Recent and renewed concern for racial injustice has revived interest in the importance of making reparations for oppressed peoples (Coates, 2014). Philosophers and socio-political theorists have responded by reinvigorating longstanding debates about the requirement for reparations for colonialism, genocide, institutionalized slavery and racial subjugation (Lyons, 2017; Thompson, 2018), as well as exploring the role of reparations in transitional justice (Murphy, 2017; Pityana, 2018). These debates have also been advanced by social movements such as Black Lives Matter and Rhodes Must Fall, which have highlighted the need to reckon with historical injustices and their continued legacies of harm. These movements have brought into sharper relief the vast magnitude of systemic racism and of the ongoing harms that result from historical wrongs. Indeed, awareness is growing that these colonial and racist structures, as well as intergenerational harms, touch every aspect of contemporary social life. In recent years, the scholarly terrain surrounding reparations has expanded to include work addressing the prospect of reparations for women (Nuti, 2019), Latinx Americans (Corlett 2018), and climate refugees (Buxton, 2019). Scholars have also defended new moral bases for reparations in cases such as police shootings (Page, 2019), mass incarceration (King and Page 2018), and ecological degradation (Katz, 2018).
This volume aims to center wronged individuals and groups in the sense that wronged peoples are the final arbiters of how the wrongs are to be understood, what are their precise contours, how, and to what extent repair can be made, and which particular actions will promote repair. This special issue explores a variety of issues related to reparation-making as a way to mitigate the ongoing effects of these historical wrongs. In particular, it considers a number of questions confronted by those who wish to make a compelling case for reparations.
The first question addressed by this special issue is the problem of who ought to make reparations. At first, one might think simply that the perpetrators of injustice ought to pay reparations. The problem with this view, of course, is that many of these large-scale, historical injustices were committed such a long time ago that the perpetrators are now long deceased. Given this, we might instead argue that those who benefitted from these injustices (Butt, 2014) or the institutions of which the perpetrators were a part (Thompson, 2018) ought to pay reparations.
Second, and related, is the matter of to whom reparations are owed. As is the case with the perpetrators, the injustices in question were committed long in the past, so that none of their victims are alive today. As a result, some argue that we owe reparations to the de
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号