Abstract Many have pointed out that the utility of mathematical objects is somewhat disconnected from their ontological status. For example, one might argue that arithmetic is useful whether or not numbers exist. We explore this phenomenon in the context of Divine Conceptualism (DC), which claims that mathematical objects exist as thoughts in the divine mind. While not arguing against DC claims, we argue that DC claims can lead to epistemological uncertainty regarding the ontological status of mathematical objects. This weakens DC attempts to explain the utility of mathematical objects on the basis of their existence. To address this weakness, we propose an appeal to Liggins’ theory of Belief Expressionism (BE). Indeed, we point out that BE is amenable to the ontological claims of DC while also explaining the utility of mathematical objects apart from reliance upon their existence. We illustrate these themes via a case study of Peano Arithmetic.
{"title":"A Belief Expressionist Explanation of Divine Conceptualist Mathematics","authors":"David M. Freeman","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many have pointed out that the utility of mathematical objects is somewhat disconnected from their ontological status. For example, one might argue that arithmetic is useful whether or not numbers exist. We explore this phenomenon in the context of Divine Conceptualism (DC), which claims that mathematical objects exist as thoughts in the divine mind. While not arguing against DC claims, we argue that DC claims can lead to epistemological uncertainty regarding the ontological status of mathematical objects. This weakens DC attempts to explain the utility of mathematical objects on the basis of their existence. To address this weakness, we propose an appeal to Liggins’ theory of Belief Expressionism (BE). Indeed, we point out that BE is amenable to the ontological claims of DC while also explaining the utility of mathematical objects apart from reliance upon their existence. We illustrate these themes via a case study of Peano Arithmetic.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45676156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many philosophers accept the view that, when one object constitutes a second (say a tree and an aggregate of wood molecules), the two objects can be entirely in the same place at the same time (collocated). But what of two objects such that neither constitutes the other (a non-constituting pair)? Can they be collocated? If there can be such a pair of objects, they would have to share the same material constituents. To show that there are two collocated objects and not just one object at a specific time and place, one has to show that one of the objects has some property that the other fails to have. I claim that the properties I use in my example are legitimate substitution instances in the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I offer a metaphysically possible example that illustrates such collocation, a possible case from ‘raw nature’, two trees.
{"title":"Collocation and Constitution","authors":"David-Hillel Ruben","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many philosophers accept the view that, when one object constitutes a second (say a tree and an aggregate of wood molecules), the two objects can be entirely in the same place at the same time (collocated). But what of two objects such that neither constitutes the other (a non-constituting pair)? Can they be collocated? If there can be such a pair of objects, they would have to share the same material constituents. To show that there are two collocated objects and not just one object at a specific time and place, one has to show that one of the objects has some property that the other fails to have. I claim that the properties I use in my example are legitimate substitution instances in the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I offer a metaphysically possible example that illustrates such collocation, a possible case from ‘raw nature’, two trees.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42531945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I introduce the implantation argument, a new argument for the existence of God. Spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind, composing an external physical reality, cannot be composed of either atomlessness (infinite divisibility, atomless gunk), or of Democritean atoms (extended simples), and therefore the inner experience of an external reality containing spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind does not represent the external reality (inner mind does not represent external, mind-independent, reality), the mind is a mere cinematic-like mindscreen (a mindscreen simulation), implanted into the mind by a creator-God. It will be shown that only a creator-God can be the implanting creator of the mindscreen simulation (the creator of reality), and other simulation theories, such as Bostrom’s famous account, that do not involve a creator-God as the mindscreen simulation creator, involve a reification fallacy.
{"title":"The Implantation Argument: Simulation Theory is Proof that God Exists","authors":"Jeffrey Grupp","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I introduce the implantation argument, a new argument for the existence of God. Spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind, composing an external physical reality, cannot be composed of either atomlessness (infinite divisibility, atomless gunk), or of Democritean atoms (extended simples), and therefore the inner experience of an external reality containing spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind does not represent the external reality (inner mind does not represent external, mind-independent, reality), the mind is a mere cinematic-like mindscreen (a mindscreen simulation), implanted into the mind by a creator-God. It will be shown that only a creator-God can be the implanting creator of the mindscreen simulation (the creator of reality), and other simulation theories, such as Bostrom’s famous account, that do not involve a creator-God as the mindscreen simulation creator, involve a reification fallacy.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45341094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article, I discuss Richard Swinburne’s case for the conception of substance causation, identified with the substances-powers-liabilities (SPL) account of causation, versus the conception of event causation, identified with alternative accounts. I specify the place of Swinburne’s argument in the debates about agent causation, and uncover reasons to be sceptical about the claims that substance causation is a genuine alternative to event causation, and that it helps to comprehend the specifics of the causation involved in free agency. I also advance considerations in favour of the relations-between-universals (RBU) account of causation that can make it preferable to the SPL account.
{"title":"Metaphysical Foundations of Causation: Powers or Laws of Nature?","authors":"D. Sepetyi","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I discuss Richard Swinburne’s case for the conception of substance causation, identified with the substances-powers-liabilities (SPL) account of causation, versus the conception of event causation, identified with alternative accounts. I specify the place of Swinburne’s argument in the debates about agent causation, and uncover reasons to be sceptical about the claims that substance causation is a genuine alternative to event causation, and that it helps to comprehend the specifics of the causation involved in free agency. I also advance considerations in favour of the relations-between-universals (RBU) account of causation that can make it preferable to the SPL account.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45878764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.
{"title":"Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism","authors":"Seungbae Park","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48835517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract With substance dualism and the existence of God, Swinburne (2004, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Moreland (2010, Consciousness and the Existence of God, Routledge, New York) have argued for a very powerful explanatory mechanism that can readily explain several philosophical problems related to consciousness. However, their positions come with presuppositions and ontological commitments which many are not prepared to share. The aim of this paper is to improve on the Swinburne-Moreland argument from consciousness by developing an argument for the existence of God from consciousness without being committed to substance dualism. The argument proceeds by suggesting a solution to the exceptional-point-of-view problem, i.e., the question how it can be explained that there is a conscious being lucky enough to experience the point of view of a relatively tiny brain amidst a giant universe that is indifferent about which physical entities it brings about according to the laws of physics.
{"title":"Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne-Moreland Argument from Consciousness","authors":"Ward Blondé, Ludger Jansen","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With substance dualism and the existence of God, Swinburne (2004, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Moreland (2010, Consciousness and the Existence of God, Routledge, New York) have argued for a very powerful explanatory mechanism that can readily explain several philosophical problems related to consciousness. However, their positions come with presuppositions and ontological commitments which many are not prepared to share. The aim of this paper is to improve on the Swinburne-Moreland argument from consciousness by developing an argument for the existence of God from consciousness without being committed to substance dualism. The argument proceeds by suggesting a solution to the exceptional-point-of-view problem, i.e., the question how it can be explained that there is a conscious being lucky enough to experience the point of view of a relatively tiny brain amidst a giant universe that is indifferent about which physical entities it brings about according to the laws of physics.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0035","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43157293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Attempting to provide an ontological framework for the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being proposed elsewhere, this paper – after some basic definitions – focuses on substances, one pillar of that notion. It recognizes only to individual substances a material (vs. formal) existence, viewed as the entire complex of the properties instantiated in each of them. It then examines features of the general essence of substances (in primis their independence). While such essence can be comprehended via abstract definitions, their individual essence (‘this-ness’) cannot, I argue, because it is not a concept but a reality, which I refer to as Being. This manifests powers, is inexhaustible growth and is one, although expressed differently in each individual. The possible connection of the human being with this reality is the second pillar of the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being, which I summarize and compare to other scenarios at the end.
{"title":"An Ontology for ‘The Universe of Being’","authors":"G. Frizzera","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Attempting to provide an ontological framework for the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being proposed elsewhere, this paper – after some basic definitions – focuses on substances, one pillar of that notion. It recognizes only to individual substances a material (vs. formal) existence, viewed as the entire complex of the properties instantiated in each of them. It then examines features of the general essence of substances (in primis their independence). While such essence can be comprehended via abstract definitions, their individual essence (‘this-ness’) cannot, I argue, because it is not a concept but a reality, which I refer to as Being. This manifests powers, is inexhaustible growth and is one, although expressed differently in each individual. The possible connection of the human being with this reality is the second pillar of the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being, which I summarize and compare to other scenarios at the end.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0029","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46607210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The recent holistic trends in metaphysics are surveyed here and a tentative typology is offered. The non-linear mode of composition is suggested as the key feature of holism, apart from its familiar non-reductionism and emergentism. It is argued that those holistic views are promising that refrain from extreme relationalism based on the denial of there being self-subsistence particulars; also, those refraining from the postulation of an unarticulated all-embracing whole where both relations and terms are denied to be genuine ontological items. The further suggestion is that a trade-off between the holistic perspective and the limits imposed upon it in the form of built-in confinements may help in making this metaphysics go.
{"title":"Holism Resurfacing: How Far Should We Go With It?","authors":"Márta Ujvári","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The recent holistic trends in metaphysics are surveyed here and a tentative typology is offered. The non-linear mode of composition is suggested as the key feature of holism, apart from its familiar non-reductionism and emergentism. It is argued that those holistic views are promising that refrain from extreme relationalism based on the denial of there being self-subsistence particulars; also, those refraining from the postulation of an unarticulated all-embracing whole where both relations and terms are denied to be genuine ontological items. The further suggestion is that a trade-off between the holistic perspective and the limits imposed upon it in the form of built-in confinements may help in making this metaphysics go.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48597182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A persistent tradition in metaphysics of mind insists that there is a substantial difference between mind and body. Avicenna’s numerous arguments, for a millennium, have encouraged the view that minds are essentially immaterial substances. In the first part, I redesign and offer five versions of such arguments and then I criticize them. First argument (indivisibility) would be vulnerable in terms of two counterexamples. Second argument (universals) confuses existence with location. Third argument (bodily tools) is less problematic than the first two, though I will say a few words about why it may also not be convincing. Fourth argument (infinity) may not support substance dualism, because, I think, abundance is very different from infinity. Fifth argument (senescence) depends on empirically incorrect premises. Hence, it seems that no Avicennian argument can reasonably save substance dualism.
{"title":"Modest Dualism and Individuation of Mind","authors":"Alireza Mazarian","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A persistent tradition in metaphysics of mind insists that there is a substantial difference between mind and body. Avicenna’s numerous arguments, for a millennium, have encouraged the view that minds are essentially immaterial substances. In the first part, I redesign and offer five versions of such arguments and then I criticize them. First argument (indivisibility) would be vulnerable in terms of two counterexamples. Second argument (universals) confuses existence with location. Third argument (bodily tools) is less problematic than the first two, though I will say a few words about why it may also not be convincing. Fourth argument (infinity) may not support substance dualism, because, I think, abundance is very different from infinity. Fifth argument (senescence) depends on empirically incorrect premises. Hence, it seems that no Avicennian argument can reasonably save substance dualism.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48524884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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