Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献

英文中文

New perspectives on the legitimacy of international institutions and power 对国际机构和权力合法性的新视角

IF 1.1 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-12-04 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12554

Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren

In democracies around the world, political forces calling for a rollback of globalization are on the ascendancy. Longstanding consensus about the benefits of free trade and human rights and around the legitimacy of the international institutions enabling these goods has been questioned by successful populist politicians on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some even claim that the entire liberal international order has become contested, perhaps as never before (Lake et al., 2021). An emerging critique of multilateralism argues that states and peoples should not be shackled by international legal arrangements and international law, but rather, that states should “do it alone.” The picture painted is one where state sovereignty is constrained and undermined by international institutions. This view implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff between multilateralism and state autonomy.Yet, in our globalized world, the relationship between state autonomy and international legal institutions is more complex than both critics and some defenders of the international order acknowledge. Though states frequently find themselves under pressure to join international legal institutions, this is often because there are good reasons to do so. In a globalized world, membership in these institutions is often crucial for states to function properly, serving their citizens domestically, while also cultivating productive relationships with other states. Therefore, international institutions may contribute to the construction of domestic legitimacy (Buchanan, 2011). By imposing reciprocal limitations on states, international institutions may increase, rather than diminish, a state's room to maneuver. Furthermore, the very act of joining and submitting to international authority may be seen as an expression of state autonomy rather than a surrender of it. Without dismissing the growing opposition to international institutions as uninformed, misguided, or insincere, this special symposium seeks to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex authority and power relations between international legal arrangements and states and between particular international institutions and the broader institutional structure in which they are embedded.More specifically, the special symposium explores power relations and legitimacy issues in the context of international legal institutions in two dimensions. It assesses, first, what we call vertical power, that is, power and authority exercised by international bodies over states and societies. The special symposium explores claims made about power abuse and illegitimacy by investigating how this kind of power operates, what sort of legitimacy problems it gives rise to, and the normative conditions and criteria of legitimacy that are relevant. Second, the special symposium addresses questions about the international horizontal allocation of power, that is, the division of function

在世界各地的民主国家，要求全球化倒退的政治力量正在崛起。关于自由贸易和人权的好处，以及促成这些好处的国际机构的合法性的长期共识，受到了意识形态光谱双方成功的民粹主义政治家的质疑。一些人甚至声称，整个自由主义国际秩序都受到了质疑，这可能是前所未有的(Lake et al.， 2021)。对多边主义的一种新批评认为，国家和人民不应受到国际法律安排和国际法的束缚，而应“单独行动”。在这幅图景中，国家主权受到国际机构的约束和破坏。这种观点意味着，在多边主义和国家自治之间必然存在一种权衡。然而，在我们这个全球化的世界里，国家自治和国际法律机构之间的关系比国际秩序的批评者和一些捍卫者所承认的要复杂得多。尽管各国经常发现自己面临加入国际法律机构的压力，但这往往是因为有充分的理由这样做。在一个全球化的世界里，这些机构的成员资格往往对国家正常运作至关重要，既要在国内为其公民服务，又要与其他国家建立富有成效的关系。因此，国际制度可能有助于构建国内合法性(Buchanan, 2011)。通过对国家施加相互限制，国际机构可能会增加(而不是减少)一个国家的回旋余地。此外，加入和服从国际权威的行为可能被视为国家自治的表达，而不是放弃它。本次特别研讨会并没有将对国际机构日益增长的反对视为无知、误导或不真诚，而是试图加深我们对国际法律安排与国家之间、特定国际机构与它们所嵌入的更广泛的机构结构之间复杂的权威和权力关系的理论理解。更具体地说，专题研讨会从两个维度探讨了国际法律制度背景下的权力关系和合法性问题。首先，它评估的是我们所说的垂直权力，即国际机构对国家和社会行使的权力和权威。本次专题研讨会通过调查权力的运作方式、产生的合法性问题以及与之相关的合法性规范条件和标准，探讨了关于权力滥用和非法性的主张。第二，专题讨论会讨论有关国际横向权力分配的问题，即国际机构之间职能、作用和责任的划分。国际机构不是中央集权政府的一部分，而是一个分散和碎片化的体系，而特定机构的职能、角色和能力受到限制，这一事实造成了特殊的合法性问题和困境。此外，国际机构植根于以国家为主导的结构背景中，其内部存在权力失衡，这对评估其合法性构成了额外的挑战。在此背景下，本系列中的文章关注一系列补充性主题。他们探讨了广泛的概念和规范问题，包括能够迫使国家遵守国际机构指令的权威机制(Scherz)、全球政治秩序的潜在权力动态(Aytac)、民粹主义崛起对欧盟和其他地区多边主义的威胁(Cozzaglio和Efthymiou)，以及引导这些主题的合法性和主权等更广泛的问题。我们的撰稿人还关注具体的跨国机构，如国际刑事法院(ICC;克里斯蒂亚诺)和欧洲人权法院(欧洲人权法院;Follesdal)。通过解决这些概念和理论上的合法性问题，并将其应用于具体机构，这次特别研讨会有助于越来越多的关于国际机构合法性的文献(Adams等人，2020;布坎南,>》,2006;global, 2012;Follesdal, 2006;赫德,2019;Scherz, 2021;Tallberg et al.， 2018;Tallberg,z<e:1> rn, 2019)从绝对规范的角度来看。 Scherz的论文解决了一个重要的哲学难题:在什么情况下，国际机构可以合法地要求国家遵守它们的规范?尽管有关政治合法性的理论比比皆是，但它们通常侧重于国家与个人之间的约束性义务;国际机构对主权国家的合法性主张往往无人问询。在概述了她自己的“基于自治”的合法性概念之后，Scherz认为，国家确实有理由遵守国际机构，作为其合法性的条件。这些主张既适用于民主国家，也适用于非民主国家。克里斯蒂亚诺的论文更具体地关注了围绕国际刑事法院的合法性困境。国际刑事法院被指责有选择性地起诉非洲民兵领导人和被认为对西方列强不友好的官员。而且它经常“不对称地”针对冲突中的一方，而不针对另一方。克里斯蒂亚诺怀疑这种“选择性起诉”是否会威胁到国际刑事法院的合法性。他没有从总体上解决该机构的规范地位问题，但在考虑减轻选择性起诉问题的策略时，他澄清了未来确定其合法性的条件。克里斯蒂亚诺仍然广泛同情国际刑事法院及其使命，但也了解国际刑事法院在国际舞台上面临的独特挑战;这篇文章提供了“对其运作及其运作的政治背景的清晰理解”(Christiano，第2页)。然而，正如Aytac的贡献所指出的那样，所有国际机构都必须与跨国资产阶级的结构性力量相抗衡。全球商业精英通过他们在公司董事会、政策团体、非政府组织和著名国际金融机构的职位，作为一个环环相扣的社区发挥作用。它们一起不成比例地影响着全球政策，甚至通过参与资本外逃和避税等活动，对国家权力施加限制。Burelli, 2022)。Aytac认为，任何关于全球政治合法性的解释都必须考虑到这种结构性力量。利用一种复杂的“激进现实主义”方法论，艾塔克将他的方法与更传统的全球正义话语区分开来;认为现实主义哲学框架最适合捕捉全球商业精英所表现出的独特权力星座。欧盟可以说是当今国际政治中最广泛的合法性挑战，它是科扎利奥和埃夫西米乌贡献的重点。对欧盟合法性的许多挑战都是由两边的民粹主义者发起的，他们认为欧盟从根本上来说是不民主和精英主义的。民粹主义者既攻击欧盟规则和程序产生的“输入”合法性，也攻击与其政治结果相关的“输出”合法性。然而，作者认为，这种民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战最终缺乏连贯性。首先，并非所有民粹主义者都是民族主义者:一些民粹主义者，比如杰里米·科尔宾(Jeremy Corbyn)领导的工党，在对欧盟保持世界主义立场的同时，采用了反精英主义的语言。此外，许多民粹主义者将“人民”和“精英”区分开来，作者认为，这种区分经不起概念上的审视。他们认为，民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战最终被证明是多余的;“毕竟，新瓶装陈酒”(Cozzaglio和Efthymiou，第13页)。自欧盟成立以来，中央集权主义者和世界主义者之间的长期争论就一直在演变，但这并没有增加多少争论。Follesdal的贡献更具体地侧重于欧洲人权委员会。该机构对-à-vis欧盟成员国起着动态的作用:确保这些国家遵守人权规范，并向一个欧盟国家的公民通报其他欧盟国家的人权记录。但正如Follesdal所言，尊重成员国的司法权威有时是合理的，尤其是当国内法官具有认知优势时——也就是说，更尊重当地的决策、价值观和传统。因此，挑战在于平衡欧洲人权法院的司法审查权力和欧盟成员国维护的司法主权“口袋”。Follesdal认为，平衡是可以实现的，但要做到这一点，就需要努力调整我们对《欧洲人权公约》的理解，包括使其更具人口代表性。与国际刑事法院一样，欧洲人权法院的合法性仍在进行中。通过对权力和权威关系的分析，本次专题研讨会的论文对超越国家的合法性辩论做出了一般性的理论贡献。但他们通过研究特定的国际法律制度以及它们产生的具体的、有时是自成一体的规范问题来做到这一点。这样，特别专题讨论会增进了我们对在国际机构范围内产生的规范性问题的认识。

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引用次数: 0

What is a black radical Kantianism without Du Bois? On method, principle, and abolition democracy 没有杜波依斯，何来黑人激进康德主义？论方法、原则和废除民主

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12552

Elvira Basevich

引用次数: 0

Alienated dependence: The unfreedom of our social relations 异化的依赖：我们社会关系的不自由

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12551

Tatiana Llaguno

引用次数: 0

Rawls and American political traditions 罗尔斯与美国政治传统

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12549

David A. Reidy

引用次数: 0

Contributors 贡献者

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12479

引用次数: 0

Issue Information - NASSP page 问题信息-NASSP页面

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12480

引用次数: 0

Labor automation for fair cooperation: Why and how machines should provide meaningful work for all 公平合作的劳动自动化:机器为什么以及如何为所有人提供有意义的工作

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-25 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12548

Denise Celentano

By affecting work, resources, organizations, and people's lives, automation processes can be disruptive of the basic structure of society. Nonetheless, we may benefit from this disruption, as automation may offer opportunities to make social cooperation fairer. Just as philosophers have addressed the problem of which values and principles should regulate the distribution of goods, so we may consider the problem of the values and principles guiding technological change with regard to work. Indeed, automation is often addressed from a distributive perspective. A prevailing concern in the debate is about making sure that the technologically unemployed will not lose access to income through unconditional redistributive policies, while some have suggested policies like a “robot tax” to disincentivize companies' investment in labor-saving devices. While crucial given the massive increase in profits afforded by automation and the inequalities that go with it, concerns about income are not the only ones raised by automation. Without underestimating their relevance, in this article I leave aside problems about income to focus on automation from the perspective of work. That is, my concern here is on social cooperation from the perspective of contribution instead of distribution, within a framework that may be called technological contributive justice. If UBI advocates expect everyone to benefit from automation in their income, the contributive perspective postulates that everyone should benefit from automation in their work.There are three main reasons behind this shift. First, even in a world in which income were unconditionally accessible to all, there would be the problem of how to fairly organize the un-automated socially necessary labor (e.g., waste collection, care work, etc.). I call this the “somebody's got to do it” problem. It cannot be solved by merely reallocating income, because it concerns the division of labor itself and its norms. Second, by conceptualizing social cooperation only as a matter of markets and distribution but not production, we are not able to see what happens with regard to what people do besides what they own. But this matters too when it comes to pursuing our life plans (see Section 4) as well as the effects on our aims, aspirations, and character (see Section 3.1). Finally, even if work were completely automatable, we would most likely still consider it undesirable to fully automate certain tasks, such as child care or teaching.On the other hand, normative thinking about automation often takes the form of utopias of “full automation.” Recent examples include ideas of “fully automated luxury communism” (Bastani, 2019) or “post-work” views. A fully automated world, Danaher (2019b) argues, would allow us to pursue a life free from the pressures of economic demands and to enjoy activities for their own sake, much like playing games. From the premise that

通过影响工作、资源、组织和人们的生活，自动化过程可以破坏社会的基本结构。尽管如此，我们可能会从这种颠覆中受益，因为自动化可能会提供机会，使社会合作更加公平。正如哲学家们讨论了应该用哪些价值观和原则来规范商品分配的问题一样，我们也可以考虑在工作方面指导技术变革的价值观和原则的问题。实际上，自动化通常是从分配的角度来处理的。在这场辩论中，一个普遍关注的问题是，如何通过无条件的再分配政策，确保技术性失业人员不会失去获得收入的机会，而一些人则建议采取“机器人税”等政策，抑制企业对节省劳动力的设备的投资。考虑到自动化带来的利润大幅增加以及随之而来的不平等，这一点至关重要，但对收入的担忧并不是自动化引发的唯一问题。没有低估它们的相关性，在这篇文章中，我把关于收入的问题放在一边，从工作的角度关注自动化。也就是说，我在这里关注的是社会合作，从贡献而不是分配的角度，在一个可以称为技术贡献正义的框架内。如果UBI的支持者期望每个人都能从收入的自动化中受益，那么贡献视角则假设每个人都应该从工作的自动化中受益。这种转变背后有三个主要原因。首先，即使在一个所有人都能无条件获得收入的世界里，如何公平地组织非自动化的社会必要劳动(例如，废物收集、护理工作等)也会存在问题。收稿日期:2022年11月14日修稿日期:2023年7月27日收稿日期:2023年8月7日

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引用次数: 0

A couple of reasons in favor of monogamy 有几个理由支持一夫一妻制

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12544

Kyle York

引用次数: 0

Critical theory, ideal theory, and conceptual engineering 批判理论、理想理论和概念工程

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12545

A. Sangiovanni

引用次数: 0

Against corporate responsibility 违背公司责任

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12547

Lars J. K. Moen

Corporate responsibility is the view that certain groups, and not just their members, can be responsible for their causal impact on the world. And in the moral sense I shall consider, these groups, and not just their members, are seen as appropriate targets of reactive attitudes like resentment and gratitude. A key challenge for defenders of corporate responsibility is to show how a group's actions may be unexplainable strictly in terms of individual actions, and that we instead should attribute the actions to the group itself. They will then have grounds for arguing that there is a class of actions for which the group itself, and not necessarily its members, is responsible. Such an argument will imply that an individualist view leaves some responsibility unaccounted for—we get a responsibility void—and that we need to hold the group itself responsible to avoid a deficit in our ascription of responsibility.Pettit (2003, 2007a) takes on this challenge in his defense of corporate responsibility (see also List & Pettit, 2011: ch. 7). He ascribes responsibility particularly to groups acting on attitudes, or beliefs and desires, formed in a procedure aggregating the group members' attitudes. But when members make consistent attitudes toward a set of logically interconnected propositions, such as {p, p → q, q}, the majority attitudes might be inconsistent. To avoid inconsistency, the group therefore needs the capacity to adopt attitudes most of its members reject. It can thus form its own irreducible attitudes. And when the group acts on these attitudes, we cannot assign full responsibility to the group members, who do not hold these attitudes. We must instead hold the group itself responsible as an agent in its own right. Otherwise, Pettit warns us, group agents will be let off the hook too easily; “there will be cases where no one is held responsible for actions that are manifestly matters of agential responsibility” (Pettit, 2007a: 197).Here, we should note that Pettit focuses primarily on cases where the issues on the agenda are clearly connected. We shall see that his example of a workers' committee is one such case. In what follows, I also focus on this type of case, and I shall also give little attention to cases where the connection between issues is less clear, and where individuals have a weaker understanding of the consequences of their actions. But it also seems less plausible that individualist explanations leave responsibility voids in such cases. If the problem of seeing how issues are connected is due to poor organizational design, then individuals high up in the organization's hierarchy might be responsible.1 Of course, even well-organized groups can make decisions without a clear understanding of the effects on future decision making. But when individuals' actions have consequences they cannot be reasonably expected to fores

企业责任是指某些群体，而不仅仅是其成员，可以对其对世界的因果影响负责。我认为，从道德意义上讲，这些群体，而不仅仅是他们的成员，被视为怨恨和感激等被动态度的适当目标。企业责任捍卫者面临的一个关键挑战是，要证明一个群体的行为如何严格地从个人行为的角度是无法解释的，而我们应该将这些行为归因于群体本身。然后，他们将有理由争辩说，有一类行为是由团体本身而不一定是其成员负责的。这样的论点意味着，个人主义观点会让一些责任不负责任——我们的责任是无效的——我们需要让团队自己承担责任，以避免我们对责任的归属出现缺陷。Pettit（20032007a）在为企业责任辩护时接受了这一挑战（另见List&Pettit，2011:c.7）。他将责任特别归因于根据态度或信仰和欲望行事的群体，这些态度或信仰是在聚合群体成员态度的过程中形成的。但是，当成员对一组逻辑上相互关联的命题（如{p，p！q，q}）持一致态度时，大多数人的态度可能是不一致的。因此，为了避免矛盾，该组织需要有能力采取大多数成员拒绝的态度。因此，它可以形成自己不可简化的态度。当团队按照这些态度行事时，我们不能将全部责任分配给不持这些态度的团队成员。相反，我们必须让该组织本身作为代理人自行承担责任。佩蒂特警告我们，否则，集团特工将很容易摆脱困境；“在某些情况下，没有人对明显属于代理人责任的行为负责”（Pettit，2007a:197）。接收日期：2022年12月30日修订日期：2023年7月26日接受日期：2022年8月6日

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