Middle East Policy最新文献

The unexpected victory of the opposition Republican People's Party in Turkey's March 31 municipal elections raises intriguing questions about the future of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after more than two decades of his rule. Just 10 months after Erdoğan won a new term, a significant portion of the electorate voted against him and his Justice and Development Party, marking his largest defeat ever. The president acknowledged the significance of the defeat, describing the results as “not only a loss of votes but also a loss of soul and blood.” This article analyzes the factors that drove the outcome and contends that this was more a protest of the Turkish strongman than an approval of opposition policies. The people voted against Erdoğan's arrogance and authoritarian style, as well as the poor quality of his party's candidates; the worsening economy, especially for retirees; and perceptions of a deteriorating justice system. The main opposition party also benefited from skillful leadership less than a year after its defeat in the presidential election. While the outcome of the 2024 vote signals a desire for democratic governance and accountability, it remains uncertain at this early stage whether this is a temporary deviation.

Since the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, Israel's reactions have been met with criticism from a key friend: Russia. However, Moscow's public condemnation of the humanitarian crisis has not changed its material or normative policies toward Israel in other respects. This article analyzes Russia-Israel relations, especially concerning the Syrian conflict between 2015 and 2021. It demonstrates how the two states developed norms and structural practices—including regular meetings of elites, public statements, and other mechanisms—to mitigate disputes. These strategies created and sustained a friendship balance that prevented rivalry and escalation between the two. This process has helped them maintain their relationship during the recent spike of violence despite increasing strains.

The ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 marked a turning point in Egypt's modern history. The long-persecuted Muslim Brotherhood immediately became a key political player, and its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won election to lead the country. But despite those two years of popular engagement and victories at the ballot box, Morsi was ousted and the movement banished once again after a confrontation with the military in July 2013. Why did the Brotherhood choose to risk a conflict with the armed forces and not seek a compromise? This article contends that the decision was driven by the Muslim Brotherhood's long history of persecution, its broad base of support, its impressive successes after Mubarak fell, and its fear of losing the presidency. These set the Brotherhood on a course of action that suited its experiences and preferences. This path led the movement to ignore several facts suggesting it must seek to coordinate with the armed forces: The Brotherhood and the military did not enjoy cordial relations after Morsi's election in 2012; the movement's grassroots power was substantial, but there was no evidence it could prevail over the military's demand for Morsi to step down; and the military maintained its internal cohesion. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood's historical path guided its decision to avoid cooperation.

This study analyzes how ongoing conflicts in the Levant and the post-Soviet South Caucasus have upset the balance of relationships among Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Russia—and how this could escalate into a major, cross-regional war. Azerbaijan's military victories of 2020 and 2023 over the Armenia-occupied, separatist republic of Nagorno-Karabakh have antagonized Iran, which has seen these gains, coupled with Baku's increasingly revanchist rhetoric, as a major threat to regional security. With Armenia left on its own by its Russian ally, and with Turkey's and Israel's backing of Azerbaijan, the Gaza war has driven Iran to see Baku as a dangerous “Israeli asset.” However, the Palestine conflict has also sparked a rift between Turkey and Israel, throwing into question Baku's strength. If the militarist rhetoric of Azerbaijani elites leads the state to invade its weakened neighbor Armenia, this will increase the potential for a military confrontation between the two Shiite nations of Azerbaijan and Iran, with Armenia, Turkey, Israel, and Russia likely to be dragged in.

Lessons learned from counterterrorism operations indicate that purely military solutions are doomed to fail, and Israel is primed to repeat many of these mistakes. The comparison between America's post-9/11 wars and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not perfect: Al-Qaeda was in Afghanistan but was not native to the country, and the transnational ISIS emerged out of the chaos in Iraq and Syria. Hamas, by contrast, represents a resistance movement indigenous to Gaza. The militant group is deeply rooted in the political and social struggle for Palestinian self-determination, and its activities and support are motivated by desperate conditions on the ground. If Israel's assaults on Gaza in retaliation for the October 2023 Hamas bloodbath are to achieve enduring security, key questions arise, including whether the conflict will end with military occupation or political settlement. I argue that Israel should learn from the US strategic blunders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Absent a political solution, Israelis are likely to face terrorist assaults in the future. The military campaign may weaken or impair Hamas's infrastructure and power bases in Gaza, but without a plan for governance and development, Israel is likely to face the re-emergence of a broadly based resistance movement.

This article analyzes the vicious cycle of Israel's control of water resources in Jordan and the Palestinian territories, the development of a one-state reality in the region, and geopolitical changes driven by the Israeli occupation and the war in Gaza. Israel no longer suffers from water shortages, but its domination of Palestine and the conflict sparked by Hamas have increased the yawning water deficit. This has played a role in the decades-long move away from the two-state solution promised by the Oslo peace process. This article examines regional security through the lens of water resources. It shows that Jordan is left with few options but to accept its dependence on Israel and muddle through. In addition, the Palestinian territories, which face not just Israeli military rule but also the expansion of settlements, experience major water shortages. The article concludes that the increasing water hegemony reduces Israeli incentives for a comprehensive peace with the Palestinians that could resolve the resource crisis and enable two states to live side by side.

While the ambivalence among Middle Eastern states about the war in Ukraine stems from multiple sources, Russian influence is a significant, if underappreciated, factor. Several of these countries see Moscow as an external balancer and hedge against the possibility of a broader US pullback from the region. At the same time, Russia maintains significant coercive capabilities thanks to its military presence in Syria and burgeoning strategic partnership with Iran. Many aspiring regional powers are also sympathetic to Moscow's calls for an international order less centered on the West. This article analyzes these concerns and perceptions, and it shows how they have shaped the way states in the region have responded to the invasion of Ukraine. Broadly speaking, these states see it as a peripheral concern—especially following the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023—though one that could destabilize the region by stoking inflation or further emboldening Iran. While they are wary of confronting Moscow or facing regional instability, many also directly benefit from Russia's economic decoupling from the West. These countries share President Vladimir Putin's assessment that the war in Ukraine is inaugurating a new age more friendly to middle powers.