<p>Under which conditions can we make a state responsible for an action? For example, is the United States (and not only Bush and his Cabinet) responsible for declaring war against Iraq? And is there any justification to make citizens contribute collectively to the reparation or compensation of the damages produced by the action? That is, should United States citizens shoulder the burdens and pay restitution to Iraq for destroying civil infrastructure during the military campaign? After reviewing some theories, I develop a framework to answer these kinds of questions.</p><p>While the idea of state responsibility has long been under discussion within both political philosophy and international legal theory, no agreement has yet been reached regarding what it is and how it can impact on ordinary citizens. The first problem lies in the difficulty of determining what states are and whether they can perform actions. For example, whereas some prominent theorists take states to be (corporate) agents, with the capacity to form and act upon intentions (e.g., Collins, <span>2019</span>; List & Pettit, <span>2011</span>), some others resist extending the notion of agency to anything other than individuals (e.g., Gilpin, <span>1984</span>; Miller, <span>2002</span>).</p><p>Additionally, there remains a controversy as to when and to what extent it is possible to distribute collective responsibility amongst citizens for the wrongful actions of their state. For instance, whereas Lawford-Smith (<span>2019</span>) argues that (unlike officials) citizens are not <i>culpable</i> for state action, and so they cannot be punished for its bad consequences, Pasternak (<span>2021</span>) and Stilz (<span>2011a</span>) hold that they can indeed be responsible if they are <i>intentional participants</i> or their state satisfies a <i>democratic authorisation principle</i>, respectively.</p><p>Although these views have revealed important aspects of state responsibility, they are not exempt from criticism. With the purpose of introducing a more compelling alternative, I discuss in this paper some crucial challenges to these accounts and then suggest another way to move forward, viz., to analyze state agency, state action, and state responsibility in terms of proxy agency, proxy action, and proxy responsibility.</p><p>I structure the paper as follows. I begin in Section 2 by motivating the analysis of three major approaches to state responsibility: Lawford-Smith's, Pasternak's, and Stilz's. Then, in Sections 3–5, 3–5, I discuss each of them in some detail and show that, despite their best efforts, they all fail at providing an adequate account of state responsibility. In particular, I argue that by focusing only on the culpability of officials, Lawford-Smith creates a normative gap between citizens and their state; that by appealing to an “intentional participation” condition, Pasternak (falling short of her own goals) blocks out the mechanism for attributing responsibilit
{"title":"Making the state responsible: A proxy account of legal organizations and private agents acting for the state","authors":"Miguel Garcia-Godinez","doi":"10.1111/josp.12546","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12546","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Under which conditions can we make a state responsible for an action? For example, is the United States (and not only Bush and his Cabinet) responsible for declaring war against Iraq? And is there any justification to make citizens contribute collectively to the reparation or compensation of the damages produced by the action? That is, should United States citizens shoulder the burdens and pay restitution to Iraq for destroying civil infrastructure during the military campaign? After reviewing some theories, I develop a framework to answer these kinds of questions.</p><p>While the idea of state responsibility has long been under discussion within both political philosophy and international legal theory, no agreement has yet been reached regarding what it is and how it can impact on ordinary citizens. The first problem lies in the difficulty of determining what states are and whether they can perform actions. For example, whereas some prominent theorists take states to be (corporate) agents, with the capacity to form and act upon intentions (e.g., Collins, <span>2019</span>; List & Pettit, <span>2011</span>), some others resist extending the notion of agency to anything other than individuals (e.g., Gilpin, <span>1984</span>; Miller, <span>2002</span>).</p><p>Additionally, there remains a controversy as to when and to what extent it is possible to distribute collective responsibility amongst citizens for the wrongful actions of their state. For instance, whereas Lawford-Smith (<span>2019</span>) argues that (unlike officials) citizens are not <i>culpable</i> for state action, and so they cannot be punished for its bad consequences, Pasternak (<span>2021</span>) and Stilz (<span>2011a</span>) hold that they can indeed be responsible if they are <i>intentional participants</i> or their state satisfies a <i>democratic authorisation principle</i>, respectively.</p><p>Although these views have revealed important aspects of state responsibility, they are not exempt from criticism. With the purpose of introducing a more compelling alternative, I discuss in this paper some crucial challenges to these accounts and then suggest another way to move forward, viz., to analyze state agency, state action, and state responsibility in terms of proxy agency, proxy action, and proxy responsibility.</p><p>I structure the paper as follows. I begin in Section 2 by motivating the analysis of three major approaches to state responsibility: Lawford-Smith's, Pasternak's, and Stilz's. Then, in Sections 3–5, 3–5, I discuss each of them in some detail and show that, despite their best efforts, they all fail at providing an adequate account of state responsibility. In particular, I argue that by focusing only on the culpability of officials, Lawford-Smith creates a normative gap between citizens and their state; that by appealing to an “intentional participation” condition, Pasternak (falling short of her own goals) blocks out the mechanism for attributing responsibilit","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"62-80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12546","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45292063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rawls's idea of human rights revisited","authors":"Rex Martin","doi":"10.1111/josp.12539","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12539","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"336-351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43855111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Alongside lively philosophical debate about human dignity (Etinson, <span>2020</span>; Rosen, <span>2012</span>), several philosophers have begun asking whether “dignity” could also illuminate our moral relations with nonhuman animals (e.g., Abbate, <span>2020</span>; Anderson, <span>2005</span>; Gruen, <span>2014</span>; Humphreys, <span>2016</span>; Nussbaum, <span>2006</span>; Ortiz, <span>2004</span>). Increasing talk of animal dignity is also occurring in public and even legal discourse (Kotzmann & Seery, <span>2017</span>). For example, in a recent habeas corpus hearing for a Bronx Zoo elephant, a Judge declared that the elephant is “a dignified creature” but “there is nothing dignified about her captivity” (Wilson, <span>2022</span>, p. 4). Such language is perhaps beginning to resonate more with people than it once did.</p><p>Nonetheless, some philosophers seriously doubt that dignity is a coherent and useful moral idea (Zuolo, <span>2016</span>). Dressing circus-kept animals in human clothes and laughing at them may strike modern people as cruelly demeaning to those nonhumans. Yet for critics, these apparent assaults on “dignity” are ethically trivial or else merely <i>indirect</i> wrongs—objectionable only because such treatment could upset human witnesses or generally promote animal exploitation (Martin, <span>2019</span>, p. 94). According to dignity's critics, other moral concepts can far better explain what is wrong with that treatment.</p><p>Dignity is a complex notion and providing lucid accounts is challenging. Furthermore, philosophical analysis of <i>animal</i> dignity is relatively limited. It warrants greater attention. In this paper, I explore an understanding of animal dignity that seems to be irreducible to a range of other moral concepts and to some other conceptions of dignity. The understanding I explore appears to be a <i>sui generis</i> notion that involves a special kind of non-natural harm and assault upon animals. This special or distinctive harm and assault is related to the cognate notions of defiling, degrading, demeaning, dishonoring, and honoring treatment.</p><p>Presenting this <i>sui generis</i> understanding requires examining arguably the most compelling current account of animal dignity on offer—a “relational” conception of dignity as <i>social respect</i> or <i>status</i>. Although very important, I shall ask whether there is also another “relational” way of understanding dignity that is irreducible even to that account—although importantly it might complement and deepen it. This suggests that more than one ethically important way of conceiving of dignity is possible.</p><p>In the following, I outline criticisms of animal dignity with a focus on reductionist attacks, identify a social conception of dignity, reflect on some key examples of human behavior that seem to facilitate understanding of animal dignity, briefly introduce positive forms of irreducible dignity, and consider several objections,
{"title":"An irreducible understanding of animal dignity","authors":"Simon Coghlan","doi":"10.1111/josp.12543","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12543","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Alongside lively philosophical debate about human dignity (Etinson, <span>2020</span>; Rosen, <span>2012</span>), several philosophers have begun asking whether “dignity” could also illuminate our moral relations with nonhuman animals (e.g., Abbate, <span>2020</span>; Anderson, <span>2005</span>; Gruen, <span>2014</span>; Humphreys, <span>2016</span>; Nussbaum, <span>2006</span>; Ortiz, <span>2004</span>). Increasing talk of animal dignity is also occurring in public and even legal discourse (Kotzmann & Seery, <span>2017</span>). For example, in a recent habeas corpus hearing for a Bronx Zoo elephant, a Judge declared that the elephant is “a dignified creature” but “there is nothing dignified about her captivity” (Wilson, <span>2022</span>, p. 4). Such language is perhaps beginning to resonate more with people than it once did.</p><p>Nonetheless, some philosophers seriously doubt that dignity is a coherent and useful moral idea (Zuolo, <span>2016</span>). Dressing circus-kept animals in human clothes and laughing at them may strike modern people as cruelly demeaning to those nonhumans. Yet for critics, these apparent assaults on “dignity” are ethically trivial or else merely <i>indirect</i> wrongs—objectionable only because such treatment could upset human witnesses or generally promote animal exploitation (Martin, <span>2019</span>, p. 94). According to dignity's critics, other moral concepts can far better explain what is wrong with that treatment.</p><p>Dignity is a complex notion and providing lucid accounts is challenging. Furthermore, philosophical analysis of <i>animal</i> dignity is relatively limited. It warrants greater attention. In this paper, I explore an understanding of animal dignity that seems to be irreducible to a range of other moral concepts and to some other conceptions of dignity. The understanding I explore appears to be a <i>sui generis</i> notion that involves a special kind of non-natural harm and assault upon animals. This special or distinctive harm and assault is related to the cognate notions of defiling, degrading, demeaning, dishonoring, and honoring treatment.</p><p>Presenting this <i>sui generis</i> understanding requires examining arguably the most compelling current account of animal dignity on offer—a “relational” conception of dignity as <i>social respect</i> or <i>status</i>. Although very important, I shall ask whether there is also another “relational” way of understanding dignity that is irreducible even to that account—although importantly it might complement and deepen it. This suggests that more than one ethically important way of conceiving of dignity is possible.</p><p>In the following, I outline criticisms of animal dignity with a focus on reductionist attacks, identify a social conception of dignity, reflect on some key examples of human behavior that seem to facilitate understanding of animal dignity, briefly introduce positive forms of irreducible dignity, and consider several objections,","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"124-142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12543","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43940394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
John Rawls famously argues that in order to arrive at a plausible conception of what justice requires politically, we ought to proceed in two steps (Rawls, 1971, pp. 245–246). First, we ought to develop an “ideal theory of justice” that lays out what principles of justice can be justified if we imagine them to govern a society that is unlike ours in that certain limitations are removed. Developing such a theory, Rawls argues, is necessary to allow us to grasp the correct conception of justice. In a second step, we can then use this conception to find out what we must do in our actual, nonideal circumstances. The idea that we need to refer to a utopian, ideal state of affairs in order to understand which conception of our most basic political concepts we ought to endorse is one of the features of Rawls's thought that has attracted the most commentary (see Robeyns, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). Realist opponents of ideal theory in this sense sometimes argue that ideal theory pays too little attention to questions of feasibility, that it does not take the limitations of human nature seriously enough, and that it is ill-equipped to guide us when thinking about necessary trade-offs (Farrelly, 2007; Galston, 2010; Nagel, 1995). In this article, I will examine arguments of a different nature that have historically emerged from the tradition of radical social thought and critical theory. These arguments do not object to ideal theorizing on the grounds that it leads to unrealistic demands or that it is insufficiently constrained by a realistic conception of human nature. Rather, these arguments assume that, given the nonideal circumstances in which current political theorists find themselves, they face limitations to their epistemic, imaginative, and conceptual capacities that distort the ideals they formulate and thereby take them in a direction that accommodates the status quo too much. Received: 7 December 2022 Revised: 6 April 2023 Accepted: 7 July 2023
{"title":"Beyond the nonideal: Why critical theory needs a utopian dimension","authors":"Titus Stahl","doi":"10.1111/josp.12542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12542","url":null,"abstract":"John Rawls famously argues that in order to arrive at a plausible conception of what justice requires politically, we ought to proceed in two steps (Rawls, 1971, pp. 245–246). First, we ought to develop an “ideal theory of justice” that lays out what principles of justice can be justified if we imagine them to govern a society that is unlike ours in that certain limitations are removed. Developing such a theory, Rawls argues, is necessary to allow us to grasp the correct conception of justice. In a second step, we can then use this conception to find out what we must do in our actual, nonideal circumstances. The idea that we need to refer to a utopian, ideal state of affairs in order to understand which conception of our most basic political concepts we ought to endorse is one of the features of Rawls's thought that has attracted the most commentary (see Robeyns, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). Realist opponents of ideal theory in this sense sometimes argue that ideal theory pays too little attention to questions of feasibility, that it does not take the limitations of human nature seriously enough, and that it is ill-equipped to guide us when thinking about necessary trade-offs (Farrelly, 2007; Galston, 2010; Nagel, 1995). In this article, I will examine arguments of a different nature that have historically emerged from the tradition of radical social thought and critical theory. These arguments do not object to ideal theorizing on the grounds that it leads to unrealistic demands or that it is insufficiently constrained by a realistic conception of human nature. Rather, these arguments assume that, given the nonideal circumstances in which current political theorists find themselves, they face limitations to their epistemic, imaginative, and conceptual capacities that distort the ideals they formulate and thereby take them in a direction that accommodates the status quo too much. Received: 7 December 2022 Revised: 6 April 2023 Accepted: 7 July 2023","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42611505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>A central idea in John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is that basic political liberties should be afforded fair value in a just liberal democratic society.<sup>1</sup> In this article, I argue that an important guideline for guaranteeing the fair value of voting rights, that is, the usefulness to citizens of their right to vote, is to make it easier not harder to exercise this basic political liberty.<sup>2</sup> This entails that just societies with a constitutional commitment to equal protection, and the value of equality more broadly, have a duty to secure unencumbered access to the ballot absent narrowly tailored compelling state interests for restricting it (hereafter <i>Unencumbered Access</i>). Where there are such interests—and this is important—the burden imposed on voting must accord with the basic priority of voting rights. This argument shifts the burden of justification from liberals to present sufficient evidence of voter suppression to conservatives, who are currently pushing restrictive voter ID and other laws, to produce compelling evidence supporting their reasons for doing so (chief of which is fraud prevention and deterrence). They must also demonstrate that these laws are carefully crafted to remedy the alleged problem. Because these conditions have not been met these laws are unjustified.<sup>3</sup></p><p>John Rawls affirms the importance of political liberties as a normative ideal in the abstract by including them on the list of equal basic liberties along with the liberties of thought, conscience, association, and those associated with the rule of law in his liberal egalitarian conception of justice as fairness. However, less abstractly, the principle of equal political liberty is also identified with the principle of equal participation within the constitutionally defined political process of a just democratic society.</p><p>Rawls has been criticized for not being entirely clear about why political liberties are included on this list,<sup>4</sup> and for failing to offer a detailed argument for their special status and a proposal for how it can be captured institutionally.<sup>5</sup> Yet there is no question that the liberty to political participation on equal terms is meant to carry the abstract normative commitment to equality modeled in the original position—where parties are selecting common principles from a position of equality—to the constitutional stage where they collectively participate in “the highest-order system of social rules for making rules” by participating in the vital political process of lawmaking.<sup>6</sup> Taking the constitution to be foundational, as the highest-order system of rules regulating and controlling all other institutions of society's basic structure, Rawls concludes that satisfying the principle of equal participation in practice affords all persons with access to the political process “common status of equal citizens.”<sup>7</sup></p><p>Having affirmed the importance of
{"title":"The fair value of voting rights","authors":"Derrick Darby","doi":"10.1111/josp.12541","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12541","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A central idea in John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is that basic political liberties should be afforded fair value in a just liberal democratic society.<sup>1</sup> In this article, I argue that an important guideline for guaranteeing the fair value of voting rights, that is, the usefulness to citizens of their right to vote, is to make it easier not harder to exercise this basic political liberty.<sup>2</sup> This entails that just societies with a constitutional commitment to equal protection, and the value of equality more broadly, have a duty to secure unencumbered access to the ballot absent narrowly tailored compelling state interests for restricting it (hereafter <i>Unencumbered Access</i>). Where there are such interests—and this is important—the burden imposed on voting must accord with the basic priority of voting rights. This argument shifts the burden of justification from liberals to present sufficient evidence of voter suppression to conservatives, who are currently pushing restrictive voter ID and other laws, to produce compelling evidence supporting their reasons for doing so (chief of which is fraud prevention and deterrence). They must also demonstrate that these laws are carefully crafted to remedy the alleged problem. Because these conditions have not been met these laws are unjustified.<sup>3</sup></p><p>John Rawls affirms the importance of political liberties as a normative ideal in the abstract by including them on the list of equal basic liberties along with the liberties of thought, conscience, association, and those associated with the rule of law in his liberal egalitarian conception of justice as fairness. However, less abstractly, the principle of equal political liberty is also identified with the principle of equal participation within the constitutionally defined political process of a just democratic society.</p><p>Rawls has been criticized for not being entirely clear about why political liberties are included on this list,<sup>4</sup> and for failing to offer a detailed argument for their special status and a proposal for how it can be captured institutionally.<sup>5</sup> Yet there is no question that the liberty to political participation on equal terms is meant to carry the abstract normative commitment to equality modeled in the original position—where parties are selecting common principles from a position of equality—to the constitutional stage where they collectively participate in “the highest-order system of social rules for making rules” by participating in the vital political process of lawmaking.<sup>6</sup> Taking the constitution to be foundational, as the highest-order system of rules regulating and controlling all other institutions of society's basic structure, Rawls concludes that satisfying the principle of equal participation in practice affords all persons with access to the political process “common status of equal citizens.”<sup>7</sup></p><p>Having affirmed the importance of ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"209-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12541","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48415181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Federalism is, minimally, a method of allocating final decision-making authority over subjects (e.g., crime, healthcare, and immigration) in a governance unit (e.g., country). Faced with questions of the form “who can decide what when,” federal bodies, like the United States., Canada, Australia, and Germany, provide at least two entities (federal governments, provinces, cities, etc.) with final decision-making “powers” over at least one subject. No other entity is morally permitted to directly interfere (substitute decisions, fine, etc.) with the authority's decision-making regarding those subject(s). This is distinct from the unitary or centralized governance of, for example, France and Israel whereby one central entity possesses all final decision-making authority.<sup>1</sup> Beyond these basics, the meaning of and criteria for evaluating claims about federalism remain contested in law and political science.<sup>2</sup> The broader debates are then oft-ignored in mainstream political philosophy, resulting in conceptual confusion with important practical results discussed below.<sup>3</sup></p><p>The following argues for adopting an “institutional” approach to federalism, rather than more common “ideological” approaches.<sup>4</sup> A long tradition equates federalism with the US Founding Fathers' institutional proposals (Publius, <span>1788/1987</span>). Yet, partly due to empirical developments, the dominant account outside philosophy now holds that federalism is a normative doctrine promoting a secure political organization combining “shared[-]rule and self-rule” and separates this federal “idea” from institutional forms that may realize it (Elazar, <span>1987</span>; Watts, <span>2008</span>). Philosophers often begin by accepting this ideological approach (as I discuss further in Da Silva, <span>2022</span>).<sup>5</sup> Popelier (<span>2021</span>, p. 33) even suggests “all” scholars view this combination as federalism's “normative core.” But philosophical strictures and practical realities demand a more circumscribed approach. The dominant ideological approach is too broad to be a distinct normative doctrine or cannot even apply to many paradigmatic federal bodies. Institutional approaches defining federalism by advocacy for the adoption of federations (defined below) for authority allocation are preferable.</p><p>To establish this, I first detail and defend criteria for evaluating philosophical accounts of federalism. I then elaborate the distinction between ideological and institutional approaches and apply the criteria to the dominant ideological approach and a new specification of an institutional approach inspired by Wheare (<span>1946/1953</span>, p. 11)'s classic, oft-critiqued account. I thereby demonstrate that ideological accounts fail to fulfill many normative adequacy criteria for a philosophical account of federalism and one can articulate a more action-guiding institutional account that avoids common critiques. I finally
{"title":"Federalism as an institutional doctrine","authors":"Michael Da Silva","doi":"10.1111/josp.12540","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12540","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Federalism is, minimally, a method of allocating final decision-making authority over subjects (e.g., crime, healthcare, and immigration) in a governance unit (e.g., country). Faced with questions of the form “who can decide what when,” federal bodies, like the United States., Canada, Australia, and Germany, provide at least two entities (federal governments, provinces, cities, etc.) with final decision-making “powers” over at least one subject. No other entity is morally permitted to directly interfere (substitute decisions, fine, etc.) with the authority's decision-making regarding those subject(s). This is distinct from the unitary or centralized governance of, for example, France and Israel whereby one central entity possesses all final decision-making authority.<sup>1</sup> Beyond these basics, the meaning of and criteria for evaluating claims about federalism remain contested in law and political science.<sup>2</sup> The broader debates are then oft-ignored in mainstream political philosophy, resulting in conceptual confusion with important practical results discussed below.<sup>3</sup></p><p>The following argues for adopting an “institutional” approach to federalism, rather than more common “ideological” approaches.<sup>4</sup> A long tradition equates federalism with the US Founding Fathers' institutional proposals (Publius, <span>1788/1987</span>). Yet, partly due to empirical developments, the dominant account outside philosophy now holds that federalism is a normative doctrine promoting a secure political organization combining “shared[-]rule and self-rule” and separates this federal “idea” from institutional forms that may realize it (Elazar, <span>1987</span>; Watts, <span>2008</span>). Philosophers often begin by accepting this ideological approach (as I discuss further in Da Silva, <span>2022</span>).<sup>5</sup> Popelier (<span>2021</span>, p. 33) even suggests “all” scholars view this combination as federalism's “normative core.” But philosophical strictures and practical realities demand a more circumscribed approach. The dominant ideological approach is too broad to be a distinct normative doctrine or cannot even apply to many paradigmatic federal bodies. Institutional approaches defining federalism by advocacy for the adoption of federations (defined below) for authority allocation are preferable.</p><p>To establish this, I first detail and defend criteria for evaluating philosophical accounts of federalism. I then elaborate the distinction between ideological and institutional approaches and apply the criteria to the dominant ideological approach and a new specification of an institutional approach inspired by Wheare (<span>1946/1953</span>, p. 11)'s classic, oft-critiqued account. I thereby demonstrate that ideological accounts fail to fulfill many normative adequacy criteria for a philosophical account of federalism and one can articulate a more action-guiding institutional account that avoids common critiques. I finally","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"81-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12540","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64056584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper analyzes Rawls's moral psychology and the claim that a just society must foster a sufficiently strong sense of justice. When Rawls investigates the development of the sense of justice under a just basic structure, he tacitly narrows down the focus: he only demonstrates the development of a sense of justice on the premise that all members of society are already in possession of a full-fledged sense of justice, save the one individual under investigation. This begs the question, largely presupposing what needs to be explained, namely, how citizens at large develop a sense of justice. Rawls's narrowing of perspective leads to distortions in the analysis of stability, particularly with regard to a property-owning democracy. However, in lesser known parts of his work, Rawls offers clues for a more plausible account. Here, the idea is that institutions must be structured such that they enable all of us to nurture the sense of justice of each of us. With this idea of collective self-transformation in place, it becomes clear that economic institutions must be broadly democratized because of their profound educational role. Thus, the choice between a property-owning democracy and liberal socialism falls more strongly upon the latter.
{"title":"Difficulties in nurturing a sense of justice","authors":"Hannes Kuch","doi":"10.1111/josp.12538","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12538","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper analyzes Rawls's moral psychology and the claim that a just society must foster a sufficiently strong sense of justice. When Rawls investigates the development of the sense of justice under a just basic structure, he tacitly narrows down the focus: he only demonstrates the development of a sense of justice on the premise that all members of society are already in possession of a full-fledged sense of justice, save the one individual under investigation. This begs the question, largely presupposing what needs to be explained, namely, how citizens at large develop a sense of justice. Rawls's narrowing of perspective leads to distortions in the analysis of stability, particularly with regard to a property-owning democracy. However, in lesser known parts of his work, Rawls offers clues for a more plausible account. Here, the idea is that institutions must be structured such that they enable all of us to nurture the sense of justice of each of us. With this idea of collective self-transformation in place, it becomes clear that economic institutions must be broadly democratized because of their profound educational role. Thus, the choice between a property-owning democracy and liberal socialism falls more strongly upon the latter.</p>","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"238-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12538","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45034888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partial ectogestation and the right to choose the method by which one ends one's pregnancy","authors":"Kristen Hine","doi":"10.1111/josp.12537","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12537","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"143-159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41412537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Unredressed injustices in national and global history raise important normative questions. These questions are highlighted by the growing chorus of voices in public and academic discourse calling for agents, especially those in the Global North, to recognize and redress the major injustices of their past, most notably colonialism, chattel slavery, and segregation.<sup>1</sup> One is the <i>justification</i> question: do (some) present-day agents have moral obligations to redress historical injustice, and if so, on what moral grounds? Another is the <i>content</i> question: assuming that reparative obligations are justified, what exactly do they obligate (some) present-day agents to do?</p><p>One prominent view in the philosophical literature responding to these questions is centered on the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP).<sup>2</sup> Proponents of the BPP have argued that some present-day agents have a moral obligation to redress historical injustices that they themselves did not commit because they enjoy material benefits—wealth, property, and other such resources—as a result of these injustices. Since these benefits were originally acquired unjustly, their contemporary inheritors ought to relinquish them, not just because they lack any legitimate claim to these resources, but also because by retaining these resources they are perpetuating the effects of injustice. This answers the justification question. The BPP also suggests an answer to the content question. While some present-day agents enjoy material benefits from historical injustices, others correspondingly suffer material harms.<sup>3</sup> It is thus morally legitimate to redistribute the relinquished resources of present-day beneficiaries of a historical injustice toward its present-day victims—even if that redistribution can only partially approximate the holdings that present-day victims would have enjoyed had the historical injustice never occurred.<sup>4</sup> Altogether, the BPP offers an account of one familiar approach to past wrongdoing, namely the provision of material compensation or <i>reparations</i>. Indeed, proponents of the BPP contend that the principle is appealing because it avoids many of the thorny moral and epistemic challenges against reparations for major historical injustices.<sup>5</sup></p><p>But reparations, so understood, is notably removed from a more radical approach to historical injustice proposed by some recent social movements for racial equality and postcolonial global justice. These proposals demand the egalitarian transformation of present-day social structures in order to undo the unjust social, political, and economic legacies of colonialism, slavery, segregation, and so forth.<sup>6</sup> In alignment with this vision, some philosophical accounts have argued for a <i>structural</i> approach to historical injustice: because many present-day injustices are products of major historical injustices like colonialism and slavery, a full and proper r
{"title":"Structural transformation and reparative obligation: Reinterpreting the beneficiary pays principle","authors":"Hochan Kim","doi":"10.1111/josp.12524","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12524","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Unredressed injustices in national and global history raise important normative questions. These questions are highlighted by the growing chorus of voices in public and academic discourse calling for agents, especially those in the Global North, to recognize and redress the major injustices of their past, most notably colonialism, chattel slavery, and segregation.<sup>1</sup> One is the <i>justification</i> question: do (some) present-day agents have moral obligations to redress historical injustice, and if so, on what moral grounds? Another is the <i>content</i> question: assuming that reparative obligations are justified, what exactly do they obligate (some) present-day agents to do?</p><p>One prominent view in the philosophical literature responding to these questions is centered on the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP).<sup>2</sup> Proponents of the BPP have argued that some present-day agents have a moral obligation to redress historical injustices that they themselves did not commit because they enjoy material benefits—wealth, property, and other such resources—as a result of these injustices. Since these benefits were originally acquired unjustly, their contemporary inheritors ought to relinquish them, not just because they lack any legitimate claim to these resources, but also because by retaining these resources they are perpetuating the effects of injustice. This answers the justification question. The BPP also suggests an answer to the content question. While some present-day agents enjoy material benefits from historical injustices, others correspondingly suffer material harms.<sup>3</sup> It is thus morally legitimate to redistribute the relinquished resources of present-day beneficiaries of a historical injustice toward its present-day victims—even if that redistribution can only partially approximate the holdings that present-day victims would have enjoyed had the historical injustice never occurred.<sup>4</sup> Altogether, the BPP offers an account of one familiar approach to past wrongdoing, namely the provision of material compensation or <i>reparations</i>. Indeed, proponents of the BPP contend that the principle is appealing because it avoids many of the thorny moral and epistemic challenges against reparations for major historical injustices.<sup>5</sup></p><p>But reparations, so understood, is notably removed from a more radical approach to historical injustice proposed by some recent social movements for racial equality and postcolonial global justice. These proposals demand the egalitarian transformation of present-day social structures in order to undo the unjust social, political, and economic legacies of colonialism, slavery, segregation, and so forth.<sup>6</sup> In alignment with this vision, some philosophical accounts have argued for a <i>structural</i> approach to historical injustice: because many present-day injustices are products of major historical injustices like colonialism and slavery, a full and proper r","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"688-708"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12524","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64056572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12476","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"150-151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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