Abstract The drivers (and inhibitors) of political finance reform are complex and overlapping. The case of Australia is an intriguing one. By international standards, regulation of political finance at the national level in Australia is laissez-faire and inertial. Since 2010 however, half the states and territories have adopted holistic party finance systems designed to limit the influence of money in electoral politics. These reforms have included caps on expenditure and donations, generous public funding and tighter donation disclosure. This article explores both the emerging constitutional constraints on—and political drivers of—this flourishing of reform. Whilst there is evidence of party machines seeking security in enhanced public funding, there is limited evidence to support the cartel thesis. Overall these developments highlight the potential for experimentation and cross-fertilization in a federal system, suggesting that reform is episodic but infectious, rather than a manifestation of any inexor...
{"title":"Party Finance Law in Australia: Innovation and Enervation","authors":"OrrGraeme","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0333","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The drivers (and inhibitors) of political finance reform are complex and overlapping. The case of Australia is an intriguing one. By international standards, regulation of political finance at the national level in Australia is laissez-faire and inertial. Since 2010 however, half the states and territories have adopted holistic party finance systems designed to limit the influence of money in electoral politics. These reforms have included caps on expenditure and donations, generous public funding and tighter donation disclosure. This article explores both the emerging constitutional constraints on—and political drivers of—this flourishing of reform. Whilst there is evidence of party machines seeking security in enhanced public funding, there is limited evidence to support the cartel thesis. Overall these developments highlight the potential for experimentation and cross-fertilization in a federal system, suggesting that reform is episodic but infectious, rather than a manifestation of any inexor...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0333","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In November 2007, Illinois passed a law requiring optical scan voting machines to provide voters with an audible warning if they failed to register a vote in elections to any one of five statewide offices. The policy took effect in 2010, but 12 counties failed to upgrade their equipment in time to implement the policy. Miller (2013) exploited this opportunity to determine whether the alert reduced undervoting in the precincts where it was implemented, and found no significant effects in primary elections. We extend the analysis to precinct-level returns from the 2010 Illinois General Election, and find little evidence for reduced aggregate undervoting resulting from the audible undervote alert. We do, however, find some evidence that the alert was more effective for races that appeared on the lower portion of the ballot.
{"title":"Revisiting Roll-Off in Alerted Optical Scan Precincts: Evidence from Illinois General Elections","authors":"G. MillerMichael, D. TumaMichelle, WoodsLogan","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0299","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In November 2007, Illinois passed a law requiring optical scan voting machines to provide voters with an audible warning if they failed to register a vote in elections to any one of five statewide offices. The policy took effect in 2010, but 12 counties failed to upgrade their equipment in time to implement the policy. Miller (2013) exploited this opportunity to determine whether the alert reduced undervoting in the precincts where it was implemented, and found no significant effects in primary elections. We extend the analysis to precinct-level returns from the 2010 Illinois General Election, and find little evidence for reduced aggregate undervoting resulting from the audible undervote alert. We do, however, find some evidence that the alert was more effective for races that appeared on the lower portion of the ballot.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"382-391"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0299","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60997345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The case of Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) challenges us to find a standard for partisan gerrymandering that is judicially discernable and manageable. Without such a standard even the most egregious partisan gerrymanders cannot be effectively challenged. However, we argue that the way to find a suitable standard is not to embark on a quest for a “new” standard. Rather it is to take the existing valid measures that science gives us, and show that these can be grounded in constitutionally protected rights. Using recent results in social choice theory, we show that the existing partisan symmetry standard can be derived from an individual right to equal protection. We also show that the existing technology for measuring partisan symmetry can provide a judicially manageable test for partisan bias.
2004年的Vieth v. Jubelirer一案挑战了我们，要求我们找到一个在司法上可识别和可管理的党派不公正划分的标准。如果没有这样的标准，即使是最恶劣的党派划分不公也无法受到有效挑战。然而，我们认为找到一个合适的标准的方法不是着手寻找一个“新”标准。相反，它是采取科学提供给我们的现有有效措施，并表明这些措施可以以宪法保护的权利为基础。利用社会选择理论的最新结果，我们表明现有的党派对称标准可以从个人平等保护的权利中推导出来。我们还表明，现有的测量党派对称性的技术可以为党派偏见提供司法上可管理的测试。
{"title":"A Discernable and Manageable Standard for Partisan Gerrymandering","authors":"A. McGann, C. Smith, Michael Latner, J. Keena","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0312","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The case of Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) challenges us to find a standard for partisan gerrymandering that is judicially discernable and manageable. Without such a standard even the most egregious partisan gerrymanders cannot be effectively challenged. However, we argue that the way to find a suitable standard is not to embark on a quest for a “new” standard. Rather it is to take the existing valid measures that science gives us, and show that these can be grounded in constitutionally protected rights. Using recent results in social choice theory, we show that the existing partisan symmetry standard can be derived from an individual right to equal protection. We also show that the existing technology for measuring partisan symmetry can provide a judicially manageable test for partisan bias.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"295-311"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0312","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60997952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract All electoral systems erect qualifications and disqualifications for would-be candidates. An unqualified candidate cannot be duly elected. But what is—or should be—the effect on an elective race of an unqualified losing candidate appearing on the ballot? This commentary examines the law and policy on point, to conclude that only in limited circumstances could an election be argued to be void because of a losing candidate being found to be unqualified. Those circumstances would be where first-past-the-post voting is used and the loser's vote tally well exceeded the winning margin. In any event, it is a point that legislators everywhere would do well to clarify.
{"title":"Does an Unqualified But Losing Candidacy Upset an Election","authors":"Graeme Orr","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0336","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract All electoral systems erect qualifications and disqualifications for would-be candidates. An unqualified candidate cannot be duly elected. But what is—or should be—the effect on an elective race of an unqualified losing candidate appearing on the ballot? This commentary examines the law and policy on point, to conclude that only in limited circumstances could an election be argued to be void because of a losing candidate being found to be unqualified. Those circumstances would be where first-past-the-post voting is used and the loser's vote tally well exceeded the winning margin. In any event, it is a point that legislators everywhere would do well to clarify.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"424-429"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0336","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Compulsory Voting: For and Against","authors":"JohnSarah","doi":"10.1089/elj.2015.0346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2015.0346","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"430-433"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/elj.2015.0346","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We propose standards for detecting partisan gerrymandering as a finding of fact and for determining whether the factual finding is legally significant. The standard is grounded in the U.S. constitutional principle of equal voting rights and is easily manageable inasmuch as its prime analytical feature requires comparing a party's district median vote percentage to its district mean vote percentage. Equally important, the median-mean comparison serves as an effective indicator of whether gerrymandering is the cause of the inequitable treatment. We apply the standard to six alleged cases of gerrymandering of congressional districts and find three cases are not gerrymanders, three are gerrymanders, and one of the three gerrymanders crosses the threshold to legal significance.
{"title":"Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases","authors":"Michael D. McDonald, Robin E. Best","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0358","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We propose standards for detecting partisan gerrymandering as a finding of fact and for determining whether the factual finding is legally significant. The standard is grounded in the U.S. constitutional principle of equal voting rights and is easily manageable inasmuch as its prime analytical feature requires comparing a party's district median vote percentage to its district mean vote percentage. Equally important, the median-mean comparison serves as an effective indicator of whether gerrymandering is the cause of the inequitable treatment. We apply the standard to six alleged cases of gerrymandering of congressional districts and find three cases are not gerrymanders, three are gerrymanders, and one of the three gerrymanders crosses the threshold to legal significance.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"312-330"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0358","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The scale and logistical demands of conducting elections means that they are typically delivered by many thousands of men and women employed for very short periods of time, most no more than a single day every three, four, or five years depending upon the constitutional requirements or electoral laws of the country concerned. The inevitable fact that elections can only be delivered “through” the individual and collective efforts of large numbers of ordinary men and women drawn from the community represents a fundamental strength of democratic systems. Their involvement provides transparency, credibility, and a strong sense of participation in the process that ultimately determines who will be installed as the government of the day to make decisions affecting the lives of the country's citizens. Yet, some recent events in Australia (and elsewhere) involving significant errors made by polling officials demonstrate that the involvement of these same men and women from the community represents a chal...
{"title":"Polling Officials: The Strength and Weakness of Democratic Systems","authors":"KillesteynEd","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0308","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The scale and logistical demands of conducting elections means that they are typically delivered by many thousands of men and women employed for very short periods of time, most no more than a single day every three, four, or five years depending upon the constitutional requirements or electoral laws of the country concerned. The inevitable fact that elections can only be delivered “through” the individual and collective efforts of large numbers of ordinary men and women drawn from the community represents a fundamental strength of democratic systems. Their involvement provides transparency, credibility, and a strong sense of participation in the process that ultimately determines who will be installed as the government of the day to make decisions affecting the lives of the country's citizens. Yet, some recent events in Australia (and elsewhere) involving significant errors made by polling officials demonstrate that the involvement of these same men and women from the community represents a chal...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"411-423"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0308","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60997518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The lack of candidates and low competition for American legislatures prompts the search for institutional reforms to encourage more citizens to run for office. One proposed remedy is to provide public subsidies to qualified candidates to mitigate the cost of fundraising and improve the odds of winning. This study provides an empirical test of whether subsidies attract additional candidates. Using new data from a unique panel survey of political elites in Connecticut before and after reform, the findings indicate that subsidies may change attitudes about the cost of running, but they have little direct impact on the decision to run because other factors are much more salient. The results highlight the strength of the “strategic candidate” thesis and illustrate the difficulty of designing institutions to encourage more people to run for office.
{"title":"Money That Draws No Interest: Public Financing of Legislative Elections and Candidate Emergence","authors":"R. J. Raja, David L. Wiltse","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0306","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The lack of candidates and low competition for American legislatures prompts the search for institutional reforms to encourage more citizens to run for office. One proposed remedy is to provide public subsidies to qualified candidates to mitigate the cost of fundraising and improve the odds of winning. This study provides an empirical test of whether subsidies attract additional candidates. Using new data from a unique panel survey of political elites in Connecticut before and after reform, the findings indicate that subsidies may change attitudes about the cost of running, but they have little direct impact on the decision to run because other factors are much more salient. The results highlight the strength of the “strategic candidate” thesis and illustrate the difficulty of designing institutions to encourage more people to run for office.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"392-410"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60997402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Social scientists have made progress in providing the courts with useful measures of partisan asymmetry in the transformation of votes to seats, but have thus far left a larger question unanswered: how can partisan gerrymandering be distinguished from a state legislature's acceptable efforts to apply traditional districting criteria, keep communities of interest together, and facilitate the representation of minorities? This article demonstrates how a straightforward redistricting algorithm can be used to generate a benchmark against which to contrast a plan that has been called into constitutional question, thus laying bare any partisan advantage that cannot be attributed to legitimate legislative objectives. We use the controversial 2012 Florida Congressional map to show how our approach can be used to demonstrate an unconstitutional gerrymander.
{"title":"Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders","authors":"ChenJowei, RoddenJonathan","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0317","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Social scientists have made progress in providing the courts with useful measures of partisan asymmetry in the transformation of votes to seats, but have thus far left a larger question unanswered: how can partisan gerrymandering be distinguished from a state legislature's acceptable efforts to apply traditional districting criteria, keep communities of interest together, and facilitate the representation of minorities? This article demonstrates how a straightforward redistricting algorithm can be used to generate a benchmark against which to contrast a plan that has been called into constitutional question, thus laying bare any partisan advantage that cannot be attributed to legitimate legislative objectives. We use the controversial 2012 Florida Congressional map to show how our approach can be used to demonstrate an unconstitutional gerrymander.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"331-345"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0317","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Voting Rights Act litigation, even in the wake of Shelby County v. Holder, requires estimates of racial bloc voting, or the extent to which members of different racial groups vote differently. Although there are a variety of methods to make these estimates, direct evaluation and comparison of these methods is lacking. I examine these alternate methods in the way that they might be used in litigation using a large dataset of partisanship and racial information at the precinct level in five states. Additionally, I extend the application of these methods to estimation of racial group preferences in locations with more than one racial minority and assess the contextual determinants of larger and smaller errors in ecological regression estimates. I conclude that the ecological inference method developed by King (1997), which incorporates the deterministic precinct-level bounds on the quantities of interest and is easily implemented using open-source software, provides the best estimates for precinct-s...
{"title":"Evidence in Voting Rights Act Litigation: Producing Accurate Estimates of Racial Voting Patterns","authors":"de Benedictis-KessnerJustin","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2013.0224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2013.0224","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Voting Rights Act litigation, even in the wake of Shelby County v. Holder, requires estimates of racial bloc voting, or the extent to which members of different racial groups vote differently. Although there are a variety of methods to make these estimates, direct evaluation and comparison of these methods is lacking. I examine these alternate methods in the way that they might be used in litigation using a large dataset of partisanship and racial information at the precinct level in five states. Additionally, I extend the application of these methods to estimation of racial group preferences in locations with more than one racial minority and assess the contextual determinants of larger and smaller errors in ecological regression estimates. I conclude that the ecological inference method developed by King (1997), which incorporates the deterministic precinct-level bounds on the quantities of interest and is easily implemented using open-source software, provides the best estimates for precinct-s...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"361-381"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2013.0224","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60995514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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