<p>The dominant philosophical approach to understanding the moral duties that states in the Global North have toward the 26 million refugees worldwide is what we can call the <i>Duty of Rescue Approach</i>.<sup>1</sup> According to this approach, states in the Global North (hereafter Northern states) are mere innocent bystanders overlooking the humanitarian crisis of refugee displacement unfold, and these states have moral duties to rescue refugees from this situation, at least if such states are able to do so at little cost to themselves.<sup>2</sup></p><p>Serena Parekh's recent normative analysis (<span>2017</span>, <span>2020</span>) has sought to challenge this dominant approach. Parekh highlights certain Northern state policies and practices used in response to refugees while they are displaced and suggests that refugees endure extensive harms as result of such policies and practices, including the harms of containment and encampment, and their being prevented from accessing adequate refuge. These harms, Parekh argues, are an injustice. Thus, for Parekh, certain Northern states, far from being mere innocent bystanders, are responsible for injustice against refugees.</p><p>In this article, I fully endorse Parekh's claims that refugees endure certain harms as a result of Northern state practices, and that such harms constitute an injustice against refugees. Yet, I will explore how we ought to understand this injustice. I contest Parekh's claim that the harms refugees endure as a result of Northern state practices are, and ought to be understood as, a <i>structural injustice—</i>an unfortunate, unintended unjust outcome resulting from structural processes (call this Parekh's <i>Structural Injustice Approach</i>). Instead, I contend that these harms are, and ought to be understood as, a <i>direct injustice</i> against refugees<i>—</i>an unjust outcome directly resulting from specific and avoidable policies enacted by relatively unconstrained actors (call this the <i>Direct Injustice Approach)</i>. I argue that Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach fails to accurately capture the causal and normative relations between Northern state practices and the harms endured by refugees, and that this approach fails to provide any advancement on, and suffers from same the problems as, the standard Duty of Rescue Approach to which it is ostensibly an alternative. I instead advocate a Direct Injustice Approach to understanding the harms that refugees endure as a result of Northern states practices. If these harms are indeed a direct injustice, then responsible Northern states are certainly not mere innocent bystanders, and are not merely involved in structural processes that have an unintended unjust outcome (as on Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach), but are instead directly committing a grave injustice against innocent refugees and thus have urgent negative duties to refrain from unjustly harming the world's displaced.</p><p>Section 1 explains Parekh's
理解全球北方国家对全球2600万难民的道德义务的主要哲学方法是我们可以称之为“救援责任方法”。1根据这种方法，全球北方国家(以下简称北方国家)仅仅是无辜的旁观者，忽视了难民流离失所的人道主义危机的展开，这些国家有道德责任从这种情况中拯救难民。至少如果这些国家能够以很少的代价这么做的话。2Serena Parekh最近的规范分析(2017,2020)试图挑战这种主导方法。Parekh强调了北方各州在难民流离失所时采取的某些政策和做法，并指出，由于这些政策和做法，难民遭受了广泛的伤害，包括围堵和扎营的危害，以及他们无法获得适当的庇护。帕瑞克认为，这些伤害是不公平的。因此，在帕雷克看来，某些北方国家远不是无辜的旁观者，而是对难民的不公正负有责任。在这篇文章中，我完全赞同Parekh的说法，即由于北方国家的做法，难民遭受了某些伤害，这种伤害构成了对难民的不公正。然而，我将探讨我们应该如何理解这种不公正。我不同意帕瑞克的观点，即北方国家的做法导致难民遭受的伤害是，也应该被理解为一种结构性的不公正——一种由结构性过程导致的不幸的、意想不到的不公正结果(称之为帕瑞克的结构性不公正方法)。相反，我认为这些伤害是，而且应该被理解为，对难民的直接不公正——由相对不受约束的行为者制定的具体和可避免的政策直接导致的不公正结果(称之为直接不公正方法)。我认为，Parekh的结构性不公正方法未能准确地捕捉到北方国家的做法与难民所遭受的伤害之间的因果关系和规范关系，而且这种方法未能提供任何进步，并遭受与标准的救援义务方法相同的问题，它表面上是一种替代方法。相反，我主张用直接不公正的方法来理解北方各州的做法给难民带来的伤害。如果这些伤害确实是一种直接的不公正，那么负责任的北方各州肯定不仅仅是无辜的旁观者，也不仅仅是参与了产生意外不公正结果的结构性过程(如Parekh的结构性不公正方法)，而是直接对无辜的难民犯下了严重的不公正，因此有紧急的消极责任来避免不公正地伤害世界上的流离失所者。第1节更详细地解释了Parekh的论点。第二节回顾了Iris Marion Young(2010)对结构性不公正的描述(Parekh的论点基于此)，以建立结构性不公正的必要条件。第三节对难民因北方国家的做法而面临的伤害是否可以根据必要的条件准确地描述为结构性不公正提出了质疑。第4节提出了反对将这些伤害理解为结构性不公正的规范性论点，因为这样的理解(除了其他不足之外)将无法在救援责任方法上提供任何进展，也无法为解决针对难民的不公正问题提供(重要的)道德责任。第5节总结。Parekh(2020)批评了在理解对难民的义务方面占主导地位的“救援责任”方法，在这种方法中，“(北方各州)往往只被视为与难民一旦流离失所所面临的伤害无关的救援者。”在这个“救援框架”上，北方各州“没有做错任何事”。他们没有让难民陷入危险，而只是介入帮助”(第18页)。这一框架未能捕捉到“难民所经历的伤害以及[北方各州]在这一结果中所扮演的角色”和“我们[北方各州]所造成的伤害”的现实(第19,158页)。在两本书中，Parekh让人们注意到由于北方国家的做法，难民所遭受的两种特别的伤害:首先是对难民的遏制和营地，其次是难民无法获得庇护。在《难民与被迫流离失所的伦理》(2017)一书中，Parekh关注了难民的收容和营地问题。北方各州通过各种政策和做法，设法将难民收容在远离北方领土的全球南方地区。 在这些地区，难民被无限期地留在难民营中，北方各州在财政和政治上支持将难民安置在难民营中，因为这是他们对难民的首选反应(而不是重新安置或给予大量难民庇护;Parekh, 2017，第37-9页)。这种封锁和营地的危害包括"一种被囚禁的感觉，以及长时间剥夺自由、自治和基本人权[.]"(第5页)。难民营中的难民被动地依赖国际援助，对未来前景感到焦虑不安，缺乏充分自主生存所必需的机会。难民在这样的条件下忍受数年、数十年，有时甚至几代人(第3页)。帕雷克进一步证明了难民营如何影响难民的权利。“第一难民营很少维护难民根据1951年《难民公约》所享有的权利。”第二，“因为难民营中的难民非常脆弱，基本人权经常受到其他难民、国家和非政府组织的侵犯，难民没有能力要求他们的权利或得到纠正”(第31页)。Parekh借鉴了一些实证研究，这些研究发现了某些难民营中侵犯人权的完整目录，并得出结论，难民营的结构本身——作为封闭空间，超越法治，否认自由流动——意味着将难民封闭在难民营中，与尊重他们的人权是不相容的(verdiame et al.， 2005)。帕瑞克指出，难民营中最严重、最普遍的侵犯行为是性暴力。“家庭暴力、性剥削和各种性折磨的发生率极高。”这“已知在全球所有营地设置中都会发生”(2017年，第34页)。在《无避难所》(2020)中，帕瑞克关注的是难民无法获得避难所的危害。Parekh将避难理解为“人类尊严的最低条件”，包括适当的生活水平(包括食物、水、衣服、适当的住房和医疗)以及免受基本人权威胁的人身安全(第11-3页)。Parekh指出，绝大多数难民(86%)一旦离开原籍国，就会居住在全球南方地区，在那里他们实际上面临着三种选择:在肮脏的难民营中度过很长一段时间，没有足够的自主权或安全保障;在没有正式援助的情况下生活在赤贫中，在城市地区面临剥削和侵犯人权的行为;或冒着生命危险踏上危险的旅程，忍受广泛的侵犯人权行为，以在北方各州获得足够的安全和生存。这三种选择中的每一种都不能提供人类尊严的最低条件，因此世界上绝大多数难民无法获得庇护(第105-6页)。对帕瑞克来说，无法获得庇护是北方各州惯例造成的伤害。寻求控制其边界的北方各州采取了各种政策和做法，旨在将难民挡在北方领土之外，防止他们获得庇护。Parekh列举的例子包括在欧洲边境对难民的抵制，美国阻止难民寻求庇护的儿童分离政策，澳大利亚在海上拦截并将难民送回瑙鲁的离岸拘留中心，将难民拘留在希腊的难民营和中心，欧盟与利比亚的安排将难民拘留在利比亚海岸的中心，并将难民收容在北非地区，以及欧盟-土耳其协议，该协议封锁了移民路线，阻止难民抵达欧洲(2016年，第121-40页)。此外，北方国家没有提供获得庇护的适当途径或重新安置大量难民，而是选择在全球南方提供和资助难民营，作为它们对难民的首选反应，正如我们在上面看到的那样，这带来了一种被囚禁和广泛侵犯人权的感觉(第105页)。由于这些做法，难民无法有效地获得北部各州的庇护，只能在南方国家的城市地区忍受肮脏的难民营或贫困，或者冒着生命危险前往北部各州，现在越来越困难和危险。因此，由于北方各州的做法，“我们造成了这样一种局面:绝大多数难民实际上无法获得任何有意义的庇护;也就是说，他们不能享有人类尊严的最低条件”(第159页)。对帕瑞克来说，上述两种伤害——对难民的收容和营地，以及难民无法找到避难所——代表了对难民的不公正。因此，北方各州远不是无辜的旁观者或仅仅是潜在的救援者，而是对难民的不公正负有责任。 虽然杨没有明确指出必要条件，但我们可以从她的分析中推断出，结构性不公正是:一种不公正的结果，它(1)不同于直接的个人互动造成的伤害和错误;(2)不同于由国家(或其他机构)的行为和政策直接导致的伤害和错误;相
{"title":"Direct and structural injustice against refugees","authors":"Bradley Hillier-Smith","doi":"10.1111/josp.12486","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12486","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The dominant philosophical approach to understanding the moral duties that states in the Global North have toward the 26 million refugees worldwide is what we can call the <i>Duty of Rescue Approach</i>.<sup>1</sup> According to this approach, states in the Global North (hereafter Northern states) are mere innocent bystanders overlooking the humanitarian crisis of refugee displacement unfold, and these states have moral duties to rescue refugees from this situation, at least if such states are able to do so at little cost to themselves.<sup>2</sup></p><p>Serena Parekh's recent normative analysis (<span>2017</span>, <span>2020</span>) has sought to challenge this dominant approach. Parekh highlights certain Northern state policies and practices used in response to refugees while they are displaced and suggests that refugees endure extensive harms as result of such policies and practices, including the harms of containment and encampment, and their being prevented from accessing adequate refuge. These harms, Parekh argues, are an injustice. Thus, for Parekh, certain Northern states, far from being mere innocent bystanders, are responsible for injustice against refugees.</p><p>In this article, I fully endorse Parekh's claims that refugees endure certain harms as a result of Northern state practices, and that such harms constitute an injustice against refugees. Yet, I will explore how we ought to understand this injustice. I contest Parekh's claim that the harms refugees endure as a result of Northern state practices are, and ought to be understood as, a <i>structural injustice—</i>an unfortunate, unintended unjust outcome resulting from structural processes (call this Parekh's <i>Structural Injustice Approach</i>). Instead, I contend that these harms are, and ought to be understood as, a <i>direct injustice</i> against refugees<i>—</i>an unjust outcome directly resulting from specific and avoidable policies enacted by relatively unconstrained actors (call this the <i>Direct Injustice Approach)</i>. I argue that Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach fails to accurately capture the causal and normative relations between Northern state practices and the harms endured by refugees, and that this approach fails to provide any advancement on, and suffers from same the problems as, the standard Duty of Rescue Approach to which it is ostensibly an alternative. I instead advocate a Direct Injustice Approach to understanding the harms that refugees endure as a result of Northern states practices. If these harms are indeed a direct injustice, then responsible Northern states are certainly not mere innocent bystanders, and are not merely involved in structural processes that have an unintended unjust outcome (as on Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach), but are instead directly committing a grave injustice against innocent refugees and thus have urgent negative duties to refrain from unjustly harming the world's displaced.</p><p>Section 1 explains Parekh's","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"262-284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46764103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digital participatory democracy: A normative framework for the democratic governance of the digital commons","authors":"Alec Stubbs","doi":"10.1111/josp.12489","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12489","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"385-403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45475632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Skill-selection and socioeconomic status: An analysis of migration and domestic justice","authors":"Michael Ball-Blakely","doi":"10.1111/josp.12485","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12485","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 4","pages":"595-613"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47728902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of <i>acting well</i> in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.</p><p>Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.</p><p>To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute <i>causal</i> responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute <i>moral</i> responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a <i>moral obligation</i> to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, <span>2007</span>).</p><p>The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, <span>2019</span>). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely sma
{"title":"“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems”","authors":"Dominic Lenzi","doi":"10.1111/josp.12488","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12488","url":null,"abstract":"<p>One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of <i>acting well</i> in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.</p><p>Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.</p><p>To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute <i>causal</i> responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute <i>moral</i> responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a <i>moral obligation</i> to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, <span>2007</span>).</p><p>The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, <span>2019</span>). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely sma","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 3","pages":"421-436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12488","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44684714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The European Union's (EU's) legitimacy is currently under pressure from what is widely perceived as a populist challenge. Populists charge the EU as being undemocratic, unrepresentative, technocratic, and tied to the interests of the elite; as serving neither the will nor the interests of the people; and as simultaneously paying too little attention to the concerns of its member states while also being only timidly cosmopolitan. These claims have stimulated a debate among scholars in the social sciences on what populism is, and on the legitimacy of populists' claims. Scholars have often described populist stances as illiberal and antidemocratic (Mudde, <span>2004</span>; Müller, <span>2017</span>; Urbinati, <span>2019a</span>) and criticized them for their antipluralistic attitude (Galston, <span>2018</span>). This paper aims to assess the normative and conceptual cogency of these diverse claims.</p><p>In this regard, we make three arguments. First, the critique of illiberalism and antidemocraticism does not target populists specifically, because some populists appeal to the principle of equality, solidarity and have a cosmopolitan picture of the international society. Second, a critique of the populist conception of international legitimacy should look not only at their claims on input legitimacy, but also at those on output legitimacy, and at the incoherence that characterizes their appeal to one or the other of their preferred theories of legitimacy—Rousseaueanian or Hobbesian. Finally, we suggest that what is inherently problematic in any populist claim on the EU's legitimacy, regardless of any other characterization is the way in which they conceive of the distinction between the elite and the people—a distinction that grounds their political position in international relations. We conclude that populism amounts to neither a normatively distinct approach for assessing EU's legitimacy, in terms of both input and output legitimacy, nor it is conceptually necessary to grasp internal diversities within political unions such as the EU, because the distinction between the people and the elite on which it is conceptually grounded often relies on a fallacy.</p><p>The article develops as follows. In Section 2 we contextualize our investigation within the scholarship on the EU's legitimacy and summarize how scholars have characterized populism by resorting to either thick or thin accounts. While the latter focus almost exclusively on the populist appeal to the distinction between the people and the elite, the former include illiberalism and antidemocraticism among the characteristics of populism. We then argue that developing a critique of populism by focusing on illiberalism and antidemocraticism is not distinctive of populism because, as we show in Section 3, the reality of populist movements is complex and variegated. In that section, we bring in examples from populists in Germany, Italy, and the UK to show that among many illiberal and antidemo
{"title":"The populist challenge to European Union legitimacy: Old wine in new bottles?","authors":"Ilaria Cozzaglio, Dimitrios Efthymiou","doi":"10.1111/josp.12487","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12487","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The European Union's (EU's) legitimacy is currently under pressure from what is widely perceived as a populist challenge. Populists charge the EU as being undemocratic, unrepresentative, technocratic, and tied to the interests of the elite; as serving neither the will nor the interests of the people; and as simultaneously paying too little attention to the concerns of its member states while also being only timidly cosmopolitan. These claims have stimulated a debate among scholars in the social sciences on what populism is, and on the legitimacy of populists' claims. Scholars have often described populist stances as illiberal and antidemocratic (Mudde, <span>2004</span>; Müller, <span>2017</span>; Urbinati, <span>2019a</span>) and criticized them for their antipluralistic attitude (Galston, <span>2018</span>). This paper aims to assess the normative and conceptual cogency of these diverse claims.</p><p>In this regard, we make three arguments. First, the critique of illiberalism and antidemocraticism does not target populists specifically, because some populists appeal to the principle of equality, solidarity and have a cosmopolitan picture of the international society. Second, a critique of the populist conception of international legitimacy should look not only at their claims on input legitimacy, but also at those on output legitimacy, and at the incoherence that characterizes their appeal to one or the other of their preferred theories of legitimacy—Rousseaueanian or Hobbesian. Finally, we suggest that what is inherently problematic in any populist claim on the EU's legitimacy, regardless of any other characterization is the way in which they conceive of the distinction between the elite and the people—a distinction that grounds their political position in international relations. We conclude that populism amounts to neither a normatively distinct approach for assessing EU's legitimacy, in terms of both input and output legitimacy, nor it is conceptually necessary to grasp internal diversities within political unions such as the EU, because the distinction between the people and the elite on which it is conceptually grounded often relies on a fallacy.</p><p>The article develops as follows. In Section 2 we contextualize our investigation within the scholarship on the EU's legitimacy and summarize how scholars have characterized populism by resorting to either thick or thin accounts. While the latter focus almost exclusively on the populist appeal to the distinction between the people and the elite, the former include illiberalism and antidemocraticism among the characteristics of populism. We then argue that developing a critique of populism by focusing on illiberalism and antidemocraticism is not distinctive of populism because, as we show in Section 3, the reality of populist movements is complex and variegated. In that section, we bring in examples from populists in Germany, Italy, and the UK to show that among many illiberal and antidemo","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"510-525"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12487","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45691734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The problem of dirty hands is, roughly speaking, concerned with situations in which an agent is faced with a choice between two evils so that, no matter what they do, they will have to violate something of important moral value. Theorists have been primarily concerned with dirty hands choices arising in politics because they are thought to be particularly frequent and pressing in this sphere.<sup>1</sup> Much of the subsequent discussion in the literature has focused on the impact that such choices have on a well-functioning democracy and how, if at all, we can ensure that a politician dirtying their hands does not undermine core democratic values and processes. A particular concern has been whether dirty-handed politicians ought to publicly reveal their actions after the fact and whether they should be held accountable through some form of punishment. The first aim of this paper is to point out that the focus on what is required in the wake of a dirty-handed decision, based on the need to protect the democratic system ought to be balanced with a genuine concern for reparative justice and what is owed to the victims of dirty hands. In the second part of this paper, I then examine the suitability of one common way in which perpetrators partly repair the damage they have done to victims, namely apologizing, in the dirty hands context.</p><p>The problem of dirty hands is a particular kind of moral conflict. Moral conflicts arise whenever an agent is faced with a choice between two morally valuable options which can be performed separately but not jointly. As a result, the agent is forced to forego one of the moral values but does so for good moral reasons, that is, to pursue the other morally valuable option. Having to choose between these two valuable options results in a moral remainder because, even if they choose the all-thing-considered better one, the lesser option has a value that cannot completely be made up for by the chosen one. This remainder is associated with a corresponding negative emotional response such as regret or remorse.<sup>2</sup> The problem of dirty hands is concerned with a particular subset of such moral conflicts, namely those that result in a grave moral remainder.<sup>3</sup></p><p>The theoretical example given most frequently to illustrate this problem is Michael Walzer's ticking bomb scenario (1973). Walzer asks us to imagine a morally good politician who genuinely wants to act in the best interest of her citizens. Unfortunately, she is confronted with a situation in which a suspect in custody is refusing to give up the location of a number of bombs hidden in the capital city. Were they to explode, hundreds of innocent citizens could die. The politician now has to consider whether she ought to authorize the torture of the subject in order to extract the information from them. She is torn between upholding the ban on torture on the one hand and protecting her citizens on the other. Whatever option she chooses, she w
{"title":"Official apologies as reparations for dirty hands","authors":"Christina Nick","doi":"10.1111/josp.12490","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12490","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The problem of dirty hands is, roughly speaking, concerned with situations in which an agent is faced with a choice between two evils so that, no matter what they do, they will have to violate something of important moral value. Theorists have been primarily concerned with dirty hands choices arising in politics because they are thought to be particularly frequent and pressing in this sphere.<sup>1</sup> Much of the subsequent discussion in the literature has focused on the impact that such choices have on a well-functioning democracy and how, if at all, we can ensure that a politician dirtying their hands does not undermine core democratic values and processes. A particular concern has been whether dirty-handed politicians ought to publicly reveal their actions after the fact and whether they should be held accountable through some form of punishment. The first aim of this paper is to point out that the focus on what is required in the wake of a dirty-handed decision, based on the need to protect the democratic system ought to be balanced with a genuine concern for reparative justice and what is owed to the victims of dirty hands. In the second part of this paper, I then examine the suitability of one common way in which perpetrators partly repair the damage they have done to victims, namely apologizing, in the dirty hands context.</p><p>The problem of dirty hands is a particular kind of moral conflict. Moral conflicts arise whenever an agent is faced with a choice between two morally valuable options which can be performed separately but not jointly. As a result, the agent is forced to forego one of the moral values but does so for good moral reasons, that is, to pursue the other morally valuable option. Having to choose between these two valuable options results in a moral remainder because, even if they choose the all-thing-considered better one, the lesser option has a value that cannot completely be made up for by the chosen one. This remainder is associated with a corresponding negative emotional response such as regret or remorse.<sup>2</sup> The problem of dirty hands is concerned with a particular subset of such moral conflicts, namely those that result in a grave moral remainder.<sup>3</sup></p><p>The theoretical example given most frequently to illustrate this problem is Michael Walzer's ticking bomb scenario (1973). Walzer asks us to imagine a morally good politician who genuinely wants to act in the best interest of her citizens. Unfortunately, she is confronted with a situation in which a suspect in custody is refusing to give up the location of a number of bombs hidden in the capital city. Were they to explode, hundreds of innocent citizens could die. The politician now has to consider whether she ought to authorize the torture of the subject in order to extract the information from them. She is torn between upholding the ban on torture on the one hand and protecting her citizens on the other. Whatever option she chooses, she w","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"746-761"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12490","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42634616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12418","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 2","pages":"289"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12418","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134802147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CONTRIBUTORS","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12417","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 2","pages":"146-147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134802148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Joshua Glasgow and Jonathan M. Woodward (<span>2015</span>) have proposed a new account of the metaphysics of race, which they call “basic racial realism.” According to the view, races are kinds whose members are united by sharing similarities, for example, visible traits like skin color, that are not directly relevant to science. They argue that basic racial realism has certain dialectical advantages over the other parties to the debate over race, viz. racial antirealism, biological racial realism, and racial social constructionism.</p><p>Glasgow and Woodward should be commended for introducing basic racial realism to the debate over the reality of race. It offers a novel account of race that promises to track the ordinary concept of race without undermining the social and political significance of race. For all those benefits, however, basic racial realism faces certain troubles. I argue, first, that basic racial realism is not as consistent with the ordinary concept of race as Glasgow and Woodward make it out to be. Second, I argue that basic racial realism does not enjoy the dialectical advantages over social constructionism that they suggest it does. In the third section, I defend social constructionism about race against their charge that it violates the ordinary concept of race. I conclude with general reflections about the comparative surprises that basic racial realism and constructionism give us regarding race.</p><p>The three familiar positions in the debate are racial antirealism, biological racial realism, and racial social constructionism. Basic racial realism says that race is real (pace the antirealist) but is neither a natural kind nor a social kind (pace the biological realist and the social constructionist, respectively). On Glasgow and Woodward's view race is a “basic kind,” that is, a kind whose members are united merely by sharing a similarity, but a similarity that is not directly relevant to science (<span>2015</span>, p. 451). (Basic kinds as such, they claim, lack causal powers and so their essential properties sometimes fail to overlap with properties that are useful to science.) Basic kinds are not gerrymandered or arbitrary sets, then, but objective, mind-independent kinds that do not rise to the scientific importance of natural or social kinds. Races are basic kinds in that they are “groups of people who are distinguished from other groups by having certain visible features (like skin color) to a significantly disproportionate degree” (<span>2015</span>, p. 452).<sup>1</sup></p><p>According to Glasgow and Woodward, familiar parties to the race debate share a commitment to “elitism” about kinds. Such elitism has it that only kinds that are directly relevant to science, whether natural or social, are real. They find the elitist assumption implausible because basic kinds seem to qualify as real on a plausible conception of reality—objective and mind-independent similarity—without being the direct objects of scientifi
约书亚·格拉斯哥(Joshua Glasgow)和乔纳森·m·伍德沃德(Jonathan M. Woodward)(2015)提出了一种关于种族形而上学的新说法，他们称之为“基本种族现实主义”。根据这一观点，种族是一种其成员通过共享相似性而团结在一起的物种，例如，与科学没有直接关系的皮肤颜色等可见特征。他们认为，基本种族现实主义相对于种族反现实主义、生物种族现实主义和种族社会建构主义具有一定的辩证优势。格拉斯哥和伍德沃德应该受到赞扬，因为他们将基本的种族现实主义引入了关于种族现实的辩论。它提供了一种新颖的种族描述，承诺在不破坏种族的社会和政治意义的情况下，追踪普通的种族概念。然而，尽管有这些好处，基本的种族现实主义面临着某些麻烦。我认为，首先，基本的种族现实主义并不像格拉斯哥和伍德沃德所说的那样与普通的种族概念相一致。其次，我认为基本的种族现实主义并不像他们所认为的那样享有社会建构主义所具有的辩证优势。在第三部分，我为种族的社会建构主义辩护，反对他们的指控，认为它违反了普通的种族概念。最后，我对基本的种族现实主义和建构主义在种族问题上给我们带来的比较惊喜进行了一般性的反思。辩论中常见的三种立场是种族反现实主义、生物种族现实主义和种族社会建构主义。基本的种族现实主义认为种族是真实的(佩斯是反现实主义)，但既不是自然的种族，也不是社会的种族(佩斯分别是生物现实主义和社会建构主义)。在格拉斯哥和伍德沃德看来，种族是一种“基本类型”，也就是说，这种类型的成员仅仅通过共享相似性而团结起来，但这种相似性与科学没有直接关系(2015年，第451页)。(他们声称，基本类型本身缺乏因果力，因此它们的基本属性有时无法与对科学有用的属性重叠。)因此，基本类型并不是不公正划分的或任意的集合，而是客观的、独立于思维的类型，它们不会上升到自然或社会类型的科学重要性。种族是基本种类，因为他们是“一群人，他们通过某些明显不成比例的可见特征(如肤色)与其他群体区别开来”(2015,p. 452)。根据格拉斯哥和伍德沃德的说法，种族辩论中熟悉的各方都致力于种族的“精英主义”。这种精英主义认为，只有与科学直接相关的物种，无论是自然的还是社会的，才是真实的。他们发现精英主义的假设是不可信的，因为基本种类似乎符合现实的合理概念-客观和心灵独立的相似性-而不是科学探究的直接对象。反对精英主义削弱了反现实主义的论点，即种族不是真实的，因为它既不是自然的，也不是社会的。因为基本的类实在论认为，类不需要是自然的或社会的才能是真实的。生物学上的种族现实主义认为种族是适当隔离的繁殖种群。格拉斯哥和伍德沃德指出，对这种观点的一个众所周知的担忧是，被算作种族的群体与我们通常算作种族的群体在本质上是不同的。例如，在某些版本的生物种族现实主义中，阿米什人被视为一个独特的种族，尽管对种族概念的普通用户来说不是这样这样，我们对种族的普通概念与生物学现实主义者所确定的人口之间就存在着一种“不匹配”。格拉斯哥和伍德沃德认为，这个问题的根源在于现实主义者试图将种族与生物或自然类型区分开来。如果种族仅仅是由普通种族概念挑选出的可见特征来区分的基本种类，那么不匹配问题就可以完全避免。3另一方面，关于种族的建构主义者认为种族是社会种类，即由分类实践等社会因素统一的种类。格拉斯哥和伍德沃德声称，普通的种族概念反对将种族视为一种社会类型。在某些可能的情况下，从直觉上看，种族仍然存在，但决定种族的社会因素(根据社会建构主义者的观点)却不存在(2015，第456页)。例如，如果将人们划分为“白人”、“黑人”或“亚洲人”决定了这些种族的存在，那么在每个人都集体患上种族失忆症一小时的情况下，种族就不复存在了。但直觉上，这些种族仍然存在，即使他们的成员不被归类为这些种族的成员。就像生物学上的种族现实主义一样，建构主义的种族观偏离了我们通常的种族概念。 只要独立于思维的世界能够满足我们的种族概念所提出的要求，基本的种族现实主义的种族概念就永远不会脱离我们的种族概念。此外，关于种族的建构主义被认为比其他种族观点有优势，因为它特别适合于解释种族的社会和政治意义。格拉斯哥和伍德沃德认为，在这一点上，基本的种族现实主义和社会建构主义做得一样好。即使基本的种族现实主义否认种族本身是社会的，这种观点仍然可以“允许谈论种族的社会意义和影响，以及建立在种族基础上的社会身份”(2015年，第457页)。基本的种族现实主义将涉及种族的社会实践与种族本身分开。在这方面，建构主义与基本的种族现实主义相比没有理论或解释上的优势。由于后者将种族与基本种类等同起来，它并不像前者那样致力于更为夸张的社会种类的种族本体论。鉴于竞争对手的弱点和基本种族现实主义的优势，格拉斯哥和伍德沃德得出结论，基本种族现实主义不仅应该被视为种族辩论中的第四竞争者，而且应该被视为最有希望的竞争者。如果这种建构主义的回应是成功的，那么它就会削弱关于种族的社会建构主义与我们通常的种族概念相冲突的说法。然而，格拉斯哥和伍德沃德的论文有用地揭示了一件事，那就是每一种种族形而上学都给这个概念的普通用户带来了惊喜。对他们来说，基本的种族现实主义给了我们最小的惊喜，也不会迫使我们放弃普通的种族概念。他们说，“基本的种族现实主义的惊喜类似于得知你有一群你不知道的表亲”(2015年，第461页)。当然，发现你比你想象的拥有更多的表亲，这与表亲的概念是一致的。但正如我上面所说的，格拉斯哥和伍德沃德并没有给出太多的论据来证明，发现你属于比你认为的更多的种族，这与普通的种族概念是一致的。“建构主义的惊喜，”他们断言，“就像我们知道你的表妹可以从你的表妹变成你的表妹，如果我们忘记了她是你的表妹，如果我们记得，她又和你重新联系起来了”(2015，第461页)。与表亲的类比是暗示性的，但夸大了反对建构主义的情况。很有可能，如果你忘记了你的堂兄，你的堂兄就会从你的堂兄变成你的堂兄，这违反了堂兄的概念。但并不是每个版本的建构主义都对种族提出类似的主张。种族健忘症思想实验只针对种族完全由我们的种族分类实践决定的建构主义观点。15格拉斯哥认识到这一点(2019年，第131页)，但他认为，对于任何被建构主义者认定为基础种族的社会因素，在某些情况下，该因素会与可见表象的事实分开，他认为这是普通种族概念的核心。格拉斯哥当然是正确的，任何社会因素都可以从可见特征的分布中分离出来。但重要的是要认识到，格拉斯哥和伍德沃德想象的场景涉及对我们的社会世界的彻底改变，例如，重构社会安排，结束某些社会实践，开始其他社会实践，并从根本上改变人体的社会意义(另见格拉斯哥2009年和2019年，第133页)。一旦我们承认这些思想实验所涉及的激进的社会变革，基本的种族现实主义和建构主义各自的惊喜看起来与格拉斯哥和伍德沃德所暗示的有所不同。基本的种族现实主义给了我们这样的惊喜:你发现你实际上属于比你想象的更多的种族，甚至是你从未设想过的种族，一些你认为存在的种族(例如，拉丁裔和阿拉伯裔)实际上并不存在。建构主义(某些流派的)给了我们这样的惊喜:你发现，在一些遥远的可能的情况下，涉及到我们的社会世界的根本变化，你不是你认为自己在现实世界中的种族。换句话说，基本的种族现实主义让我们对种族话题的延伸感到惊
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{"title":"Race and evaluation of philosophical skill: A virtue theoretical explanation of why people of color are so absent from philosophy","authors":"Eric Bayruns García","doi":"10.1111/josp.12472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12472","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"386-408"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142324647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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