal as a “nouvelle métaphysique thomiste,” assuming that it is a movement that brings a genuine renewal. In this article we will show that this movement, although it claims to be a novelty, is nothing more than the revitalization of the formalist theses of the Dominican school, and therefore cannot be considered a valid interpretation of Thomas Aquinas.
摘要对于托马斯主义学者之一的博尼诺来说,对托马斯·阿奎那存在哲学的研究出现了两极分化,以多明尼加托马斯学派为轴心。其中之一就是法国中世纪学者Étienne吉尔松对这个学派的立场所作的严厉批评。另一方面,第二种观点的特点是坚定地捍卫这个学派主要评论家的论点。在20世纪,吉尔森的一个学生,加拿大人劳伦斯·德万,在传统解释的基础上公开反对吉尔森·托马斯主义。今天,他的一些学生认为德瓦尼的这一提议是一种“新变革”,认为这是一场带来真正革新的运动。在这篇文章中,我们将展示这个运动,虽然它声称是一个新奇的,只不过是多明尼加学派的形式主义论文的振兴,因此不能被认为是对托马斯·阿奎那的有效解释。
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引用次数: 0
An Aristotelian Conception of Time(s) 亚里士多德的时间观(五)
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-08-30 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0021
A. Brook
Abstract In recent publications, there has been something of an emerging debate about the relationship between powers ontology and current accounts of time. It seems that if powers ontology is to have bearing on contemporary metaphysical accounts of time, some work needs to be done to show how powers ontology might overcome the apparent contradictions that have arisen in this emerging debate. One avenue to pursue is to test out the possibility of wresting a powers temporal ontology out of a re-reading of Aristotle’s account of time with a specific focus on his account of motion and potency. This article will make an effort to make some headway here.
摘要在最近的出版物中,关于权力本体论和时间时事之间的关系,出现了一些新的争论。似乎,如果权力本体论要对当代形而上学的时间叙述产生影响,就需要做一些工作来展示权力本体论如何克服这场新兴辩论中出现的明显矛盾。一种追求的途径是,通过重读亚里士多德对时间的描述,特别关注他对运动和效力的描述,来测试从权力的时间本体论中夺取权力的可能性。这篇文章将努力在这方面取得一些进展。
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引用次数: 0
Two Notes on Composition 关于作文的两点注
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-08-29 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0020
J. Biro
Abstract If, as some philosophers maintain, there are no composites, we do not have to ask whether, as others hold, composition is identity. Here I argue that both groups are wrong: there are composites, and composition is not identity. I examine one argument for excluding composites from our ontology, based on their alleged causal redundancy. I give reason to think that composites are ineliminable in causal explanations of macroscopic effects. I go on to argue that the relation between composites and their components is not one of identity.
摘要如果像一些哲学家所坚持的那样,没有复合物,我们就不必像其他人所认为的那样,问复合物是否是同一性。在这里,我认为这两个群体都是错误的:有复合物,而复合物不是同一性。我研究了将复合物从我们的本体论中排除的一个论点,基于它们所谓的因果冗余。我有理由认为,在宏观效应的因果解释中,复合物是不合格的。我继续认为,复合材料及其成分之间的关系不是同一性的关系。
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引用次数: 0
Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question? 非因果解释能回答莱布尼兹问题吗?
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-08-29 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0006
Jens Lemanski
Abstract Leibniz is often cited as an authority when it comes to the formulation and answer strategy of the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Yet much current research assumes that Leibniz advocates an unambiguous question and strategy for the answer. In this respect, one repeatedly finds the argument in the literature that alternative explanatory approaches to this question violate Leibniz’s intention, since he derives the question from the principle of sufficient reason and also demands a causal explanation to the question. In particular, the new research on non-causal explanatory strategies to the Leibniz question seems to concern this counter-argument. In this paper, however, I will argue that while Leibniz raises the question by means of the principle of sufficient reason, he even favours a non-causal explanatory strategy to the question. Thus, a more accurate Leibniz interpretation seems not only to legitimise but also to support non-causal explanations to the Leibniz question.
摘要当谈到“为什么有东西而不是什么都没有?”这个问题的制定和回答策略时,莱布尼茨经常被认为是权威。然而,目前的许多研究都认为莱布尼茨提倡一个明确的问题和答案策略。在这方面,人们反复发现文献中的论点,即对这个问题的替代解释方法违反了莱布尼茨的意图,因为他从充分理性的原则中得出了这个问题,并要求对这个问题进行因果解释。特别是,关于莱布尼茨问题的非因果解释策略的新研究似乎关注这一反论点。然而,在这篇论文中,我认为,虽然莱布尼茨是通过充分理性原则提出这个问题的,但他甚至倾向于对这个问题采取非因果解释策略。因此,更准确的莱布尼茨解释似乎不仅使莱布尼茨问题合法化,而且支持对莱布尼兹问题的非因果解释。
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引用次数: 0
Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers 询价和普通Truthmakers
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-08-26 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0035
A. Schipper
Abstract This paper argues that accepting an ordinary approach to truthmakers and rejecting something I call “the metaphysical knowledge assumption” (MKA) allows us to account for inquiry in terms of truthmaking. §1 introduces inquiry and the potential place of truthmakers in inquiry. §2 presents the relevant ordinary notion of truthmakers. §3 presents and motivates MKA. This assumption, I argue (§4), makes a truthmaker-focused account of inquiry whose objects are not the fundamental nature of things impossible and thus should be rejected. The ordinary picture, which understands truthmakers not exclusively in terms of the objects of fundamental reality or of semantics (§5), but in terms of the relevant, intentional objects of inquiry, gives us an attractive, general, truthmaker-based view of inquiry.
摘要本文认为,接受对真理制造者的一种普通方法,并拒绝我称之为“形而上学知识假设”(MKA)的东西,使我们能够从真理制造的角度来解释探究。§1介绍了探究和真理制造者在探究中的潜在地位。§2给出了有关真理制造者的一般概念。展示并激励MKA。我认为(§4),这种假设使得一个以真理制造者为中心的探究,其对象不是不可能的事物的基本性质,因此应该被拒绝。普通的图景并不仅仅从基本实在的对象或语义学的对象(§5)的角度来理解真理制造者,而是从相关的、有意的探究对象的角度来理解真理制造者,这就给了我们一个有吸引力的、普遍的、以真理制造者为基础的探究观点。
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引用次数: 0
The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making 关于存在、认识和创造的全面叙述中的超越与制约问题
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-08-23 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0019
M. Baç, Büke Temizler
Abstract Barry Allen defends a highly unorthodox and compact account of humans and their evolutionary adventure, which comprises inter alia epistemological, alethic, technological, and artistic aspects. His anthropocentric view distinguishes itself from traditional forms of realism and anti-realism by virtue of its dynamic and non-reductionist character. Allen adopts a certain perspective of techno-artistic and onto-epistemic construction, which we dub “panartifactualism,” claiming principally that nothing at all escapes the artifactualizing power of human beings. We maintain that, under closer scrutiny, various dimensions of Allen’s account conflict and that his philosophical approach to “being” and “making” ultimately gives rise to a rather problematic ontological picture. Having pointed out its shortcomings and untenable results, we spell out the conceptual contours of a contemporary and far more attractive version of realism which suffers neither from the issues faced by views like panartifactualism nor from the obvious difficulties of noumenalist realism justifiably opposed by Allen.
巴里·艾伦(Barry Allen)为人类及其进化冒险的高度非正统和紧凑的描述辩护,其中包括认识论、真性、技术和艺术方面的内容。他的人类中心主义观点以其动态的、非还原论的特征区别于传统形式的现实主义和反现实主义。艾伦采用了一种技术艺术和本体认知建构的观点,我们称之为“全人工主义”,主要主张没有任何东西能逃脱人类的人工力量。我们坚持认为,在更仔细的审查下,艾伦的叙述的各个方面是冲突的,他对“存在”和“制造”的哲学方法最终导致了一个相当有问题的本体论图景。在指出了它的缺点和站不住脚的结果之后,我们阐述了一个当代的、更有吸引力的现实主义版本的概念轮廓,它既没有像全人工主义这样的观点所面临的问题,也没有像艾伦所反对的本体主义现实主义所面临的明显困难。
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引用次数: 0
Haecceity Mereology Haecceity Mereology
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-08-10 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0034
Ruoyu Zhang
Abstract Haecceities are non-qualitative properties for individuation but the current theories about haecceities are still to be much more explored. This paper aims to develop a “haecceity mereology” – that is, an ontological system that understands substances as mereological combinations of haecceities and qualitative properties. In this way, the view developed is an alternative to Paul’s (2002. “Logical Parts.” Noûs 36 (4): 578–96; 2006. “Coincidence as Overlap.” Noûs 40 (4): 623–59) mereological approach. Three rules are proposed: (1) If S is a substance, then there is one and only one haecceity which is S’s qualitative part; (2) For all the fusions with the same haecceity, at most only one of those fusions is a substance; (3) When all the relevant elements are abundant, every element must overlap at least one substance. This is the first ontology of haecceities in the recent literature and would be a model for systematic metaphysics.
摘要幸福感是个体化的非定性性质,但目前关于幸福感的理论还有待进一步探索。本文的目的是发展一种“容性本体论”,即一种本体论系统,将物质理解为容性和质性的本体论组合。通过这种方式,形成的观点是对保罗(2002)的一种替代。《逻辑部分》,编号36(4):578–96;2006年,《重叠的巧合》,Noûs 40(4):623-59)语言方法。提出了三个规则:(1)如果S是一种物质,则存在一个且只有一个性质,即S的定性部分;(2) 对于所有具有相同性质的融合体,这些融合体中最多只有一个是物质;(3) 当所有相关元素都丰富时,每个元素必须至少与一种物质重叠。这是近代文学中第一个关于接受的本体论,也是系统形而上学的典范。
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引用次数: 0
Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics 不仅仅是许多世界,还有许多宇宙?量子力学多世界观的一个问题
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-08-04 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0012
Peter Baumann
Abstract The many-worlds view is one of the most discussed “interpretations” of quantum mechanics. As is well known, this view has some very controversial and much discussed aspects. This paper focuses on one particular problem arising from the combination of quantum mechanics with Special Relativity. It turns out that the ontology of the many-worlds view – the account of what there is and what branches of the universe exist – is relative to inertial frames. If one wants to avoid relativizing ontology, one has to argue either that there is an additional source of branching due to Special Relativity and thus additional branches or worlds. Or one has to argue that there are not only many worlds but also many universes (sets of worlds or world-branches); there is thus not only one tree of many world-branches but many frame-specific trees, a “forest” of many world-trees. The main problem here is how one can understand all or any of this.
摘要多世界观是量子力学中讨论最多的“解释”之一。众所周知,这种观点有一些非常有争议和备受讨论的方面。本文着重讨论量子力学与狭义相对论相结合所产生的一个特殊问题。事实证明,多世界观的本体论——对宇宙的存在和分支的描述——是相对于惯性系的。如果一个人想避免将本体论相对化,就必须争辩说,由于狭义相对论,分支有一个额外的来源,从而有额外的分支或世界。或者人们不得不争辩说,不仅有许多世界,还有许多宇宙(世界集合或世界分支);因此,不仅有一棵树有许多世界分支,还有许多特定框架的树,一个由许多世界树组成的“森林”。这里的主要问题是如何理解所有或任何一个。
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引用次数: 0
All Designators are Rigid 所有指示器都是刚性的
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-07-13 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0040
H. Noonan
Abstract In Naming and Necessity Kripke introduces the concept of a rigid designator and argues that proper names are rigid designators. He argues that in this way they are different from typical definite descriptions (though he allows that some definite descriptions, e.g., ‘the actual winner of the lottery’, ‘the square of 3’, are rigid designators). His opponents have either argued that names can be regarded as abbreviations of rigid descriptions (e.g., ‘actualized’ ones) or have tried to deny that names are rigid designators. I shall argue that no unambiguous descriptions are non-rigid. All unambiguous descriptions are rigid. The appearance of non-rigidity in descriptions is simply an illusion, a manifestation of ambiguity. I shall then go on to show that an explanation of the difficulty which has been found in extending the rigid/non-rigid distinction from singular terms to predicates follows.
在《命名与必然性》一书中,克里普克引入了刚性指示符的概念,认为专有名称是刚性指示符。他认为,在这一点上,它们不同于典型的确定描述(尽管他允许某些确定描述,例如,“彩票的实际赢家”,“3的平方”,是严格的指示)。他的反对者要么认为名字可以被视为严格描述的缩写(例如,“实际的”名字),要么试图否认名字是严格的指示物。我认为没有任何明确的描述是非刚性的。所有明确的描述都是严格的。在描述中出现的非刚性只是一种幻觉,一种模棱两可的表现。然后,我将继续说明将刚性/非刚性区分从单数术语扩展到谓词时所遇到的困难。
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引用次数: 0
Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will 形而上学的相容论与跨世界人格的本体论:一个关于神性预知(决定论)与形而上学自由意志相容的新刘易斯论证
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-07-13 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0041
Bartlomiej A. Lenart
Abstract David Lewis’ contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis’ own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory.
摘要大卫·刘易斯关于神的先验知识和自由意志的思考,以及他关于模态实在论的其他一些更实质性的工作和他的对应理论,可以作为一个跳板来解决先验知识和形而上学自由之谜,即提出真正的形而上学自由与决定论兼容,这与通常的相容主义者关注决定论与道德责任之间的相容性截然不同。本文认为,虽然刘易斯为这种可能性打开了大门,但为了充分阐明一种真正形而上学的相容主义解释,必须放弃刘易斯自己的对应理论,转而支持由罗伯特·诺齐克最接近连续理论的修改版本在理论上构建的跨世界身份解释。
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引用次数: 0
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Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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