Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1177/09683445221087744
Agustín Daniel Desiderato
This article focuses on the Argentine Navy’s situation during the years after the Great War. It explores some of the issues discussed within the institution and their connection to the national and international political context of the time. The technological backwardness and material obsolescence of the Navy was the focus of criticisms and claims made by some of its officers. The experience of the First World War was a prevailing element in these discussions and in designing projects to modernize the Argentine naval forces.
{"title":"Discussing Maritime Defence Programmes During the Interwar Period: Argentine Navy Officers and the Lessons of the First World War (1919-1924)","authors":"Agustín Daniel Desiderato","doi":"10.1177/09683445221087744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221087744","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on the Argentine Navy’s situation during the years after the Great War. It explores some of the issues discussed within the institution and their connection to the national and international political context of the time. The technological backwardness and material obsolescence of the Navy was the focus of criticisms and claims made by some of its officers. The experience of the First World War was a prevailing element in these discussions and in designing projects to modernize the Argentine naval forces.","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"30 1","pages":"144 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48696558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1177/09683445221084141
M. Samuels
Even after the First World War, the British and German armies remained strongly influenced by Clausewitz, for whom personality rather than mass was the best means to reduce friction. This article explores how this was reflected in their military doctrine between the two world wars. The German regulations showed a clear alignment with Clausewitz's thinking. The British tended to focus on the characteristics Clausewitz had argued were necessary for the troops, rather than for their commanders. The campaigns of 1939/40 caused the Germans to place even greater emphasis on boldness, while the British focused on steadiness and caution.
{"title":"Clausewitz and the Personality Characteristics of the Battlefield Commander in British and German Military Doctrine, 1918–1941","authors":"M. Samuels","doi":"10.1177/09683445221084141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221084141","url":null,"abstract":"Even after the First World War, the British and German armies remained strongly influenced by Clausewitz, for whom personality rather than mass was the best means to reduce friction. This article explores how this was reflected in their military doctrine between the two world wars. The German regulations showed a clear alignment with Clausewitz's thinking. The British tended to focus on the characteristics Clausewitz had argued were necessary for the troops, rather than for their commanders. The campaigns of 1939/40 caused the Germans to place even greater emphasis on boldness, while the British focused on steadiness and caution.","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"30 1","pages":"122 - 143"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42927259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-16DOI: 10.1177/09683445221078058
Pablo Ortega-del-Cerro
Early-Modern war absorbed large material resources, including manpower, warships, guns, ammunition and supplies, but there was one key element of warfare that was quite immaterial: information. This article analyses Spanish naval intelligence and deals with the production, collection, and management of information within and through the navy. To examine this complex issue this paper will focus on the Spanish naval intelligence system during the American Revolutionary War (1776–83). By the 1770s and the 1780s the Spanish navy had developed and improved an efficient framework that provided decisive information for the mobilisation of its naval forces.
{"title":"A War of Information: Spanish Naval Intelligence During the American Revolutionary War (1775–83)","authors":"Pablo Ortega-del-Cerro","doi":"10.1177/09683445221078058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221078058","url":null,"abstract":"Early-Modern war absorbed large material resources, including manpower, warships, guns, ammunition and supplies, but there was one key element of warfare that was quite immaterial: information. This article analyses Spanish naval intelligence and deals with the production, collection, and management of information within and through the navy. To examine this complex issue this paper will focus on the Spanish naval intelligence system during the American Revolutionary War (1776–83). By the 1770s and the 1780s the Spanish navy had developed and improved an efficient framework that provided decisive information for the mobilisation of its naval forces.","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"30 1","pages":"235 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46963995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-16DOI: 10.1177/09683445221084169
Benjamin M. Schneider
In April of 1945, members of the U.S. army massacred twenty unarmed prisoners near Tambach, Germany. This paper examines the army's response, and why despite abundant evidence and multiple confessions the military justice system failed to convict anyone for the crime. The system faltered due to an incomplete shift in the nature of military justice, one that sought to turn it from a disciplinary tool into one capable of punishing war criminals. The incident at Tambach was not unique, and instead shows a system in crisis – one unable to hold soldiers accountable for illegal violence on the battlefield.
{"title":"Massacre at Tambach: American War Criminals and the Limits of Military Justice, 1945","authors":"Benjamin M. Schneider","doi":"10.1177/09683445221084169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221084169","url":null,"abstract":"In April of 1945, members of the U.S. army massacred twenty unarmed prisoners near Tambach, Germany. This paper examines the army's response, and why despite abundant evidence and multiple confessions the military justice system failed to convict anyone for the crime. The system faltered due to an incomplete shift in the nature of military justice, one that sought to turn it from a disciplinary tool into one capable of punishing war criminals. The incident at Tambach was not unique, and instead shows a system in crisis – one unable to hold soldiers accountable for illegal violence on the battlefield.","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"30 1","pages":"163 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44107291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/0968344520963311
Hanene Zoghlami
Because the Anglophone historiography has tended to marginalize the French contribution to the allied chemical war during the Great War 1914-1918, this study has attempted to re-balance the historical narrative by emphasizing the collective nature and importance of this joint Franco-British enterprise. By interrogating a raft of under-utilized primary evidence in the French and British archives, elements of the two armies’ defensive and offensive gas warfare performance have been reassessed through the co-operation prism. The investigation demonstrates how closely, comprehensively, and effectively the two allies worked together in chemical weapon production and exchange, research and development, anti-gas protection, and indirect battlefield applications.
{"title":"Franco-British military co-operation in the Great Gas War 1915-1918","authors":"Hanene Zoghlami","doi":"10.1177/0968344520963311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344520963311","url":null,"abstract":"Because the Anglophone historiography has tended to marginalize the French contribution to the allied chemical war during the Great War 1914-1918, this study has attempted to re-balance the historical narrative by emphasizing the collective nature and importance of this joint Franco-British enterprise. By interrogating a raft of under-utilized primary evidence in the French and British archives, elements of the two armies’ defensive and offensive gas warfare performance have been reassessed through the co-operation prism. The investigation demonstrates how closely, comprehensively, and effectively the two allies worked together in chemical weapon production and exchange, research and development, anti-gas protection, and indirect battlefield applications.","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"29 1","pages":"406 - 426"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44127703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/09683445221088574e
A. Wilson
security crises caused by the war to an end. One means to that end was armaments limitation. In the League of Nations Covenant, the member states committed themselves to match Germany’s forced disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles by disarming to the lowest level consistent with national security. Although the preparations in Geneva for the much-delayed World Disarmament Conference were complex, tedious, and slow,Webster is correct that the military experts succeeded in identifying all the technical obstacles to disarmament – even if they failed to find ways around them. That goal would of course ultimately come down to a political agreement among the great powers on a mutually acceptable distribution of land, sea, and air forces combined with a legal regime to enable collective action against ‘aggressors’, the compulsory arbitration of disputes, and perhaps some limited international supervision or control of armaments. AsWebster argues, if general disarmament had any chance of success, then the critical first step was an Anglo-French consensus. As we know, that unanimity never emerged. For Webster, the explanation for the lack of agreement lies in different conceptions of international security. France, fearful of its relative weakness in relation to Germany, needed a security commitment from London or risk cutting its forces and/or allowing Germany some measure of rearmament. For Britain, preoccupied with its globe-spanning empire, France appeared both over-armed and overbearing in Europe. Despite changes in governments and the knowledge that no British government could ever allow France to fall to a German invasion, British officials dodged every French attempt to obtain a commitment from London to assist France in the event of an unprovoked German attack in exchange for compromises on all other security issues. When the World Disarmament Conference opened in February 1932, Britain played the role of honest broker between Paris and Berlin instead of an interested party. At the same time, France proposed disarmament schemes that would perpetuate its military superiority on the continent, Germany demanded not just the right to rearm but genuine equality in military strength, the Soviet Union (cynically) proposed the total abolition of armaments, the United States somewhat naively called for a general cut to defence spending and military strength, and Italy demanded equality with France, particularly in warships. In December 1932, Britain, France, and Italy recognised Germany’s equality of rights in armaments, but by then that limited concession was too little too late. To his credit, Webster speculates as to whether London and Paris had missed an opportunity to stabilise Europe through disarmament, but does not place much weight on that implausible counterfactual. Certainly, had Britain offered France a security guarantee, then France might have been more willing to accept limited German rearmament. But by 1932 Germany’s traditional politi
{"title":"Book Review: The 1945 Burma Campaign and the Transformation of the British Indian Army by Raymond A. Callahan and Daniel Marston","authors":"A. Wilson","doi":"10.1177/09683445221088574e","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221088574e","url":null,"abstract":"security crises caused by the war to an end. One means to that end was armaments limitation. In the League of Nations Covenant, the member states committed themselves to match Germany’s forced disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles by disarming to the lowest level consistent with national security. Although the preparations in Geneva for the much-delayed World Disarmament Conference were complex, tedious, and slow,Webster is correct that the military experts succeeded in identifying all the technical obstacles to disarmament – even if they failed to find ways around them. That goal would of course ultimately come down to a political agreement among the great powers on a mutually acceptable distribution of land, sea, and air forces combined with a legal regime to enable collective action against ‘aggressors’, the compulsory arbitration of disputes, and perhaps some limited international supervision or control of armaments. AsWebster argues, if general disarmament had any chance of success, then the critical first step was an Anglo-French consensus. As we know, that unanimity never emerged. For Webster, the explanation for the lack of agreement lies in different conceptions of international security. France, fearful of its relative weakness in relation to Germany, needed a security commitment from London or risk cutting its forces and/or allowing Germany some measure of rearmament. For Britain, preoccupied with its globe-spanning empire, France appeared both over-armed and overbearing in Europe. Despite changes in governments and the knowledge that no British government could ever allow France to fall to a German invasion, British officials dodged every French attempt to obtain a commitment from London to assist France in the event of an unprovoked German attack in exchange for compromises on all other security issues. When the World Disarmament Conference opened in February 1932, Britain played the role of honest broker between Paris and Berlin instead of an interested party. At the same time, France proposed disarmament schemes that would perpetuate its military superiority on the continent, Germany demanded not just the right to rearm but genuine equality in military strength, the Soviet Union (cynically) proposed the total abolition of armaments, the United States somewhat naively called for a general cut to defence spending and military strength, and Italy demanded equality with France, particularly in warships. In December 1932, Britain, France, and Italy recognised Germany’s equality of rights in armaments, but by then that limited concession was too little too late. To his credit, Webster speculates as to whether London and Paris had missed an opportunity to stabilise Europe through disarmament, but does not place much weight on that implausible counterfactual. Certainly, had Britain offered France a security guarantee, then France might have been more willing to accept limited German rearmament. But by 1932 Germany’s traditional politi","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"29 1","pages":"513 - 515"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42318145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/09683445211002554
D. Reynaud, E. Reynaud
While the Australian Imperial Force of 1914–1918 experienced a significant shift from amateurism to professionalism over the course of the war in most areas, one crucial role not yet examined in the literature on the Australian Imperial Force is that of army cook. This article argues that their role was not taken sufficiently seriously during the Great War, leaving them effectively still amateurs at the end of the war. It explores the regulations for army cooks, the processes of selection, training and monitoring, as well as their performance in camps and in the field, and draws the conclusion that the army failed to professionalize role.
{"title":"‘A kind of useless man’? An evaluation of AIF cooks and cookery, 1914–1918","authors":"D. Reynaud, E. Reynaud","doi":"10.1177/09683445211002554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445211002554","url":null,"abstract":"While the Australian Imperial Force of 1914–1918 experienced a significant shift from amateurism to professionalism over the course of the war in most areas, one crucial role not yet examined in the literature on the Australian Imperial Force is that of army cook. This article argues that their role was not taken sufficiently seriously during the Great War, leaving them effectively still amateurs at the end of the war. It explores the regulations for army cooks, the processes of selection, training and monitoring, as well as their performance in camps and in the field, and draws the conclusion that the army failed to professionalize role.","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"29 1","pages":"385 - 405"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49247510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/09683445221088574i
D. French
{"title":"Book Review: The EOKA Cause. Nationalism and the Failure of Cypriot Enosis by Andrew R. Novo","authors":"D. French","doi":"10.1177/09683445221088574i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221088574i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"29 1","pages":"519 - 520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44943717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/09683445221088574b
S. Zoller
{"title":"Book Review: Another Kind of War: The Nature and History of Terrorism by John A. Lynn II","authors":"S. Zoller","doi":"10.1177/09683445221088574b","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221088574b","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"29 1","pages":"510 - 511"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47529209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.1177/09683445221088574
G. Halsall
‘... Professor Clarke was cavalier with the facts. Oswald’s army was Anglian, not Saxon;* its Welsh enemies were Christians not pagans; the battle was fought not at Heavenfield but several miles away;* and it took place in the Winter of 634-5 not 642. Her ‘vocantur’ is a mistake for Bede’s vocatur. Battles and Latin grammar are not the strong point of Catherine Clarke, or (it seems) of Southampton University, where she now has a Chair of English.’ (p. 80: asterisks added)
{"title":"Book Review: British Battles 493–937. Mount Badon to Brunanburh by Andrew Breeze","authors":"G. Halsall","doi":"10.1177/09683445221088574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221088574","url":null,"abstract":"‘... Professor Clarke was cavalier with the facts. Oswald’s army was Anglian, not Saxon;* its Welsh enemies were Christians not pagans; the battle was fought not at Heavenfield but several miles away;* and it took place in the Winter of 634-5 not 642. Her ‘vocantur’ is a mistake for Bede’s vocatur. Battles and Latin grammar are not the strong point of Catherine Clarke, or (it seems) of Southampton University, where she now has a Chair of English.’ (p. 80: asterisks added)","PeriodicalId":44606,"journal":{"name":"War in History","volume":"29 1","pages":"507 - 508"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45570530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：