The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the security commitment it entails are cornerstones of the current international order. Despite this centrality, international relations scholarship is ill equipped to explain the origin of the American commitment to Europe in the form of a long-term, peacetime military presence. At the time, this disposition of military forces represented a historically novel practice. The rational and norm-oriented logics of action that characterize much international relations theory explain cooperation as proceeding from a foundation of given interests. This perspective constrains the ability of analysts to make sense of the dynamic nature and potential creativity of cooperative endeavors. Building on a pragmatist understanding of action, this paper conceptualizes cooperation as a contingent process, characterized by the reciprocal relationship of means and ends, through which actors’ initially ambiguous interests become more concrete. The ends of cooperation emerge endogenously, and the potential for creativity is inherent in the process. This dynamic resulted in the specific form of the American commitment to Europe. A pragmatist account foregrounds agency and in doing so draws attention to important developments that traditional analyses may overlook or assume in the effort to reconstruct a pre-existing structure of interests as the basis for cooperation. By underlining the processual cast of action, this paper also helps recontextualize institutionalization as one step within a broader cooperative dynamic.
{"title":"Boots on the Ground: Means, Ends, and the American Military Commitment to Europe","authors":"S. Schmidt","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the security commitment it entails are cornerstones of the current international order. Despite this centrality, international relations scholarship is ill equipped to explain the origin of the American commitment to Europe in the form of a long-term, peacetime military presence. At the time, this disposition of military forces represented a historically novel practice. The rational and norm-oriented logics of action that characterize much international relations theory explain cooperation as proceeding from a foundation of given interests. This perspective constrains the ability of analysts to make sense of the dynamic nature and potential creativity of cooperative endeavors. Building on a pragmatist understanding of action, this paper conceptualizes cooperation as a contingent process, characterized by the reciprocal relationship of means and ends, through which actors’ initially ambiguous interests become more concrete. The ends of cooperation emerge endogenously, and the potential for creativity is inherent in the process. This dynamic resulted in the specific form of the American commitment to Europe. A pragmatist account foregrounds agency and in doing so draws attention to important developments that traditional analyses may overlook or assume in the effort to reconstruct a pre-existing structure of interests as the basis for cooperation. By underlining the processual cast of action, this paper also helps recontextualize institutionalization as one step within a broader cooperative dynamic.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75857402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Populists have often seemed influential in the securitization of migration, in great part through pressuring non-populist governing elites into “mainstreaming” more hardline immigration positions. This article asks why, given the presumption in securitization literatures that elite insiders possess strong authority in defining security, non-populist governing elites often in fact cede ground to populist challengers who paint immigration as a threat. Securitization and political science literatures paint very different pictures of elite–challenger dynamics, but populist and securitization claims possess key ideational similarities, in relation to the holism and autonomy of the political community, and the apoliticism of pursuing purportedly self-evident goals. However, populism articulates securitarian concepts through a moralized anti-elitism that impugns elite authority, portraying governing elites as corruptly inert toward threats facing “the people.” This article explores how this ideational relationship may affect securitization processes through a process-tracing study of the populist radical right's successful pressuring of governing elites to securitize migration in the US state of Arizona. There, populists’ moralized accusations of corrupt elite inaction toward urgent security threats moved governing elites to adopt positions intended to demonstrate responsiveness to public border-security anxieties, thereby inscribing securitization. Taking an “ideational” view of both concepts shows how they can form a politically influential account of “common sense.” By undermining elite security authority—thus inverting the typically theorized power dynamics of securitization—populism may open new pathways for securitized policies to emerge.
{"title":"Populism and Securitization: The Corrosion of Elite Security Authority in a US–Mexico Border State","authors":"Mike Slaven","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Populists have often seemed influential in the securitization of migration, in great part through pressuring non-populist governing elites into “mainstreaming” more hardline immigration positions. This article asks why, given the presumption in securitization literatures that elite insiders possess strong authority in defining security, non-populist governing elites often in fact cede ground to populist challengers who paint immigration as a threat. Securitization and political science literatures paint very different pictures of elite–challenger dynamics, but populist and securitization claims possess key ideational similarities, in relation to the holism and autonomy of the political community, and the apoliticism of pursuing purportedly self-evident goals. However, populism articulates securitarian concepts through a moralized anti-elitism that impugns elite authority, portraying governing elites as corruptly inert toward threats facing “the people.” This article explores how this ideational relationship may affect securitization processes through a process-tracing study of the populist radical right's successful pressuring of governing elites to securitize migration in the US state of Arizona. There, populists’ moralized accusations of corrupt elite inaction toward urgent security threats moved governing elites to adopt positions intended to demonstrate responsiveness to public border-security anxieties, thereby inscribing securitization. Taking an “ideational” view of both concepts shows how they can form a politically influential account of “common sense.” By undermining elite security authority—thus inverting the typically theorized power dynamics of securitization—populism may open new pathways for securitized policies to emerge.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90189637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper casts American influence over the Schuman Plan of May 1950 as a hegemonic field effect, pushing forward recent attempts to develop more dynamic models of hegemonic ordering in world politics. Far from an automatic enactment of US preferences for European unification by French policy-makers, as prevailing macro-level theories imply, the Schuman Plan—French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's proposal to pool French and German coal and steel—was the product of a “structural homology” that developed between the French and American political fields after 1945. American officials in Paris, empowered by their control of Marshall Aid, fostered an alignment of the French and American political fields, empowering centrist coalitions and technocratic planners in France, who favored pro-capitalist, pro-European integration policies, of which the Schuman Plan was a signature artifact. The paper explores the implications of this historical case for the further development of relational meso-level theories of hegemony.
{"title":"Hegemonic Field Effects in World Politics: The United States and the Schuman Plan of 1950","authors":"David M. McCourt","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA035","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper casts American influence over the Schuman Plan of May 1950 as a hegemonic field effect, pushing forward recent attempts to develop more dynamic models of hegemonic ordering in world politics. Far from an automatic enactment of US preferences for European unification by French policy-makers, as prevailing macro-level theories imply, the Schuman Plan—French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's proposal to pool French and German coal and steel—was the product of a “structural homology” that developed between the French and American political fields after 1945. American officials in Paris, empowered by their control of Marshall Aid, fostered an alignment of the French and American political fields, empowering centrist coalitions and technocratic planners in France, who favored pro-capitalist, pro-European integration policies, of which the Schuman Plan was a signature artifact. The paper explores the implications of this historical case for the further development of relational meso-level theories of hegemony.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78393635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Islamic State, which controlled significant territory in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017, engaged in a wide repertoire of violence against civilians living in these areas. Despite extensive media coverage and scholarly attention, the determinants of this pattern of violence remain poorly understood. We argue that, contrary to a widespread assumption that the Islamic State wielded violence indiscriminately, it systematically targeted different social groups with distinct forms of violence, including sexual violence. Our theory focuses on ideology, suggesting it is a necessary element of explanations of patterns of violence on the part of many armed actors. Ideologies, to varying extent, prescribe organizational policies that order or authorize particular forms of violence against specific social groups and institutions that regulate the conditions under which they occur. We find support for our theory in the case of sexual violence by the Islamic State by triangulating between several types of qualitative data: official documents; social media data generated by individuals in or near Islamic State-controlled areas; interviews with Syrians and Iraqis who have knowledge of the organization’s policies including victims of violence and former Islamic State combatants; and secondary sources including local Arabic-language newspapers. Consistent with our theory, we find that the organization adopted ideologically motivated policies that authorized certain forms of sexual violence, including sexual slavery and child marriage. Forms of violence that violated organizational policies but were nonetheless tolerated by many commanders also occurred and we find evidence of two such practices: gang rape of Yazidi women and forced marriage of Sunni Muslim women.
{"title":"The Islamic State's Pattern of Sexual Violence: Ideology and Institutions, Policies and Practices","authors":"M. Revkin, E. Wood","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogaa038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa038","url":null,"abstract":"The Islamic State, which controlled significant territory in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017, engaged in a wide repertoire of violence against civilians living in these areas. Despite extensive media coverage and scholarly attention, the determinants of this pattern of violence remain poorly understood. We argue that, contrary to a widespread assumption that the Islamic State wielded violence indiscriminately, it systematically targeted different social groups with distinct forms of violence, including sexual violence. Our theory focuses on ideology, suggesting it is a necessary element of explanations of patterns of violence on the part of many armed actors. Ideologies, to varying extent, prescribe organizational policies that order or authorize particular forms of violence against specific social groups and institutions that regulate the conditions under which they occur. We find support for our theory in the case of sexual violence by the Islamic State by triangulating between several types of qualitative data: official documents; social media data generated by individuals in or near Islamic State-controlled areas; interviews with Syrians and Iraqis who have knowledge of the organization’s policies including victims of violence and former Islamic State combatants; and secondary sources including local Arabic-language newspapers. Consistent with our theory, we find that the organization adopted ideologically motivated policies that authorized certain forms of sexual violence, including sexual slavery and child marriage. Forms of violence that violated organizational policies but were nonetheless tolerated by many commanders also occurred and we find evidence of two such practices: gang rape of Yazidi women and forced marriage of Sunni Muslim women.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"218 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74523342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Who is a political prisoner? The classification of inmates as political prisoners has important real-world implications such as deciding over accession to international organizations or triggering international advocacy. However, the concept is ambiguously used in academic studies referring to both theoretically and empirically distinct groups of individuals. Building on a systematic review of the academic literature, I identify that definitions of political prisoners differ primarily with regard to (1) the source of politicization, (2) the timing of politicization, (3) the question of nonviolence, (4) the inclusion of identity prisoners, and (5) the criteria for biased state actions. In order to establish political prisoners as analytically consistent concept, I suggest to reserve it for victims of politically biased trials while remaining agnostic toward prisoners’ political motivations. I introduce explicit criteria grounded in international law to identify politically biased trials in practice. The new conceptualization allows to disentangle political imprisonments from other types of illegitimate and non-illegitimate imprisonments. A disaggregation of the concept further highlights that only a subset of political prisoners is entitled to demands for unconditional releases. Taken together, this article sheds light to the underlying meanings of different actors’ claims about political imprisonments and contributes to the systematic study of this type of human rights abuse.
{"title":"Who Is a Political Prisoner?","authors":"C. Steinert","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogaa052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa052","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Who is a political prisoner? The classification of inmates as political prisoners has important real-world implications such as deciding over accession to international organizations or triggering international advocacy. However, the concept is ambiguously used in academic studies referring to both theoretically and empirically distinct groups of individuals. Building on a systematic review of the academic literature, I identify that definitions of political prisoners differ primarily with regard to (1) the source of politicization, (2) the timing of politicization, (3) the question of nonviolence, (4) the inclusion of identity prisoners, and (5) the criteria for biased state actions. In order to establish political prisoners as analytically consistent concept, I suggest to reserve it for victims of politically biased trials while remaining agnostic toward prisoners’ political motivations. I introduce explicit criteria grounded in international law to identify politically biased trials in practice. The new conceptualization allows to disentangle political imprisonments from other types of illegitimate and non-illegitimate imprisonments. A disaggregation of the concept further highlights that only a subset of political prisoners is entitled to demands for unconditional releases. Taken together, this article sheds light to the underlying meanings of different actors’ claims about political imprisonments and contributes to the systematic study of this type of human rights abuse.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78891388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Disobedience among military personnel is common and can be highly consequential, given the military's centrality to the conduct of foreign policy and war. Despite this, scholars of international affairs typically assume that subordinates in the military obey their orders. While scholarship on military politics acknowledges the prevalence of disobedience, it focuses on group-level forms of resistance and characterizes all such behavior as undesirable. Both of these analytical choices obscure the fact that individuals in the military can respond to orders they do not like in any number of ways. Building on existing work on civil–military relations and military decision-making, this article develops a novel conceptual typology of individual-level disobedience in military organizations. Drawing on dozens of diverse examples, it shows how such resistance is best categorized into four broad types: defiance, refinement, grudging obedience, and exit. Further, it demonstrates the advantages of adopting this typology. In particular, it highlights how military disobedience can be either disloyal or loyal; disobedience can be productive by fostering innovation, adaptability, or cohesion in military organizations. In addition to providing new variables for research on military politics, this typology also points to underexplored linkages between behaviors that have so far been studied separately, such as desertion, surrender, and mutiny. La désobéissance du personnel militaire est courante et peut avoir de lourdes conséquences selon la centralité de l'Armée dans la conduite de la politique étrangère et de la guerre. Malgré cela, les chercheurs en affaires internationales présupposent généralement que les subordonnés de l'Armée obéissent aux ordres qui leur sont donnés. Bien que les recherches sur la politique militaire admettent la prévalence de la désobéissance, ces dernières se concentrent sur les formes de résistance au niveau Groupes et caractérisent toutes un tel comportement comme indésirable. Ces deux choix analytiques obscurcissent le fait que les individus de l'Armée peuvent réagir aux ordres qui ne leur plaisent pas de bien des façons. Cet article s'appuie sur des travaux existants portant sur les relations entre civils et militaires et sur la prise de décisions militaires pour développer une nouvelle typologie conceptuelle de la désobéissance au niveau Individus dans les organisations militaires. Il s'inspire de dizaines d'exemples divers pour montrer à quel point il est préférable de classer une telle résistance en quatre grands types: Défiance, Peaufinement, Obéissance à contrecœur et Sortie de l'Armée. De plus, cet article montre les avantages qu'offre l'adoption de cette typologie. Il met en particulier en évidence la mesure dans laquelle la désobéissance militaire peut être soit loyale, soit déloyale; la désobéissance peut s'avérer productive lorsqu'elle encourage l'innovation, l'adaptabilité ou la cohésion dans les organisations militaires
鉴于军方在外交政策和战争中的核心地位，军事人员的不服从是很常见的，而且可能会造成严重后果。尽管如此，国际事务学者通常认为军队中的下属服从他们的命令。虽然军事政治方面的学术研究承认不服从的普遍存在，但它关注的是群体层面的抵抗形式，并将所有这些行为定性为不受欢迎的。这两种分析性的选择都掩盖了这样一个事实，即军队中的个人可以以各种方式对他们不喜欢的命令做出反应。基于军民关系和军事决策的现有工作，本文发展了军事组织中个人层面不服从的新概念类型学。通过几十个不同的例子，它展示了这种抵抗如何被最好地分为四种类型:反抗、改进、勉强服从和退出。此外，它还展示了采用这种类型的优点。特别是，它强调了军事上的不服从可以是不忠的，也可以是忠诚的;在军事组织中，不服从可以通过培养创新、适应性或凝聚力而产生成效。除了为军事政治研究提供新的变量外，这种类型学还指出了迄今为止被单独研究的行为之间未被充分探索的联系，例如逃兵、投降和叛变。由军事人员和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人和政治人员组成的个人和军事人员组成的个人。马尔格里斯·塞拉，国际事务管理人员和其他组织的成员，如:与其他组织的成员，如:与其他组织的成员，如:与其他组织的成员，如:与其他组织的成员，如:从政治军事管理的角度来看，这是一种比较复杂的研究方法，它可以帮助人们更好地理解和理解与之相适应的各种形式，也可以帮助人们更好地理解与之相适应的各种形式。这两种选择的分析模糊了“个体的缺陷”和“个体的缺陷”，即“个体的缺陷”和“个体的缺陷”和“个体的缺陷”。第5条规定:“民事和军事之间的关系，民事和军事之间的关系，民事和军事之间的关系，民事和军事之间的关系，民事和军事之间的关系”，“新的类型学概念”，“民事和军事之间的关系”，“个人和组织之间的关系”，“军事之间的关系”。i ' s'inspire de dizaines d' examples跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水跳水。另外，这篇文章在采用新的类型学之前所提供的优势较少。特别地，我将会见到，当我采取措施时，我将会见到，当我采取措施时，我将会见到，当我采取措施时，我将会见到:“”是指“”，是指“”，是指“生产力”，是指“创新”，是指“适应性”，是指“”，是指“组织”，是指“军事”。En plus de fournir de nouvelles variables pour les research sur la politique militaire, ette typologie moncamement de liens insuffisment, ente prepologie moncamement, ente precamement, ente ente comcomements, ente ente ente, ente ente ente, ente ente ente, ente ente ente, ente ente ente, ente ente, ente ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente, ente。La desobediencia el个人militar es缩写y之间的测试有consecuencias importancia所对应艾尔·卢格中央del ejercito en La conduccion de La politica y La guerra外观。在此基础上，建立了一个国际组织，建立了一个国际组织，建立了一个国际组织，建立了一个国际组织，建立了一个国际组织，建立了一个国际组织，建立了一个国际组织，建立了一个国际组织。在此基础上，作者提出了一种新的研究方法，即通过对这些特征的分析，将这些特征与不可取的组合结合起来，将这些特征与不可取的组合结合起来。大使的意见是:analíticas我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是，órdenes我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是，我们的意见是。一个不服从的人存在于一个不服从的人的关系中cívico-militares通过一个不服从的人的决定，在一个不服从的人的关系中cívico-militares通过一个不服从的人的关系，在一个不服从的人的关系中存在于一个不服从的人的关系中。A travationssamuveros ejemployment diversos, muestra cómo esa resistencia se classic major en cuatro categorías amplias: desafío, perfeccionamiento, beencia de mala gana y retirada。Además, musea las ventajas de adoptar esta categorización。具体来说，destaca cómo la desobedient military puede ser desleal to leal。我们的服务包括:生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产、生产和生产。Además比例新变量para investigación en material de política military, esta categorización tamamicans señala vínculos poco explorados enter comcomamientos que hasta el momento se than estudiado por separado, como la deserción, la rendición y el motín。
{"title":"The Diversity of Disobedience in Military Organizations","authors":"Eric Hundman","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Disobedience among military personnel is common and can be highly consequential, given the military's centrality to the conduct of foreign policy and war. Despite this, scholars of international affairs typically assume that subordinates in the military obey their orders. While scholarship on military politics acknowledges the prevalence of disobedience, it focuses on group-level forms of resistance and characterizes all such behavior as undesirable. Both of these analytical choices obscure the fact that individuals in the military can respond to orders they do not like in any number of ways. Building on existing work on civil–military relations and military decision-making, this article develops a novel conceptual typology of individual-level disobedience in military organizations. Drawing on dozens of diverse examples, it shows how such resistance is best categorized into four broad types: defiance, refinement, grudging obedience, and exit. Further, it demonstrates the advantages of adopting this typology. In particular, it highlights how military disobedience can be either disloyal or loyal; disobedience can be productive by fostering innovation, adaptability, or cohesion in military organizations. In addition to providing new variables for research on military politics, this typology also points to underexplored linkages between behaviors that have so far been studied separately, such as desertion, surrender, and mutiny.\u0000 La désobéissance du personnel militaire est courante et peut avoir de lourdes conséquences selon la centralité de l'Armée dans la conduite de la politique étrangère et de la guerre. Malgré cela, les chercheurs en affaires internationales présupposent généralement que les subordonnés de l'Armée obéissent aux ordres qui leur sont donnés. Bien que les recherches sur la politique militaire admettent la prévalence de la désobéissance, ces dernières se concentrent sur les formes de résistance au niveau Groupes et caractérisent toutes un tel comportement comme indésirable. Ces deux choix analytiques obscurcissent le fait que les individus de l'Armée peuvent réagir aux ordres qui ne leur plaisent pas de bien des façons. Cet article s'appuie sur des travaux existants portant sur les relations entre civils et militaires et sur la prise de décisions militaires pour développer une nouvelle typologie conceptuelle de la désobéissance au niveau Individus dans les organisations militaires. Il s'inspire de dizaines d'exemples divers pour montrer à quel point il est préférable de classer une telle résistance en quatre grands types: Défiance, Peaufinement, Obéissance à contrecœur et Sortie de l'Armée. De plus, cet article montre les avantages qu'offre l'adoption de cette typologie. Il met en particulier en évidence la mesure dans laquelle la désobéissance militaire peut être soit loyale, soit déloyale; la désobéissance peut s'avérer productive lorsqu'elle encourage l'innovation, l'adaptabilité ou la cohésion dans les organisations militaires","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83081270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What explains the existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions involving arms transfers? This paper examines the potential influence of democratization and civil society activities on arms transfer policies and practice through a case study on Brazil. Brazil's re-democratization in 1985 provides an opportunity to test whether a change of regime type influences arms export behavior and whether civil society groups can influence it in newly democratized countries. Based on evidence collected mainly through archival research at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and semi-structured interviews, this paper argues that transitioning to democracy had an immediate effect on arms transfer policies and practice in Brazil. After the end of Brazil's military regime, arms export policies and practice changed due mainly to reputational concerns: a stricter arms control could provide reputational gains to Brazil in an international norm environment where liberal values were perceived to be cascading. In addition to this immediate effect, democratic institutions created better conditions for the emergence of civil society groups campaigning for a stricter arms control, which emerged in the late 1990s. The paper studies a campaign and network led by the civil society group Viva Rio, which led to the introduction of a stricter policy on arms sales to most Latin American and Caribbean countries. These findings imply that democratization has both short- and long-term effects on arms transfers and that democratic institutions can influence state behavior regarding arms transfers even in countries with little tradition of civil society groups working with arms control.
{"title":"Weapons from the South: Democratization, Civil Society, and Brazil's Arms Exports","authors":"Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What explains the existence of humanitarian concerns in decisions involving arms transfers? This paper examines the potential influence of democratization and civil society activities on arms transfer policies and practice through a case study on Brazil. Brazil's re-democratization in 1985 provides an opportunity to test whether a change of regime type influences arms export behavior and whether civil society groups can influence it in newly democratized countries. Based on evidence collected mainly through archival research at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and semi-structured interviews, this paper argues that transitioning to democracy had an immediate effect on arms transfer policies and practice in Brazil. After the end of Brazil's military regime, arms export policies and practice changed due mainly to reputational concerns: a stricter arms control could provide reputational gains to Brazil in an international norm environment where liberal values were perceived to be cascading. In addition to this immediate effect, democratic institutions created better conditions for the emergence of civil society groups campaigning for a stricter arms control, which emerged in the late 1990s. The paper studies a campaign and network led by the civil society group Viva Rio, which led to the introduction of a stricter policy on arms sales to most Latin American and Caribbean countries. These findings imply that democratization has both short- and long-term effects on arms transfers and that democratic institutions can influence state behavior regarding arms transfers even in countries with little tradition of civil society groups working with arms control.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78206220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Population movements have causes and consequences for both global security and the economic and security considerations of states. Migration itself is inexorably intertwined with global security outcomes, in the form of instability, state fragility, transnational terrorism and crime, and the radicalization (or perceived radicalization) of migrants and host societies. While modern states may have monopolized the authority over legitimate movement, they have never fully captured the management and enforcement of migration flows. Instead, market actors play key roles in determining migration outcomes—including the scale, direction, and violence associated with migration flows. Migration outcomes are, thus, critically constituted by two key forces—the security priorities of states and the complementary and competing forces of privatization and profit-making. While market forces undermine state control over migration, states have buffered and further consolidated their power over mobility by harnessing private actors and markets toward migration management and border control. We situate migration management and border control as a political economy of security issue, arguing that migration outcomes cannot be explained without examining the interaction between state security imperatives, private actors, and market forces.
{"title":"A Political Economy of Global Security Approach to Migration and Border Control","authors":"Noora Lori, Kaija Schilde","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogaa011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Population movements have causes and consequences for both global security and the economic and security considerations of states. Migration itself is inexorably intertwined with global security outcomes, in the form of instability, state fragility, transnational terrorism and crime, and the radicalization (or perceived radicalization) of migrants and host societies. While modern states may have monopolized the authority over legitimate movement, they have never fully captured the management and enforcement of migration flows. Instead, market actors play key roles in determining migration outcomes—including the scale, direction, and violence associated with migration flows. Migration outcomes are, thus, critically constituted by two key forces—the security priorities of states and the complementary and competing forces of privatization and profit-making. While market forces undermine state control over migration, states have buffered and further consolidated their power over mobility by harnessing private actors and markets toward migration management and border control. We situate migration management and border control as a political economy of security issue, arguing that migration outcomes cannot be explained without examining the interaction between state security imperatives, private actors, and market forces.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79419083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do some parties fail to settle conflict, even after long periods of fighting? Bargaining theory explains this through imperfect information, commitment problems, war entrepreneurs, and indivisible stakes. Integrating insights from social psychology into bargaining theory, this article proposes an additional bargaining obstacle. Conflict party members not only care about their in-group's welfare, but also want to avoid rewarding their opponent through concessions. A mutually acceptable agreement always contains concessions, yet when concessions are unpopular with key constituents, they are costly for leaders to make. This may result in a situation where leaders would prefer to settle but still decide to continue the war. Modifying a standard bargaining setup to account for this dilemma, the article demonstrates the difficulties of settling a conflict when out-group preferences are salient. It shows how events that increase the saliency of out-group preferences, such as major ceasefire violations, lead to a drop in public support for negotiations. The problem of costly concessions renders the search for a mutually acceptable agreement a delicate balancing act, particularly if constituents are isolated from the costs of war and political competitors mobilize around unpopular concessions.
{"title":"Negotiating Peace with Your Enemy: The Problem of Costly Concessions","authors":"V. Sticher","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA054","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Why do some parties fail to settle conflict, even after long periods of fighting? Bargaining theory explains this through imperfect information, commitment problems, war entrepreneurs, and indivisible stakes. Integrating insights from social psychology into bargaining theory, this article proposes an additional bargaining obstacle. Conflict party members not only care about their in-group's welfare, but also want to avoid rewarding their opponent through concessions. A mutually acceptable agreement always contains concessions, yet when concessions are unpopular with key constituents, they are costly for leaders to make. This may result in a situation where leaders would prefer to settle but still decide to continue the war. Modifying a standard bargaining setup to account for this dilemma, the article demonstrates the difficulties of settling a conflict when out-group preferences are salient. It shows how events that increase the saliency of out-group preferences, such as major ceasefire violations, lead to a drop in public support for negotiations. The problem of costly concessions renders the search for a mutually acceptable agreement a delicate balancing act, particularly if constituents are isolated from the costs of war and political competitors mobilize around unpopular concessions.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76581914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that states needing to engage in short-term strategic manipulation of their identity will often turn to branding strategies. Branding allows leaders the flexibility to adopt new roles or reimagine existing roles to fit with the current security environment. Drawing on insights from role theory, social identity, and branding, we develop a theoretical framework to understand how leaders innovate in roles. We apply this framework to two episodes of Argentine–US relations. The first case focuses on the Argentine role of active independent (1933–1945) despite US efforts to ascribe the faithful ally role. Only near the conclusion of the war did Perón transition to an ally partner role for strategic reasons and without much of a branding strategy. The second case is that of Argentina's adoption of the faithful ally role with the United States accompanied by a strong branding strategy under President Menem beginning in 1989. While innovation in the first case was possible without branding (though short-lived), the second case shows a more substantive transformation in Argentina's role set. Branding helps to carve out space in the role set for new roles that may compete with existing ones and ensure their successful adoption and enactment.
{"title":"Identity Management and Role Branding in Security Affairs: Alliance Building in Argentine Foreign Policy","authors":"Cameron G. Thies, Leslie E. Wehner","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAA055","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues that states needing to engage in short-term strategic manipulation of their identity will often turn to branding strategies. Branding allows leaders the flexibility to adopt new roles or reimagine existing roles to fit with the current security environment. Drawing on insights from role theory, social identity, and branding, we develop a theoretical framework to understand how leaders innovate in roles. We apply this framework to two episodes of Argentine–US relations. The first case focuses on the Argentine role of active independent (1933–1945) despite US efforts to ascribe the faithful ally role. Only near the conclusion of the war did Perón transition to an ally partner role for strategic reasons and without much of a branding strategy. The second case is that of Argentina's adoption of the faithful ally role with the United States accompanied by a strong branding strategy under President Menem beginning in 1989. While innovation in the first case was possible without branding (though short-lived), the second case shows a more substantive transformation in Argentina's role set. Branding helps to carve out space in the role set for new roles that may compete with existing ones and ensure their successful adoption and enactment.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79174965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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