{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12477","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":"285"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12477","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50116064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Climate hypocrisy and environmental integrity","authors":"Valentin Beck","doi":"10.1111/josp.12522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12522","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47335797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Reparations are often justified as a means to ensure “peace,” “reconciliation,” or to “vindicate victims” (Bottigliero, <span>2004</span>, p. 14; Greiff, <span>2006</span>, pp. 463–466; Laplante, <span>2015</span>, pp. 555–557). The justification of reparations range from corrective justice notions of <i>restitutio in integrum</i> (returning all that is lost) to moral notions of recognition and relational restoration, to even communitarian notions of engendering civic trust, social cohesion and transformative explanations of the place of reparations in post-conflict societies. Reparations can seem almost Janus-faced, allowing a broad umbrella of conceptions and expectations to co-exist, but it is worth interrogating the justifications of reparations, as it can help to “serve to clarify the nature and the full extent of our normative commitments” (Greiff, <span>2012</span>, p. 33).</p><p>This article analyses some of the main justifications for reparations so as to challenge some of their normative assumptions in redressing the past. The discussion focuses on three predominate concepts of reparations namely justice, morality/recognition and reconciliation/relational justifications. These accounts do not fully reflect the practice of reparations for mass atrocities, which creates a normative account that is either too utopian to be realized or inadequately provides the conceptual tools to navigate moral challenges to realize effective reparations. Indeed more critical scholars working on these issues point to “rough” or “imperfect” justice (Eizenstat, <span>2003</span>), but do not provide a coherent account to what this theoretically amounts to. Instead this author proposes reparation as balance to reflect that such measures in practice are part of a negotiated process. Reparation as balance involves the relevant stakeholders finding common ground to redress the past and prevent its non-recurrence in the future. This point is referred to as the “goldilocks' zone” wherein reparations can be conceived as a space to which conflicting perspective can find a harmony to redress the past through a spectrum of measures. Such a position does not fully repair victims' harm as required by <i>restitutio in integrum</i>, but also does not compromise society's values nor is humiliating to those responsible. This approach envisages reparations as not simply a victim-centered measure to remedy their harm, but also a space for responsible actors to rehabilitate their own moral position in the present and future from their past actions. “Reparations as balance” is informed by many contemporary struggles for reparations by victims, but also an understanding of what has succeeded in practice.</p><p>Reparations are a means to find equilibrium after violence, a way to move forward from the violations of the past. There are elements in each of these theories that resonate around the importance of values, the actors' relationship (whether social or not) between perpet
{"title":"Reparations as balance","authors":"Luke Moffett","doi":"10.1111/josp.12523","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12523","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Reparations are often justified as a means to ensure “peace,” “reconciliation,” or to “vindicate victims” (Bottigliero, <span>2004</span>, p. 14; Greiff, <span>2006</span>, pp. 463–466; Laplante, <span>2015</span>, pp. 555–557). The justification of reparations range from corrective justice notions of <i>restitutio in integrum</i> (returning all that is lost) to moral notions of recognition and relational restoration, to even communitarian notions of engendering civic trust, social cohesion and transformative explanations of the place of reparations in post-conflict societies. Reparations can seem almost Janus-faced, allowing a broad umbrella of conceptions and expectations to co-exist, but it is worth interrogating the justifications of reparations, as it can help to “serve to clarify the nature and the full extent of our normative commitments” (Greiff, <span>2012</span>, p. 33).</p><p>This article analyses some of the main justifications for reparations so as to challenge some of their normative assumptions in redressing the past. The discussion focuses on three predominate concepts of reparations namely justice, morality/recognition and reconciliation/relational justifications. These accounts do not fully reflect the practice of reparations for mass atrocities, which creates a normative account that is either too utopian to be realized or inadequately provides the conceptual tools to navigate moral challenges to realize effective reparations. Indeed more critical scholars working on these issues point to “rough” or “imperfect” justice (Eizenstat, <span>2003</span>), but do not provide a coherent account to what this theoretically amounts to. Instead this author proposes reparation as balance to reflect that such measures in practice are part of a negotiated process. Reparation as balance involves the relevant stakeholders finding common ground to redress the past and prevent its non-recurrence in the future. This point is referred to as the “goldilocks' zone” wherein reparations can be conceived as a space to which conflicting perspective can find a harmony to redress the past through a spectrum of measures. Such a position does not fully repair victims' harm as required by <i>restitutio in integrum</i>, but also does not compromise society's values nor is humiliating to those responsible. This approach envisages reparations as not simply a victim-centered measure to remedy their harm, but also a space for responsible actors to rehabilitate their own moral position in the present and future from their past actions. “Reparations as balance” is informed by many contemporary struggles for reparations by victims, but also an understanding of what has succeeded in practice.</p><p>Reparations are a means to find equilibrium after violence, a way to move forward from the violations of the past. There are elements in each of these theories that resonate around the importance of values, the actors' relationship (whether social or not) between perpet","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 4","pages":"624-642"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12523","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49571747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responding to microaggression with irony: The case of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz","authors":"S. A. Gallegos‐Ordorica, J. Perez Gomez","doi":"10.1111/josp.12521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12521","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44315479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ideal theory, political liberalism, and the well-ordered society","authors":"Samuel Freeman","doi":"10.1111/josp.12520","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12520","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"278-298"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45230417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public reason and private bias: Accommodating political disagreement","authors":"Athmeya Jayaram","doi":"10.1111/josp.12518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12518","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42266948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Microaggressions as negligence","authors":"David Schraub","doi":"10.1111/josp.12519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12519","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43786120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Recent studies by economists such as Piketty (<span>2013</span>, <span>2019</span>) and Atkinson (<span>2015</span>) have contested the well-established view that post-war redistribution policies have been successful in the long term at slowing down the rise of structural inequalities. In reality, the claim goes, they have dealt mostly with reducing inequalities of income through redistribution and have left inequalities of wealth and capital ownership uncontrolled. These, according to their studies, have now risen in the developed world and reached levels more typical of 19th Century Europe.</p><p>To make matters worse, perceptions of and attitudes towards fighting inequalities as unjust that Rawls saw as based on a wide consensus of citizens' “considered judgments” (Rawls, <span>1999</span>, p. 17), have changed, leading to them being accepted as the justified and even necessary price to pay for economic growth and as a reward for merit. Economic arguments based on the need for incentives for raising productivity and the “trickle-down effect” have become widely accepted as if the price of economic efficiency should be disconnected from the demands of equity. Meritocracy has provided ethical arguments too. As John Roemer says, “today the most important problem for the social sciences of inequality is understanding how electorates have come to <i>acquiesce</i> to policies which increase inequality… and to try revealing the logic of the micro mechanisms that lead to this acquiescence… to challenge the view that interfering with the incentives the market provides necessarily reduces economic welfare” (Roemer, <span>2011</span>, p. 301).</p><p>Such recent developments, as some critics have argued (Forrester, <span>2019</span>, pp. 278–279), suggest that Rawls's <i>A Theory of Justice</i>, published in 1971, before the watershed of neoliberal welfare policies, should be considered as a product of its time and as still thinking about justice within the context of the post-war market economy of rising demand and economic growth, supported by state interventions. But post-1980s, another ideology has been dominant. “Small government” and limited state intervention are the new norms, even on the Left with the Third Way in Britain, and redistribution is being reconsidered<sup>1</sup> as often too costly and conducing to the rise of a work-shy population, even if the 2020–2022 COVID-19 pandemic has considerably watered down these criticisms.</p><p>In this article, I examine Rawls's “political” critique of WSC and of its inability to fight structural injustices together with his proposal for POD as a realistic prospect and a credible alternative to WSC. Section 2 describes the rise of inequalities of wealth and power as a source of structural injustices, and Rawls's insight as to why WSC is unable to fight them. Section 3 presents Rawls's alternative proposal of POD with its two ambitions, to protect, but also to emancipate citizens and guarantee their fu
{"title":"Addressing the rise of inequalities: How relevant is Rawls's critique of welfare state capitalism?","authors":"Catherine Audard","doi":"10.1111/josp.12517","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12517","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent studies by economists such as Piketty (<span>2013</span>, <span>2019</span>) and Atkinson (<span>2015</span>) have contested the well-established view that post-war redistribution policies have been successful in the long term at slowing down the rise of structural inequalities. In reality, the claim goes, they have dealt mostly with reducing inequalities of income through redistribution and have left inequalities of wealth and capital ownership uncontrolled. These, according to their studies, have now risen in the developed world and reached levels more typical of 19th Century Europe.</p><p>To make matters worse, perceptions of and attitudes towards fighting inequalities as unjust that Rawls saw as based on a wide consensus of citizens' “considered judgments” (Rawls, <span>1999</span>, p. 17), have changed, leading to them being accepted as the justified and even necessary price to pay for economic growth and as a reward for merit. Economic arguments based on the need for incentives for raising productivity and the “trickle-down effect” have become widely accepted as if the price of economic efficiency should be disconnected from the demands of equity. Meritocracy has provided ethical arguments too. As John Roemer says, “today the most important problem for the social sciences of inequality is understanding how electorates have come to <i>acquiesce</i> to policies which increase inequality… and to try revealing the logic of the micro mechanisms that lead to this acquiescence… to challenge the view that interfering with the incentives the market provides necessarily reduces economic welfare” (Roemer, <span>2011</span>, p. 301).</p><p>Such recent developments, as some critics have argued (Forrester, <span>2019</span>, pp. 278–279), suggest that Rawls's <i>A Theory of Justice</i>, published in 1971, before the watershed of neoliberal welfare policies, should be considered as a product of its time and as still thinking about justice within the context of the post-war market economy of rising demand and economic growth, supported by state interventions. But post-1980s, another ideology has been dominant. “Small government” and limited state intervention are the new norms, even on the Left with the Third Way in Britain, and redistribution is being reconsidered<sup>1</sup> as often too costly and conducing to the rise of a work-shy population, even if the 2020–2022 COVID-19 pandemic has considerably watered down these criticisms.</p><p>In this article, I examine Rawls's “political” critique of WSC and of its inability to fight structural injustices together with his proposal for POD as a realistic prospect and a credible alternative to WSC. Section 2 describes the rise of inequalities of wealth and power as a source of structural injustices, and Rawls's insight as to why WSC is unable to fight them. Section 3 presents Rawls's alternative proposal of POD with its two ambitions, to protect, but also to emancipate citizens and guarantee their fu","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"221-237"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12517","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41708000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The importance of contingently public goods","authors":"Friedemann Bieber","doi":"10.1111/josp.12516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12516","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46599291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP PAGE","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12474","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 1","pages":"145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12474","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50147406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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