Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第3页

Accountability in criminal justice 刑事司法问责制

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12560

Erin I. Kelly

引用次数: 0

Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School 非理想理论应该依赖理想理论吗？法兰克福学派的启示

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12556

Kristina Lepold

While ideal theory tells us “what a perfectly just society would be like” (Rawls, 1971, p. 8), our current social world is far from perfectly just, and we clearly want to know how to orient ourselves and act in these less than perfectly just, or unjust, circumstances. This is why many political philosophers¹ today agree that what is needed is nonideal theory. There is, however, disagreement on one key issue. While some—most notably Charles W. Mills and Amartya Sen—have argued that nonideal theory does not need to build on ideal theory and should do without it, others have pointed out ways in which ideal theory may still be necessary for doing nonideal theory, and that ideal theory should not be dismissed so easily for the project of nonideal theory. The central question, then, is whether nonideal theory should rely on ideal theory.

In what follows, I would like to take up this question and propose an answer to it. I will do so by considering a more specific question. Taking the Frankfurt School as my point of departure, I would like to examine whether nonideal theory, when guided by ideal theory, can help members of the social world to understand injustices and thus contribute to their self-reflection. Advocates of nonideal theory should be concerned about the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection, because whether it can successfully inform collective action to overcome injustice depends on its ability to contribute to self-reflection. In other words, what is at stake is nothing less than the practical relevance of political philosophy. As I will argue, however, reliance on ideal theory renders the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection uncertain and therefore a matter of sheer luck. As a result, the ability of nonideal theory to successfully guide action is in constant doubt. I will therefore conclude by suggesting that if political philosophy wants to be practically relevant, nonideal theory should not rely on ideal theory.

My argument will involve four steps. First, I will explain my understanding of ideal and nonideal theory (Section 1), before addressing the debate about the role of ideal theory for nonideal theory (Section 2). I will then turn to the Frankfurt School and outline its basic approach to injustice and social problems in general (Section 3). Finally, I will examine what lessons advocates of nonideal theory can learn from the Frankfurt School, which is where the main action of this paper takes place (Section 4). I will conclude with a summary of the argument.

虽然理想理论告诉我们 "一个完全公正的社会会是什么样子"（Rawls, 1971, p.8），但我们当前的社会世界远非完全公正，我们显然想知道如何在这些并非完全公正或不公正的环境中定位自己并采取行动。这就是为什么当今许多政治哲学家1 都认为我们需要的是非理想理论。不过，在一个关键问题上存在分歧。有些人--其中最著名的是查尔斯-W-米尔斯（Charles W. Mills）和阿马蒂亚-森（Amartya Sen）--认为非理想理论不需要建立在理想理论的基础上，应该不需要理想理论，而另一些人则指出了理想理论对于非理想理论的必要性，认为理想理论不应该因为非理想理论的项目而被轻易否定。因此，核心问题是非理想理论是否应该依赖于理想理论。在下文中，我想讨论这个问题并提出一个答案。下面，我将讨论这个问题，并提出一个答案。我想以法兰克福学派为出发点，探讨非理想理论在理想理论的指导下，能否帮助社会成员理解不公正现象，从而促进他们的自我反思。非理想理论的倡导者应该关注非理想理论促进自我反思的能力，因为非理想理论能否成功地指导集体行动以克服不公正，取决于其促进自我反思的能力。换句话说，政治哲学的现实意义正是其关键所在。然而，正如我将要论证的那样，对理想理论的依赖使得非理想理论促进自我反思的能力变得不确定，因此纯粹是一个运气问题。因此，非理想理论成功指导行动的能力一直受到质疑。因此，我将在结论中提出，如果政治哲学想要具有现实意义，非理想理论就不应该依赖于理想理论。首先，我将解释我对理想理论和非理想理论的理解（第 1 节），然后讨论理想理论对非理想理论的作用（第 2 节）。然后，我将转向法兰克福学派，概述其处理不公正和一般社会问题的基本方法（第 3 节）。最后，我将探讨非理想理论的倡导者可以从法兰克福学派那里学到哪些经验教训，这也是本文的主要内容（第 4 节）。最后，我将对本文的论点进行总结。

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引用次数: 0

Care and exploitation in precarious employment in academic philosophy 学术哲学不稳定就业中的关爱与剥削

IF 1.1 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12558

Christine Wieseler

引用次数: 0

Recognition of Reviewers 表彰审查员

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2024-01-08 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12553

In addition to our current editorial board, the Journal of Social Philosophy would like to thank the following reviewers who refereed manuscripts for us from September 1, 2021 through August 31, 2023.Aas, SeanAbundez-Guerra, VictorAdams, MatthewAdkins, KarenAgmon, ShaiAl Hashmi, RufaidaAlbertsen, AndreasAllais, LucyAlthorpe, CalebAnderson, JamiArlen, GordonArzuaga, FabianAytaç, UğurBaatz, ChristianBadano, GabrieleBallantyne, AngelaBaltzly, VaughnBarrett, JacobBaumann, PeterBeaton, EilidhBeck, ValentinBendik-Keymer, JeremyBengtson, AndreasBerg, AmyBerkey, BrianBianchin, MatteoBistagnino, GiuliaBluhm, RobynBlustein, JeffreyBoettcher, JamesBorghini, AndreaBotts, TinaBoult, CameronBoxill, BernardBoyum, SteinarBraun, StewartBreakey, HughBreen, KeithBrixel, PascalBrooks, ThomBrouwer, HuubBrouwer, ThomasBrown, EtienneBrown, JeffreyBrown, RachelBrownstein, MichaelBrunning, LukeBryan, AlexanderBurelli, CarloBurkhart, BrianButt, DanielButterfield, PaulBuxton, RebeccaCabrera, LuisCaney, SimonCantalamessa, ElizabethCarroll, JeffreyCatala, AmandineCaulfield, MattCavaliere, GiuliaCavallero, EricChung, RyoaCockburn, PatrickCollins, StephanieCroce, MichelCruft, RowanCrummett, DustinCunningham, MarioDaly, EoinDarr, RyanDaventry, Andréade Haan, Nielsde Jongh, Mauritsde Marneffe, Peterde Ruiter, Adriennede Wijze, StephenDemetriou, DanDillingh, SavrielDinishak, JannetteDixon, PeterDoan, MichaelDraper, JamieDryzek, JohnEdell, CeliaEdmundson, WilliamEdyvane, DerekElder, AlexisEphratt, MichalErez, LiorEtinson, AdamFabre, CécileFaraci, DavidFatima, SabaFaulkner, JoanneFehr, CarlaFerdman, AvigailFerracioli, LuaraFine, SarahFinlayson, LornaFox, CarlFrancis, LeslieFreeman, LaurenFreyenhagen, FabianFriedlaender, ChristinaFrye, HarrisonFumagalli, RobertoGallegos, SergioGelber, KatharineGentile, ValentinaGiebel, HeidiGonzález Ricoy, IñigoGoppel, AnnaGordon, John-StewartGosselin, AbigailGotlib, AnnaGraham, KevinGray, Sean W.DGriffith, AaronHeld, VirginiaHerzog, LisaHicks, DanHindriks, FrankHirvonen, On

除现任编辑委员会外，《社会哲学杂志》还要感谢以下审稿人，他们在 2021 年 9 月 1 日至 2023 年 8 月 31 日期间为我们审稿。Aas, SeanAbundez-Guerra, VictorAdams, MatthewAdkins, KarenAgmon, ShaiAl Hashmi, RufaidaAlbertsen, AndreasAllais, LucyAlthorpe, CalebAnderson, JamiArlen, GordonArzuaga, FabianAytaç, UğurBaatz, ChristianBadano、GabrieleBallantyne、AngelaBaltzly、VaughnBarrett、JacobBaumann、PeterBeaton、EilidhBeck、ValentinBendik-Keymer、JeremyBengtson、AndreasBerg、AmyBerkey、BrianBianchin、MatteoBistagnino、GiuliaBluhm、RobynBlustein、JeffreyBoettcher, JamesBorghini, AndreaBotts, TinaBoult, CameronBoxill, BernardBoyum, SteinarBraun, StewartBreakey, HughBreen, KeithBrixel, PascalBrooks, ThomBrouwer, HuubBrouwer, ThomasBrown, EtienneBrown, JeffreyBrown、MattCavaliere, GiuliaCavallero, EricChung, RyoaCockburn, PatrickCollins, StephanieCroce, MichelCruft, RowanCrummett, DustinCunningham, MarioDaly, EoinDarr, RyanDaventry, Andréade Haan, Nielsde Jongh, Mauritsde Marneffe、Peterde Ruiter、Adriennede Wijze、StephenDemetriou、DanDillingh、SavrielDinishak、JannetteDixon、PeterDoan、MichaelDraper、JamieDryzek、JohnEdell、CeliaEdmundson、WilliamEdyvane、DerekElder、AlexisEphratt、MichalErez、LiorEtinson、AdamFabre、CécileFaraci、DavidFatima、SabaFaulkner、JoanneFehr、CarlaFerdman、AvigailFerracioli、LuaraFine、SarahFinlayson、LornaFox、CarlFrancis、LeslieFreeman、LaurenFreyenhagen、FabianFriedlaender、ChristinaFrye、HarrisonFumagalli、RobertoGallegos、SergioGelber、KatharineGentile、ValentinaGiebel、HeidiGonzálezRicoy、IñigoGoppel、AnnaGordon、John-StewartGosselin、AbigailGotlib、AnnaGraham、KevinGray、SeanW.DGriffith, AaronHeld, VirginiaHerzog, LisaHicks, DanHindriks, FrankHirvonen, OnniHolder, CindyHooley, DanHopster, JeroenHourdequin, MarionHoward, DanaHoward, NathanHutchings, KimberlyJackson, JakeJohnston, RebekahKandiyali, JanKates, MichaelKatzer, MatthiasKawall、JasonKim、DavidKisilevsky、SariKiverstein、JulianKling、JenniferKnight、CarlKoltonski、DanielKönigs、PeterKoren、LadislavKramer、ChrisKukla、Quill RebeccaKurtulmuş、FaikKwan、JonathanKyllönen、SimoLamb、RobertLambert、AndrewLance、MarkLang、GeraldLarsen、SigneLeland、R.JLemeire, OlivierLenard, PattiLenczewska, OlgaLensmire, TimothyLepold, KristinaLewis, JonathanLiberman, AlidaLiebow, NabinaLim, Chong-MingLin, Ting-AnLister, MatthewLizarzaburu、JorgeLove, SuzanneLovett, AdamLowe, DanielMacKay, DouglasMackenzie, CatrionaMacleod, ColinMacRae, CallumMadva, AlexMaguire, BarryMalek, JanetMancilla, AlejandraMang, FranzManrique、米尔亚姆-蒙、塞西莱亚-纳尔、希克姆-纳特、雷卡-尼尔、安东尼-诺伊费尔德、布莱恩-诺伊豪瑟、克里斯蒂安-尼克尔、詹姆斯-尼尔森、拉塞-努南、杰夫-诺瓦科维奇、安德烈亚-奥布莱恩、戴维-奥唐纳尔、凯瑟琳-奥弗林特、伊恩-奥谢、汤姆-奥布莱恩、托马斯-奥布莱恩、托马斯-奥布莱恩、托马斯-奥布莱恩、托马斯-奥布莱恩、托马斯-奥布莱恩IanO'Shea, TomOliver, AmyOtto, JessOwen, DavidPage, JenniferPanizza, SilviaParietti, GuidoPark, ShelleyPeacock, MarkPerez, NahshonPerring, ChristianPersson, ErikPetersen-Overton、KristoferPismenny、ArinaPleasants、NigelPohlhaus、GailePrainsack、BarbaraRachar、MatthewRäsänen、JoonaRaven、MikeReglitz、MertenResnik、DavidRietdijk、NataschaRiker、WalterRini、雷吉娜-罗伯茨-卡迪、萨拉-鲁索、玛丽亚-萨格、亚历克斯-桑德文、哈尔瓦德-桑卡兰、基伦-萨特内、保拉-索尔、珍妮弗-斯卡雷、杰弗里-舍梅尔、克里斯蒂安-辛克、菲利普-施梅尔茨勒、科德-施密特、马可-F.

引用次数: 0

The libertarian argument for reparations 自由主义者关于赔偿的论点

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2024-01-03 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12555

Mark R. Reiff

<h2>1 INTRODUCTION</h2>The case for reparations for grievous acts of historical injustice has been getting a lot of attention lately, both within and outside academia (e.g., California Reparations Report 2023; Coates, 2014; Martin & Yaquinto, 2007). Those who advance it claim that the injuries inflicted by these acts are ongoing and severe, and the only way that members of the groups that were the focus of these acts can begin to regain the place they would have held within society had these injustices not occurred, or at least be able and willing to move on from them into the future, is to provide current members of these victimized groups reparations for the wrongs committed against their forebearers. In New World societies, talk of reparations has typically focused on two of these historic wrongs. First, the continuing injury inflicted by slavery and the discrimination against Black people that continued in its aftermath. Second, the injury inflicted through the widespread murder and seizure of land by government and government-sanctioned forces from indigenous peoples. In both the New and Old World, however, other groups—for example, religious or ethnic minorities who have been subjected to centuries of persecution—are also sometimes discussed as being entitled to reparations. Whenever reparations are discussed, however, the claim has generally been that these are required for violations of the principle of equality, a principle to which liberal societies have long paid lip service, but which is now (in some quarters, at least) beginning to be taken more seriously.But I am going to talk about reparations in a different way. Not because I think that any of the current arguments for reparations for Black and indigenous people or anyone else for that matter do not lead to the conclusions that their proponents say they do. On the contrary, with perhaps a few exceptions, I find these arguments not only valid but also convincing. Accordingly, nothing I will say in this paper should be taken as an argument against any of these existing claims for reparations. But I do want to broaden the current discussion in two ways.First, in part I, I am going to set forth what I call a general theory of reparations. In it, I am not only going to talk about reparations as a means of remedying the injuries inflicted by slavery and by the genocide of indigenous peoples, the theft of their land, and the ongoing ripple effects of these historic wrongs. And I am not merely going to add to this a call for reparations for injuries caused by the long-time persecution of the usual religious, ethnic, and other minority populations. I am going to talk about reparations for an even wider variety of historical injustices, including, most importantly, the long-term economic oppression of women, and the historical exploitation of labor.Second, in part II, I am going to set forth my argument for reparations,

1 引言近来，对历史不公正的严重行为进行赔偿的案例在学术界内外受到广泛关注（如《加州 2023 年赔偿报告》；Coates, 2014；Martin & Yaquinto, 2007）。提出这一观点的人声称，这些行为造成的伤害是持续的、严重的，只有为这些受害群体的现任成员对其先辈所犯下的错误提供赔偿，这些群体的成员才能开始重新获得如果这些不公正行为没有发生时他们本应在社会中占据的地位，或者至少能够并愿意从这些不公正行为中走出来，走向未来。在新世界社会中，关于赔偿的讨论通常集中在两个历史性错误上。第一，奴隶制造成的持续伤害以及奴隶制之后对黑人的歧视。第二，政府和政府认可的势力对土著人民的大肆屠杀和强占土地所造成的伤害。然而，无论是在新世界还是在旧世界，其他群体--例如，遭受数百年迫害的宗教或少数民族--有时也被讨论为有权获得赔偿。然而，每当讨论赔偿问题时，人们一般都会说，需要对违反平等原则的行为进行赔偿，长期以来，自由主义社会对这一原则口惠而实不至，但现在（至少在某些方面），人们开始更加认真地对待这一原则。我之所以要以不同的方式谈论赔偿问题，并不是因为我认为目前为黑人和原住民或其他任何人提出的赔偿论点并不能得出支持者所说的结论。相反，除了少数例外，我认为这些论点不仅有效，而且令人信服。因此，我在本文中所说的一切都不应被视为反对任何现有赔偿主张的论据。首先，在第一部分，我将提出一个我称之为赔偿的一般理论。在这一部分中，我不仅要讨论赔偿问题，将其作为补救奴隶制和对土著人民的种族灭绝所造成的伤害、对其土地的掠夺以及这些历史性错误所产生的持续涟漪效应的一种手段。此外，我还将呼吁对长期迫害宗教、种族和其他少数群体所造成的伤害进行赔偿。其次，在第二部分，我将提出我的赔偿论点，但不是像大多数人目前所做的那样，以平等原则为基础。相反，我将以自由原则为基础。再次强调，这不应被理解为基于平等原则的赔偿要求是错误的。相反，我的观点是，政治右翼人士经常以自由原则为由，为基于平等原则的要求辩护，但自由原则并不支持其右翼支持者所认为的立场。它实际上把我们引向了与基于平等原则的论点所声称的完全相同的地方。最后，在本文的第三部分，我将提出一个具体的建议，开始履行我们在自由原则下的赔偿义务。但我还是想从一开始就明确我的建议的局限性。我不会说我的建议是我们履行这一义务的唯一途径，我只是说这是一个途径。我甚至不会声称，按照我的建议去做是强制性的，因为它是一揽子其他补救措施中的一个必要因素。我也不会说，即使我们全心全意地遵循我的建议，我们就能完全履行赔偿义务，清除历史污点，使我们所有人都能在正义的恩典下再次携手前进。相反，我将论证我们的赔偿义务是一个持续的过程，必须随着时间的推移以不同的方式在不同程度上采取各种补救措施。我在本文中提出的只是一个值得考虑的重要方案，但目前在很大程度上被忽视了。我认为这种补救措施与自由主义原则有着特殊的联系，但我并不是说补救措施必须有这种特殊联系才是自由主义的。补救措施只需符合自由主义原则即可接受。最后，请注意，即使有人拒绝我的特定补救建议，也不会损害我的总体主张，即补救是应该的。事实上，我的其他论点仍然成立。在我开始论述上述所有问题之前，我还想提出一个初步的问题。如今有许多人反对赔偿要求，无论其形式如何（参见格罗斯，2008 年）。但要理解自由主义者的赔偿论点，并领会其吸引人之处，记住这些反对意见通常是由两个基本关切驱动的，会有所帮助。首先，许多人认为任何赔偿都必然意味着相关历史错误的道德责任可以转移，至少是部分转移，从最初犯错者所属的群体（在大多数情况下是指白人）转移到今天属于该群体的人身上。然而，大多数现在的白人并不愿意接受与过去的不法行为相关的任何道德内疚的转移（见 Parker, 2019）。他们本人并没有做过任何被定性为历史不公正的事情。事实上，他们声称认识到这些行为是错误的，并声称他们大力支持制定防止这些不法行为在今天重演的规则，事实上，他们对这些规则的制定负有主要责任。白人通常表达的第二个潜在担忧是，他们不明白向今天还活着的人支付的钱怎么可能不是意外之财（Luna，2023 年）。现在活着的人（也许有少数例外）都不是历史不公正的真正受害者。他们认为，道义上的受害者身份并不比道义上的指责更容易在代际之间转移。如果赔偿只给某些受苦受难的人而不给其他人，那么这只是重复了过去的错误，没有平等对待今天所有受苦受难的人。此外，在过去受压迫的群体中，有相当一部分人（目前处于中产阶级或上层阶级的人）今天根本没有受苦，而有许多贫穷的白人却在受苦。任何值得我们尊重的正义理论都不会主张给那些没有受苦受难的人以好处，而向那些没有造成这种苦难、实际上自己也在受苦受难的人收取这种费用。如果你想知道什么是不公平，反对意见认为，这就是一个教科书式的例子。显然，任何赔偿方法都需要对这两个问题做出回答，这样才有希望在现实世界中取得进展。但是，任何值得我们支持的赔偿方法都需要以一种有原则的方式来解决这些问题，而不仅仅是为了减少实际的政治阻力，尽管后一个目标并非不恰当或不重要。目前，所有专门针对这些问题的现有赔偿方法都只是正面回应了这些问题，也就是说，这些方法认为，即使对那些没有亲身犯下任何错误行为的人来说，道德转移确实是合理的；即使以前受压迫群体的成员没有亲身遭受痛苦，而其他群体的成员遭受了更多或同样多的痛苦，他们在道义上确实有权获得赔偿。本文没有任何内容假定这些回应是错误的。但很显然，如果目前提出的赔偿论据更有说服力，今天白人中普遍存在的担忧就不会继续如此广泛地表达出来。因此，如果有一种方法能够避免这些担忧，而不是将其视为毫无道理，并以一种有原则的方式这样做，那将会很有帮助。我想说的是，这正是我将要提出的自由主义方法所要做的。说到这里，我现在要开始描述并为它辩护了。

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引用次数: 0

New perspectives on the legitimacy of international institutions and power 对国际机构和权力合法性的新视角

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-12-04 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12554

Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren

In democracies around the world, political forces calling for a rollback of globalization are on the ascendancy. Longstanding consensus about the benefits of free trade and human rights and around the legitimacy of the international institutions enabling these goods has been questioned by successful populist politicians on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some even claim that the entire liberal international order has become contested, perhaps as never before (Lake et al., 2021). An emerging critique of multilateralism argues that states and peoples should not be shackled by international legal arrangements and international law, but rather, that states should “do it alone.” The picture painted is one where state sovereignty is constrained and undermined by international institutions. This view implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff between multilateralism and state autonomy.Yet, in our globalized world, the relationship between state autonomy and international legal institutions is more complex than both critics and some defenders of the international order acknowledge. Though states frequently find themselves under pressure to join international legal institutions, this is often because there are good reasons to do so. In a globalized world, membership in these institutions is often crucial for states to function properly, serving their citizens domestically, while also cultivating productive relationships with other states. Therefore, international institutions may contribute to the construction of domestic legitimacy (Buchanan, 2011). By imposing reciprocal limitations on states, international institutions may increase, rather than diminish, a state's room to maneuver. Furthermore, the very act of joining and submitting to international authority may be seen as an expression of state autonomy rather than a surrender of it. Without dismissing the growing opposition to international institutions as uninformed, misguided, or insincere, this special symposium seeks to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex authority and power relations between international legal arrangements and states and between particular international institutions and the broader institutional structure in which they are embedded.More specifically, the special symposium explores power relations and legitimacy issues in the context of international legal institutions in two dimensions. It assesses, first, what we call vertical power, that is, power and authority exercised by international bodies over states and societies. The special symposium explores claims made about power abuse and illegitimacy by investigating how this kind of power operates, what sort of legitimacy problems it gives rise to, and the normative conditions and criteria of legitimacy that are relevant. Second, the special symposium addresses questions about the international horizontal allocation of power, that is, the division of functi

在世界各地的民主国家，要求全球化倒退的政治力量正在崛起。关于自由贸易和人权的好处，以及促成这些好处的国际机构的合法性的长期共识，受到了意识形态光谱双方成功的民粹主义政治家的质疑。一些人甚至声称，整个自由主义国际秩序都受到了质疑，这可能是前所未有的(Lake et al.， 2021)。对多边主义的一种新批评认为，国家和人民不应受到国际法律安排和国际法的束缚，而应“单独行动”。在这幅图景中，国家主权受到国际机构的约束和破坏。这种观点意味着，在多边主义和国家自治之间必然存在一种权衡。然而，在我们这个全球化的世界里，国家自治和国际法律机构之间的关系比国际秩序的批评者和一些捍卫者所承认的要复杂得多。尽管各国经常发现自己面临加入国际法律机构的压力，但这往往是因为有充分的理由这样做。在一个全球化的世界里，这些机构的成员资格往往对国家正常运作至关重要，既要在国内为其公民服务，又要与其他国家建立富有成效的关系。因此，国际制度可能有助于构建国内合法性(Buchanan, 2011)。通过对国家施加相互限制，国际机构可能会增加(而不是减少)一个国家的回旋余地。此外，加入和服从国际权威的行为可能被视为国家自治的表达，而不是放弃它。本次特别研讨会并没有将对国际机构日益增长的反对视为无知、误导或不真诚，而是试图加深我们对国际法律安排与国家之间、特定国际机构与它们所嵌入的更广泛的机构结构之间复杂的权威和权力关系的理论理解。更具体地说，专题研讨会从两个维度探讨了国际法律制度背景下的权力关系和合法性问题。首先，它评估的是我们所说的垂直权力，即国际机构对国家和社会行使的权力和权威。本次专题研讨会通过调查权力的运作方式、产生的合法性问题以及与之相关的合法性规范条件和标准，探讨了关于权力滥用和非法性的主张。第二，专题讨论会讨论有关国际横向权力分配的问题，即国际机构之间职能、作用和责任的划分。国际机构不是中央集权政府的一部分，而是一个分散和碎片化的体系，而特定机构的职能、角色和能力受到限制，这一事实造成了特殊的合法性问题和困境。此外，国际机构植根于以国家为主导的结构背景中，其内部存在权力失衡，这对评估其合法性构成了额外的挑战。在此背景下，本系列中的文章关注一系列补充性主题。他们探讨了广泛的概念和规范问题，包括能够迫使国家遵守国际机构指令的权威机制(Scherz)、全球政治秩序的潜在权力动态(Aytac)、民粹主义崛起对欧盟和其他地区多边主义的威胁(Cozzaglio和Efthymiou)，以及引导这些主题的合法性和主权等更广泛的问题。我们的撰稿人还关注具体的跨国机构，如国际刑事法院(ICC;克里斯蒂亚诺)和欧洲人权法院(欧洲人权法院;Follesdal)。通过解决这些概念和理论上的合法性问题，并将其应用于具体机构，这次特别研讨会有助于越来越多的关于国际机构合法性的文献(Adams等人，2020;布坎南,>》,2006;global, 2012;Follesdal, 2006;赫德,2019;Scherz, 2021;Tallberg et al.， 2018;Tallberg,z<e:1> rn, 2019)从绝对规范的角度来看。 Scherz的论文解决了一个重要的哲学难题:在什么情况下，国际机构可以合法地要求国家遵守它们的规范?尽管有关政治合法性的理论比比皆是，但它们通常侧重于国家与个人之间的约束性义务;国际机构对主权国家的合法性主张往往无人问询。在概述了她自己的“基于自治”的合法性概念之后，Scherz认为，国家确实有理由遵守国际机构，作为其合法性的条件。这些主张既适用于民主国家，也适用于非民主国家。克里斯蒂亚诺的论文更具体地关注了围绕国际刑事法院的合法性困境。国际刑事法院被指责有选择性地起诉非洲民兵领导人和被认为对西方列强不友好的官员。而且它经常“不对称地”针对冲突中的一方，而不针对另一方。克里斯蒂亚诺怀疑这种“选择性起诉”是否会威胁到国际刑事法院的合法性。他没有从总体上解决该机构的规范地位问题，但在考虑减轻选择性起诉问题的策略时，他澄清了未来确定其合法性的条件。克里斯蒂亚诺仍然广泛同情国际刑事法院及其使命，但也了解国际刑事法院在国际舞台上面临的独特挑战;这篇文章提供了“对其运作及其运作的政治背景的清晰理解”(Christiano，第2页)。然而，正如Aytac的贡献所指出的那样，所有国际机构都必须与跨国资产阶级的结构性力量相抗衡。全球商业精英通过他们在公司董事会、政策团体、非政府组织和著名国际金融机构的职位，作为一个环环相扣的社区发挥作用。它们一起不成比例地影响着全球政策，甚至通过参与资本外逃和避税等活动，对国家权力施加限制。Burelli, 2022)。Aytac认为，任何关于全球政治合法性的解释都必须考虑到这种结构性力量。利用一种复杂的“激进现实主义”方法论，艾塔克将他的方法与更传统的全球正义话语区分开来;认为现实主义哲学框架最适合捕捉全球商业精英所表现出的独特权力星座。欧盟可以说是当今国际政治中最广泛的合法性挑战，它是科扎利奥和埃夫西米乌贡献的重点。对欧盟合法性的许多挑战都是由两边的民粹主义者发起的，他们认为欧盟从根本上来说是不民主和精英主义的。民粹主义者既攻击欧盟规则和程序产生的“输入”合法性，也攻击与其政治结果相关的“输出”合法性。然而，作者认为，这种民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战最终缺乏连贯性。首先，并非所有民粹主义者都是民族主义者:一些民粹主义者，比如杰里米·科尔宾(Jeremy Corbyn)领导的工党，在对欧盟保持世界主义立场的同时，采用了反精英主义的语言。此外，许多民粹主义者将“人民”和“精英”区分开来，作者认为，这种区分经不起概念上的审视。他们认为，民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战最终被证明是多余的;“毕竟，新瓶装陈酒”(Cozzaglio和Efthymiou，第13页)。自欧盟成立以来，中央集权主义者和世界主义者之间的长期争论就一直在演变，但这并没有增加多少争论。Follesdal的贡献更具体地侧重于欧洲人权委员会。该机构对-à-vis欧盟成员国起着动态的作用:确保这些国家遵守人权规范，并向一个欧盟国家的公民通报其他欧盟国家的人权记录。但正如Follesdal所言，尊重成员国的司法权威有时是合理的，尤其是当国内法官具有认知优势时——也就是说，更尊重当地的决策、价值观和传统。因此，挑战在于平衡欧洲人权法院的司法审查权力和欧盟成员国维护的司法主权“口袋”。Follesdal认为，平衡是可以实现的，但要做到这一点，就需要努力调整我们对《欧洲人权公约》的理解，包括使其更具人口代表性。与国际刑事法院一样，欧洲人权法院的合法性仍在进行中。通过对权力和权威关系的分析，本次专题研讨会的论文对超越国家的合法性辩论做出了一般性的理论贡献。但他们通过研究特定的国际法律制度以及它们产生的具体的、有时是自成一体的规范问题来做到这一点。这样，特别专题讨论会增进了我们对在国际机构范围内产生的规范性问题的认识。

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引用次数: 0

What is a black radical Kantianism without Du Bois? On method, principle, and abolition democracy 没有杜波依斯，何来黑人激进康德主义？论方法、原则和废除民主

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12552

Elvira Basevich

引用次数: 0

Alienated dependence: The unfreedom of our social relations 异化的依赖：我们社会关系的不自由

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12551

Tatiana Llaguno