One of the most frustrating features of modern jihadist insurgencies is their ability to endure and resurge, even after seeming defeats. What explains this jihadist resilience? In this paper, I present a new “boom–bust” economic theory for why jihadist groups can withstand serious losses, survive periods of decline, and then reclaim power. Using new evidence from Somalia, I demonstrate that jihadists learn how to adapt to fluctuations in their degree of territorial control, so that they can survive—and even thrive—during periods of decline. During a “boom” period, when jihadists enjoy a monopoly on force, they tax and govern as a proto-state. However, during a “bust,” when they are pushed out of power, jihadists shift their efforts to illicit business activities and insurgent warfare. When pressure abates, they again shift back to taxing and governing as a proto-state. This cyclical and long-term approach to order-making allows jihadists to adapt to changing battlefield conditions and survive serious setbacks. Jihadists establish their proto-states to varying degrees, governing in pockets and coves wherever and whenever the opportunities present themselves. They are as orderly as they can afford to be.
{"title":"The Long Jihad: The Boom–Bust Cycle behind Jihadist Durability","authors":"Aisha Ahmad","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One of the most frustrating features of modern jihadist insurgencies is their ability to endure and resurge, even after seeming defeats. What explains this jihadist resilience? In this paper, I present a new “boom–bust” economic theory for why jihadist groups can withstand serious losses, survive periods of decline, and then reclaim power. Using new evidence from Somalia, I demonstrate that jihadists learn how to adapt to fluctuations in their degree of territorial control, so that they can survive—and even thrive—during periods of decline. During a “boom” period, when jihadists enjoy a monopoly on force, they tax and govern as a proto-state. However, during a “bust,” when they are pushed out of power, jihadists shift their efforts to illicit business activities and insurgent warfare. When pressure abates, they again shift back to taxing and governing as a proto-state. This cyclical and long-term approach to order-making allows jihadists to adapt to changing battlefield conditions and survive serious setbacks. Jihadists establish their proto-states to varying degrees, governing in pockets and coves wherever and whenever the opportunities present themselves. They are as orderly as they can afford to be.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76610538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under what circumstances do third-party states oppose governments that marginalize their ethnic kin in foreign civil conflicts? We argue that the effect of transborder ethnic ties on third-party support for rebel movements depends upon two factors: (1) a constellation of ethnic power relations in which an ethnicity with access to political power in a potential intervener but is marginalized in a civil conflict state and (2) the political insecurity of leaders in a potential intervener. Said leaders facing a high probability of removal from office are willing to undertake risky foreign policies, including support for rebel movements, hoping that such actions will generate an ethnically tinged rally effect. We draw upon the literature on diversionary theory to develop an empirical expectation. We then assemble a dataset of potential intervener–civil conflict state dyad-years to model this expectation. The political insecurity of leaders is measured with a variety of proxies. Our findings suggest that the well-known diversionary theory can be applied to a novel dependent variable that of third-party state sponsorship of rebel movements.
{"title":"Playing the Ethnic Card: Diversion, Transborder Ethnic Ties, and Sponsorship of Rebel Movements","authors":"Benjamin T. Jones, C. Linebarger","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA056","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Under what circumstances do third-party states oppose governments that marginalize their ethnic kin in foreign civil conflicts? We argue that the effect of transborder ethnic ties on third-party support for rebel movements depends upon two factors: (1) a constellation of ethnic power relations in which an ethnicity with access to political power in a potential intervener but is marginalized in a civil conflict state and (2) the political insecurity of leaders in a potential intervener. Said leaders facing a high probability of removal from office are willing to undertake risky foreign policies, including support for rebel movements, hoping that such actions will generate an ethnically tinged rally effect. We draw upon the literature on diversionary theory to develop an empirical expectation. We then assemble a dataset of potential intervener–civil conflict state dyad-years to model this expectation. The political insecurity of leaders is measured with a variety of proxies. Our findings suggest that the well-known diversionary theory can be applied to a novel dependent variable that of third-party state sponsorship of rebel movements.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84477689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"159 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84681683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87623204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab032","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83270295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79119963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80958487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87426618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent scholarship analyzes norm dynamics in the US context using the prohibition on assassination contained in Executive Order 12333 as the relevant norm. These studies argue that—before 9/11—the ban on assassination was largely uncontested and effectively constrained US foreign policy. In doing so, these studies overlook the impact of the Reagan administration on the evolution of the ban. This article establishes that the Reagan administration engaged in a concerted, and largely successful, effort to undermine the ban. The article relies on scholarship on norm contestation and norm robustness. The analysis identifies key features of the ban as a norm, including its ambiguity and executive character. It highlights the role and power of a cluster of US officials led by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Casey. Crucially, the analysis traces the prominence of dynamics of contestation of the ban in the context of unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. In line with existing scholarship, the analysis finds cases of validity contestation, meaning contestation, and applicatory contestation. Contrary to existing scholarship, however, the analysis stresses the radical nature of actors’ attempts to shrink the remit of the ban through applicatory contestation. This contestation was often made superfluous by the blurring—through meaning contestation—of the expectations set by the norm. A historically grounded analysis of contestation during the Reagan years provides a better understanding of how US officials (re)shaped the ban, establishing precedents for the legal, political, and discursive conventions surrounding assassination deployed after 9/11.
{"title":"Death by Reinterpretation: Dynamics of Norm Contestation and the US Ban on Assassination in the Reagan Years","authors":"Luca Trenta","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB012","url":null,"abstract":"Recent scholarship analyzes norm dynamics in the US context using the prohibition on assassination contained in Executive Order 12333 as the relevant norm. These studies argue that—before 9/11—the ban on assassination was largely uncontested and effectively constrained US foreign policy. In doing so, these studies overlook the impact of the Reagan administration on the evolution of the ban. This article establishes that the Reagan administration engaged in a concerted, and largely successful, effort to undermine the ban. The article relies on scholarship on norm contestation and norm robustness. The analysis identifies key features of the ban as a norm, including its ambiguity and executive character. It highlights the role and power of a cluster of US officials led by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Casey. Crucially, the analysis traces the prominence of dynamics of contestation of the ban in the context of unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. In line with existing scholarship, the analysis finds cases of validity contestation, meaning contestation, and applicatory contestation. Contrary to existing scholarship, however, the analysis stresses the radical nature of actors’ attempts to shrink the remit of the ban through applicatory contestation. This contestation was often made superfluous by the blurring—through meaning contestation—of the expectations set by the norm. A historically grounded analysis of contestation during the Reagan years provides a better understanding of how US officials (re)shaped the ban, establishing precedents for the legal, political, and discursive conventions surrounding assassination deployed after 9/11.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74263521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do governments make a strategic choice in deciding what type of security agent to use for repression? Research acknowledges the role of auxiliary groups such as militias in repression, yet surprisingly little attention is given to the state's formal domestic security agents, such as the police. We show that formal security organizations and auxiliary groups enhance the government's ability to repress by acting as strategic complements. As the better-regulated force, formal agents are often employed against violent riots, when regimes worry more about the ability to control the agents and their behavior more than about being visibly linked to the violence. In contrast, auxiliaries are often used to repress nonviolent campaigns, when the government seeks to benefit from agency loss in order not to be associated with the violence, which can be costly in these contexts. We empirically verify these linkages on country-month data for Africa using panel vector-autoregression (pVAR), which accounts for endogeneity, not only between the dependent and independent variables, but also the dependent variables. We complement these statistical results with case-based evidence and descriptive original data from non-African countries.
{"title":"Civil Dissent and Repression: An Agency-Centric Perspective","authors":"Ore Koren, Bumba Mukherjee","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogaa051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa051","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do governments make a strategic choice in deciding what type of security agent to use for repression? Research acknowledges the role of auxiliary groups such as militias in repression, yet surprisingly little attention is given to the state's formal domestic security agents, such as the police. We show that formal security organizations and auxiliary groups enhance the government's ability to repress by acting as strategic complements. As the better-regulated force, formal agents are often employed against violent riots, when regimes worry more about the ability to control the agents and their behavior more than about being visibly linked to the violence. In contrast, auxiliaries are often used to repress nonviolent campaigns, when the government seeks to benefit from agency loss in order not to be associated with the violence, which can be costly in these contexts. We empirically verify these linkages on country-month data for Africa using panel vector-autoregression (pVAR), which accounts for endogeneity, not only between the dependent and independent variables, but also the dependent variables. We complement these statistical results with case-based evidence and descriptive original data from non-African countries.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85568042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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