and the concepts that “give this synthesis unity” (A 79/B 104). Laywine’s claim that a reason is needed for thinking that “the space and time of” distinct perceptions “are somehow related” (242) is puzzling in light of Kant’s insistence in the Transcendental Aesthetic on the singularity and what we could call connectedness of space and time, which Laywine seems to discount with her later clarification that the unity ascribed to them in the Aesthetic is “just whatever makes any determinate . . . magnitude a continuous one” (254). But even if these or other details have more proximate sources or explanations, Laywine’s appeal to Kant’s cosmology and the development of his metaphysics powerfully illuminates the Transcendental Deduction as a whole. K a t h e r i n e D u n l o p University of Texas at Austin
{"title":"Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law by Christopher J. Insole (review)","authors":"Chris L. Firestone","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"and the concepts that “give this synthesis unity” (A 79/B 104). Laywine’s claim that a reason is needed for thinking that “the space and time of” distinct perceptions “are somehow related” (242) is puzzling in light of Kant’s insistence in the Transcendental Aesthetic on the singularity and what we could call connectedness of space and time, which Laywine seems to discount with her later clarification that the unity ascribed to them in the Aesthetic is “just whatever makes any determinate . . . magnitude a continuous one” (254). But even if these or other details have more proximate sources or explanations, Laywine’s appeal to Kant’s cosmology and the development of his metaphysics powerfully illuminates the Transcendental Deduction as a whole. K a t h e r i n e D u n l o p University of Texas at Austin","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"164 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47866752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
precedes or perhaps accompanies my rummaging for food. Epiphenomenalism is not an attractive position, and it would seem to wreak havoc with Kant’s moral psychology, but Jauernig may be right about his commitment to it. After laying out her interpretations of core Kantian doctrines and Kant’s arguments for them in the first four chapters, Jauernig turns in the last two chapters to perennially difficult questions about how things in themselves can ground appearances and how things in themselves can be known to exist. I consider just one of these tricky issues, the relation between transcendental and empirical selves. Jauernig observes, “It seems pretty clear that Kant is committed to a one-to-one mapping between empirical selves and the transcendental selves that ground them” (276). Kant’s seeming identification by fiat of the empirical self with the real, moral, transcendental self was one of Strawson’s prime reasons for dismissing his metaphysics. Jauernig does not try to defend transcendental idealism against this or other trenchant objections, but only to be as faithful to the texts and the historical context as she can in interpreting it. P a t r i c i a K i t c h e r Columbia University
在我翻箱倒柜找食物之前，或者可能伴随着我。表观现象主义不是一个有吸引力的立场，它似乎会对康德的道德心理造成严重破坏，但贾尔尼格对它的承诺可能是正确的，在最后两章中，Jauernig转向了长期存在的难题，即事物本身如何形成表象，以及事物本身如何存在。我只考虑其中一个棘手的问题，超越自我和经验自我之间的关系。Jauernig观察到，“很明显，康德致力于经验自我和超越自我之间的一对一映射”（276）。康德似乎通过法令将经验自我与真实的、道德的、超越的自我相认同，这是斯特劳森否定其形而上学的主要原因之一。Jauernig并不试图为先验唯心主义辩护，反对这种或其他尖锐的反对意见，而是在解释它时尽可能忠实于文本和历史背景。P a t r i c i a K i t c h e r哥伦比亚大学
{"title":"Kant's Transcendental Deduction by Alison Laywine (review)","authors":"Katherine Dunlop","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0006","url":null,"abstract":"precedes or perhaps accompanies my rummaging for food. Epiphenomenalism is not an attractive position, and it would seem to wreak havoc with Kant’s moral psychology, but Jauernig may be right about his commitment to it. After laying out her interpretations of core Kantian doctrines and Kant’s arguments for them in the first four chapters, Jauernig turns in the last two chapters to perennially difficult questions about how things in themselves can ground appearances and how things in themselves can be known to exist. I consider just one of these tricky issues, the relation between transcendental and empirical selves. Jauernig observes, “It seems pretty clear that Kant is committed to a one-to-one mapping between empirical selves and the transcendental selves that ground them” (276). Kant’s seeming identification by fiat of the empirical self with the real, moral, transcendental self was one of Strawson’s prime reasons for dismissing his metaphysics. Jauernig does not try to defend transcendental idealism against this or other trenchant objections, but only to be as faithful to the texts and the historical context as she can in interpreting it. P a t r i c i a K i t c h e r Columbia University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"162 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49648344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:Malebranche claims that God always, or nearly always, acts by general volitions. However, two possible interpretations of this claim have led to competing understandings of Malebranche's occasionalism. The General Content interpretation (GC) holds that God forms as few volitions as possible, and that aside from a limited number of particular volitions, God's normal mode of action consists simply in willing the general laws themselves. The Particular Content interpretation (PC) affirms that God forms a distinct volition for each event or state of affairs, but that those volitions count as general when they are issued "in accordance with" some general law. This essay examines five lines of evidence that purport to reveal Malebranche's commitment to PC and explains why they all fail. As a result, GC emerges unscathed as a consistent and viable interpretation, and, at the same time, much of the case for PC is undermined.
{"title":"Malebranche on General Volitions: Putting Criticisms of the General Content Interpretation to Rest","authors":"T. Miller","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0001","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Malebranche claims that God always, or nearly always, acts by general volitions. However, two possible interpretations of this claim have led to competing understandings of Malebranche's occasionalism. The General Content interpretation (GC) holds that God forms as few volitions as possible, and that aside from a limited number of particular volitions, God's normal mode of action consists simply in willing the general laws themselves. The Particular Content interpretation (PC) affirms that God forms a distinct volition for each event or state of affairs, but that those volitions count as general when they are issued \"in accordance with\" some general law. This essay examines five lines of evidence that purport to reveal Malebranche's commitment to PC and explains why they all fail. As a result, GC emerges unscathed as a consistent and viable interpretation, and, at the same time, much of the case for PC is undermined.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"25 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42027814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:This paper discusses the anthropology, ethics, and politics of Helvetius, focusing on the theme of power and the passions that gravitate around it, and highlighting the transition from a position that could be broadly defined as "anarchic" (all powers are bad) to one that realistically takes power for granted as an insurmountable horizon (and which leads to the future-laden idea of a "democratic despotism"). By analyzing these themes, it questions the common interpretation of Helvetius's thought as a compact block ("Le système d'Helvétius"), emphasizing the way in which the theoretical reworkings presented in De l'homme must be understood in light of the internal tensions of De l'esprit.
本文讨论了海尔维修斯的人类学、伦理学和政治学，重点讨论了权力的主题和围绕它的激情，并强调了从一个可以被广泛定义为“无政府主义”(所有权力都是坏的)的立场到一个现实地认为权力是理所当然的不可逾越的立场的转变(这导致了充满未来的“民主专制主义”的想法)。通过分析这些主题，它质疑了对Helvetius思想作为一个紧凑块的普遍解释(“Le systemmes d' helvsamtius”)，强调了必须根据De l'esprit的内部紧张关系来理解De l'homme中提出的理论重新工作的方式。
{"title":"Ambition, désir d'être despote, amour du pouvoir: Un aspect de la théorie helvétienne des passions entre De l'esprit et De l'homme","authors":"Francesco Toto","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0002","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:This paper discusses the anthropology, ethics, and politics of Helvetius, focusing on the theme of power and the passions that gravitate around it, and highlighting the transition from a position that could be broadly defined as \"anarchic\" (all powers are bad) to one that realistically takes power for granted as an insurmountable horizon (and which leads to the future-laden idea of a \"democratic despotism\"). By analyzing these themes, it questions the common interpretation of Helvetius's thought as a compact block (\"Le système d'Helvétius\"), emphasizing the way in which the theoretical reworkings presented in De l'homme must be understood in light of the internal tensions of De l'esprit.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"51 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42558801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:Was there a linguistic turn in Frankfurt School Critical Theory before Habermas's communications-theoretic one? Might later Wittgenstein and the early Frankfurt School have adopted similar pictures of language? I propose that both questions should be answered affirmatively, focusing on Horkheimer's Eclipse of Reason. I argue that, thanks to the picture of language that Horkheimer and Adorno share with (later) Wittgenstein, we can reconstruct their theory in a way that renders it more defensible. Insofar as the human life form and language are inseparable, language can be an inextinguishable reservoir of what Horkheimer called "objective reason." Recognizing this allows us to answer Habermas's critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. Moreover, paying attention to this inseparableness can enable us to engage in disclosing social critique (for example, regarding current debates about sustainability).
{"title":"The Linguistic Turn in the Early Frankfurt School: Horkheimer and Adorno","authors":"F. Freyenhagen","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0005","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Was there a linguistic turn in Frankfurt School Critical Theory before Habermas's communications-theoretic one? Might later Wittgenstein and the early Frankfurt School have adopted similar pictures of language? I propose that both questions should be answered affirmatively, focusing on Horkheimer's Eclipse of Reason. I argue that, thanks to the picture of language that Horkheimer and Adorno share with (later) Wittgenstein, we can reconstruct their theory in a way that renders it more defensible. Insofar as the human life form and language are inseparable, language can be an inextinguishable reservoir of what Horkheimer called \"objective reason.\" Recognizing this allows us to answer Habermas's critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. Moreover, paying attention to this inseparableness can enable us to engage in disclosing social critique (for example, regarding current debates about sustainability).","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"127 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46629380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good by Marta Jimenez (review)","authors":"Jerry Green","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"151 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43931046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
conclusively. To prove convincingly that the Dutch Cartesians served as the midwives to the birth of a philosophy of science, a significantly longer work would be needed—one that spends more time detailing philosophy’s relation to science not only in previous traditions but also in those outside the Dutch context in the same centuries. Strazzoni also makes far-reaching claims on the need for foundationalism; however, the book would have benefited from offering a more robust defense against possible counterexamples and objections. Strazzoni does point to Regius, who conspicuously leaves out much of Descartes’s metaphysics, as a powerful counterexample, but holds him to be both an exception and the catalyst driving the shift to foundational concerns. This might be seen as problematic in light of the book’s strongest claim: just how successful Strazzoni is in problematizing the very meaning of “foundation.” Throughout the book, we see ethics as the goal of a foundation, logic as a foundation, reliability as a gauge for foundations, metaphysics as foundational, and all manners of approaches to epistemic foundationalism, which leaves the reader wondering if there really is a consistent thread motivating these various thinkers or if there could be any common origin. We might also question what was unique in the Dutch context, as questions and debates over many of these themes also emerged in France, for example, where there were prominent Cartesians who disregarded foundational concerns, such as Jacques Rohault, and many others who were deeply engaged in them. While I have raised some criticisms, it is important to note that they are less about the substance of the book than they are about the packaging. Strazzoni’s book severely problematizes any assumptions one might have about a single kind of foundationalism as a consistent theme throughout Cartesianism, while also giving an excellent vantage point to assess the various ends that these six thinkers had in mind. His insight also presents a compelling narrative of the complex interrelations among Dutch Cartesians with too many novel observations to note here. A a r o n S p i n k Dartmouth College
{"title":"Traité des premières vérités by Claude G. Buffier (review)","authors":"Jeffrey D. Burson","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0011","url":null,"abstract":"conclusively. To prove convincingly that the Dutch Cartesians served as the midwives to the birth of a philosophy of science, a significantly longer work would be needed—one that spends more time detailing philosophy’s relation to science not only in previous traditions but also in those outside the Dutch context in the same centuries. Strazzoni also makes far-reaching claims on the need for foundationalism; however, the book would have benefited from offering a more robust defense against possible counterexamples and objections. Strazzoni does point to Regius, who conspicuously leaves out much of Descartes’s metaphysics, as a powerful counterexample, but holds him to be both an exception and the catalyst driving the shift to foundational concerns. This might be seen as problematic in light of the book’s strongest claim: just how successful Strazzoni is in problematizing the very meaning of “foundation.” Throughout the book, we see ethics as the goal of a foundation, logic as a foundation, reliability as a gauge for foundations, metaphysics as foundational, and all manners of approaches to epistemic foundationalism, which leaves the reader wondering if there really is a consistent thread motivating these various thinkers or if there could be any common origin. We might also question what was unique in the Dutch context, as questions and debates over many of these themes also emerged in France, for example, where there were prominent Cartesians who disregarded foundational concerns, such as Jacques Rohault, and many others who were deeply engaged in them. While I have raised some criticisms, it is important to note that they are less about the substance of the book than they are about the packaging. Strazzoni’s book severely problematizes any assumptions one might have about a single kind of foundationalism as a consistent theme throughout Cartesianism, while also giving an excellent vantage point to assess the various ends that these six thinkers had in mind. His insight also presents a compelling narrative of the complex interrelations among Dutch Cartesians with too many novel observations to note here. A a r o n S p i n k Dartmouth College","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"156 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47234952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
heteronomous, because they are dependent on the moral outlook of others, and (2) making developing moral agents superficial, because they focus on how they appear to others rather than how they really are. Judged by its own aim, this book is a success: it provides a plausible reconstruction of the nature of shame in Aristotle and its function in the habituation of virtue in developing moral agents. It is also enviably clear and well-organized, with an adept balance of textual interpretation, engagement with contemporary secondary sources, and an intuitive presentation of a concept that would operate very differently in the original Greek context of Aristotle’s thought than we are likely to view it today. In some ways, however, the narrow focus of this book works to its detriment, as there are many topics that the reader might like to see discussed more thoroughly. For instance, the discussion of moral education in the Politics is only passingly addressed, though Jimenez’s reliance on other texts (such as Rhetoric II.6 and Metaphysics IX.8) shows that the work is not restricted to being a treatment of the Nicomachean Ethics account specifically. The Eudemian Ethics is assumed to be mostly consonant with the NE and is therefore used largely as a resource for additional textual support to supplement the NE. It is a striking omission that Jimenez does not discuss the inclusion of shame as its own virtue in the EE’s table of virtues and vices at 1221a1: this is at least a prima facie departure from NE IV.9’s treatment of shame as merely a protovirtue, and calls into question the methodology of pulling from both the NE and EE together to defend a single interpretation. Moreover, if shame is a real virtue in the EE, this would seem to complicate chapter 6’s thesis that shame ceases to be a praiseworthy state once agents develop into fully virtuous adults (for an excellent treatment of this topic, see Christopher Raymond, “Shame and Virtue in Aristotle,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53 [2017]: 111–61). As to the sui generis nature of shame in Aristotle’s ethics, one might have questions about the assimilation of shame and honor in chapter 5 (concepts that Aristotle treats distinctly in the NE and EE) and wonder why other states like friendship or pride could not operate in a similar way to shame in moral development or hold a similar mixed-state role in Aristotle’s moral psychology. Despite these lingering questions, Jimenez’s book does an admirable job of doing what it sets out to do. It deserves a space on the shelf of any scholar interested in Aristotle’s moral psychology. J e r r y G r e e n University of Central Oklahoma
异质性，因为他们依赖于他人的道德观，以及（2）使发展中的道德主体变得肤浅，因为他们关注的是自己在他人面前的样子，而不是自己的真实样子。从其自身目的来看，这本书是成功的：它对亚里士多德的羞耻本质及其在培养道德代理人中的美德习惯化中的作用进行了看似合理的重建。它也是令人羡慕的清晰和有序，在文本解释、与当代次要来源的接触之间有着熟练的平衡，并且直观地呈现了一个概念，这个概念在亚里士多德思想的原始希腊背景下的运作方式与我们今天可能看到的大不相同。然而，在某些方面，这本书的狭隘关注对其不利，因为读者可能希望看到许多主题得到更彻底的讨论。例如，《政治学》中对道德教育的讨论只是被动的，尽管希门尼斯对其他文本的依赖（如《修辞学II.6》和《形而上学IX.8》）表明，这部作品并不局限于对尼科马赫伦理学的具体处理。欧洲伦理学被认为与NE基本一致，因此在很大程度上被用作补充NE的额外文本支持的资源。希门尼斯在1221a1没有讨论将羞耻作为其自身美德纳入EE的美德和罪恶表中，这是一个惊人的遗漏：这至少从表面上偏离了NE IV.9将羞耻视为一种原始美德的处理方式，并对将NE和EE两者结合起来为单一解释辩护的方法提出了质疑。此外，如果羞耻在EE中是一种真正的美德，这似乎会使第6章的论点复杂化，即一旦代理人发展成完全有道德的成年人，羞耻就不再是一种值得称赞的状态（关于这一主题的优秀处理，请参阅Christopher Raymond，“亚里士多德的羞耻和美德”，牛津古代哲学研究53[2017]：111–61）。关于亚里士多德伦理学中羞耻的独特性质，人们可能会对第5章中羞耻和荣誉的同化（亚里士多德在NE和EE中明确对待的概念）产生疑问，并想知道为什么友谊或自豪等其他状态在道德发展中不能以与羞耻相似的方式运作，或者在亚里士多德的道德心理学中扮演类似的混合状态角色。尽管有这些挥之不去的问题，希门尼斯的书在做它打算做的事情方面做得很好。它值得任何对亚里士多德道德心理学感兴趣的学者在书架上占有一席之地。J e r r y G r e n俄克拉荷马州中部大学
{"title":"Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act by Can Laurens Löwe (review)","authors":"T. M. Osborne","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0009","url":null,"abstract":"heteronomous, because they are dependent on the moral outlook of others, and (2) making developing moral agents superficial, because they focus on how they appear to others rather than how they really are. Judged by its own aim, this book is a success: it provides a plausible reconstruction of the nature of shame in Aristotle and its function in the habituation of virtue in developing moral agents. It is also enviably clear and well-organized, with an adept balance of textual interpretation, engagement with contemporary secondary sources, and an intuitive presentation of a concept that would operate very differently in the original Greek context of Aristotle’s thought than we are likely to view it today. In some ways, however, the narrow focus of this book works to its detriment, as there are many topics that the reader might like to see discussed more thoroughly. For instance, the discussion of moral education in the Politics is only passingly addressed, though Jimenez’s reliance on other texts (such as Rhetoric II.6 and Metaphysics IX.8) shows that the work is not restricted to being a treatment of the Nicomachean Ethics account specifically. The Eudemian Ethics is assumed to be mostly consonant with the NE and is therefore used largely as a resource for additional textual support to supplement the NE. It is a striking omission that Jimenez does not discuss the inclusion of shame as its own virtue in the EE’s table of virtues and vices at 1221a1: this is at least a prima facie departure from NE IV.9’s treatment of shame as merely a protovirtue, and calls into question the methodology of pulling from both the NE and EE together to defend a single interpretation. Moreover, if shame is a real virtue in the EE, this would seem to complicate chapter 6’s thesis that shame ceases to be a praiseworthy state once agents develop into fully virtuous adults (for an excellent treatment of this topic, see Christopher Raymond, “Shame and Virtue in Aristotle,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53 [2017]: 111–61). As to the sui generis nature of shame in Aristotle’s ethics, one might have questions about the assimilation of shame and honor in chapter 5 (concepts that Aristotle treats distinctly in the NE and EE) and wonder why other states like friendship or pride could not operate in a similar way to shame in moral development or hold a similar mixed-state role in Aristotle’s moral psychology. Despite these lingering questions, Jimenez’s book does an admirable job of doing what it sets out to do. It deserves a space on the shelf of any scholar interested in Aristotle’s moral psychology. J e r r y G r e e n University of Central Oklahoma","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"152 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49188221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:This article examines Kant's response to the criticisms of natural theology that Hume articulates in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Though Kant was in agreement with the Dialogues' rejection of dogmatic theism, he equally viewed many of its arguments as a threat to his aim of constructing a critical theology. Kant is often taken to have successfully diffused this skeptical threat on the basis of a symbolic anthropomorphism articulated in the Prolegomena. However, I argue that the Prolegomena account remains susceptible to Hume's criticisms, and that it was only several years later in the third Critique that Kant was able to show how the Dialogues' skeptical conclusions can be circumvented. In this manner, I aim to show that Hume's challenge is more significant, and Kant's response more complex, than has previously been acknowledged.
{"title":"Kant's Response to Hume on Natural Theology: Dogmatic Anthropomorphism, Analogical Inference, and Symbolic Representation","authors":"P. Reichl","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:This article examines Kant's response to the criticisms of natural theology that Hume articulates in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Though Kant was in agreement with the Dialogues' rejection of dogmatic theism, he equally viewed many of its arguments as a threat to his aim of constructing a critical theology. Kant is often taken to have successfully diffused this skeptical threat on the basis of a symbolic anthropomorphism articulated in the Prolegomena. However, I argue that the Prolegomena account remains susceptible to Hume's criticisms, and that it was only several years later in the third Critique that Kant was able to show how the Dialogues' skeptical conclusions can be circumvented. In this manner, I aim to show that Hume's challenge is more significant, and Kant's response more complex, than has previously been acknowledged.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"101 - 77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44728560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rudolf A. Makkreel 1936-2021","authors":"J. Zupko","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"-"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47700588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：