Pub Date : 1999-09-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640872
Peter L. Hahn
city of Jerusalem evokes powerful feelings and provokes stormy political debate. For Jews, the capital of ancient Israel remained a religious and cultural beacon for centuries and, after the state of Israel was created in 1948, control of the city became one of its most important goals. 'Paratroopers! Conquerors of Jerusalem!', Lieutenant General Mordechai Gur addressed victorious Israeli soldiers on the
{"title":"Alignment by Coincidence: Israel, the United States, and the Partition of Jerusalem, 1949–1953","authors":"Peter L. Hahn","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640872","url":null,"abstract":"city of Jerusalem evokes powerful feelings and provokes stormy political debate. For Jews, the capital of ancient Israel remained a religious and cultural beacon for centuries and, after the state of Israel was created in 1948, control of the city became one of its most important goals. 'Paratroopers! Conquerors of Jerusalem!', Lieutenant General Mordechai Gur addressed victorious Israeli soldiers on the","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"665-689"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640872","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59985933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-09-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640871
T. Biddle
{"title":"Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942–1945","authors":"T. Biddle","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640871","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"626-664"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640871","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59986264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-09-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640874
Michael A. Barnhart
STEPHEN S. LARGE. Emperor Hirohito and Shāwa Japan: A Political Biography. London and New York: Roudedge, 1997. Pp. xii, 249. $18.95 (US); paper; PETER WETZLER. Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998. Pp. xi, 294. $38.00 (US); EDWARD J. DREA. In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. Pp. xvii, 299. $45.00 (US); ROBERT B. EDGERTON. Warriors of the Rising Sun: A History of the Japanese Military. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997. Pp. 384. $29.95 (US). Reviewed by Michael A. Barnhart
{"title":"Review Article: Hirohito and His Army","authors":"Michael A. Barnhart","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640874","url":null,"abstract":"STEPHEN S. LARGE. Emperor Hirohito and Shāwa Japan: A Political Biography. London and New York: Roudedge, 1997. Pp. xii, 249. $18.95 (US); paper; PETER WETZLER. Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998. Pp. xi, 294. $38.00 (US); EDWARD J. DREA. In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. Pp. xvii, 299. $45.00 (US); ROBERT B. EDGERTON. Warriors of the Rising Sun: A History of the Japanese Military. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997. Pp. 384. $29.95 (US). Reviewed by Michael A. Barnhart","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"696-703"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640874","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59986142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-06-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865
R. Johnson
assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs in John F. Kennedy's administration, Edwin Martin, testified on 3 October 1963 before a closed session of the senate's Foreign Relations Committee to defend the administration's handling of a military coup in the Dominican Republic. While the administration privately conceded the coup to be a grave setback, committee Republicans generally supported the restrained welcome given to the military regime which had replaced Juan Bosch's democratically elected government, whereas most committee Democrats were sharply critical. Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) attributed the disagreement to Kennedy's failure elsewhere in the Americas to promote 'constitutionalism' with enough vigour.1 Morse's testiness was more remarkable given that, three years earlier, both the executive and legislative branches had thought generous economic aid combined with rhetorical support for democracy the best way to wage the cold war in Latin America. But they soon parted company. Support for the Alliance for Progress waned not only because the administration rarely achieved its stated goals in Latin America; it also fell victim to ideological differences between the president and various senate factions which coloured other disputes over how much freedom of action the executive branch should be allowed in its conduct of foreign affairs. In this sense, the fate of the Alliance illustrates not only the difficulty of promoting democracy during the cold war, but also how differently the executive and legislative branches approach foreign affairs. Latin America provides some of the earliest evidence of the emergence of an empowered congressional perspective on US foreign policy, fuelled by the reaction against executive power caused by the war in Vietnam.
{"title":"Constitutionalism Abroad and At Home: The United States Senate and the Alliance for Progress, 1961–1967","authors":"R. Johnson","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865","url":null,"abstract":"assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs in John F. Kennedy's administration, Edwin Martin, testified on 3 October 1963 before a closed session of the senate's Foreign Relations Committee to defend the administration's handling of a military coup in the Dominican Republic. While the administration privately conceded the coup to be a grave setback, committee Republicans generally supported the restrained welcome given to the military regime which had replaced Juan Bosch's democratically elected government, whereas most committee Democrats were sharply critical. Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) attributed the disagreement to Kennedy's failure elsewhere in the Americas to promote 'constitutionalism' with enough vigour.1 Morse's testiness was more remarkable given that, three years earlier, both the executive and legislative branches had thought generous economic aid combined with rhetorical support for democracy the best way to wage the cold war in Latin America. But they soon parted company. Support for the Alliance for Progress waned not only because the administration rarely achieved its stated goals in Latin America; it also fell victim to ideological differences between the president and various senate factions which coloured other disputes over how much freedom of action the executive branch should be allowed in its conduct of foreign affairs. In this sense, the fate of the Alliance illustrates not only the difficulty of promoting democracy during the cold war, but also how differently the executive and legislative branches approach foreign affairs. Latin America provides some of the earliest evidence of the emergence of an empowered congressional perspective on US foreign policy, fuelled by the reaction against executive power caused by the war in Vietnam.","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"414-442"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59985482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-06-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640860
D. Ryan
{"title":"Colonialism and Hegemony in Latin America: An Introduction","authors":"D. Ryan","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640860","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"287-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640860","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59985659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-06-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640864
S. Streeter
than A year after the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) toppled the nationalist regime in Guatemala of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmdn, the vice-president of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, announced to the National Security Council in March 1955 that 'the United States was now provided with an opportunity to accomplish in two years in Guatemala what the Communists had completely failed to accomplish in ten years.'1 A few months later, in July 1955, a special study mission from the US house of representatives called Guatemala 'the showcase of Latin America', and declared that, with the victory of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas over Arbenz, Guatemala ;has become a political, social, and economic laboratory . . . The success or failure of this experiment by the first country in the world to overthrow the Communist yoke will be a major factor in determining the future course of Latin American affairs.'2 The 'showcase' metaphor invoked by Nixon and other US officials was an important component of a counter-revolution against 'Communism' that began with the resignation of Arbenz on 27 June 1954. Washington sought to establish an anti-Communist government in Guatemala that would return expropriated land to the United Fruit Company, lift trade barriers, eliminate restrictions on foreign investment, supply inexpensive strategic raw materials, realign Guatemala's foreign policy positions with those of the United States in the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and welcome US military training and assistance. US officials also hoped to blunt Guatemalan nationalism by sponsoring an economic development assistance programme that would create prosperity while promoting free trade and private investment. Thus, between 1954
1955年3月，在美国中央情报局(CIA)推翻了危地马拉的雅各博·阿本斯·古兹曼登的民族主义政权一年多之后，美国副总统理查德·m·尼克松(Richard M. Nixon)向国家安全委员会宣布，“美国现在有机会在危地马拉用两年时间完成共产党人用十年时间完全未能完成的任务。”1几个月后，即1955年7月，美国众议院的一个特别研究代表团称危地马拉为“拉丁美洲的展示橱窗”，并宣布，随着卡洛斯·卡斯蒂略·阿马斯上校对阿本斯的胜利，危地马拉已成为一个政治、社会和经济实验室……世界上第一个推翻共产主义枷锁的国家的这一试验的成功或失败将是决定拉丁美洲事务未来走向的一个主要因素。尼克松和其他美国官员引用的“展示”隐喻是1954年6月27日阿本斯辞职后开始的反革命“共产主义”的重要组成部分。华盛顿试图在危地马拉建立一个反共政府，将被征收的土地归还给联合水果公司，取消贸易壁垒，消除对外国投资的限制，提供廉价的战略原材料，重新调整危地马拉在美洲国家组织和联合国中的外交政策立场，并欢迎美国的军事训练和援助。美国官员还希望通过赞助一项经济发展援助计划来削弱危地马拉的民族主义，该计划将在促进自由贸易和私人投资的同时创造繁荣。因此，在1954年
{"title":"The Failure of ‘Liberal Developmentalism’: The United States's Anti-Communist Showcase in Guatemala, 1954–1960","authors":"S. Streeter","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640864","url":null,"abstract":"than A year after the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) toppled the nationalist regime in Guatemala of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmdn, the vice-president of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, announced to the National Security Council in March 1955 that 'the United States was now provided with an opportunity to accomplish in two years in Guatemala what the Communists had completely failed to accomplish in ten years.'1 A few months later, in July 1955, a special study mission from the US house of representatives called Guatemala 'the showcase of Latin America', and declared that, with the victory of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas over Arbenz, Guatemala ;has become a political, social, and economic laboratory . . . The success or failure of this experiment by the first country in the world to overthrow the Communist yoke will be a major factor in determining the future course of Latin American affairs.'2 The 'showcase' metaphor invoked by Nixon and other US officials was an important component of a counter-revolution against 'Communism' that began with the resignation of Arbenz on 27 June 1954. Washington sought to establish an anti-Communist government in Guatemala that would return expropriated land to the United Fruit Company, lift trade barriers, eliminate restrictions on foreign investment, supply inexpensive strategic raw materials, realign Guatemala's foreign policy positions with those of the United States in the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and welcome US military training and assistance. US officials also hoped to blunt Guatemalan nationalism by sponsoring an economic development assistance programme that would create prosperity while promoting free trade and private investment. Thus, between 1954","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"386-413"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640864","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59985468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-06-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640861
Tyler Priest
Valentim Getulio Vargas, explained to him in 1942 that 'there are two currents of [US] economic policy. The most prominent one is the Good Neighbor policy ... a departure from that antiquated policy of domination and subjugation.' The other is 'based on commercial and industrial profits, with the same old mentality of exploiting raw materials, which leaves us with holes in the ground and no industries'.1 After the Second World War, the administration led by Harry S. Truman dismantled the Good Neighbor policy, redirected aid elsewhere in the world, and rigidly opposed Communism in the hemisphere, as historians of interAmerican affairs have amply demonstrated.2 The scholarly focus on the demise of the Good Neighbor, however, has deflected attention from the persistence of the current in US policy that so troubled Boucas. Although the new global priorities of the United States during the cold war altered hemispheric political relations, they also intensified the US search for strategic minerals in Latin America. The completion in the 1940s of the United States's long transition from relative self-sufficiency in natural resources to becoming the world's greatest importer3 had a profound effect on the Truman administration's approach to Latin American economic development. In the quest to carry out global designs while accommodating particular national interests, Truman officials made compromises in foreign economic policy which are well covered by the historical literature.4 Yet few scholars appreciate how
{"title":"Banking on Development: Brazil in the United States's Search for Strategic Minerals, 1945–1953","authors":"Tyler Priest","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640861","url":null,"abstract":"Valentim Getulio Vargas, explained to him in 1942 that 'there are two currents of [US] economic policy. The most prominent one is the Good Neighbor policy ... a departure from that antiquated policy of domination and subjugation.' The other is 'based on commercial and industrial profits, with the same old mentality of exploiting raw materials, which leaves us with holes in the ground and no industries'.1 After the Second World War, the administration led by Harry S. Truman dismantled the Good Neighbor policy, redirected aid elsewhere in the world, and rigidly opposed Communism in the hemisphere, as historians of interAmerican affairs have amply demonstrated.2 The scholarly focus on the demise of the Good Neighbor, however, has deflected attention from the persistence of the current in US policy that so troubled Boucas. Although the new global priorities of the United States during the cold war altered hemispheric political relations, they also intensified the US search for strategic minerals in Latin America. The completion in the 1940s of the United States's long transition from relative self-sufficiency in natural resources to becoming the world's greatest importer3 had a profound effect on the Truman administration's approach to Latin American economic development. In the quest to carry out global designs while accommodating particular national interests, Truman officials made compromises in foreign economic policy which are well covered by the historical literature.4 Yet few scholars appreciate how","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"297-330"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640861","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59985703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-06-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640862
Glenn J. Dorn
United States' s charge d'affaires at Buenos Aires, John Moors Cabot, remarked in 1946 of the Argentine presidential candidate Colonel Juan Domingo Peron: 'Whenever we look around for a really good stick with which to beat a certain gent, we never seem to be able to find one handy.'1 The statement illustrates how Good Neighbor pledges of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Latin American states handcuffed the administration of Harry S. Truman as it sought to combat the Peronist movement in the late 1940s. Although Carlos Escude and C. A. MacDonald show how the United States and Britain used economic boycott and political manipulation to lever Peronist Argentina away from a statist economic programme,2 the Truman administration, which wished to draw all of the Latin American states in its train, saw that an open attack on or condemnation of Peron would backfire and tried to hide its leverage behind the facade of non-intervention. Peron won the Argentine election of February 1946 by advocating 'social justice' for working people and national development through 'populist' statism.3 At the heart of his economic programme was the Instituto
1946年，美国驻布宜诺斯艾利斯临时代办约翰·摩尔·卡博特(John Moors Cabot)在谈到阿根廷总统候选人胡安·多明戈·庇隆上校时说:“每当我们四处寻找一根真正好用的棍子来打击某个绅士时，我们似乎永远找不到随手可得的。”这份声明说明了“好邻居”不干涉拉美国家内政的承诺如何束缚了哈里·s·杜鲁门(Harry S. Truman)政府在20世纪40年代末打击庇隆主义运动的努力。尽管卡洛斯·埃斯库德和c·a·麦克唐纳展示了美国和英国是如何利用经济抵制和政治操纵来迫使庇隆主义的阿根廷放弃中央集权的经济计划的，2但杜鲁门政府希望吸引所有拉美国家加入自己的计划，他们看到公开攻击或谴责庇隆会适得其反，并试图在不干涉的表象下隐藏自己的影响力。庇隆在1946年2月的阿根廷大选中赢得了胜利，他主张通过“民粹主义”的统计主义为劳动人民争取“社会正义”和国家发展他的经济计划的核心是研究所
{"title":"‘Bruce Plan’ and Marshall Plan: The United States's Disguised Intervention against Peronism in Argentina, 1947–1950","authors":"Glenn J. Dorn","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640862","url":null,"abstract":"United States' s charge d'affaires at Buenos Aires, John Moors Cabot, remarked in 1946 of the Argentine presidential candidate Colonel Juan Domingo Peron: 'Whenever we look around for a really good stick with which to beat a certain gent, we never seem to be able to find one handy.'1 The statement illustrates how Good Neighbor pledges of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Latin American states handcuffed the administration of Harry S. Truman as it sought to combat the Peronist movement in the late 1940s. Although Carlos Escude and C. A. MacDonald show how the United States and Britain used economic boycott and political manipulation to lever Peronist Argentina away from a statist economic programme,2 the Truman administration, which wished to draw all of the Latin American states in its train, saw that an open attack on or condemnation of Peron would backfire and tried to hide its leverage behind the facade of non-intervention. Peron won the Argentine election of February 1946 by advocating 'social justice' for working people and national development through 'populist' statism.3 At the heart of his economic programme was the Instituto","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"331-351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640862","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59985377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-06-01DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1999.9640863
J. V. Kofas
{"title":"Stabilization and Class Conflict: The State Department, the IMF, and the IBRD in Chile, 1952–1958","authors":"J. V. Kofas","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640863","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"352-385"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640863","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59985404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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