Journal of Social Philosophy最新文献_第6页

Labor automation for fair cooperation: Why and how machines should provide meaningful work for all 公平合作的劳动自动化:机器为什么以及如何为所有人提供有意义的工作

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-25 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12548

Denise Celentano

By affecting work, resources, organizations, and people's lives, automation processes can be disruptive of the basic structure of society. Nonetheless, we may benefit from this disruption, as automation may offer opportunities to make social cooperation fairer. Just as philosophers have addressed the problem of which values and principles should regulate the distribution of goods, so we may consider the problem of the values and principles guiding technological change with regard to work. Indeed, automation is often addressed from a distributive perspective. A prevailing concern in the debate is about making sure that the technologically unemployed will not lose access to income through unconditional redistributive policies, while some have suggested policies like a “robot tax” to disincentivize companies' investment in labor-saving devices. While crucial given the massive increase in profits afforded by automation and the inequalities that go with it, concerns about income are not the only ones raised by automation. Without underestimating their relevance, in this article I leave aside problems about income to focus on automation from the perspective of work. That is, my concern here is on social cooperation from the perspective of contribution instead of distribution, within a framework that may be called technological contributive justice. If UBI advocates expect everyone to benefit from automation in their income, the contributive perspective postulates that everyone should benefit from automation in their work.There are three main reasons behind this shift. First, even in a world in which income were unconditionally accessible to all, there would be the problem of how to fairly organize the un-automated socially necessary labor (e.g., waste collection, care work, etc.). I call this the “somebody's got to do it” problem. It cannot be solved by merely reallocating income, because it concerns the division of labor itself and its norms. Second, by conceptualizing social cooperation only as a matter of markets and distribution but not production, we are not able to see what happens with regard to what people do besides what they own. But this matters too when it comes to pursuing our life plans (see Section 4) as well as the effects on our aims, aspirations, and character (see Section 3.1). Finally, even if work were completely automatable, we would most likely still consider it undesirable to fully automate certain tasks, such as child care or teaching.On the other hand, normative thinking about automation often takes the form of utopias of “full automation.” Recent examples include ideas of “fully automated luxury communism” (Bastani, 2019) or “post-work” views. A fully automated world, Danaher (2019b) argues, would allow us to pursue a life free from the pressures of economic demands and to enjoy activities for their own sake, much like playing games. From the premise that

通过影响工作、资源、组织和人们的生活，自动化过程可以破坏社会的基本结构。尽管如此，我们可能会从这种颠覆中受益，因为自动化可能会提供机会，使社会合作更加公平。正如哲学家们讨论了应该用哪些价值观和原则来规范商品分配的问题一样，我们也可以考虑在工作方面指导技术变革的价值观和原则的问题。实际上，自动化通常是从分配的角度来处理的。在这场辩论中，一个普遍关注的问题是，如何通过无条件的再分配政策，确保技术性失业人员不会失去获得收入的机会，而一些人则建议采取“机器人税”等政策，抑制企业对节省劳动力的设备的投资。考虑到自动化带来的利润大幅增加以及随之而来的不平等，这一点至关重要，但对收入的担忧并不是自动化引发的唯一问题。没有低估它们的相关性，在这篇文章中，我把关于收入的问题放在一边，从工作的角度关注自动化。也就是说，我在这里关注的是社会合作，从贡献而不是分配的角度，在一个可以称为技术贡献正义的框架内。如果UBI的支持者期望每个人都能从收入的自动化中受益，那么贡献视角则假设每个人都应该从工作的自动化中受益。这种转变背后有三个主要原因。首先，即使在一个所有人都能无条件获得收入的世界里，如何公平地组织非自动化的社会必要劳动(例如，废物收集、护理工作等)也会存在问题。收稿日期:2022年11月14日修稿日期:2023年7月27日收稿日期:2023年8月7日

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引用次数: 0

A couple of reasons in favor of monogamy 有几个理由支持一夫一妻制

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12544

Kyle York

引用次数: 0

Critical theory, ideal theory, and conceptual engineering 批判理论、理想理论和概念工程

IF 1.1 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12545

Andrea Sangiovanni

I shall take critical theory to have four main characteristics. First, it is a form of social, cultural, or political critique whose aim is emancipation, where emancipation is liberation from oppression or injustice.1 Second, as a result of its emancipatory focus, critical theory is embedded.2 It is embedded in the sense that it is focused on understanding and overcoming forms of unfreedom that impinge on the lives of people now and around here. Third, as a result of being embedded, its critical component emerges from a diagnosis: how and why do currently existing practices oppress those enmeshed in them? Fourth, it is self-reflexive about the role that theory (including its own theorizing) might play in promoting and/or preventing emancipation. Critical theory is, in short, emancipatory, embedded, diagnostic, and self-reflexive.Critical theory thus always begins from the particular lived experience of people here and now, and focuses on the social structures and practices within which particular choices are channeled and enabled. A critical theory might begin with puzzles such as the following: why do people's educational and professional choices still cluster along gender lines in ways that seem, at least at first glance, to disadvantage women?3 Or: What might explain why many working-class voters resist egalitarian policy-making proposals that would seem, at first glance, to work in their interest?4 Alternatively, critical theory might begin with values that have become particularly salient in contemporary social and political debates, such as solidarity, and ask things like: Why has solidarity become important here and now? What needs does its invocation respond to? What scope, if any, does its invocation have for improving things?5 What might talk of solidarity hide or obscure? For the critical theorist, principles and theories are always enmeshed in particular constellations of power and counter-power; one must always be self-conscious about the needs and functions that principles, forms of consciousness, and theories are meant to meet (in the case of needs) and play (in the case of functions) in any given society. There is therefore no such thing as a division of labor between empirical and normative theorizing; there is no suggestion that the theorist should merely aim to justify political principles and plans, and then leave empirical social scientists or policy analysts to implement them.6 The empirical, descriptive, and diagnostic understanding of how the social world is, and how it constrains, provides the background against which it makes sense to ask and answer normative questions.I will not attempt to specify critical theory any further. Under its heading, we can include classical Frankfurt-style Critical Theory, ideology critique, critical race theory, disability studies, post-colonial theory, and radical feminism,

我认为批判理论有四个主要特征。首先，它是一种以解放为目标的社会、文化或政治批判形式，这里的解放是指从压迫或不公正中解放出来第二，由于它的解放焦点，批判性理论被嵌入它植根于这样一种意义上，即它专注于理解和克服各种形式的不自由，这些不自由影响着现在和周围人们的生活。第三，作为嵌入的结果，它的关键组成部分从诊断中浮现出来：当前现有的实践如何以及为什么压迫那些陷入其中的人？第四，它对理论（包括其自身的理论化）在促进和/或阻止解放方面可能发挥的作用进行了自我反思。简而言之，批判理论是解放的、嵌入的、诊断的和自我反思的。因此，批判理论总是从此时此地人们的特定生活经验出发，并关注特定选择在其中被引导和实现的社会结构和实践。一个批判的理论可能会从以下这样的困惑开始：为什么人们的教育和职业选择仍然按照性别的界限聚集在一起，至少乍一看，似乎对女性不利？或者：什么可以解释为什么许多工人阶级选民抵制乍一看似乎符合他们利益的平等主义政策制定建议？或者，批判理论可以从在当代社会和政治辩论中变得特别突出的价值观开始，比如团结，并问这样的问题：为什么团结在此时此地变得重要？它的调用响应什么需求？如果有的话，它的调用对改善事物有什么作用？关于团结的讨论可能隐藏或模糊什么？对于批判理论家来说，原则和理论总是被卷入特定的权力和反权力的星座中；一个人必须始终自觉地意识到原则、意识形式和理论在任何特定社会中都是为了满足（在需要的情况下）和发挥（在功能的情况下）的需求和功能。因此，在经验的理论化和规范的理论化之间不存在所谓的分工；没有人建议理论家应该仅仅致力于为政治原则和计划辩护，然后让经验主义的社会科学家或政策分析师去实施它们对社会世界的经验、描述和诊断性理解，以及它是如何约束的，为提出和回答规范性问题提供了有意义的背景。我不会试图进一步详细说明批判理论。在它的标题下，我们可以包括古典法兰克福式批判理论、意识形态批判、批判种族理论、残疾研究、后殖民理论和激进女权主义等。但是我想谈谈批判理论和理想理论之间的对比。我认为批判理论和理想理论不相容是一种误导。它们有重要的区别，但我想说的是，它们是方法论和重点的问题，而不是本质结构的问题。事实上，我认为，就两者之间的差异而言，理想理论应该变得更像批判理论。的确，一切社会哲学和政治哲学都应该成为批判的理论。为了激发这一论点，我将使用一些来自概念工程的最新工具来说明为什么批判理论家强调原则、理论和意识形式在此时此地发挥的作用，同时密切关注原则、理论和意识形式旨在满足的需求，这是证明旨在指导当前制度改革和转型的所有社会和政治原则的关键。理想理论是在理想条件下寻求规范原则来指导实践和制度设计的理论。这些条件是理想化的，因为它们需要严格遵守，暂停对可行性的任何关注，以及一个不再需要进一步改革或彻底修改原则的最终状态在这简短的描述中，很明显，强调此时此地的批判理论，和强调理想化的理想理论，在根本上必然是对立的。但事实并非如此。批判理论可以是（而且经常是）乌托邦式的。很好的例子是唐娜·哈拉威经典而神秘的《生化人宣言》和女权主义科幻小说——包括乌苏拉·k·勒奎恩的《黑暗的左手》（1969）——她用它来想象性别和人机杂交的新的激进可能性。但是，将批判乌托邦理论称为理想理论（在罗尔斯和后罗尔斯的意义上）也同样具有误导性。在这种解读中，正义的概念可能无法充分代表潜在的社会和道德上的突出类型；如果是这样，那么表达概念的特定判断就会以元语言阅读所抵制的方式是错误的（它们只能或多或少有用或适当）。为了加强元语言和外在主义观点之间的对比，并揭示它们的批判性规范潜力，强调三种不同方式之间的区别是有用的，我们一直在考虑的各种争议涉及道德和评估方面的考虑。到目前为止，我已经提到了所讨论的概念——团结、正义、人权和妇女——作为“道德上的突出”，但我没有详细讨论道德和评估因素如何在这两种观点中发挥作用。社会和政治概念可以是(a)描述性的，但在规范上是依赖的；(b)道德化的，但内容丰富；或(c)道德化的，但内容贫乏。描述性但规范性依赖的概念，比如女人，不是道德化的，我的意思是，概念的字面内容不是由任何道德或评价事实（或态度）直接固定的。有公正的和不公正的，好的和坏的，道德上正确的和道德上错误的女人。女人不会挑出世界上任何可评价的或道德的事实（或态度）；因此，女性是一个描述性的范畴。然而，道德和评价事实（或态度）仍然间接地起作用。“女人”这一类别包括道德含义和规范性期望（“如果一个人是女人，他就有责任……”），但这些角色义务是按惯例划定和固定的。一个人不需要对某些所谓的义务是否真的是一种义务进行评估，以确定某人是否为女性。一个人就是女人，不管是现在还是在这里，只要她被期望遵守任何被认为适用于作为女人的女人的责任和义务。因此，女人是一个规范依赖的类别，而不是一个道德化的类别。正如我在上面提到的，我认为团结的最佳特征是它是描述性的，但以同样的方式在规范上是依赖的。例如，当人们团结一致地行动时，他们对彼此有充满道德的期望，这是这种现象的组成部分，人们可以算作团结一致地行动，即使充满道德的期望并没有说明做任何事情的真正责任或道德原因；因此，新纳粹分子可以团结一致。因此，在元语言的阅读中，适当的道德和评价考虑同时进入：它们有助于判断人们应该选择哪种词-概念配对（包括是否选择描述性但规范性依赖的概念，还是同一概念的道德化版本）。例如，如果普遍采用，关于妇女（或团结）的哪个词-概念配对将确保道德上和评估上的最佳结果？在特定的语境中引用这个术语的道德或评价点是什么（以及：它应该是什么？）在外在主义的解读中，适当的道德和评价考虑也以一种不同的方式进入。这里的问题是：哪个概念最好地捕捉了妇女/团结类别发挥核心作用的实践？因为（我们假设）妇女和团结在规范上是相互依赖的，道德和评价方面的考虑将影响这些实践中的参与者如何塑造这一类别。比如说，互惠的道德期望在团结的实践中起着什么作用？作为女性，女性应该履行哪些特别的职责和义务？也就是说，外部主义者对游戏中的道德和评价考虑采取了更多的社会学观点，而不是规定性观点。但是，当道德化的概念岌岌可危时，这种区别是如何发挥作用的呢？让我们先来看一下道德观念。深奥的道德化概念之所以深奥，是因为它们结合了描述性和道德/评价性的成分我把正义描述为一个厚重的道德化概念。在这种观点下，正义理论不仅仅是关于对与错的简单观点。它是在特定的社会、政治、文化、经济背景下，在适当的反应态度和行动的背景下，对一套特定的实践的对与错的理论。元语言的阅读,什么是谈判双方争论“正义”/正义不仅是特定的原则和内容的原因,我们应该认识到,还什么角色或功能“正义”/正义应该玩,在这里,应该遵循“不公正”的判断/不公(什么关系这样的判断社会问题)的特殊形式,并扮演了什么样的角色。道德和评价性的考虑是一种移除，并作为评估和批评现在和这里为“正义”设想的各种角色和内容的标准。从外部主义的角度来看，重点是当前的实践和背景，人们在其中做出正义的判断。首先，问题不是：“正义”/正义应该告知什么样的背景/制度/实践？相反，问题是：正义——作为一种社会和道德现象（因此是无序的）——是如何进入并与当前的背景/制度/实践相关的？它在我们的社会中起着什么作用？只有当这个

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引用次数: 0

Against corporate responsibility 违背公司责任

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12547

Lars J. K. Moen

Corporate responsibility is the view that certain groups, and not just their members, can be responsible for their causal impact on the world. And in the moral sense I shall consider, these groups, and not just their members, are seen as appropriate targets of reactive attitudes like resentment and gratitude. A key challenge for defenders of corporate responsibility is to show how a group's actions may be unexplainable strictly in terms of individual actions, and that we instead should attribute the actions to the group itself. They will then have grounds for arguing that there is a class of actions for which the group itself, and not necessarily its members, is responsible. Such an argument will imply that an individualist view leaves some responsibility unaccounted for—we get a responsibility void—and that we need to hold the group itself responsible to avoid a deficit in our ascription of responsibility.Pettit (2003, 2007a) takes on this challenge in his defense of corporate responsibility (see also List & Pettit, 2011: ch. 7). He ascribes responsibility particularly to groups acting on attitudes, or beliefs and desires, formed in a procedure aggregating the group members' attitudes. But when members make consistent attitudes toward a set of logically interconnected propositions, such as {p, p → q, q}, the majority attitudes might be inconsistent. To avoid inconsistency, the group therefore needs the capacity to adopt attitudes most of its members reject. It can thus form its own irreducible attitudes. And when the group acts on these attitudes, we cannot assign full responsibility to the group members, who do not hold these attitudes. We must instead hold the group itself responsible as an agent in its own right. Otherwise, Pettit warns us, group agents will be let off the hook too easily; “there will be cases where no one is held responsible for actions that are manifestly matters of agential responsibility” (Pettit, 2007a: 197).Here, we should note that Pettit focuses primarily on cases where the issues on the agenda are clearly connected. We shall see that his example of a workers' committee is one such case. In what follows, I also focus on this type of case, and I shall also give little attention to cases where the connection between issues is less clear, and where individuals have a weaker understanding of the consequences of their actions. But it also seems less plausible that individualist explanations leave responsibility voids in such cases. If the problem of seeing how issues are connected is due to poor organizational design, then individuals high up in the organization's hierarchy might be responsible.1 Of course, even well-organized groups can make decisions without a clear understanding of the effects on future decision making. But when individuals' actions have consequences they cannot be reasonably expected to fores

企业责任是指某些群体，而不仅仅是其成员，可以对其对世界的因果影响负责。我认为，从道德意义上讲，这些群体，而不仅仅是他们的成员，被视为怨恨和感激等被动态度的适当目标。企业责任捍卫者面临的一个关键挑战是，要证明一个群体的行为如何严格地从个人行为的角度是无法解释的，而我们应该将这些行为归因于群体本身。然后，他们将有理由争辩说，有一类行为是由团体本身而不一定是其成员负责的。这样的论点意味着，个人主义观点会让一些责任不负责任——我们的责任是无效的——我们需要让团队自己承担责任，以避免我们对责任的归属出现缺陷。Pettit（20032007a）在为企业责任辩护时接受了这一挑战（另见List&Pettit，2011:c.7）。他将责任特别归因于根据态度或信仰和欲望行事的群体，这些态度或信仰是在聚合群体成员态度的过程中形成的。但是，当成员对一组逻辑上相互关联的命题（如{p，p！q，q}）持一致态度时，大多数人的态度可能是不一致的。因此，为了避免矛盾，该组织需要有能力采取大多数成员拒绝的态度。因此，它可以形成自己不可简化的态度。当团队按照这些态度行事时，我们不能将全部责任分配给不持这些态度的团队成员。相反，我们必须让该组织本身作为代理人自行承担责任。佩蒂特警告我们，否则，集团特工将很容易摆脱困境；“在某些情况下，没有人对明显属于代理人责任的行为负责”（Pettit，2007a:197）。接收日期：2022年12月30日修订日期：2023年7月26日接受日期：2022年8月6日

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引用次数: 0

Making the state responsible: A proxy account of legal organizations and private agents acting for the state 让国家负责：代表国家行事的法律组织和私人代理人的代理账户

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12546

Miguel Garcia-Godinez

Under which conditions can we make a state responsible for an action? For example, is the United States (and not only Bush and his Cabinet) responsible for declaring war against Iraq? And is there any justification to make citizens contribute collectively to the reparation or compensation of the damages produced by the action? That is, should United States citizens shoulder the burdens and pay restitution to Iraq for destroying civil infrastructure during the military campaign? After reviewing some theories, I develop a framework to answer these kinds of questions.

While the idea of state responsibility has long been under discussion within both political philosophy and international legal theory, no agreement has yet been reached regarding what it is and how it can impact on ordinary citizens. The first problem lies in the difficulty of determining what states are and whether they can perform actions. For example, whereas some prominent theorists take states to be (corporate) agents, with the capacity to form and act upon intentions (e.g., Collins, 2019; List & Pettit, 2011), some others resist extending the notion of agency to anything other than individuals (e.g., Gilpin, 1984; Miller, 2002).

Additionally, there remains a controversy as to when and to what extent it is possible to distribute collective responsibility amongst citizens for the wrongful actions of their state. For instance, whereas Lawford-Smith (2019) argues that (unlike officials) citizens are not culpable for state action, and so they cannot be punished for its bad consequences, Pasternak (2021) and Stilz (2011a) hold that they can indeed be responsible if they are intentional participants or their state satisfies a democratic authorisation principle, respectively.

Although these views have revealed important aspects of state responsibility, they are not exempt from criticism. With the purpose of introducing a more compelling alternative, I discuss in this paper some crucial challenges to these accounts and then suggest another way to move forward, viz., to analyze state agency, state action, and state responsibility in terms of proxy agency, proxy action, and proxy responsibility.

I structure the paper as follows. I begin in Section 2 by motivating the analysis of three major approaches to state responsibility: Lawford-Smith's, Pasternak's, and Stilz's. Then, in Sections 3–5, 3–5, I discuss each of them in some detail and show that, despite their best efforts, they all fail at providing an adequate account of state responsibility. In particular, I argue that by focusing only on the culpability of officials, Lawford-Smith creates a normative gap between citizens and their state; that by appealing to an “intentional participation” condition, Pasternak (falling short of her own goals) blocks out the mechanism for attributing responsibilit

但重要的是，由于这些理由只是辅助性的，劳福德-史密斯认为，它们既符合只有当普通公民被排除在国家成员之外时国家才是一个集体（道德）代理人的观点，也符合按比例分配责难-责任的观点（2019：第172页）。因此，换句话说，只有在责任缺失的情况下，才有理由呼吁公民基于其补救责任为履行国家义务做出贡献；否则，只有对国家不法行为负有责任的政府官员才能为此承担责任。2 与劳福德-史密斯不同，帕斯捷尔纳克并没有将公民排除在国家之外。事实上，她的观点（帕斯捷尔纳克，2013 年、2014 年和 2021 年）侧重于公民的内部态度，尤其是他们的参与意图。因此，主要区别在于帕斯捷尔纳克采用的是国家行动参与者的视角（2021 年：第 8 页），而劳福德-史密斯采用的是集体代理的视角。然而，尽管帕斯捷尔纳克的方法在这方面比劳福德-史密斯的方法更具诱惑力，但它仍然受到重要的反对。在谈这个问题之前，让我先介绍一下它的主要内容。帕斯捷尔纳克在她的《国家责任》（2021 年）的导言中说，她希望提供一种关于国家责任的论述，在两种立场之间 "开辟中间地带"，即在官员之间按比例分配（类似劳福德-史密斯）和非按比例分配（在国际法中普遍存在），后者不加区分地将责任完全推给公民（2021 年：第 6 页）。简而言之，帕斯捷尔纳克的论述将公民与国家分担补救责任（尤其是赔偿和补偿）的义务建立在他们参与国家的意图之上（同上）。帕斯捷尔纳克论述的一个特殊之处在于，尽管它对具体情况有敏感认识，但它证明了国家补救责任在民主和非民主国家公民之间的非比例分配是合理的（同上）。与施蒂尔茨的国家责任民主理论（见下文第 5 节）相比，该理论的优势在于 "证明让广大公民承担责任的现实做法是合理的"（2021 年：第 9 页）。正如帕斯捷尔纳克所说，"只有在公民的参与意图是真实的情况下，基于公民身份的分配效应理由才会适用"（同上）。虽然我将在下文详述这一点，但值得注意的是，她对 "真正的参与意图 "的描述是相当消极的；也就是说，它涉及到公民不感到与他们的国家疏远，或不会被迫放弃国家的领土。帕斯捷尔纳克认为，适当的态度可以通过全国性的调查来证明（2021 年：第 14 页），这样国家就可以通过增加税收或限制获得公共服务等方式，将赔偿和补偿的负担转嫁给公民（2021 年：第 17 页）。事实上，她认为，这源于将国家视为（机构）企业代理人（2021 年：第 19、22-23 页），因为只有通过公民，国家才能履行其补救责任（2021 年：第 28 页）。她反对按比例分配的方案（如上文第 3.1 节所述）有两方面的原因。首先，它会导致 "责任不足"（即 "国家无法筹集足够的资源来履行其对受害者的补救义务"）；其次，它需要一个 "复杂而昂贵的事实调查过程"（这可能会影响其履行义务的能力）（2021 年：第 44 页）。因此，在寻找更好的替代方案时，她选择了非比例分配模式，根据该模式，"如果[比例]分配不可行或成本很高，公民可以接受非比例的国家责任负担"（2021 年：第 46 页）。帕斯捷尔纳克以库茨关于 "参与集体行动 "的论述为基础，旨在解释公民在国家中共同行动的方式（2021 年：第 48 页）。与帕斯捷尔纳克一样，斯蒂尔茨关注的是公民责任和任务责任的分配，而不是罪责和归咎责任的分配（2011a：第194-195页）。她认为两者的区别在于，前者 "涉及向人们分配修复特定情况的责任，即使他们并没有造成结果，也不能因此受到责备"（2011a: p.195）。例如，一个无贡献的团体成员（如雇员）可能对该团体的所作所为不负责任，但仍可能被指派某些任务以促进赔偿（同上）。她的策略是论证民主法制国家（即符合特定合法性标准的国家）"可以在道义上要求其公民尽自己的一份力量履行国家责任"（2011a: p.191）。她说，在这些国家中，成员资格本身就能证明要求公民为其国家的所作所为承担责任是合理的（无需进一步调查他们的参与意图等）；然而，在非民主国家中，同样的原则并不成立（同上）。在此基础上，施蒂尔茨提出了民主授权说，其目标是允许 "民主法制国家将责任分配给其公民"（同上）。在阐释这一观点时，她首先将国家视为 "法人团体"（即拥有 "内部宪法 "的团体，其成员可在此基础上讨论其意图并控制其行为，从而也满足了道德人格的条件）（2011a：第192、195页）。然而，她注意到，与公司不同，国家是非自愿的（即我们通常不会选择 "加入 "一个国家）。更重要的是，"退出国家要么代价高昂（对于那些可以离开的人来说，会失去与家人、朋友和文化的联系），要么几乎不可能（欠发达国家的公民通常无处可去）"（2011a: p.196）。因此，仅仅诉诸纳入原则不足以确保民主国家的公民接受分担任务责任的负担。在提出替代方案时，施蒂尔茨提出了民主授权原则，意在表明 "即使公民个人不同意加入国家，即使她可能不同意国家的政策，但她的意愿与国家的行为有牵连"（2011a: p.197）。因此，换一种说法，这一原则既声称 "民主法制国家的公民有充分的理由确认其成员身份[......]，而且这一事实足以证明将政治责任的负担分配给他们是合理的"（2011a: p.198）。首先，利用民主授权原则在公民之间分配责任，"可以激励他们行使政治参与权来控制国家，最大限度地减少对外人的伤害"（2011a: p.206）。其次，如果民主法制国家滥用权力，"即使持不同政见者也要对国家造成的损害承担修复责任"（同上）。这样做的理由是，这些持不同政见者也会因国家对其权利的合理解释而受益。因此，归根结底，只要国家符合民主授权原则，它就可以公民的名义行事，而公民则被视为接受了拥有一个代表其利益的合法政府的风险。如上所述，在对劳福德-史密斯的观点提出一些质疑时（见第 3.1 节），没有充分的理由将公民排除在国家成员之外；然而，如果是这样的话，我们如何理解国家以公民的名义行事呢？施蒂尔茨在此正确地指出了代理的概念。例如，当律师在法庭上代表其委托人行事时，她是作为代理人行事的；这就好比委托人本人在行事一样。尽管我认为我们可以将国家责任理解为代理责任的一种特殊情况，但我认为斯蒂尔茨的观点没有正确地把握这一点。首先，代理人不是监护人（即代理人不必以委托人的最佳利益行事）。

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引用次数: 0

Rawls's idea of human rights revisited 罗尔斯的人权思想被重新审视

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-09 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12539

Rex Martin

引用次数: 0

An irreducible understanding of animal dignity 对动物尊严的不可简化的理解

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-07-24 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12543

Simon Coghlan

Alongside lively philosophical debate about human dignity (Etinson, 2020; Rosen, 2012), several philosophers have begun asking whether “dignity” could also illuminate our moral relations with nonhuman animals (e.g., Abbate, 2020; Anderson, 2005; Gruen, 2014; Humphreys, 2016; Nussbaum, 2006; Ortiz, 2004). Increasing talk of animal dignity is also occurring in public and even legal discourse (Kotzmann & Seery, 2017). For example, in a recent habeas corpus hearing for a Bronx Zoo elephant, a Judge declared that the elephant is “a dignified creature” but “there is nothing dignified about her captivity” (Wilson, 2022, p. 4). Such language is perhaps beginning to resonate more with people than it once did.

Nonetheless, some philosophers seriously doubt that dignity is a coherent and useful moral idea (Zuolo, 2016). Dressing circus-kept animals in human clothes and laughing at them may strike modern people as cruelly demeaning to those nonhumans. Yet for critics, these apparent assaults on “dignity” are ethically trivial or else merely indirect wrongs—objectionable only because such treatment could upset human witnesses or generally promote animal exploitation (Martin, 2019, p. 94). According to dignity's critics, other moral concepts can far better explain what is wrong with that treatment.

Dignity is a complex notion and providing lucid accounts is challenging. Furthermore, philosophical analysis of animal dignity is relatively limited. It warrants greater attention. In this paper, I explore an understanding of animal dignity that seems to be irreducible to a range of other moral concepts and to some other conceptions of dignity. The understanding I explore appears to be a sui generis notion that involves a special kind of non-natural harm and assault upon animals. This special or distinctive harm and assault is related to the cognate notions of defiling, degrading, demeaning, dishonoring, and honoring treatment.

Presenting this sui generis understanding requires examining arguably the most compelling current account of animal dignity on offer—a “relational” conception of dignity as social respect or status. Although very important, I shall ask whether there is also another “relational” way of understanding dignity that is irreducible even to that account—although importantly it might complement and deepen it. This suggests that more than one ethically important way of conceiving of dignity is possible.

In the following, I outline criticisms of animal dignity with a focus on reductionist attacks, identify a social conception of dignity, reflect on some key examples of human behavior that seem to facilitate understanding of animal dignity, briefly introduce positive forms of irreducible dignity, and consider several objections,

阿贝特声称，有尊严的不法行为和伤害不同于 "普通 "的不法行为和伤害，因为前者本身并不损害 "经验 "福利，例如，造成痛苦或阻止满足（阿贝特，2020 年，第 772 页）。事实上，阿贝特的尊严性错误和伤害可以在没有任何普通伤害--包括非经验性福利伤害--的情况下发生2（Abbate, 2020, p.776）。尊严伤害源于对尊严的侵犯。将这些特征结合起来：社会账户中的尊严涉及对个人的行为，这些行为在社会上促进或表达了对个人内在道德价值的不充分认可（无论如何理解 "价值"）。这些行为是对有价值的个人的不尊重，从而（也许）伤害了他们，即使他们没有遭受任何自然伤害的风险。这种不尊重可能源于文化上对动物固有道德价值的标榜，也可能源于对动物的蔑视，还可能源于其他带有社会色彩的行为。3 与社会概念一样，对尊严的独特理解也与对待动物的明显独特--但往往被忽视--的方式有关。无论是自成一类还是社会理解，都没有将尊严归结为自然特征，如福祉和自主，或道德属性，如内在价值。相反，这两种概念都将尊严与人类对个体的某些重要行为联系在一起。然而，虽然自足尊严是关系性的，但可以说它并不能还原为尊严的社会形式。我想说的是，当我们反思某些有说服力的经历或对动物待遇的描述时，似乎并不总是可以用社会的观点来解释或完全解释这些现象。尽管如此，我还将提出，一种独特的尊严有时可以补充和深化社会概念。在概述与其他道德概念和尊严的社会论述不可分割的对尊严的理解时，关注几个有说服力的例子会有所帮助。这些例子涉及人们被迫使用 "尊严 "一词和相关道德术语（如 "贬低"、"玷污"、"贬低 "和 "玷污"）的经历。为方便起见，我将这些术语称为 d-术语。这些 d 术语是我所说的 "尊严语言 "的一部分。这里采用的方法与考夫曼等人（2011 年，第 24:2 页）的建议一致，即对尊严的概念研究不是从抽象的伦理概念（如固有价值）开始，而是从尊严受到侵犯的实例开始，如贬低、玷污和羞辱，这些现象在道德上给我们留下了深刻印象（另见 Luban, 2009 年；Margalit, 1998 年）。对 Cataldi 来说，拒绝使用这种语言，或用身体虐待或繁衍能力减弱的概念来替代，都会模糊而不是澄清对这些熊的攻击的全部性质。因此，这里的侵犯似乎是 "非自然的"。科兹认为，将尸体5 丢弃在垃圾堆中或殴打它们，不仅让卢里感到痛苦，而且对死去的狗来说也是错误和不好的，尽管它们什么也没经历，也没有受到自然的伤害。这与许多人（大多数人？）的信念相似，即当死人的尸体被 "亵渎 "时，他们会受到冤屈甚至伤害。下一个例子涉及的不是死后的侮辱，而是杀人行为中的推定侮辱：哲学家雷蒙-盖塔（Raimond Gaita）讲述了这样一个故事：他的猫托斯卡（Tosca）在家中被狗咬成重伤。盖塔目睹了猫的可怕痛苦，考虑用一把近在咫尺的铁锹敲打它的头部，"让它脱离苦海"（盖塔，2016 年，第 94 页），但托斯卡却消失了。后来，他震惊地意识到，就这样杀了她，虽然没有痛苦，也很仁慈，但这是对她的不敬。盖塔明确地将这种玷污与侵犯动物尊严的想法联系在一起（盖塔，2016 年，第 35 页）。在盖塔看来，尊严并不涉及自然福利、固有价值或各种熟悉的动物权利（如生命权或善待权）。用铁锹敲打托斯卡所造成的伤害并不是要结束她的生命或伤害她。事实上，盖塔认为，结束她的生命和痛苦（也许可以把她带到兽医那里注射致死安乐死）在道德上是正确的。尽管如此，他认为用铲子杀死她会使她蒙羞，从而冒犯了她的尊严：哲学家科拉-戴蒙德（Cora Diamond）讲述了这样一个场景7：头部损伤实验室的一名工作人员与一只狒狒合影，这只狒狒 "头盖骨半球形大面积缝合"。

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引用次数: 0

Beyond the nonideal: Why critical theory needs a utopian dimension 超越非理想：为什么批判理论需要乌托邦维度

IF 1.1 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12542

Titus Stahl

John Rawls famously argues that in order to arrive at a plausible conception of what justice requires politically, we ought to proceed in two steps (Rawls, 1971, pp. 245–246). First, we ought to develop an “ideal theory of justice” that lays out what principles of justice can be justified if we imagine them to govern a society that is unlike ours in that certain limitations are removed. Developing such a theory, Rawls argues, is necessary to allow us to grasp the correct conception of justice. In a second step, we can then use this conception to find out what we must do in our actual, nonideal circumstances.The idea that we need to refer to a utopian, ideal state of affairs in order to understand which conception of our most basic political concepts we ought to endorse is one of the features of Rawls's thought that has attracted the most commentary (see Robeyns, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). Realist opponents of ideal theory in this sense sometimes argue that ideal theory pays too little attention to questions of feasibility, that it does not take the limitations of human nature seriously enough, and that it is ill-equipped to guide us when thinking about necessary trade-offs (Farrelly, 2007; Galston, 2010; Nagel, 1995). In this article, I will examine arguments of a different nature that have historically emerged from the tradition of radical social thought and critical theory. These arguments do not object to ideal theorizing on the grounds that it leads to unrealistic demands or that it is insufficiently constrained by a realistic conception of human nature. Rather, these arguments assume that, given the nonideal circumstances in which current political theorists find themselves, they face limitations to their epistemic, imaginative, and conceptual capacities that distort the ideals they formulate and thereby take them in a direction that accommodates the status quo too much.In response to these arguments, this article pursues two goals, a critical and a constructive one. On the one hand, I will argue that most (but not all) of these arguments fail and that even the most successful versions do not require us to give up on the idea that our political projects ought to be guided by a conception of an ideal society. Critical theory need not be an exclusively nonideal enterprise. On the other hand, I will outline a methodological approach that integrates critical theory's defining commitment to the idea of immanent critique and the historical nature of reason, but preserves a role for the construction of idealized visions of the future in its normative parts.In Section 2, I briefly survey Rawls's conception of ideal theory. In Sections 3, 6, I focus on four arguments against ideal theory that emerge from the critical theory tradition and that deny that a conception of what a genuinely ideal society would be like is accessible

约翰·罗尔斯（John Rawls）著名地认为，为了对正义在政治上的要求达成一个合理的概念，我们应该分两步进行（Rawls，1971，第245-246页）。首先，我们应该发展一种“理想的正义理论”，阐明如果我们想象正义的原则来治理一个与我们不同的社会，即消除某些限制，那么正义的原则是合理的。罗尔斯认为，发展这样一种理论对于我们正确理解正义是必要的。在第二步中，我们可以使用这个概念来找出我们在实际的、不理想的情况下必须做什么。为了理解我们应该支持我们最基本的政治概念中的哪一个概念，我们需要提及乌托邦式的理想状态，这是罗尔斯思想的一个最受评论的特征（见Robeyns，2008；西蒙斯，2010年；Valentini，2012）。在这个意义上，理想理论的现实主义反对者有时会认为，理想理论对可行性问题关注太少，它没有足够认真地对待人性的局限性，并且在思考必要的权衡时，它没有能力指导我们（Farrelly，2007；加尔斯顿，2010年；纳格尔，1995年）。在这篇文章中，我将考察历史上从激进社会思想和批判理论传统中产生的不同性质的论点。这些论点并不反对理想的理论化，理由是它会导致不切实际的要求，或者它没有受到对人性的现实概念的充分约束。相反，这些论点认为，鉴于当前政治理论家所处的非理想环境，他们的认识、想象和概念能力受到限制，扭曲了他们所形成的理想，从而使他们朝着过于适应现状的方向发展。接收日期：2022年12月7日修订日期：2023年4月6日接受日期：2024年7月7日

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引用次数: 0

The fair value of voting rights 投票权的公允价值

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-06-28 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12541

Derrick Darby

A central idea in John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is that basic political liberties should be afforded fair value in a just liberal democratic society.1 In this article, I argue that an important guideline for guaranteeing the fair value of voting rights, that is, the usefulness to citizens of their right to vote, is to make it easier not harder to exercise this basic political liberty.2 This entails that just societies with a constitutional commitment to equal protection, and the value of equality more broadly, have a duty to secure unencumbered access to the ballot absent narrowly tailored compelling state interests for restricting it (hereafter Unencumbered Access). Where there are such interests—and this is important—the burden imposed on voting must accord with the basic priority of voting rights. This argument shifts the burden of justification from liberals to present sufficient evidence of voter suppression to conservatives, who are currently pushing restrictive voter ID and other laws, to produce compelling evidence supporting their reasons for doing so (chief of which is fraud prevention and deterrence). They must also demonstrate that these laws are carefully crafted to remedy the alleged problem. Because these conditions have not been met these laws are unjustified.3John Rawls affirms the importance of political liberties as a normative ideal in the abstract by including them on the list of equal basic liberties along with the liberties of thought, conscience, association, and those associated with the rule of law in his liberal egalitarian conception of justice as fairness. However, less abstractly, the principle of equal political liberty is also identified with the principle of equal participation within the constitutionally defined political process of a just democratic society.Rawls has been criticized for not being entirely clear about why political liberties are included on this list,4 and for failing to offer a detailed argument for their special status and a proposal for how it can be captured institutionally.5 Yet there is no question that the liberty to political participation on equal terms is meant to carry the abstract normative commitment to equality modeled in the original position—where parties are selecting common principles from a position of equality—to the constitutional stage where they collectively participate in “the highest-order system of social rules for making rules” by participating in the vital political process of lawmaking.6 Taking the constitution to be foundational, as the highest-order system of rules regulating and controlling all other institutions of society's basic structure, Rawls concludes that satisfying the principle of equal participation in practice affords all persons with access to the political process “common status of equal citizens.”7Having affirmed the importance of

显然，如果不能减少资源差异，从而影响在投票箱前影响政治结果的公平机会，其后果将与政治言论的情况类似。因此，保障政治言论公平价值的理由显然同样适用于本案，而且本案也需要采取某些补偿措施。这些步骤的净效果是，根据植根于平等参与原则的 "无障碍参与"（Unencumbered Access）--一个既有内在价值又有工具价值的原则--使投票变得更容易而不是更困难，从而确保投票权的公平价值。35 令人吃惊的是，在维持印第安纳州限制性选民身份证法的克劳福德案裁决中，法院承认该州 "没有提供任何证据证明在印第安纳州历史上任何时候确实发生过此类欺诈行为"。然而，法院淡化了这一点，认为国内其他地方的选民冒名顶替行为为印第安纳州的防欺诈法提供了充分的依据。因此，在这里，给投票权增加负担的理由不仅是防止舞弊--几乎没有舞弊--还扩大到为了公共利益而阻止舞弊。与所有其他基本自由一样，投票权及其公平价值的保障不能仅仅因为这样做可以实现某些广泛的社会目的而受到侵犯。例如，假设华盛顿的僵局减少了，美国就会更好，因为这将使立法者能够更快、更有效地起草和通过立法。再假设这对整个社会都有好处，而这种好处可以通过允许一个政党（比如共和党）垄断政治职位来实现。最后，假设如果非洲裔美国人、拉美裔美国人、大学生和穷人等可能投票给民主党的人的选票被系统性地稀释（使他们无法真正让自己支持的人当选），或者他们在行使选票时面临难以克服的负担（大大降低了他们在选举日的投票率），那么这一结果就可以实现。与其他基本自由一样，这一权利对追求社会福利结果施加了实质性的规范约束。然而，投票权对公民的有用性不能以公共利益为代价，这并不意味着投票权永远不能受到合理的限制。正如我在前面提到的，投票权并不是一项绝对的权利。与所有其他基本自由一样，选举权及其公平价值的保障可以用其他基本自由来交换。因此，假设我们试图在社会的基本结构中建立规则，将投票的政治自由以及思想和政治表达自由这两种其他的基本自由纳入一个连贯的权利体系。此外，假设承认某些人在选举前发表商业言论抹黑不喜欢的政治候选人的自由，则限制了其他人--没有机会发表商业言论--利用选票让自己喜欢的候选人上台的权利。这种权衡可能会让人想起最高法院在 "花旗联合 "案中的裁决，但只要它构成了为了另一项基本自由而限制一项基本自由的情况，而不是为了更大的社会利益，就不会被直接排除。36 注意到投票权不是绝对权利的一个好处是，它考虑到了一种偶然的可能性，即行使投票权所必需的社会条件可能会发生变化，从而需要限制这一权利，使之与其他基本自由相适应。例如，如果社会条件发生变化，选民舞弊现象确实变得猖獗，或者新技术使亲临现场的选民舞弊行为变得轻而易举，那么为了维护一项或多项相互竞争的基本自由，可能需要制定限制选举权的法规，例如通过对舞弊行为实施更多的检查--即使是成本适中的检查--来增加投票的难度。

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引用次数: 0

Federalism as an institutional doctrine 联邦制作为一种制度理论

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-06-19 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12540

Michael Da Silva

Federalism is, minimally, a method of allocating final decision-making authority over subjects (e.g., crime, healthcare, and immigration) in a governance unit (e.g., country). Faced with questions of the form “who can decide what when,” federal bodies, like the United States., Canada, Australia, and Germany, provide at least two entities (federal governments, provinces, cities, etc.) with final decision-making “powers” over at least one subject. No other entity is morally permitted to directly interfere (substitute decisions, fine, etc.) with the authority's decision-making regarding those subject(s). This is distinct from the unitary or centralized governance of, for example, France and Israel whereby one central entity possesses all final decision-making authority.1 Beyond these basics, the meaning of and criteria for evaluating claims about federalism remain contested in law and political science.2 The broader debates are then oft-ignored in mainstream political philosophy, resulting in conceptual confusion with important practical results discussed below.3The following argues for adopting an “institutional” approach to federalism, rather than more common “ideological” approaches.4 A long tradition equates federalism with the US Founding Fathers' institutional proposals (Publius, 1788/1987). Yet, partly due to empirical developments, the dominant account outside philosophy now holds that federalism is a normative doctrine promoting a secure political organization combining “shared[-]rule and self-rule” and separates this federal “idea” from institutional forms that may realize it (Elazar, 1987; Watts, 2008). Philosophers often begin by accepting this ideological approach (as I discuss further in Da Silva, 2022).5 Popelier (2021, p. 33) even suggests “all” scholars view this combination as federalism's “normative core.” But philosophical strictures and practical realities demand a more circumscribed approach. The dominant ideological approach is too broad to be a distinct normative doctrine or cannot even apply to many paradigmatic federal bodies. Institutional approaches defining federalism by advocacy for the adoption of federations (defined below) for authority allocation are preferable.To establish this, I first detail and defend criteria for evaluating philosophical accounts of federalism. I then elaborate the distinction between ideological and institutional approaches and apply the criteria to the dominant ideological approach and a new specification of an institutional approach inspired by Wheare (1946/1953, p. 11)'s classic, oft-critiqued account. I thereby demonstrate that ideological accounts fail to fulfill many normative adequacy criteria for a philosophical account of federalism and one can articulate a more action-guiding institutional account that avoids common critiques. I finally

31 每个政府还应向不同的选区负责。每届政府成员的选举应（至少在很大程度上）是不同的。联邦政府的成员应来自各省（即美国或澳大利亚式的组成州、瑞士州、德国州），但成员不应仅仅是省立法机构的成员。例如，各省在联邦政府中应有代表。一些代表也可以在省政府中任职。但人员不应相同，角色不应重叠。这对于保障不同的决策和问责地点是必要的。如果两级政府中的大多数角色都由同一人担任，那么独特性的可能性就会降到最低。一个省也应有单独决策的手段。省一级的 "统治 "不应仅仅依赖于在一个同时拥有其他组成单位成员的机构中的代表权。我们提出的观点仍然是坚定的制度性观点：它认为制度形式在概念上先于其可能产生的任何想法，并接受随之而来的范围较窄的真正的联邦现象。然而，与许多前人的观点相比，它对制度的要求较低。它对联邦的定义要求较低，允许联邦制的概念更加细化。该建议并不像 Elazar（1987 年）所说的那样要求通过谈判来解决问题，也不要求联邦是由先前存在的团体以在新的宪法安排中保持其地位的方式缔结契约而产生的（同上；Tierney，2022 年）。这已经表明，联邦制本身并不包含忠诚要求，但这并不能证明这一点。多个实体必须拥有不同的权力领域。联邦制的概念本身对它们是否必须合作或何时合作并无定论。如果存在这样的要求，那么它必须源于构成性制度形式的性质：忠诚要求的支持者必须解释联邦是如何存在的。辅助性也是如此。同样，联邦制的概念并不要求许多经常与之相关的特征，无论是对民主的承诺还是司法审查。联邦形式可能包含每一种特征。这种观点与惠尔的观点一致，即联邦是联邦治理的定义形式，联邦制是促进采用这种形式的规范理论。这种观点采纳了惠尔对联邦形式的理解，即联邦形式需要多个具有最终权力的决策者及其决策机构的独立性，例如，联邦政府不仅仅是省级政府代表的集合，省级政府的大部分权力也不依赖于在中央机构中的代表权。尽管如此，该建议仍有别于并有助于避免对惠尔和厚重制度模式的常见批评。例如，Popelier (2021)批评以联邦为中心的制度观点对民主和美国式联邦优越性的承诺动机不足，没有考虑到像苏联这样的非民主联邦，也没有考虑到德国或瑞士治理的规范可取性。惠尔本人承认，他只将美国、瑞士、澳大利亚和加拿大作为联邦治理的明确案例（1946/1953，第22页）。虽然他的一些局限性是历史环境造成的，比如当时印度宪法的萌芽状态（47），将德国作为准联邦制国家来讨论（26-27）似乎也很奇怪。然而，惠尔的描述性问题并没有破坏他更广泛的制度主义项目。密切关注他所否定的案例表明基本联邦形式存在细微差别，而不是需要超越制度主义。印度的提案具有基本联邦形式的特征。而德国权力划分的复杂性也可以在这一观点中得到解决。例如，德国承认并行权力，这在联邦专有权力和州专有权力各自存在的情况下是没有问题的。另一个例子是，在下院和立法院各不相同的情况下，上院的州代表也是可以接受的。

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