Pub Date : 2023-06-08DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2214328
J. Wirtz
Abstract There is a paradox that accompanies intelligence failure. Drawn from the work of Richard Betts, one of the most influential scholars in the field of intelligence studies, this paradox is based on two propositions. First, there will always be accurate signals in the “pipeline” before a significant failure of intelligence. Second, intelligence failures are inevitable. Combined, these propositions motivate much intellectual activity in the field of intelligence studies: to devise effective ways to use available information and analysis to avoid failures of intelligence, especially those leading to strategic surprise. This article explores how scholars have addressed these propositions to answer the question: Are intelligence failures still inevitable?
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Pub Date : 2023-05-30DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2209493
Bram Spoor, Peter de Werd
Intelligence studies missed social science’s “complexity turn” more than twenty years ago. The aim of this article is to examine military intelligence from a complexity science perspective and discuss related concepts such as sensemaking and reflexivity. For this, military and intelligence theory, doctrine, and practice are studied. Complexity insights from military sciences are used to review mental models and current thinking in military intelligence. Rather than viewing it as a clearly defined and autonomous field or function embodied by a closed intelligence cycle, military intelligence is best seen as a situated practice. This situatedness is illustrated in two cases regarding vertical and horizontal contextual influences. First, a discussion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization deployments in Afghanistan shows important vertical influences: the impact of (political) context and task. Second, a review of United Nations missions exemplifies the horizontal dimension: the need for informal collaboration, ad hoc organization, and a holistic approach. However, both cases show vertical and horizontal influences. Overall, this article stresses the applicability of sensemaking rather than the intelligence cycle and makes suggestions for further incorporating complexity research into intelligence.
{"title":"Complexity in Military Intelligence","authors":"Bram Spoor, Peter de Werd","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2209493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2209493","url":null,"abstract":"Intelligence studies missed social science’s “complexity turn” more than twenty years ago. The aim of this article is to examine military intelligence from a complexity science perspective and discuss related concepts such as sensemaking and reflexivity. For this, military and intelligence theory, doctrine, and practice are studied. Complexity insights from military sciences are used to review mental models and current thinking in military intelligence. Rather than viewing it as a clearly defined and autonomous field or function embodied by a closed intelligence cycle, military intelligence is best seen as a situated practice. This situatedness is illustrated in two cases regarding vertical and horizontal contextual influences. First, a discussion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization deployments in Afghanistan shows important vertical influences: the impact of (political) context and task. Second, a review of United Nations missions exemplifies the horizontal dimension: the need for informal collaboration, ad hoc organization, and a holistic approach. However, both cases show vertical and horizontal influences. Overall, this article stresses the applicability of sensemaking rather than the intelligence cycle and makes suggestions for further incorporating complexity research into intelligence.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135479082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-30DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2204726
Jefferson Adams
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1 “Former Special Agent in Charge of the New York FBI Counterintelligence Division Charged with Violating U.S. Sanctions on Russia.” The United States Department of Justice, 23 January 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-special-agent-charge-new-york-fbi-counterintelligence-division-charged-violating2 Brian Latell, Castro’s Secrets: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 239–247.3 A vigorous rebuttal to Bamford’s critique of Israel can be found in the recent memoirs of Mike Pompeo, the former CIA director and secretary of state. “America’s real special relationship,” he argues, “may well be the one we have with Israel.” Explaining how the Abraham Accords emerged during his tenure in office, Pompeo states, “We didn’t see things as Jews versus Arabs, or Israel versus everyone but America. We could see with fresh eyes how the region was poised for a realignment, with the forces of peace and stability (Israel and certain neighbors) opposing the forces of destruction and extremism (the Iranian regime, its proxies, and Sunni jihadists such as ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and al-Queda).” Never Give an Inch: Fighting for the America I Love (New York: Broadside Books, 2023), pp. 309–329.4 Prime examples cited by Bamford include Admiral Michael Rogers (National Security Agency [NSA]/Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), General Michael Hayden (NSA/CIA), General James Clapper (director of national intelligence), and George Tenet (CIA).Additional informationNotes on contributorsJefferson AdamsJefferson Adams is Professor Emeritus of History at Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, New York; Senior Editor of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence; and author of Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War. The author can be contacted at jadams@slc.edu.
注1“负责纽约联邦调查局反情报部门的前特工，被控违反美国对俄罗斯的制裁。”美国司法部，2023年1月23日，https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-special-agent-charge-new-york-fbi-counterintelligence-division-charged-violating2 Brian Latell，卡斯特罗的秘密:中央情报局和古巴的情报机器(纽约:Palgrave Macmillan出版社，2012)，第239-247.3页，对班福德批评以色列的有力反驳可以在前中央情报局局长和国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥最近的回忆录中找到。“美国真正的特殊关系，”他认为，“很可能是我们与以色列的关系。”蓬佩奥在解释《亚伯拉罕协议》是如何在他任职期间形成的时说，“我们没有把事情看作犹太人与阿拉伯人，或者以色列与除美国以外的所有国家。我们可以以全新的视角看到该地区是如何准备重新调整的，和平与稳定的力量(以色列和某些邻国)反对破坏和极端主义的力量(伊朗政权，其代理人，以及逊尼派圣战分子，如ISIS[伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国]和基地组织)。”《永不让步:为我爱的美国而战》(纽约:Broadside Books, 2023)，第309-329.4页。班福德引用的主要例子包括海军上将迈克尔·罗杰斯(国家安全局/中央情报局)、迈克尔·海登将军(国家安全局/中央情报局)、詹姆斯·克拉珀将军(国家情报局局长)和乔治·特尼特(中央情报局)。作者简介:杰佛逊·亚当斯杰佛逊·亚当斯是纽约布朗克斯维尔莎拉·劳伦斯学院的名誉教授;国际情报与反情报杂志高级编辑;也是《德国情报历史词典》和《冷战时期的战略情报》的作者。可以通过jadams@slc.edu与作者联系。
{"title":"Chaos in Counterintelligence","authors":"Jefferson Adams","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2204726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2204726","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1 “Former Special Agent in Charge of the New York FBI Counterintelligence Division Charged with Violating U.S. Sanctions on Russia.” The United States Department of Justice, 23 January 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-special-agent-charge-new-york-fbi-counterintelligence-division-charged-violating2 Brian Latell, Castro’s Secrets: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 239–247.3 A vigorous rebuttal to Bamford’s critique of Israel can be found in the recent memoirs of Mike Pompeo, the former CIA director and secretary of state. “America’s real special relationship,” he argues, “may well be the one we have with Israel.” Explaining how the Abraham Accords emerged during his tenure in office, Pompeo states, “We didn’t see things as Jews versus Arabs, or Israel versus everyone but America. We could see with fresh eyes how the region was poised for a realignment, with the forces of peace and stability (Israel and certain neighbors) opposing the forces of destruction and extremism (the Iranian regime, its proxies, and Sunni jihadists such as ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and al-Queda).” Never Give an Inch: Fighting for the America I Love (New York: Broadside Books, 2023), pp. 309–329.4 Prime examples cited by Bamford include Admiral Michael Rogers (National Security Agency [NSA]/Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), General Michael Hayden (NSA/CIA), General James Clapper (director of national intelligence), and George Tenet (CIA).Additional informationNotes on contributorsJefferson AdamsJefferson Adams is Professor Emeritus of History at Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, New York; Senior Editor of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence; and author of Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War. The author can be contacted at jadams@slc.edu.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135642890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2187190
Alessandro Scheffler, Jan Dietrich
Abstract Despite being centrally important, military intelligence remains understudied and undertheorized. This negligence stems partly from its unclear definition and the difficult differentiation between “civilian” and “military” intelligence. The available official definitions serve instrumental purposes rather than compelling lines of reasoning and reflect the complex and heterogeneous structure of national military intelligence architectures. By using classical intelligence studies approaches, it is possible to get a better understanding of the various ways in which military intelligence can be defined. But such an approach must be complemented by an appreciation of five classic points of “bureaucratic contention” that influence how states define the role of military intelligence within their wider Intelligence Community. These are divided mandates, adequate warfighter support, consistency of national intelligence assessments, intellectual independence and rigor within military intelligence, and the optimal organization and integration of military expertise.
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Pub Date : 2023-05-22DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2204461
J. Prout
{"title":"Queen of Cuba","authors":"J. Prout","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2204461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2204461","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"233 1","pages":"1380 - 1384"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77010246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-18DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2204173
Nigel West
{"title":"Dutch Courage","authors":"Nigel West","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2204173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2204173","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77642741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-18DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2204995
Petr Kaňák, Jan Koura
{"title":"In the Shadow of the KGB: Legacy of Czechoslovak Intelligence (1948–1989)","authors":"Petr Kaňák, Jan Koura","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2204995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2204995","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84237520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-16DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2177940
Matthew Gerth
Abstract Throughout the 1940s and into the early 1950s, the British government sought through various means to curtain the activities of a journalist and a self-described private intelligence officer named Kenneth de Courcy. The objective of this consorted campaign was to discover de Courcy’s sources and to limit his influence on current affairs. The methods employed in this pursuit were unethical, conspiratorial, and at times illegal. They represent a form of governmental malfeasance that hitherto has rarely been noted in the existing historiography covering the period. This overlooked episode calls into question the long-standing narrative that British authorities of the time considered communist spies as the primary threat to continued governmental secrecy, especially because few suspected Soviet agents were investigated and harassed to the same degree as this dedicated anticommunist and self-described committed patriot.
{"title":"Fighting the Anti-Red Menace: Britain’s Cold War against Kenneth de Courcy","authors":"Matthew Gerth","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2177940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2177940","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Throughout the 1940s and into the early 1950s, the British government sought through various means to curtain the activities of a journalist and a self-described private intelligence officer named Kenneth de Courcy. The objective of this consorted campaign was to discover de Courcy’s sources and to limit his influence on current affairs. The methods employed in this pursuit were unethical, conspiratorial, and at times illegal. They represent a form of governmental malfeasance that hitherto has rarely been noted in the existing historiography covering the period. This overlooked episode calls into question the long-standing narrative that British authorities of the time considered communist spies as the primary threat to continued governmental secrecy, especially because few suspected Soviet agents were investigated and harassed to the same degree as this dedicated anticommunist and self-described committed patriot.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88426517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-11DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2197560
Peter B.M.J. Pijpers, Paul A.L. Ducheine
The dawn of cyberspace has been conducive to unlocking the potential of the information environment. As a result, armed forces embrace concepts of engagement in the information environment, in cyberspace, and especially in information maneuver—the concept of generating effects in the information environment. Unfortunately, some within the military remit perceive information maneuver as the “2.0 version” of existing intelligence capabilities emphasizing the digitization of the battlefield. While enhanced intelligence, understanding, and decisionmaking are essential, information maneuver is, above all, a means to act and generate effects in the cognitive, virtual, or physical dimension similar to deception, propaganda, or covert actions. The concept of information maneuver must not be seen as an “add on” to existing capabilities within the military instrument of power but instead as a way of exerting power and achieving effects within the remit of information as an instrument, away from the traditional physical military approach to conduct operations.
{"title":"“If You Have a Hammer…”: Shaping the Armed Forces’ Discourse on Information Maneuver","authors":"Peter B.M.J. Pijpers, Paul A.L. Ducheine","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2197560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2197560","url":null,"abstract":"The dawn of cyberspace has been conducive to unlocking the potential of the information environment. As a result, armed forces embrace concepts of engagement in the information environment, in cyberspace, and especially in information maneuver—the concept of generating effects in the information environment. Unfortunately, some within the military remit perceive information maneuver as the “2.0 version” of existing intelligence capabilities emphasizing the digitization of the battlefield. While enhanced intelligence, understanding, and decisionmaking are essential, information maneuver is, above all, a means to act and generate effects in the cognitive, virtual, or physical dimension similar to deception, propaganda, or covert actions. The concept of information maneuver must not be seen as an “add on” to existing capabilities within the military instrument of power but instead as a way of exerting power and achieving effects within the remit of information as an instrument, away from the traditional physical military approach to conduct operations.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135473838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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