Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835093987
{"title":"Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung. Herausgegeben von Gerhard Ernst und Christof Rapp","authors":"","doi":"10.3196/004433022835093987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835093987","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47449522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835093879
Tobias Förster
In this essay an epistemic solution to the Bald Man Paradox is suggested. Pre- supposing classical logic and minimal additional premises it is shown that there is a sharp border for baldness. In the course of that it is argued that the same argument can be given regarding alternative many-valued logics. Following this we formulate a plausible principle of imperfect soritical knowledge (ISK), with the aid of which it is shown that the concrete value of the sharp border is un- known. The proposed solution of the Bald Man Paradox will then be compared with Williamson's solution to the Sorites Paradox. In the end it is argued that the tolerance principle derives its plausibility from an ambiguity of the word "false". To this end it is shown that there is an equivalent formulation of the tolerance principle in Ulrich Blau's three-valued logic which is consistent with the existence of a sharp border.
{"title":"Ein epistemischer Lösungsvorschlag für das Kahlkopfparadox","authors":"Tobias Förster","doi":"10.3196/004433022835093879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835093879","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay an epistemic solution to the Bald Man Paradox is suggested. Pre- supposing classical logic and minimal additional premises it is shown that there is a sharp border for baldness. In the course of that it is argued that the same argument can be given regarding alternative\u0000 many-valued logics. Following this we formulate a plausible principle of imperfect soritical knowledge (ISK), with the aid of which it is shown that the concrete value of the sharp border is un- known. The proposed solution of the Bald Man Paradox will then be compared with Williamson's\u0000 solution to the Sorites Paradox. In the end it is argued that the tolerance principle derives its plausibility from an ambiguity of the word \"false\". To this end it is shown that there is an equivalent formulation of the tolerance principle in Ulrich Blau's three-valued logic which is consistent\u0000 with the existence of a sharp border.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48687979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835093897
Claudia Blöser
The central question of this article is what hope contributes to a good life. The starting point is the assumption that living a good life involves having a good relation to the past, present and future. Hope is a central attitude towards the future that contributes, I argue, to having an own future. I distinguish three ways in which there is reference to an "own future" and thus different ways in which hope contributes to the good life. Finally, I discuss the objection that hope is detrimental to a good life precisely because of its reference to the future, insofar as a good life essentially takes place "in the present".
{"title":"Hoffnung als Zukunftsbezug. Ein Beitrag zur Zeitlichkeit des guten Lebens","authors":"Claudia Blöser","doi":"10.3196/004433022835093897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835093897","url":null,"abstract":"The central question of this article is what hope contributes to a good life. The starting point is the assumption that living a good life involves having a good relation to the past, present and future. Hope is a central attitude towards the future that contributes, I argue, to having\u0000 an own future. I distinguish three ways in which there is reference to an \"own future\" and thus different ways in which hope contributes to the good life. Finally, I discuss the objection that hope is detrimental to a good life precisely because of its reference to the future, insofar as a\u0000 good life essentially takes place \"in the present\".","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69806624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835093914
Ingolf Max, R. Borchers, Julia Franke-Reddig, Philipp Leon Bauer
{"title":"Konsequentes Philosophieren im Lichte empirischer Wissenschaften und Logik. Drei neue Bände der Abteilung II Nachgelassene Schriften der Moritz Schlick Gesamtausgabe [= MSGA]","authors":"Ingolf Max, R. Borchers, Julia Franke-Reddig, Philipp Leon Bauer","doi":"10.3196/004433022835093914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835093914","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44245582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835093950
M. Heepe
{"title":"Zur Bedeutung von Absicht und Effekt bei der moralischen Verhaltensbewertung. Ein vergleichendes Argument für das Prinzip des Doppeleffekts","authors":"M. Heepe","doi":"10.3196/004433022835093950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835093950","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44640294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-15DOI: 10.3196/004433021834259273
Vuko Andrić
Aus Platzgründen kann ich die originellen und scharfsinnigen Kommentare von Annette Dufner, Jörg Löschke, Dorothee Bleisch und Konstantin Weber nicht vollständig würdigen. Ich beschränke mich auf einige zentrale Aussagen und Überlegungen.
{"title":"Maximieren, Satisficing, Handlungsanleitung und “ Sollen impliziert Können \": Antworten auf die Kommentare von Annette Dufner, Jörg Löschke, Dorothee Bleisch und Konstantin Weber","authors":"Vuko Andrić","doi":"10.3196/004433021834259273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433021834259273","url":null,"abstract":"Aus Platzgründen kann ich die originellen und scharfsinnigen Kommentare von Annette Dufner, Jörg Löschke, Dorothee Bleisch und Konstantin Weber nicht vollständig würdigen. Ich beschränke mich auf einige zentrale Aussagen und Überlegungen.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46335500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-15DOI: 10.3196/004433021834259246
Julius Schälike
Luck egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen claim that the influence of luck on the distribution of goods or welfare has to be equalized, whereas inequality must be accepted if the subjects bear responsibility for it. The paper investigates how this claim should be interpreted and if it is plausible. Analyzing several examples, I try to show that the spectrum of pertinent cases is much more limited than Dworkin and Cohen think. Sometimes it seems as if someone is responsible for being in a worse position than someone else, while in fact they didn't have equal opportunities. Fitting cases of responsibility for inequality can be found when we focus on the outcomes of calculated gambles (Dworkin: option luck). But why, and what exactly are cases in point? What distinguishes the risk-taking of someone who buys a lottery ticket from that of a peasant who cultivates a piece of land, knowing that a storm might ruin the crop? I try to demonstrate that an ethically relevant difference occurs when the attitude towards risk differs. Would the agent prefer to receive the expected utility safely, or would she rather gamble?
{"title":"Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Verantwortung und Zufall: Die Bedeutung von Risikoakzeptanz für den Glücksegalitarismus","authors":"Julius Schälike","doi":"10.3196/004433021834259246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433021834259246","url":null,"abstract":"Luck egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen claim that the influence of luck on the distribution of goods or welfare has to be equalized, whereas inequality must be accepted if the subjects bear responsibility for it. The paper investigates how this claim should be interpreted\u0000 and if it is plausible. Analyzing several examples, I try to show that the spectrum of pertinent cases is much more limited than Dworkin and Cohen think. Sometimes it seems as if someone is responsible for being in a worse position than someone else, while in fact they didn't have equal opportunities.\u0000 Fitting cases of responsibility for inequality can be found when we focus on the outcomes of calculated gambles (Dworkin: option luck). But why, and what exactly are cases in point? What distinguishes the risk-taking of someone who buys a lottery ticket from that of a peasant who cultivates\u0000 a piece of land, knowing that a storm might ruin the crop? I try to demonstrate that an ethically relevant difference occurs when the attitude towards risk differs. Would the agent prefer to receive the expected utility safely, or would she rather gamble?","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47195740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-15DOI: 10.3196/004433021834259291
Ansgar Seide
In the extensive methodology of his Logik, Wilhelm Wundt examines in detail the methodological procedure in the individual sciences. As will be shown in this article, these investigations are not only intended to clarify or improve the procedures in the individual sciences, but also to be of benefit to philosophy and especially to metaphysics. Wundt belongs to the traditional line of inductive metaphysics, whose representatives were of the opinion that metaphysics should be based on the results and methods of the individual sciences. In this sense, Wundt's detailed investigation of the methods of the individual sciences should be understood as a prelude to an inductive metaphysics. By means of a central example, namely the introduction of the concept of causality based on an inference to the best explanation, this article shows how Wundt conceives the construction of a metaphysics based on the foundations of the individual sciences.
{"title":"Wilhelm Wundts Logik als Auftakt zu einer induktiven Metaphysik","authors":"Ansgar Seide","doi":"10.3196/004433021834259291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433021834259291","url":null,"abstract":"In the extensive methodology of his Logik, Wilhelm Wundt examines in detail the methodological procedure in the individual sciences. As will be shown in this article, these investigations are not only intended to clarify or improve the procedures in the individual sciences, but\u0000 also to be of benefit to philosophy and especially to metaphysics. Wundt belongs to the traditional line of inductive metaphysics, whose representatives were of the opinion that metaphysics should be based on the results and methods of the individual sciences. In this sense, Wundt's detailed\u0000 investigation of the methods of the individual sciences should be understood as a prelude to an inductive metaphysics. By means of a central example, namely the introduction of the concept of causality based on an inference to the best explanation, this article shows how Wundt conceives the\u0000 construction of a metaphysics based on the foundations of the individual sciences.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47040213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-15DOI: 10.3196/004433021834259345
M. Neuber
Wir leben in unübersichtlichen Zeiten: Sogenannte Fake News verzerren, verdrehen und leugnen Informationen mit dem Ziel umfassender Verunsicherung; Verschwörungstheoretiker unterstellen dunkle Mächte und rufen teils sehr explizit zum Aufstand auf; Covid-19 treibt uns gnadenlos vor sich her, und niemand weiß so recht, wohin das alles noch führt. Was sagen Philosophinnen und Philosophen zu all dem? Es ist dies die Frage, der im Rahmen dieses Literaturberichtes nachgegangen werden soll. Ein Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit wird dabei freilich nicht erhoben. Was aber geleistet werden kann und soll, ist, eine Bestandsaufnahme zu liefern, die zumindest ein Zwischenfazit zum gegenwärtigen Stand der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen unserer Zeit erlaubt.
{"title":"Fake News, Pandemien, Verschwörungstheorien: Neuere philosophische Literatur zu Fragen unserer Zeit","authors":"M. Neuber","doi":"10.3196/004433021834259345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433021834259345","url":null,"abstract":"Wir leben in unübersichtlichen Zeiten: Sogenannte Fake News verzerren, verdrehen und leugnen Informationen mit dem Ziel umfassender Verunsicherung; Verschwörungstheoretiker unterstellen dunkle Mächte und rufen teils sehr explizit zum Aufstand auf; Covid-19 treibt uns\u0000 gnadenlos vor sich her, und niemand weiß so recht, wohin das alles noch führt. Was sagen Philosophinnen und Philosophen zu all dem? Es ist dies die Frage, der im Rahmen dieses Literaturberichtes nachgegangen werden soll. Ein Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit wird dabei freilich\u0000 nicht erhoben. Was aber geleistet werden kann und soll, ist, eine Bestandsaufnahme zu liefern, die zumindest ein Zwischenfazit zum gegenwärtigen Stand der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen unserer Zeit erlaubt.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49292394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-15DOI: 10.3196/004433021834259318
Annette Dufner
{"title":"Ein Konsequentialismus mit subjektivem Entscheidungskriterium: Kommentar zu From Value to Rightness","authors":"Annette Dufner","doi":"10.3196/004433021834259318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433021834259318","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41972473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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