Thomas’s view that the commanded act is material “strongly suggests, counter to what Brock maintains, that the commanded act is not a human act in a secondary sense, but rather an essential part of the human act just as the form is” (132). Significantly, Löwe does not cite the article in which Brock shows that “use makes it possible for acts of powers besides the will also to be voluntary, moral human acts” (“What Is the Use of Usus in Aquinas’ Philosophy of Action?,” in Moral and Political Philosophies of the Middle Ages, ed. B. Carlos Bazán, Eduardo Andujár, and Léonard G. Sbrocchi [Ottawa: Legas, 1995], 2:661). In general, Löwe does not consider Brock’s explanation of how a complete human act consists of other acts, and the way in which parts of the act are formal or material. Löwe’s presentation could have benefited from engagement with more of the scholarship on the interior and exterior acts, and from a careful consideration of such central texts on the issue as the Prima Secundae, qq. 19–20, and the De Malo, q. 2, art. 2–4. Moreover, he mentions that choice is in some way virtually present in the act of command, but he does not address the plentiful scholarship and texts on the virtual ordering of human acts, which include acts that are themselves commanded by other acts, as when an act of charity commands almsgiving, or an act of adultery commands theft. In chapter 7, Löwe argues that use, since it is an immanent act that is complete in an instant, is not in time in the way that the commanded act is, but nevertheless can be in time per accidens. Here he seems to be applying to the problem of use and the commanded act Thomas’s well-known thesis that human thinking, willing, and sensing are in time per accidens. In chapter 8, Löwe gives a less controversial reading of the way that the will uses the intellect in mental acts. He considers memory but avoids the more difficult issues of whether and how intellectual acts such as command might also be subject to use, or how the will can use itself. Chapter 9 provides a brief sketch of how, if this interpretation of Thomas is correct, it might help to clarify issues addressed by philosophers such as Donald Davidson and Jennifer Hornsby. This book provides highly idiosyncratic and to this reviewer’s mind unconvincing readings of many of the relevant texts and scholarly works on Thomas’s account of human action. Moreover, it neglects some of the more significant primary texts and scholarly works. However, it provokes thought, and the account of mental acts such as memory furthers scholarly discussion. T h o m a s M . O s b o r n e J r . University of St. Thomas (Houston, TX)
托马斯认为命令行为是物质的观点“强烈暗示，与布洛克的观点相反，命令行为不是次要意义上的人类行为，而是人类行为的重要组成部分，就像形式一样”(132)。值得注意的是，Löwe并没有引用布罗克的文章，在这篇文章中，布罗克表明，“使用使得除了意志之外的权力行为也成为自愿的、道德的人类行为成为可能”(《在阿奎那的行动哲学中，Usus的用途是什么?《中世纪的道德与政治哲学》，B. Carlos Bazán, Eduardo Andujár, and l onard G. sbrochi主编[渥太华:Legas, 1995]，第2期:661)。一般来说，Löwe没有考虑布洛克对一个完整的人类行为如何由其他行为组成的解释，以及该行为的部分是正式的还是实质性的方式。Löwe的演讲本可以受益于更多关于内部和外部行为的学术研究，以及对《第二次序曲》(Prima Secundae, qq)等核心文本的仔细考虑。19-20，以及De Malo, q. 2, art。2 - 4。此外，他提到选择在某种程度上实际上存在于命令行为中，但他没有提到大量关于人类行为的虚拟秩序的学术研究和文本，其中包括由其他行为命令的行为，比如慈善行为命令施舍，或者通奸行为命令盗窃。在第7章中，Löwe认为，使用，因为它是一个内在的行为，在瞬间完成，不以命令行为的方式在时间中，但仍然可以在偶然的时间中。在这里，他似乎将托马斯著名的理论应用于使用和命令行为的问题，即人类的思维，意愿和感知都是偶然发生的。在第8章中，Löwe给出了一种较少争议的解读意志在精神行为中使用智力的方式。他考虑了记忆，但回避了更困难的问题，如命令等智力行为是否也可能被使用，以及如何被使用，或者意志如何被使用。第9章提供了一个简短的概述，如果对托马斯的这种解释是正确的，它可能有助于澄清哲学家如唐纳德戴维森和詹妮弗霍恩斯比所解决的问题。这本书对托马斯关于人类行为的许多相关文本和学术著作提供了非常独特的解读，在笔者看来，这些解读并不令人信服。此外，它忽略了一些更重要的原始文本和学术著作。然而，它引发了思考，对记忆等心理行为的描述进一步推动了学术讨论。这是我最喜欢的。这是一个很好的例子。圣托马斯大学(休斯顿，德克萨斯州)
{"title":"Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science by Andrea Strazzoni (review)","authors":"Aaron Spink","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas’s view that the commanded act is material “strongly suggests, counter to what Brock maintains, that the commanded act is not a human act in a secondary sense, but rather an essential part of the human act just as the form is” (132). Significantly, Löwe does not cite the article in which Brock shows that “use makes it possible for acts of powers besides the will also to be voluntary, moral human acts” (“What Is the Use of Usus in Aquinas’ Philosophy of Action?,” in Moral and Political Philosophies of the Middle Ages, ed. B. Carlos Bazán, Eduardo Andujár, and Léonard G. Sbrocchi [Ottawa: Legas, 1995], 2:661). In general, Löwe does not consider Brock’s explanation of how a complete human act consists of other acts, and the way in which parts of the act are formal or material. Löwe’s presentation could have benefited from engagement with more of the scholarship on the interior and exterior acts, and from a careful consideration of such central texts on the issue as the Prima Secundae, qq. 19–20, and the De Malo, q. 2, art. 2–4. Moreover, he mentions that choice is in some way virtually present in the act of command, but he does not address the plentiful scholarship and texts on the virtual ordering of human acts, which include acts that are themselves commanded by other acts, as when an act of charity commands almsgiving, or an act of adultery commands theft. In chapter 7, Löwe argues that use, since it is an immanent act that is complete in an instant, is not in time in the way that the commanded act is, but nevertheless can be in time per accidens. Here he seems to be applying to the problem of use and the commanded act Thomas’s well-known thesis that human thinking, willing, and sensing are in time per accidens. In chapter 8, Löwe gives a less controversial reading of the way that the will uses the intellect in mental acts. He considers memory but avoids the more difficult issues of whether and how intellectual acts such as command might also be subject to use, or how the will can use itself. Chapter 9 provides a brief sketch of how, if this interpretation of Thomas is correct, it might help to clarify issues addressed by philosophers such as Donald Davidson and Jennifer Hornsby. This book provides highly idiosyncratic and to this reviewer’s mind unconvincing readings of many of the relevant texts and scholarly works on Thomas’s account of human action. Moreover, it neglects some of the more significant primary texts and scholarly works. However, it provokes thought, and the account of mental acts such as memory furthers scholarly discussion. T h o m a s M . O s b o r n e J r . University of St. Thomas (Houston, TX)","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"154 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48442815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:In the following, I argue that Hegel took concepts—not propositions, judgments, or spatiotemporal objects—as the primary truth-bearer in his logic and attempt to offer a defensible interpretation of what it means for an individual concept (or "thought-determination") to be assessed as true or untrue. Along the way, I consider the shortcomings of several alternative interpretations of truth in Hegelian logic, paying particular attention to the now-common contention that a commitment to something like Frege's context principle prevents Hegel from assessing concepts independently of the role that they play in judgments.
{"title":"Untrue Concepts in Hegel's Logic","authors":"M. Alznauer","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0004","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In the following, I argue that Hegel took concepts—not propositions, judgments, or spatiotemporal objects—as the primary truth-bearer in his logic and attempt to offer a defensible interpretation of what it means for an individual concept (or \"thought-determination\") to be assessed as true or untrue. Along the way, I consider the shortcomings of several alternative interpretations of truth in Hegelian logic, paying particular attention to the now-common contention that a commitment to something like Frege's context principle prevents Hegel from assessing concepts independently of the role that they play in judgments.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"103 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46509954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
together. This overlooks the growing importance that Macaulay’s political framework, suitably recast in contemporary secular terms, has in republican discourse today. Green says little in the book about modern republicanism, other than to distance her reading of Macaulay from the current republican ideal of “non-domination” (223–24). What this omission obscures, however, is the increasing awareness by present-day republicans that women contributed in significant numbers to the history of this tradition, challenging many of the male-dominated assumptions that have beset it (see Alan Coffee, “Women and Republicanism,” Australasian Philosophical Review 3/4 [2020]: 361–69). Particularly through her influence on Wollstonecraft, but also on her own account, Macaulay is at the forefront of this reappraisal. This is, in my view, a missed opportunity. In her conclusion, for example, Green includes a subsection on “Macaulay on the Tradition of Liberal Feminism,” but she is silent on republican feminism. One final observation about Green’s focus on the particular substantive principles in Macaulay, rather than on her framework, is that it also sometimes leads Green to take a narrower view than she might of some of the principles she identifies. On the question of liberty, Green twice says that Macaulay “clearly” uses a positive notion as understood through Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction (220–21). However, while it cannot be denied that in some sense Macaulay does invoke a positive notion, Berlin’s sharp dichotomy is not helpful when thinking in terms of a framework of ideas in which Macaulay makes use of both positive and negative elements within her broader system. These methodological differences aside, Green has produced a magnificent intellectual biography that will be indispensable for scholars interested in Macaulay specifically or in late eighteenth-century politics in general. As Bridget Hill ushered in a new era of Macaulay studies a generation ago with The Republican Virago (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), Green too has likely produced the definitive guide for the generation to come. A l a n C o f f e e King’s College London
{"title":"The World According to Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism by Anja Jauernig (review)","authors":"Patricia Kitcher","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0008","url":null,"abstract":"together. This overlooks the growing importance that Macaulay’s political framework, suitably recast in contemporary secular terms, has in republican discourse today. Green says little in the book about modern republicanism, other than to distance her reading of Macaulay from the current republican ideal of “non-domination” (223–24). What this omission obscures, however, is the increasing awareness by present-day republicans that women contributed in significant numbers to the history of this tradition, challenging many of the male-dominated assumptions that have beset it (see Alan Coffee, “Women and Republicanism,” Australasian Philosophical Review 3/4 [2020]: 361–69). Particularly through her influence on Wollstonecraft, but also on her own account, Macaulay is at the forefront of this reappraisal. This is, in my view, a missed opportunity. In her conclusion, for example, Green includes a subsection on “Macaulay on the Tradition of Liberal Feminism,” but she is silent on republican feminism. One final observation about Green’s focus on the particular substantive principles in Macaulay, rather than on her framework, is that it also sometimes leads Green to take a narrower view than she might of some of the principles she identifies. On the question of liberty, Green twice says that Macaulay “clearly” uses a positive notion as understood through Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction (220–21). However, while it cannot be denied that in some sense Macaulay does invoke a positive notion, Berlin’s sharp dichotomy is not helpful when thinking in terms of a framework of ideas in which Macaulay makes use of both positive and negative elements within her broader system. These methodological differences aside, Green has produced a magnificent intellectual biography that will be indispensable for scholars interested in Macaulay specifically or in late eighteenth-century politics in general. As Bridget Hill ushered in a new era of Macaulay studies a generation ago with The Republican Virago (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), Green too has likely produced the definitive guide for the generation to come. A l a n C o f f e e King’s College London","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"160 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48180525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:Plato's Republic X attack on imitative poetry is based in the metaphysics of appearance, since appearances are the objects and products of imitation. I offer a new reading, showing that Plato's account coherently introduces appearances as a new type of item, distinct from Forms and sensible particulars, and applies beyond imitation to a broad range of appearances. Focusing on the importance of perspective to Plato's reasoning, I argue that an appearance is a relation that comes about between a material particular and an apprehending subject. Ordinarily, appearances are transparent: they confer determinate awareness on the subject, but are not the objects of our awareness insofar as we are appeared to. This reading resolves longstanding obscurities, grounds an improved account of imitation, and shows that Plato here presents the cornerstone of a general theory of appearance.
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Appearance in Republic X (596a5–598d7)","authors":"Lee Franklin","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0000","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Plato's Republic X attack on imitative poetry is based in the metaphysics of appearance, since appearances are the objects and products of imitation. I offer a new reading, showing that Plato's account coherently introduces appearances as a new type of item, distinct from Forms and sensible particulars, and applies beyond imitation to a broad range of appearances. Focusing on the importance of perspective to Plato's reasoning, I argue that an appearance is a relation that comes about between a material particular and an apprehending subject. Ordinarily, appearances are transparent: they confer determinate awareness on the subject, but are not the objects of our awareness insofar as we are appeared to. This reading resolves longstanding obscurities, grounds an improved account of imitation, and shows that Plato here presents the cornerstone of a general theory of appearance.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"1 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47448584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
and Locke; furthermore, it is foundational, both to Buffier’s “psychologie rationnelle” and to Buffier’s notion of common sense (32–42). If the first foundational principle of truth is “sens intime” or “sentiment intérieur,” then “sens commun” is the second (47). Because of the inevitable limits of logic and speculative reason, and because of our intimate sense of ourselves as a union of soul and body, Buffier maintains that an intersubjective common sense “se fonde sans cesse sur le témoignage des autres” (60). Rouquayrol develops his treatment of Buffier’s notion of common sense with a useful comparison of Buffier and Thomas Reid drawn from his own close readings of the two, as much as from the important study by Louise Marcil-Lacoste, Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers ([Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982], 52–57). Like so many early modern philosophers and érudits of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century studied by Richard Popkin in The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and more recently, Anton Matytsin in The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), the common sense of Buffier proceeded from a species of “practical reason” or “mitigated skepticism,” not as a means of deducing a metaphysical system, but as principles of acting in the world on the basis of practical moral certitude (60). Beyond its instructive front matter and scholarly bibliography, the Rouquayrol edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités also includes the less well-known appendix to the 1732 edition of the Traité (291–306); Buffier’s earlier and separately published remarks on the metaphysical principles of Descartes (307–17); his remarks on the metaphysics of John Locke published in response to Pierre Coste’s first translation of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1700 (318–30); and his “Observations sur la métaphysique du Père Malebranche” published in the latter’s 1712 work, De la recherche de la verité (331–35). As if that were not enough, Rouquayrol publishes Buffier’s observations on the metaphysics of LeClerc (336), the logic of de Crousaz (337–43), and the logic of Pierre Sylvain Régis (344–46). Having all of these scattered reflections by the famed Jesuit philosopher and longtime editor of Mémoires de Trévoux published in one place will undoubtedly prove immensely useful to many scholars, in a way that enriches what is sure to be the standard edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités for years to come. J e f f r e y D . B u r s o n Georgia Southern University
和洛克；此外，它是基础，无论是布菲的“心理学理性”和布菲的常识概念（32-42）。如果真理的第一个基本原则是“内在感觉”或“内在情感”，那么“共同感觉”是第二个原则（47）。由于逻辑和思辨理性的不可避免的局限性，以及我们将自己视为灵魂和身体的结合体的亲密感觉，Buffer坚持认为，主体间的常识“在导演的创作过程中是不必要的”（60）。Rouquayrol通过对Buffer和Thomas Reid的有益比较，以及Louise Marcil Lacoste、Claude Buffeer和Thomas Reid:two common sense Philosophers（[蒙特利尔：麦吉尔女王大学出版社，1982年]，52–57）的重要研究，发展了他对Buffeer常识概念的处理。就像理查德·波普金在《从伊拉斯谟到斯宾诺莎的怀疑主义史》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1979年）中以及最近在《启蒙时代怀疑主义的幽灵》（巴尔的摩：约翰斯·霍普金斯大学出版社，2016年）中研究的许多17世纪末和18世纪初的早期现代哲学家和理论家一样，布菲尔的常识源于一种“实践理性”或“缓和的怀疑论”，不是作为推导形而上学系统的手段，而是作为在实践道德确信的基础上在世界上行动的原则（60）。除了其具有指导意义的前沿内容和学术参考书目外，鲁奎罗版的布菲尔的《Traitédes premières vérités》还包括1732年版的《Traté》（291–306）的不太知名的附录；布菲尔早期和单独发表的关于笛卡尔形而上学原理的评论（307–17）；他对约翰·洛克形而上学的评论发表于1700年（318–30），以回应皮埃尔·科斯特对洛克《关于人类理解的随笔》的第一次翻译；以及他在后者1712年的著作《真实研究》（331–35）中发表的“对Père Malebranche医学的观察”。似乎这还不够，Rouquayrol发表了Buffer对LeClerc的形而上学（336）、de Crousaz的逻辑（337-43）和Pierre Sylvain Régis的逻辑（344-46）的观察。著名的耶稣会哲学家、《Mémoires de Trévoux》的长期编辑将所有这些零散的思考集中在一个地方发表，无疑将对许多学者非常有用，从而丰富了未来几年肯定会成为标准版的《Buffer’s Traitédes premières vérités》。J e f f r e y D。佐治亚南方大学
{"title":"Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment by Karen Green (review)","authors":"Alan M. S. J. Coffee","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0012","url":null,"abstract":"and Locke; furthermore, it is foundational, both to Buffier’s “psychologie rationnelle” and to Buffier’s notion of common sense (32–42). If the first foundational principle of truth is “sens intime” or “sentiment intérieur,” then “sens commun” is the second (47). Because of the inevitable limits of logic and speculative reason, and because of our intimate sense of ourselves as a union of soul and body, Buffier maintains that an intersubjective common sense “se fonde sans cesse sur le témoignage des autres” (60). Rouquayrol develops his treatment of Buffier’s notion of common sense with a useful comparison of Buffier and Thomas Reid drawn from his own close readings of the two, as much as from the important study by Louise Marcil-Lacoste, Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers ([Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982], 52–57). Like so many early modern philosophers and érudits of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century studied by Richard Popkin in The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and more recently, Anton Matytsin in The Specter of Skepticism in the Age of Enlightenment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), the common sense of Buffier proceeded from a species of “practical reason” or “mitigated skepticism,” not as a means of deducing a metaphysical system, but as principles of acting in the world on the basis of practical moral certitude (60). Beyond its instructive front matter and scholarly bibliography, the Rouquayrol edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités also includes the less well-known appendix to the 1732 edition of the Traité (291–306); Buffier’s earlier and separately published remarks on the metaphysical principles of Descartes (307–17); his remarks on the metaphysics of John Locke published in response to Pierre Coste’s first translation of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1700 (318–30); and his “Observations sur la métaphysique du Père Malebranche” published in the latter’s 1712 work, De la recherche de la verité (331–35). As if that were not enough, Rouquayrol publishes Buffier’s observations on the metaphysics of LeClerc (336), the logic of de Crousaz (337–43), and the logic of Pierre Sylvain Régis (344–46). Having all of these scattered reflections by the famed Jesuit philosopher and longtime editor of Mémoires de Trévoux published in one place will undoubtedly prove immensely useful to many scholars, in a way that enriches what is sure to be the standard edition of Buffier’s Traité des premières vérités for years to come. J e f f r e y D . B u r s o n Georgia Southern University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"158 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46549359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aristotle on the Concept of Shared Life by Sara Brill (review)","authors":"Zoli Filotas","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"149 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46886912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:By means of the Ten Modes, Pyrrhonian skeptics appeal to conflicting appearances to bring about suspension of judgment. However, precisely how the skeptic might do so in a nondogmatic manner is not entirely clear. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of the Modes face significant objections, and I defend an alternative account that better explains the logical structure, rational nature, and effectiveness of the Modes. In particular, I clarify how the Modes appeal to concerns about epistemic impartiality and circularity, the nature of the skeptic's nondoxastic attitude(s), and how the skeptic can employ the Modes nondogmatically.
{"title":"Conflicting Appearances, Suspension of Judgment, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism without Commitment","authors":"Tamer Nawar","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0052","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:By means of the Ten Modes, Pyrrhonian skeptics appeal to conflicting appearances to bring about suspension of judgment. However, precisely how the skeptic might do so in a nondogmatic manner is not entirely clear. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of the Modes face significant objections, and I defend an alternative account that better explains the logical structure, rational nature, and effectiveness of the Modes. In particular, I clarify how the Modes appeal to concerns about epistemic impartiality and circularity, the nature of the skeptic's nondoxastic attitude(s), and how the skeptic can employ the Modes nondogmatically.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"537 - 560"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46586661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hume's Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl (review)","authors":"Stefanie Rocknak","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"700 - 701"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46350389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:Aristotle identifies four modes of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous. Recent scholarship has renewed the Renaissance and early Modern Thomist critique that John Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) doctrine of the univocity of being is based on a failure to appreciate proportional unity. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the copious literature on Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being by presenting and offering an analysis of the texts where Scotus addresses the topic of proportional or analogous unity. The paper argues that Scotus's early and mature works consistently reject the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. Nonetheless, Scotus's early remarks on an analogous unity that is mind-independent provide both an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists over whether a single concept can signify analogously—a dispute that features such distinguished participants as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) and Bartolomaeus Mastrius (1602–73)—and an avenue for further investigation into the thought of the Subtle Doctor.
摘要：亚里士多德确定了四种统一模式：数值的、特定的、一般的、比例的或类似的。最近的学术界重新提出了文艺复兴时期和早期现代托米斯的批评，即约翰·邓斯·斯科图斯（d.1308）关于存在的统一性的学说是基于对比例统一性的不理解。本文试图通过对斯科特提出比例或类似统一主题的文本进行分析，填补大量关于斯科特存在统一性学说的文献中的空白。文章认为，斯科特早期和成熟的作品一贯拒绝类似或比例统一可以作为概念之间更大而非模棱两可的统一的基础，斯科特的发展立场代表了亚里士多德将统一划分为数字、特定、一般和类似模式的替代方案。尽管如此Scotus早期关于一种与心智无关的类似统一的言论，为Thomists和Scotiss之间关于一个概念是否可以具有类似含义的争议提供了内部理由——这一争议以Thomas de Vio Cajetan（1469–1534）和Bartolomaeus Mastrius（1602–73）等杰出参与者为特征——以及进一步调查的途径进入了神秘博士的思想。
{"title":"Analogous Unity in the Writings of John Duns Scotus","authors":"Domenic D'ettore","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0053","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Aristotle identifies four modes of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous. Recent scholarship has renewed the Renaissance and early Modern Thomist critique that John Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) doctrine of the univocity of being is based on a failure to appreciate proportional unity. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the copious literature on Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being by presenting and offering an analysis of the texts where Scotus addresses the topic of proportional or analogous unity. The paper argues that Scotus's early and mature works consistently reject the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. Nonetheless, Scotus's early remarks on an analogous unity that is mind-independent provide both an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists over whether a single concept can signify analogously—a dispute that features such distinguished participants as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) and Bartolomaeus Mastrius (1602–73)—and an avenue for further investigation into the thought of the Subtle Doctor.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"561 - 589"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44776685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:This paper argues that in the Eudemian Ethics (EE), Aristotle aims to prove the Pleasure Thesis (PT). According to the Pleasure Thesis, happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. Through a reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT, this paper shows that happiness is most pleasant for three reasons: (1) it is pleasant by definition; (2) it is constituted by the most pleasant activities (virtuous actions and contemplation); (3) it is pleasant by nature. A reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT is philosophically interesting not only in order to better understand the argument in the EE—and in particular the debated status and role of NE VII/EE VI.11–14—but also insofar as it sheds light on the relation between the pleasant and the good.
本文认为，亚里士多德在《真德伦理学》(EE)中旨在证明快乐命题(PT)。根据快乐理论，快乐是所有事物中最令人愉快的。通过对支持PT理论的论证进行重构，本文表明幸福之所以是最令人愉快的，有三个原因:(1)从定义上讲，幸福是令人愉快的;(2)它是由最令人愉快的活动(善行和沉思)构成的;它本质上是令人愉快的。从哲学上讲，重建支持PT的论点是很有趣的，这不仅是为了更好地理解EE中的论点，特别是NE VII/EE vi .11 - 14的争论地位和作用，而且还因为它揭示了愉快与良好之间的关系。
{"title":"The Pleasure Thesis in the Eudemian Ethics","authors":"Giulia Bonasio","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0051","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:This paper argues that in the Eudemian Ethics (EE), Aristotle aims to prove the Pleasure Thesis (PT). According to the Pleasure Thesis, happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. Through a reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT, this paper shows that happiness is most pleasant for three reasons: (1) it is pleasant by definition; (2) it is constituted by the most pleasant activities (virtuous actions and contemplation); (3) it is pleasant by nature. A reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT is philosophically interesting not only in order to better understand the argument in the EE—and in particular the debated status and role of NE VII/EE VI.11–14—but also insofar as it sheds light on the relation between the pleasant and the good.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"521 - 536"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47022364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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