{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12482","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"442-443"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143245374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In addition to our current editorial board, the Journal of Social Philosophy would like to thank the following reviewers who refereed manuscripts for us from September 1, 2021 through August 31, 2023.
{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12483","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"444"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143248928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The case for reparations for grievous acts of historical injustice has been getting a lot of attention lately, both within and outside academia (e.g., California Reparations Report 2023; Coates, 2014; Martin & Yaquinto, 2007). Those who advance it claim that the injuries inflicted by these acts are ongoing and severe, and the only way that members of the groups that were the focus of these acts can begin to regain the place they would have held within society had these injustices not occurred, or at least be able and willing to move on from them into the future, is to provide current members of these victimized groups reparations for the wrongs committed against their forebearers. In New World societies, talk of reparations has typically focused on two of these historic wrongs. First, the continuing injury inflicted by slavery and the discrimination against Black people that continued in its aftermath. Second, the injury inflicted through the widespread murder and seizure of land by government and government-sanctioned forces from indigenous peoples. In both the New and Old World, however, other groups—for example, religious or ethnic minorities who have been subjected to centuries of persecution—are also sometimes discussed as being entitled to reparations. Whenever reparations are discussed, however, the claim has generally been that these are required for violations of the principle of equality, a principle to which liberal societies have long paid lip service, but which is now (in some quarters, at least) beginning to be taken more seriously.
But I am going to talk about reparations in a different way. Not because I think that any of the current arguments for reparations for Black and indigenous people or anyone else for that matter do not lead to the conclusions that their proponents say they do. On the contrary, with perhaps a few exceptions, I find these arguments not only valid but also convincing. Accordingly, nothing I will say in this paper should be taken as an argument against any of these existing claims for reparations. But I do want to broaden the current discussion in two ways.
First, in part I, I am going to set forth what I call a general theory of reparations. In it, I am not only going to talk about reparations as a means of remedying the injuries inflicted by slavery and by the genocide of indigenous peoples, the theft of their land, and the ongoing ripple effects of these historic wrongs. And I am not merely going to add to this a call for reparations for injuries caused by the long-time persecution of the usual religious, ethnic, and other minority populations. I am going to talk about reparations for an even wider variety of historical injustices, including, most importantly, the long-term economic oppression of women, and the historical exploitation of labor.
Second, in part II, I am going to set forth my argument for reparations, but not one based on the pr
{"title":"The libertarian argument for reparations","authors":"Mark R. Reiff","doi":"10.1111/josp.12555","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12555","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The case for reparations for grievous acts of historical injustice has been getting a lot of attention lately, both within and outside academia (e.g., California Reparations Report <span>2023</span>; Coates, <span>2014</span>; Martin & Yaquinto, <span>2007</span>). Those who advance it claim that the injuries inflicted by these acts are ongoing and severe, and the only way that members of the groups that were the focus of these acts can begin to regain the place they would have held within society had these injustices not occurred, or at least be able and willing to move on from them into the future, is to provide current members of these victimized groups reparations for the wrongs committed against their forebearers. In New World societies, talk of reparations has typically focused on two of these historic wrongs. First, the continuing injury inflicted by slavery and the discrimination against Black people that continued in its aftermath. Second, the injury inflicted through the widespread murder and seizure of land by government and government-sanctioned forces from indigenous peoples. In both the New and Old World, however, other groups—for example, religious or ethnic minorities who have been subjected to centuries of persecution—are also sometimes discussed as being entitled to reparations. Whenever reparations are discussed, however, the claim has generally been that these are required for violations of the principle of equality, a principle to which liberal societies have long paid lip service, but which is now (in some quarters, at least) beginning to be taken more seriously.</p><p>But I am going to talk about reparations in a different way. Not because I think that any of the current arguments for reparations for Black and indigenous people or anyone else for that matter do not lead to the conclusions that their proponents say they do. On the contrary, with perhaps a few exceptions, I find these arguments not only valid but also convincing. Accordingly, nothing I will say in this paper should be taken as an argument against any of these existing claims for reparations. But I do want to broaden the current discussion in two ways.</p><p>First, in part I, I am going to set forth what I call a general theory of reparations. In it, I am not only going to talk about reparations as a means of remedying the injuries inflicted by slavery and by the genocide of indigenous peoples, the theft of their land, and the ongoing ripple effects of these historic wrongs. And I am not merely going to add to this a call for reparations for injuries caused by the long-time persecution of the usual religious, ethnic, and other minority populations. I am going to talk about reparations for an even wider variety of historical injustices, including, most importantly, the long-term economic oppression of women, and the historical exploitation of labor.</p><p>Second, in part II, I am going to set forth my argument for reparations, but not one based on the pr","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"643-672"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12555","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139376627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren
In democracies around the world, political forces calling for a rollback of globalization are on the ascendancy. Longstanding consensus about the benefits of free trade and human rights and around the legitimacy of the international institutions enabling these goods has been questioned by successful populist politicians on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some even claim that the entire liberal international order has become contested, perhaps as never before (Lake et al., 2021). An emerging critique of multilateralism argues that states and peoples should not be shackled by international legal arrangements and international law, but rather, that states should “do it alone.” The picture painted is one where state sovereignty is constrained and undermined by international institutions. This view implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff between multilateralism and state autonomy.
Yet, in our globalized world, the relationship between state autonomy and international legal institutions is more complex than both critics and some defenders of the international order acknowledge. Though states frequently find themselves under pressure to join international legal institutions, this is often because there are good reasons to do so. In a globalized world, membership in these institutions is often crucial for states to function properly, serving their citizens domestically, while also cultivating productive relationships with other states. Therefore, international institutions may contribute to the construction of domestic legitimacy (Buchanan, 2011). By imposing reciprocal limitations on states, international institutions may increase, rather than diminish, a state's room to maneuver. Furthermore, the very act of joining and submitting to international authority may be seen as an expression of state autonomy rather than a surrender of it. Without dismissing the growing opposition to international institutions as uninformed, misguided, or insincere, this special symposium seeks to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex authority and power relations between international legal arrangements and states and between particular international institutions and the broader institutional structure in which they are embedded.
More specifically, the special symposium explores power relations and legitimacy issues in the context of international legal institutions in two dimensions. It assesses, first, what we call vertical power, that is, power and authority exercised by international bodies over states and societies. The special symposium explores claims made about power abuse and illegitimacy by investigating how this kind of power operates, what sort of legitimacy problems it gives rise to, and the normative conditions and criteria of legitimacy that are relevant. Second, the special symposium addresses questions about the international horizontal allocation of power, that is, the division of function
在世界各地的民主国家，要求全球化倒退的政治力量正在崛起。关于自由贸易和人权的好处，以及促成这些好处的国际机构的合法性的长期共识，受到了意识形态光谱双方成功的民粹主义政治家的质疑。一些人甚至声称，整个自由主义国际秩序都受到了质疑，这可能是前所未有的(Lake et al.， 2021)。对多边主义的一种新批评认为，国家和人民不应受到国际法律安排和国际法的束缚，而应“单独行动”。在这幅图景中，国家主权受到国际机构的约束和破坏。这种观点意味着，在多边主义和国家自治之间必然存在一种权衡。然而，在我们这个全球化的世界里，国家自治和国际法律机构之间的关系比国际秩序的批评者和一些捍卫者所承认的要复杂得多。尽管各国经常发现自己面临加入国际法律机构的压力，但这往往是因为有充分的理由这样做。在一个全球化的世界里，这些机构的成员资格往往对国家正常运作至关重要，既要在国内为其公民服务，又要与其他国家建立富有成效的关系。因此，国际制度可能有助于构建国内合法性(Buchanan, 2011)。通过对国家施加相互限制，国际机构可能会增加(而不是减少)一个国家的回旋余地。此外，加入和服从国际权威的行为可能被视为国家自治的表达，而不是放弃它。本次特别研讨会并没有将对国际机构日益增长的反对视为无知、误导或不真诚，而是试图加深我们对国际法律安排与国家之间、特定国际机构与它们所嵌入的更广泛的机构结构之间复杂的权威和权力关系的理论理解。更具体地说，专题研讨会从两个维度探讨了国际法律制度背景下的权力关系和合法性问题。首先，它评估的是我们所说的垂直权力，即国际机构对国家和社会行使的权力和权威。本次专题研讨会通过调查权力的运作方式、产生的合法性问题以及与之相关的合法性规范条件和标准，探讨了关于权力滥用和非法性的主张。第二，专题讨论会讨论有关国际横向权力分配的问题，即国际机构之间职能、作用和责任的划分。国际机构不是中央集权政府的一部分，而是一个分散和碎片化的体系，而特定机构的职能、角色和能力受到限制，这一事实造成了特殊的合法性问题和困境。此外，国际机构植根于以国家为主导的结构背景中，其内部存在权力失衡，这对评估其合法性构成了额外的挑战。在此背景下，本系列中的文章关注一系列补充性主题。他们探讨了广泛的概念和规范问题，包括能够迫使国家遵守国际机构指令的权威机制(Scherz)、全球政治秩序的潜在权力动态(Aytac)、民粹主义崛起对欧盟和其他地区多边主义的威胁(Cozzaglio和Efthymiou)，以及引导这些主题的合法性和主权等更广泛的问题。我们的撰稿人还关注具体的跨国机构，如国际刑事法院(ICC;克里斯蒂亚诺)和欧洲人权法院(欧洲人权法院;Follesdal)。通过解决这些概念和理论上的合法性问题，并将其应用于具体机构，这次特别研讨会有助于越来越多的关于国际机构合法性的文献(Adams等人，2020;布坎南,>》,2006;global, 2012;Follesdal, 2006;赫德,2019;Scherz, 2021;Tallberg et al.， 2018;Tallberg,z<e:1> rn, 2019)从绝对规范的角度来看。 Scherz的论文解决了一个重要的哲学难题:在什么情况下，国际机构可以合法地要求国家遵守它们的规范?尽管有关政治合法性的理论比比皆是，但它们通常侧重于国家与个人之间的约束性义务;国际机构对主权国家的合法性主张往往无人问询。在概述了她自己的“基于自治”的合法性概念之后，Scherz认为，国家确实有理由遵守国际机构，作为其合法性的条件。这些主张既适用于民主国家，也适用于非民主国家。克里斯蒂亚诺的论文更具体地关注了围绕国际刑事法院的合法性困境。国际刑事法院被指责有选择性地起诉非洲民兵领导人和被认为对西方列强不友好的官员。而且它经常“不对称地”针对冲突中的一方，而不针对另一方。克里斯蒂亚诺怀疑这种“选择性起诉”是否会威胁到国际刑事法院的合法性。他没有从总体上解决该机构的规范地位问题，但在考虑减轻选择性起诉问题的策略时，他澄清了未来确定其合法性的条件。克里斯蒂亚诺仍然广泛同情国际刑事法院及其使命，但也了解国际刑事法院在国际舞台上面临的独特挑战;这篇文章提供了“对其运作及其运作的政治背景的清晰理解”(Christiano，第2页)。然而，正如Aytac的贡献所指出的那样，所有国际机构都必须与跨国资产阶级的结构性力量相抗衡。全球商业精英通过他们在公司董事会、政策团体、非政府组织和著名国际金融机构的职位，作为一个环环相扣的社区发挥作用。它们一起不成比例地影响着全球政策，甚至通过参与资本外逃和避税等活动，对国家权力施加限制。Burelli, 2022)。Aytac认为，任何关于全球政治合法性的解释都必须考虑到这种结构性力量。利用一种复杂的“激进现实主义”方法论，艾塔克将他的方法与更传统的全球正义话语区分开来;认为现实主义哲学框架最适合捕捉全球商业精英所表现出的独特权力星座。欧盟可以说是当今国际政治中最广泛的合法性挑战，它是科扎利奥和埃夫西米乌贡献的重点。对欧盟合法性的许多挑战都是由两边的民粹主义者发起的，他们认为欧盟从根本上来说是不民主和精英主义的。民粹主义者既攻击欧盟规则和程序产生的“输入”合法性，也攻击与其政治结果相关的“输出”合法性。然而，作者认为，这种民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战最终缺乏连贯性。首先，并非所有民粹主义者都是民族主义者:一些民粹主义者，比如杰里米·科尔宾(Jeremy Corbyn)领导的工党，在对欧盟保持世界主义立场的同时，采用了反精英主义的语言。此外，许多民粹主义者将“人民”和“精英”区分开来，作者认为，这种区分经不起概念上的审视。他们认为，民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战最终被证明是多余的;“毕竟，新瓶装陈酒”(Cozzaglio和Efthymiou，第13页)。自欧盟成立以来，中央集权主义者和世界主义者之间的长期争论就一直在演变，但这并没有增加多少争论。Follesdal的贡献更具体地侧重于欧洲人权委员会。该机构对-à-vis欧盟成员国起着动态的作用:确保这些国家遵守人权规范，并向一个欧盟国家的公民通报其他欧盟国家的人权记录。但正如Follesdal所言，尊重成员国的司法权威有时是合理的，尤其是当国内法官具有认知优势时——也就是说，更尊重当地的决策、价值观和传统。因此，挑战在于平衡欧洲人权法院的司法审查权力和欧盟成员国维护的司法主权“口袋”。Follesdal认为，平衡是可以实现的，但要做到这一点，就需要努力调整我们对《欧洲人权公约》的理解，包括使其更具人口代表性。与国际刑事法院一样，欧洲人权法院的合法性仍在进行中。通过对权力和权威关系的分析，本次专题研讨会的论文对超越国家的合法性辩论做出了一般性的理论贡献。但他们通过研究特定的国际法律制度以及它们产生的具体的、有时是自成一体的规范问题来做到这一点。 这样，特别专题讨论会增进了我们对在国际机构范围内产生的规范性问题的认识。
{"title":"New perspectives on the legitimacy of international institutions and power","authors":"Gordon Arlen, Antoinette Scherz, Martin Vestergren","doi":"10.1111/josp.12554","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12554","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In democracies around the world, political forces calling for a rollback of globalization are on the ascendancy. Longstanding consensus about the benefits of free trade and human rights and around the legitimacy of the international institutions enabling these goods has been questioned by successful populist politicians on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Some even claim that the entire liberal international order has become contested, perhaps as never before (Lake et al., <span>2021</span>). An emerging critique of multilateralism argues that states and peoples should not be shackled by international legal arrangements and international law, but rather, that states should “do it alone.” The picture painted is one where state sovereignty is constrained and undermined by international institutions. This view implies that there is necessarily a tradeoff between multilateralism and state autonomy.</p><p>Yet, in our globalized world, the relationship between state autonomy and international legal institutions is more complex than both critics and some defenders of the international order acknowledge. Though states frequently find themselves under pressure to join international legal institutions, this is often because there are good reasons to do so. In a globalized world, membership in these institutions is often crucial for states to function properly, serving their citizens domestically, while also cultivating productive relationships with other states. Therefore, international institutions may contribute to the construction of domestic legitimacy (Buchanan, <span>2011</span>). By imposing reciprocal limitations on states, international institutions may increase, rather than diminish, a state's room to maneuver. Furthermore, the very act of joining and submitting to international authority may be seen as an expression of state autonomy rather than a surrender of it. Without dismissing the growing opposition to international institutions as uninformed, misguided, or insincere, this special symposium seeks to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex authority and power relations between international legal arrangements and states and between particular international institutions and the broader institutional structure in which they are embedded.</p><p>More specifically, the special symposium explores power relations and legitimacy issues in the context of international legal institutions in two dimensions. It assesses, first, what we call vertical power, that is, power and authority exercised by international bodies over states and societies. The special symposium explores claims made about power abuse and illegitimacy by investigating how this kind of power operates, what sort of legitimacy problems it gives rise to, and the normative conditions and criteria of legitimacy that are relevant. Second, the special symposium addresses questions about the international horizontal allocation of power, that is, the division of function","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"445-449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12554","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138511968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is a black radical Kantianism without Du Bois? On method, principle, and abolition democracy","authors":"Elvira Basevich","doi":"10.1111/josp.12552","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12552","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 1","pages":"6-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139244563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Modern individuals grapple with a paradoxical reality: their lives are characterized by a strong feeling of independence as well as by an intense social interconnection. In Karl Marx's words, this paradox is best described as individuals achieving “personal independence” under an “objective dependence” (<span>1993</span>, p. 158). This paper focuses on the notion of objective dependence, which has been insufficiently problematized in recent debates about social interdependence. By bringing to light a distinctively Hegelian-Marxist approach to the problem of dependence and to the problem of objectivity, the article aims at contributing to the ongoing scholarly debate on the ethical and political consequences of dependence as an acknowledged social condition. Starting from the inevitability claim, I push for an understanding of dependence that avoids its reduction to domination and that instead presents it as a complex reality that can be actively and freely experienced. Contrary to what a considerable number of political theorists have argued (see Macpherson, <span>1962</span>), I hold that dependence per se does not lead to unfreedom; although, at present, many relations of dependence do. To understand why this is the case, I defend that the analysis of social dependence must be brought together with the critique of political economy. In fact, when looked from the perspective of our economic relations, the rejection of dependence is not entirely misguided: it points out to defective social relations that we need to untangle in order to criticize. In doing so, I respond to Renault's invitation to deploy dependence as a <i>critical</i> concept (<span>2018</span>, p. 36).</p><p>In what follows, I will delineate my own approach by way of a critical review of the accounts of dependence circulating in contemporary social and political philosophy, focusing on their failure to integrate, to a greater or lesser degree, the specificity of modern relations of dependence, that is, their objectivity. I classify current approaches in two groups: one informed by discussions around care and vulnerability (which tends to provide little systematic understanding of how actual forms of generalized dependence are experienced under capitalist relations) and another informed by the critique of political economy (which tends to downplay the importance of dependence's objective nature). While the former risks offering a defense of dependence that remains blind to important axes of domination, the latter might appear oblivious about the specific nature of modern forms of social domination. The focus on the objective nature of dependence is sanctioned by two theses. First, I claim that when objectivity is taken into account, specific normative failures arise. Second, I believe that the emphasis on objectivity enables important conceptual distinctions. Thus, I will suggest that we need to criticize alienated objective dependence, rather than objective relations of depend
现代人与一个矛盾的现实作斗争：他们的生活既具有强烈的独立感，又具有强烈的社会联系。用卡尔·马克思的话来说，这种悖论最好描述为个人在“客观依赖”下实现“个人独立”（1993，第158页）。本文关注的是客观依赖的概念，这一概念在最近关于社会相互依赖的辩论中没有得到充分的质疑。通过揭示一种独特的黑格尔-马克思主义方法来解决依赖问题和客观性问题，本文旨在促进正在进行的关于依赖作为一种公认的社会条件的伦理和政治后果的学术辩论。从必然性的主张出发，我推动对依赖的理解，避免将其简化为支配，而是将其呈现为一种可以积极自由地体验的复杂现实。与相当多的政治理论家的观点相反（见Macpherson， 1962），我认为依赖本身不会导致不自由；虽然，目前，许多依赖关系。为了理解为什么会出现这种情况，我认为对社会依赖性的分析必须与对政治经济学的批判结合起来。事实上，从我们的经济关系的角度来看，拒绝依赖并不完全是错误的：它指出了有缺陷的社会关系，我们需要理清这些社会关系才能进行批评。在这样做的过程中，我回应了雷诺的邀请，将依赖作为一个关键概念（2018年，第36页）。在接下来的内容中，我将通过对在当代社会和政治哲学中流传的依赖描述的批判性回顾来描述我自己的方法，重点是它们未能或多或少地整合现代依赖关系的特殊性，即它们的客观性。我把目前的研究方法分为两类：一类是关于关怀和脆弱性的讨论（它往往对资本主义关系下普遍依赖的实际形式提供很少的系统理解），另一类是关于政治经济学的批评（它往往淡化依赖的客观本质的重要性）。前者冒着为依赖辩护的风险，对重要的统治轴心视而不见，而后者似乎忽视了现代社会统治形式的具体性质。对依赖的客观性质的关注得到了两篇论文的认可。首先，我主张，当考虑客观性时，就会出现具体的规范性失败。其次，我认为对客观性的强调使重要的概念区分成为可能。因此，我建议我们需要批判异化的客观依赖，而不是客观的依赖关系本身。简而言之，我将论证资本主义社会的客观支配特征与客观或客观化的依赖是不同的。我的论点分为三个部分。在第一节中，我回顾了依赖性在当代社会和政治哲学中是如何被讨论的。我提出了在关怀和脆弱性研究中提出的论点，以便理解缺乏与政治经济学的接触是如何破坏依赖作为分析概念的关键潜力的。然后，我概述了将依赖性研究和资本主义关系分析结合在一起的尝试，其中包括劳工共和党人所做的工作。我描述了他们的贡献，以及他们的局限性，并解释了本文旨在对这些讨论进行的明确干预。在第二节中，我介绍了马克思的客观依赖概念，并阐述了它的三种形式：交换或货币的客观性，资本的客观性和机器的客观性。在第三节中，我借鉴了批判理论的最新发展，并认为现代社会的问题在于它们促进了异化和具体化的客观依赖，将我们不可避免的社会依赖转化为客观统治的形式。虽然我不能在这里详细地提出一种替代这种依赖形式的方法，但我对自由的、非异化的依赖关系的可能性提出了一些初步的想法。最后，鉴于独立与依赖之间的辩证关系，即使那些最担心前者的人也应该关心后者。在过去的几十年里，理论家们试图揭开自由主义者对个人独立的幻想的神秘面纱，转而提出一种范式，在这种范式中，脆弱和相互依存的共同条件占主导地位。第一个重要的里程碑是罗伯特。 马克思没有反驳他们的主张，而是反思了人们以这种方式行动的原因，并给了我们一个直截了当的答案：人们这样做“只是因为那件事是人与人之间的客观关系”（1993，第160页）。马克思并不相信我们以完全有意识的方式这样做，但他仍然有兴趣指出，货币具有这种社会力量“只是因为个人已经将自己的社会关系与自己疏远了”（1993年，第160页）。当然，马克思所做的最重要的举动之一是通过表明货币实际上是等价交换的必要和不可避免的结果，从而与欧文主义者（他们将社会的罪恶归咎于货币）保持距离（罗伯茨，2017，第58页）。因此，对马克思来说，交换中的社会关系的客观化，它的异己和独立的特性，是必须被标记为问题根源的东西。为了通过一个（反）直觉的例子来阐明这个公认的抽象概念，想想玛格丽特·撒切尔首相宣称的“没有办法对抗市场”。虽然历史上的撒切尔不太可能这样说，但我们虚构的撒切尔在这样说的时候，确实是在证实交换关系的物化本质，她提出了一种观点，认为交换关系是我们无法真正处理的，是我们无法控制的。然而，如上所述，市场在现代依赖关系的建立中占据着特权地位，发挥着塑造我们生活语法的结构性力量，分配了所有主要的生产投入，并指导了社会剩余的投资(弗雷泽和；Jaeggi, 2018，第24页)。通过接受它们自我调节的存在，我们把自己的生存交给了一种权力形式，从各种迹象来看，这种权力会自己夺走生命。简而言之，社会生产最终不是作为我们的共同财富由我们自由管理，而是作为我们的“命运”而存在于我们之外（马克思，1993，第158页）。正如我所指出的，在目前的客观依赖形式下，情况正是如此。我们参与的社会过程最终会超出我们的影响范围（或在我们看来是如此）。从逻辑上讲，缺乏对我们社会关系本质的影响必然会让现代自我决定的主体感到不满意，因为它使这些关系自然化，使我们认为它们响应的逻辑是不可逆转的，也不可讨论的。让我在这里强调一下，在我们无法触及的形式下，我们的依赖性的具体化是意识形态的，在同时是真实和虚假的意义上（Jaeggi, 2009, p. 66）。在某种程度上，交换、资本和机器变得独立，并获得了自己的生命，我们受制于它们；但在某种程度上，它们是我们自己创造的，它们是可以改变的。因为，正如我所断言的那样，问题不在于我们依赖的客观本质，而在于资本主义条件下的这种客观性成为依赖的一种具体化形式，它的异化是个人遭受“从这种外部化中受阻的回归”的完美案例（Jaeggi, 2014，第15页）。对于Jaeggi来说，物化实例的进一步问题是僵化，即对实际问题的抑制；通过作为决策对象的消失，凝固的关系“使自己免受进一步质疑”（2014年，第59页）。因此，资本主义可以被视为不仅物化了我们的社会关系，而且物化了我们的生产代理，也就是说，它异化了我们的“理性生产能力”（Vrousalis, 2020，第265页）。这种“将最重要的事情从民主决策的范围内先发制人地移除”（Fraser, 2020, p. 290），而不是将我们从艰难的决定中“解放”出来，而是将我们谴责为具象化的统治形式。由于劳动者无法获得生存资料，并且需要资本拥有的货币来获得这些资料，他们在结构上被迫向资本出售自己的劳动力。资本（通常）会为劳动力提供工资，但前提是在这个过程中资本价值重估。因此，我们的依赖代表了一种异化和一种统治关系，在这种关系中，个人为了赚取利润而服从于资本的物化权力。通过将“其价值增值的逻辑强加于社会生活”（Mau, 2021，第6页），资本的社会形式从民主审议中消除了生产的目的。最后，让我对依赖与独立的辩证关系提出最后的思考。到目前为止所做的分析假设“为了允许新的解放的社会愿景出现，我们需要质疑我们所接受的对依赖和独立的评价和定义”(弗雷泽&；Gordon, 2013，第110页)。 我的直觉是，只有解决了异化依赖的问题，我们才能重新认识独立。到目前为止，独立的神话已经被证明是强大的，但它已经系统地将个人置于边缘，并促进了一种有限的思考社会，
{"title":"Alienated dependence: The unfreedom of our social relations","authors":"Tatiana Llaguno","doi":"10.1111/josp.12551","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12551","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Modern individuals grapple with a paradoxical reality: their lives are characterized by a strong feeling of independence as well as by an intense social interconnection. In Karl Marx's words, this paradox is best described as individuals achieving “personal independence” under an “objective dependence” (<span>1993</span>, p. 158). This paper focuses on the notion of objective dependence, which has been insufficiently problematized in recent debates about social interdependence. By bringing to light a distinctively Hegelian-Marxist approach to the problem of dependence and to the problem of objectivity, the article aims at contributing to the ongoing scholarly debate on the ethical and political consequences of dependence as an acknowledged social condition. Starting from the inevitability claim, I push for an understanding of dependence that avoids its reduction to domination and that instead presents it as a complex reality that can be actively and freely experienced. Contrary to what a considerable number of political theorists have argued (see Macpherson, <span>1962</span>), I hold that dependence per se does not lead to unfreedom; although, at present, many relations of dependence do. To understand why this is the case, I defend that the analysis of social dependence must be brought together with the critique of political economy. In fact, when looked from the perspective of our economic relations, the rejection of dependence is not entirely misguided: it points out to defective social relations that we need to untangle in order to criticize. In doing so, I respond to Renault's invitation to deploy dependence as a <i>critical</i> concept (<span>2018</span>, p. 36).</p><p>In what follows, I will delineate my own approach by way of a critical review of the accounts of dependence circulating in contemporary social and political philosophy, focusing on their failure to integrate, to a greater or lesser degree, the specificity of modern relations of dependence, that is, their objectivity. I classify current approaches in two groups: one informed by discussions around care and vulnerability (which tends to provide little systematic understanding of how actual forms of generalized dependence are experienced under capitalist relations) and another informed by the critique of political economy (which tends to downplay the importance of dependence's objective nature). While the former risks offering a defense of dependence that remains blind to important axes of domination, the latter might appear oblivious about the specific nature of modern forms of social domination. The focus on the objective nature of dependence is sanctioned by two theses. First, I claim that when objectivity is taken into account, specific normative failures arise. Second, I believe that the emphasis on objectivity enables important conceptual distinctions. Thus, I will suggest that we need to criticize alienated objective dependence, rather than objective relations of depend","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":"185-201"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12551","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139271079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rawls and American political traditions","authors":"David A. Reidy","doi":"10.1111/josp.12549","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12549","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"178-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135974425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12479","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"290-291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50125481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12480","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"437"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12480","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50138412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号