Pub Date : 2022-01-01Epub Date: 2022-06-22DOI: 10.1007/s12122-022-09334-1
Arnd Kölling
The author investigates the different influences of labor shortage on wages in firms with or without collective bargaining agreements. In addition to training, technological solutions, and organizational flexibility, employers can also offer higher wages at a constant employment level to fill vacancies if the current payments are lower than the marginal revenue of the workers. Firms with collective bargaining agreements probably already pay wages according to marginal revenue or, in the case of rent sharing, above it, and the remuneration is probably also not adjusted. Using wage regressions with panel data for German establishments, this paper shows that collective bargaining and a lack of skilled workers can lead to higher wages. However, the latter only applies to firms that are not bound by collective agreements. Hence, wage differentials between these firms decrease, providing further explanation for a countercyclical development of the wage premium from the collective bargaining agreement.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12122-022-09334-1.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-01Epub Date: 2022-11-18DOI: 10.1007/s12122-022-09338-x
Peter McHenry, Jennifer M Mellor
Various U.S. states and municipalities raised their mandated minimum wages between 2017 and 2019. In some areas, minimum wages became high enough to bind for more professional workers, such as lower paid staff at nursing facilities. We add to the small prior literature on the effects of minimum wages on nursing facility staffing using novel establishment-level data on daily hours worked; these data allow us to examine changes in staffing hours along margins previously unexplored in the minimum wage literature. We find no evidence that minimum wage increases reduced hours worked among lower-paid nurses in nursing facilities. In contrast, we find that increases in state and local minimum wages increased hours worked per resident day by nursing assistants; increases occurred for the average of all days throughout the month and on weekend days. We also find that a higher minimum wage increased the share of days in the month that facilities meet at least 75% of the minimum recommended levels of staffing for nursing assistants. These results lessen concerns that minimum wage hikes may reduce the quality of resident care at nursing facilities.
{"title":"The Impact of Recent State and Local Minimum Wage Increases on Nursing Facility Employment.","authors":"Peter McHenry, Jennifer M Mellor","doi":"10.1007/s12122-022-09338-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-022-09338-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Various U.S. states and municipalities raised their mandated minimum wages between 2017 and 2019. In some areas, minimum wages became high enough to bind for more professional workers, such as lower paid staff at nursing facilities. We add to the small prior literature on the effects of minimum wages on nursing facility staffing using novel establishment-level data on daily hours worked; these data allow us to examine changes in staffing hours along margins previously unexplored in the minimum wage literature. We find no evidence that minimum wage increases reduced hours worked among lower-paid nurses in nursing facilities. In contrast, we find that increases in state and local minimum wages increased hours worked per resident day by nursing assistants; increases occurred for the average of all days throughout the month and on weekend days. We also find that a higher minimum wage increased the share of days in the month that facilities meet at least 75% of the minimum recommended levels of staffing for nursing assistants. These results lessen concerns that minimum wage hikes may reduce the quality of resident care at nursing facilities.</p>","PeriodicalId":46592,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Research","volume":"43 3-4","pages":"345-368"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9673218/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40481888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-07DOI: 10.1007/s12122-021-09323-w
W. Allen
{"title":"Work Environment and Worker Performance: A View from the Goal Crease","authors":"W. Allen","doi":"10.1007/s12122-021-09323-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-021-09323-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46592,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"418 - 448"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47708691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1007/s12122-021-09322-x
Tobias Brändle, Lukas Fervers
{"title":"Give it Another Try: What are the Effects of a Job Creation Scheme Especially Designed for Hard-to-Place Workers?","authors":"Tobias Brändle, Lukas Fervers","doi":"10.1007/s12122-021-09322-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-021-09322-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46592,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"382 - 417"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41430076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s12122-021-09321-y
C. Makridis, B. Hirsch
{"title":"The Labor Market Earnings of Veterans: Is Military Experience More or Less Valuable than Civilian Experience?","authors":"C. Makridis, B. Hirsch","doi":"10.1007/s12122-021-09321-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-021-09321-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46592,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"303 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45823972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.1007/s12122-021-09320-z
D. Martin
{"title":"The Minimum Wage in a Roy Model with Monopsony","authors":"D. Martin","doi":"10.1007/s12122-021-09320-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-021-09320-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46592,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"358 - 381"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41536911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper compares the effectiveness of two mechanisms of regulation enforcement: (1) the frequency of inspections and (2) penalties for violations. Threat effects of increased penalties and inspection rates, rather than corrective effects upon receiving an inspection or penalty, are the focus of analysis. Mining industry data from 2004–2009 are used to analyze the responses of mines to separate increases in inspections and citation penalties regarding regulations of safety standards. Mines did not improve safety in response to increased penalties at the ex-ante inspecting rates; however, mines significantly reduced accidents under increased inspections when implemented at those higher penalty rates. The identification strategy results in a local average treatment effect that implies increasing inspection rates from current levels would likely increase social welfare. Results are shown to be robust to bandwidth changes and model specification. The interpretation of the estimated local effect in the context of selection is analyzed. Robustness checks regarding selection exploit staffing changes and restrict to similar samples of treated and non-treated mines, justifying that results are representative.
{"title":"Regulation Enforcement","authors":"Michael Gmeiner, R. Gmeiner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3921078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3921078","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares the effectiveness of two mechanisms of regulation enforcement: (1) the frequency of inspections and (2) penalties for violations. Threat effects of increased penalties and inspection rates, rather than corrective effects upon receiving an inspection or penalty, are the focus of analysis. Mining industry data from 2004–2009 are used to analyze the responses of mines to separate increases in inspections and citation penalties regarding regulations of safety standards. Mines did not improve safety in response to increased penalties at the ex-ante inspecting rates; however, mines significantly reduced accidents under increased inspections when implemented at those higher penalty rates. The identification strategy results in a local average treatment effect that implies increasing inspection rates from current levels would likely increase social welfare. Results are shown to be robust to bandwidth changes and model specification. The interpretation of the estimated local effect in the context of selection is analyzed. Robustness checks regarding selection exploit staffing changes and restrict to similar samples of treated and non-treated mines, justifying that results are representative.","PeriodicalId":46592,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Research","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47127215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-11DOI: 10.1007/s12122-020-09315-2
Chia-Jung Chang
{"title":"Is the Road to Unemployment Paved with Good Intentions? Labor Market Outcomes of Young Women","authors":"Chia-Jung Chang","doi":"10.1007/s12122-020-09315-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-020-09315-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46592,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Labor Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"244 - 302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s12122-020-09315-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43399557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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