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Fame and redemption: On the moral dangers of celebrity apologies 名誉与救赎:论名人道歉的道德危险
IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12510
Benjamin Matheson
<p>Like most celebrity apologies, Woods offered his apology publicly. But he did not just apologize to those he directly wronged. He also apologized <i>to his fans</i>.</p><p>Why do celebrities sometimes apologize to their fans? Why do celebrities typically publicly apologize? In this paper, I first consider three possible explanations for why celebrities typically apologize publicly <i>and</i> sometimes also include their fans among the targets of their apology. I then identify three moral dangers of celebrity apologies, the third of which arises specifically for fan-targeted apologies, and each of which teaches us important lessons about the practice of celebrity apologies. From these individual lessons, I draw more general lessons about apologies from those with elevated social positions. So, while my initial focus is on celebrities and on learning about an important and undertheorized social phenomenon, this investigation into celebrity apologies aims to illuminate a more general social phenomenon by using celebrity apologies as a case study.</p><p>In Section 2, I outline an account of apology and redemption, drawing primarily on Radzik's (<span>2009</span>) work. In Sections 3, 5, I consider three possible explanations for why celebrities apologies are often both fan-targeted and publicly given. Because my focus is on such apologies, I set aside standard reasons for why people might apologize (e.g., a desire to make amends), though I discuss the relevance of celebrities <i>also</i> being motivated by these other reasons. The first explanation I consider is that celebrities are motivated to set the public record straight. The second I consider is that celebrities see themselves as having role model obligations. And the third is that celebrities aim to maintain their fame—that is, their positive celebrity status—and its associated powers.</p><p>In Sections 6, 8, I then identify three moral dangers of celebrity apologies and then draw out lessons each danger teaches us about the practice of celebrity apologies. First, by apologizing publicly celebrities can set the public narrative about their misdeed in their favor. So, we have reason not to trust celebrity apologies. Second, even when they do not set the public narrative in their favor, a publicly given celebrity apology can still function to disempower the victim from having control over their own life narrative. So, celebrity apologies can present an additional harm to victims. Third, publicly given fan-targeted apologies block a celebrity from, what I will call, <i>moral redemption</i>. So, celebrities ought to be concerned about caring about their fame more than anything else. Additionally, the third moral danger also risks exacerbating the first two moral dangers.</p><p>According to Linda Radzik (<span>2009</span>, p. 113), redemption is the “proper end state of responses to wrongdoing.” She holds that “When one is redeemed, one has justifiably regained one's moral standing” (Radzik, <sp
像大多数名人道歉一样,伍兹公开道歉。但他不只是向他直接冤枉的人道歉。他还向粉丝道歉。为什么明星有时会向粉丝道歉?为什么名人通常会公开道歉?在本文中,我首先考虑了三种可能的解释,为什么名人通常公开道歉,有时也把他们的粉丝作为他们道歉的目标。然后,我指出了名人道歉的三种道德危险,其中第三种是专门针对粉丝的道歉,每一种都给我们上了关于名人道歉实践的重要一课。从这些个人的教训中,我从那些社会地位较高的人那里得到了更多关于道歉的普遍教训。因此,虽然我最初关注的是名人和学习一个重要的和未被理论化的社会现象,但对名人道歉的调查旨在通过名人道歉作为案例研究来阐明一个更普遍的社会现象。在第二部分中,我主要借鉴Radzik(2009)的作品,概述了对道歉和救赎的描述。在第3节和第5节中,我考虑了三种可能的解释,为什么名人的道歉通常是针对粉丝的,也是公开的。因为我关注的是这种道歉,所以我把人们道歉的标准原因(例如,渴望弥补)放在一边,尽管我讨论了名人也受到这些其他原因激励的相关性。我考虑的第一个解释是,名人有纠正公众记录的动机。第二,我认为名人认为自己有榜样的义务。第三,名人的目标是维持他们的名声——也就是说,他们积极的名人地位——以及与之相关的权力。在第6、8节中,我指出了名人道歉的三种道德危险,然后总结出每种危险教给我们的关于名人道歉实践的教训。首先,通过公开道歉,名人可以使公众对他们的不当行为的叙述对他们有利。所以,我们有理由不相信名人的道歉。其次,即使他们没有让公众的叙述对他们有利,一个公开的名人道歉仍然可以剥夺受害者对自己生活叙述的控制权。所以,名人道歉会给受害者带来额外的伤害。第三,公开向粉丝道歉会阻碍名人获得我所说的道德救赎。所以,名人应该关心关心他们的名声比什么都重要。此外,第三种道德风险也有加剧前两种道德风险的风险。根据Linda Radzik(2009,第113页)的说法,救赎是“对错误行为的正确回应的最终状态”。她认为“当一个人被救赎时,他就有理由重新获得了自己的道德地位”(Radzik, 2009, p. 113)。在她看来,道德地位是“我们在道德共同体中获得的适当行为的尊重和信任程度”,我们应该在默认情况下得到一定程度的信任(Radzik, 2009, p. 82)。当我们做错事的时候,就表明我们不值得信任。当我们被救赎时,我们被认为是值得信赖的,从而重新获得了我们在道德共同体中的地位。Radzik借鉴了Karen Jones对信任的描述,根据该描述,信任是“一种乐观的态度,认为另一个人的善意和能力将扩展到我们与她互动的领域,同时期望被信任的人会被我们指望她的想法直接和有利地感动”(Jones, 1996,第4页;引自Radzik, 2009,第114页)。要理解她对救赎的描述,我们必须首先理解她对错误的描述。在Radzik看来,不当行为通过长期持续的侮辱和威胁来破坏人际关系(参见Murphy &amp;汉普顿,1988)。例如,一个孤独的小偷可能没有朋友或家人,但她可能仍然会破坏自己和他人之间的关系,以及她自己和道德社区之间的关系,因为她过去的错误使她持续威胁要从别人那里偷东西。因为她过去的行为传递了这样的信息,别人不会信任她,所以她的道德地位至少会降低。为了救赎自己,小偷必须消除这种威胁——也就是说,她必须停止过去发送这种信息的行为。一旦威胁被消除,小偷就值得和解——也就是说,她是这样的,她的受害者和道德社会应该与她和解。重要的是,消除威胁需要的不仅仅是罪犯的道德转变。道德转变仍然是促成和解的关键。通过在道德上改变自己,犯错的人变得值得信赖。然而,仅仅改变是不够的。 做错事的人要为自己道德地位的下降负责,所以他们有责任让别人知道他们已经改变了。换句话说,他们必须传达他们现在(或再次)是值得信赖的。因此,他们也必须传达他们的转变。最后,违法者必须满足他们因错误行为而产生的任何索赔。在这样做的过程中,犯错的人展示了他们的可信度。因此,为了获得和解并因此得到救赎,犯错者必须做三件事:(i)道德转变,(ii)传达这种转变,(iii)满足因错误行为而产生的任何索赔(Radzik, 2009,第85页)。道德转化具有向后和前瞻性的因素,Radzik (2009, p. 86)认为这等同于忏悔。改过自新的作恶者回顾自己的过错,以正确的眼光看待它们。这包括承认她对自己所做的事情的责任,相关行为的错误,她所违反的规范的权威,以及她不应该那样做。她也必须关心她的行为所产生的影响。这包括以正确的目标和适当的程度感受负面情绪,如内疚、悔恨、遗憾和羞耻。仅仅因为行为不当被发现而感到后悔的人,不会对正确的目标感到后悔。对重大错误感到轻微而短暂的悔恨的人感觉还不够糟糕。但是那些因为一个小错误而陷入自我憎恨的人就太过分了。简而言之,犯错的人应该正确地评估自己和他们的行为所造成的影响。转变后的犯错者也期待着未来的行为:她决心不再重复过去的错误,如果需要更多的改进,她会改善自己的性格,或者保持自己的性格改善。因为不法行为涉及表达性伤害——特别是对受害者和道德社区的威胁——不法行为者应该传达他们的道德转变——例如,通过道歉、说实话和承担补救工作(例如,护理和慈善工作)。Radzik并不认为任何一个都是值得道德和解的必要条件。相反,它们都是传达一个人道德转变的可能方式。哪种沟通方式是合适的,将取决于错误的细节和它所产生的影响。道歉是满足这种沟通要求的一种常见而重要的方式。道歉可以通过展示对受害者和社区的尊重,以及对自己早期错误的谦逊回应,明确地帮助抵消自己早期错误所发出的有害信息。做错事的人可以明确表示,他们对之前的错误负有责任,他们对错误感到适当的内疚,等等。然而,有时候做错事的人并没有将他们应该立即理解的事情概念化或理解。出于这个原因,Radzik赞同这样一种观点,即道歉通常是犯错者与受害者/社区之间的谈判(参见Battistella, 2014;来到2005;预告,2014;史密斯,2008)。通过这种协商,犯错者的内疚、后悔、羞耻和悔恨的感觉,以及她对未来行为的承诺,可以变得更加准确和清晰。简而言之,公开道歉具有公共记录设置功能,可以向那些与受害者有类似错误的人发出尊重的信息(另见MacLachlan, 2014, 2018;史密斯,2008)。如果道歉满足了“应得的和解”的沟通要求,就算是道德上好的道歉。这样的道歉也可以帮助满足犯错者因错误行为而招致的一些索赔——比如修复对受害者名誉造成的任何损害。做错事的人必须满足她因错误行为而招致的任何索赔,这样他们才能纠正自己的错误,但这也有一个最初的好处,那就是沟通他们的转变和重新获得信任。虽然Radzik (2009, p. 84)认为某些错误是无法容忍的,犯错的人随后不可能得到完全的和解,但她认为犯错的人通常可以为他们过去的错误赎罪。重要的是,救赎的所有方面都可能是虚假的、误导的或非法的。我们可以相信一个狡猾的道歉,或者相信某人已经改变了,并再次信任他们,即使他们没有改变,也不值得信任。即使我们仍然不信任他们,其他人也会认为做错事的人再次拥有完全的道德地位。简而言之,我们可能会错误地认为某人已经赎罪,即使他们实际上并不值得和解。当然,这不是真正的救赎,而只
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引用次数: 0
Political liberalism today 今天的政治自由主义
IF 0.8 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12509
J. Donald Moon
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引用次数: 0
The possibility of social unity in the Liberal democratic state 自由民主国家社会统一的可能性
IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12507
Kaveh Pourvand
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引用次数: 0
Issue Information - NASSP PAGE 发行信息- NASSP页
IF 0.8 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12424
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引用次数: 0
Contributors 贡献者
IF 0.8 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12423
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引用次数: 0
Analyzing social wrongs 分析社会错误
IF 0.8 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12505
Hilkje C. Hänel, Sally Haslanger, Odin Kroeger
<p>Academic philosophy has witnessed a significant change in the last years from nonideal investigations of social wrongs as being a rather marginal topic in comparison to what was assumed to be more fundamental questions to those very investigations drawing significant attention and taking their rightful place in the midst of the profession of philosophy. Yet, despite these advances and the increasing awareness of social wrongs in relation to—for example, gender, race, class, and disability—social philosophers are still regularly asked to justify what they are doing or to justify that what they are doing is rightfully called philosophy. This special issue is motivated by the following three ideas: First, to increase awareness for nonideal investigations into gender, race, class, and disability. Second, to draw attention to the insight that our philosophical methods and the topics we are concerned with are not two separate issues; in fact, what we investigate and how we do so are tightly connected. Third, to question the ways in which philosophy as a discipline excludes certain voices, topics, and methods.</p><p>Many of the papers in this issue were the result of a conference marked by the attempt to bring investigations of social wrongs in the tradition of post-Analytic philosophy to the German-speaking philosophy world—a context still very much behind on investigations of social wrongs in a nonideal manner. This conference, which took place in Vienna, and which was organized in 2014 by Hilkje C. Hänel, Daniel James, and Odin Kroeger, served as an international forum for social philosophers to think about the way in which we do philosophy and the topics that are often strikingly absent from philosophy. Since then, much has changed, but the need to question what philosophy is, what it can do, and who is doing it remains. Before we provide a brief overview of the papers in this issue, let us say a bit more about the three aspects mentioned above.</p><p>Discussions of gender, race, and disability have slowly paved their way into the midst of philosophical theorizing and have become an essential aspect of academia; this is evidenced by recent hires in feminist philosophy and critical race studies, the emergence of journals on the topics of gender, race, and most recently, disability, or the central place that these topics take in the APA newsletter, conferences, as well as book and article publications. (This is of course due to the resistant struggle of a few to make our profession better and more welcoming for marginalized and oppressed philosophers.) However, neither nonideal investigations of social wrongs in general nor debates on gender, race, and disability—and many other important sites of oppression and injustice—have a secure place within academic philosophy yet; as can be seen by recent backlashes against trans philosophy or the metaphysical debates that claim that gender and race (and likely disability) are not substantive debates within
学术哲学在过去的几年里见证了一个重大的变化,从对社会错误的非理想调查,作为一个相当边缘的话题,与那些被认为是更基本的问题相比,这些调查引起了极大的关注,并在哲学专业中占据了应有的位置。然而,尽管取得了这些进步,人们也越来越意识到社会上的错误——例如,性别、种族、阶级和残疾——社会哲学家们仍然经常被要求为他们所做的事情辩护,或者为他们所做的事情辩护,证明他们所做的事情是正当的哲学。本期特刊的动机有以下三点:第一,提高对性别、种族、阶级和残疾的非理想调查的认识。第二,提请注意我们的哲学方法和我们所关心的主题并不是两个独立的问题;事实上,我们调查的内容和调查的方式是紧密相连的。第三,质疑哲学作为一门学科排斥某些声音、主题和方法的方式。这期杂志上的许多论文都是一次会议的结果,这次会议的标志是试图将后分析哲学传统中的社会错误研究引入德语哲学世界——这一背景仍然远远落后于以非理想方式研究社会错误。这次会议于2014年在维也纳举行,由Hilkje C. Hänel、Daniel James和Odin Kroeger组织,为社会哲学家提供了一个国际论坛,让他们思考我们研究哲学的方式以及哲学中经常明显缺失的主题。从那以后,很多事情都发生了变化,但人们仍然需要质疑哲学是什么,哲学能做什么,谁在做哲学。在我们对本期论文进行简要概述之前,让我们再多说一下上面提到的三个方面。关于性别、种族和残疾的讨论已经慢慢地进入了哲学理论的中心,并成为学术界的一个重要方面;最近在女权主义哲学和批判性种族研究方面的招聘证明了这一点,出现了关于性别,种族和最近的残疾主题的期刊,或者这些主题在APA通讯,会议以及书籍和文章出版物中占据中心位置。(当然,这是由于少数人为了使我们的职业更好,更欢迎边缘化和受压迫的哲学家而进行的抵抗斗争。)然而,无论是对一般社会错误的非理想调查,还是对性别、种族和残疾——以及许多其他压迫和不公正的重要领域——的辩论,在学术哲学中都没有一个安全的位置;从最近对跨性别哲学或形而上学辩论的强烈反对中可以看出,这些辩论声称性别和种族(以及可能的残疾)在形而上学中不是实质性的辩论(正如Díaz-León在本期中讨论的那样)。此外,对妇女堕胎权利的更普遍反对,在2019冠状病毒病大流行期间对残疾和/或慢性病患者进行分类的有害辩论,以及针对黑人和边缘化社会群体的国家和人际暴力,都证明了继续提出这些话题的重要性。在立场认识论、批判理论和哲学的其他领域,我们选择的研究方法对我们的感知和我们感兴趣的主题有影响,反之亦然,这是一个司空见惯的现象;毕竟,站在树顶的观点不太可能导致对其根源的良好或任何研究。我们自己的社会地位和关系对我们认为有趣的事情和我们的研究结果产生影响的方式,可以在无知认识论的最新理论中详细看到。这个问题引起了人们对一个相关现象的关注,即我们选择的方法对我们的思维内容和我们认为值得研究的现象有影响。此外,选择一种非理想的哲学方法意味着我们从特定的社会错误开始思考,这些错误有时会揭示出我们已建立的哲学理论的不足;正如Bierria, Hänel, Haslanger和Hufendiek在本期的贡献所示。最后,我们认为值得研究的东西和我们选择的研究方法会影响哲学对谁开放和吸引谁。研究表明,被边缘化的哲学家在研究领域和主题中感到不受其他学者的欢迎和代表,并且通常对不同的主题或方法论方法感兴趣;例如,跨学科方法或对现实世界不公正的调查。 在本期中,Dotson、Ball-Blakely、Chapman和Carel将人们的注意力吸引到了学术界内外对特定话题以及学术界边缘化哲学家的非常真实且相当明确的排斥和沉默,以及学术资源、规范和规则暗中排斥学术界某些人而不是其他人的方式。前四篇论文是关于一般的方法论问题;当我们分析社会错误时,我们在做什么,我们应该做什么?接着她的论文《这篇论文是怎样的哲学?》(2012), Kristie Dotson反映了哲学论文的吸收,特别是那些与社会相关的话题。“关于社会相关哲学论文的成本:反思”提供了学术界有问题的排斥以及这种排斥影响哲学书面生产的方式的重要见解。为了做到这一点,多森介绍了被认为与社会相关的论文包含的三个方面:概念劳动力、建设劳动力和期望成本。第一部分描述了将一篇论文置于其适当的解释学景观中所涉及的劳动,包括思想和概念的历史形成。第二种描述了“话语执行的物质和实践必需品”(xx)所涉及的劳动,例如撰写论文所需的工具、培训或时间。构想性劳动和建构性劳动不一定有问题;虽然他们可以。第三,期望成本,指的是“对未来参与施加影响”的期望目标(xx)。这些成本是有问题的,因为它们往往导致排除复杂而不是技术话语及其多样化的从业者。多森的论点是基于她2012年的论文中提出的重要的哲学见解,即我们在西方学术界研究哲学的方式,并要求一些(但不是全部)来证明他们正在做的事情,以及我们的行为在个人和结构上的成本。接下来,在她的论文《扰乱需求:对分析方法论的混乱挑战》中,Naomi Scheman质疑了分析哲学的核心假设,即“适当的概念划分逻辑空间”和“真实的种类和真实的细节都不是本体论上模糊的”(xx)。Scheman认为,一个完全多元主义的——至少有时——概念上混乱的方法更适合解放女性主义的理论化。总的观点是,作为哲学家,我们不应该以清理混乱的社会世界为目标,而应该更好地理解它的全部混乱。这是出于这样一种理解,即特别是被压迫、从属和边缘化的主体往往有相互冲突的需求,如果其中任何一种需求优先于其他需求,他们的声音就会被排除和沉默。图式阐释了这些重要的论点,他引入了一场辩论,讨论作为一个女人意味着什么,以及谁被视为女人,这在很大程度上主导了分析女性主义哲学。接下来的两篇论文都表明,通过关注哲学中常见的不充分理论,质疑方法选择对社会错误的批判性分析的重要性。在她的《超越本质主义谬误:对生物性别差异诉求的微调意识形态批判》一书中,丽贝卡·胡芬迪克关注了进化心理学关于人类行为性别差异的过时观点。Hufendiek认为,进化心理学家忽视了数据、方法和对女性主义科学哲学家的批评,这表明他们的分析在方法上是不充分的,并且再现了性别歧视的刻板印象,以及从他们的分析中得出的伦理含义。这是一个特别有问题的问题,因为进化心理学有广泛的受众——甚至在学术界之外——因此影响了关于性别和性的论述。胡芬迪克认为,这些有问题的观点既需要女性主义科学哲学家的分析,也需要意识形态的批判性调查,因为进化心理学中的本质主义谬误再现并证明了压迫结构的合理性。因此,Hufendiek展示了方法和内容是如何经常携手并进的,对社会错误的分析必须注意方法问题。莎莉·哈斯兰格在她的论文《方法论个人主义的失败:社会系统的物质性》中认为方法论个人主义是不充分的。哈斯兰格的总体目标是表明,在社会系统中,物质、文化和心理之间存在着一种相互依存关系——这对许多社会解释至关重要;换句话说,一些社会现象最好是从系统或结构的角度来理解,而不是从个人和他们的个人态度的角度来理解。 为了论证方法论个人主义的不足,哈斯兰格指出,这种方法可以追溯到“社会世界由个人组成”的理想(xx),因此,对社会现象的任何解释都应该关注这些个人;无论是本体论个人主义还是解释性个人主义。然而
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引用次数: 0
Justice for (and by) philosophers: Professional ethics and punishing our own 哲学家的正义:职业道德和惩罚我们自己
IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12508
Timothy Weidel
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引用次数: 0
The normative justification of obligatory integration policies 强制性一体化政策的规范性理由
IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12506
Matthias Hoesch

Since the late 1990s a class of political measures that can be called “obligatory integration policies” has constantly gained importance in Europe (cf. Goodman, 2010; Goodman & Wright, 2015; Joppke, 2017; Michalowski & van Oers, 2012; Triadafilopoulos, 2011). These policies require immigrants to take certain actions or to demonstrate certain competences that, in the eyes of the host society, serve their integration.

Some of these measures are aimed at integration in a general sense. The requirement in several European states to take up residence in a particular place (“residence condition”), for instance, is intended to “facilitate the integration [of immigrants]” (EuGH Press Release No. 22/16), without specifying what integration consists in. Typically, however, these measures focus on learning the host society's language as the key to integration. In particular, many Western states prescribe some groups of immigrants to attend language classes. Often, these measures additionally seek to promote “civic” integration, for example, when integration courses encompass, beside language lessons, units about the host society's values, politics, culture, and history.

Obligatory integration policies are obligatory in the sense that they do not seek to promote attendance with incentives, but to compel it with sanctions or penalties. In case of incentives, immigrants are at liberty to respond to them or not. If, for example, the state subsidizes language courses so that the fee is very low or if the state pays grants to immigrants for successfully joining classes, many immigrants will decide to participate of their own free will. In case of obligatory integration policies, however, immigrants cannot choose whether or not they respond to an incentive; they simply have to comply with the legal obligation and any violation is deemed to be wrongdoing. In recent decades, there has been a shift in many European states from integration policies based on incentives toward obligatory integration policies. When, for instance, publicly subsidized integration courses were established in Germany in 2005, about a third of the participants in the courses were obliged to attend, whereas a majority chose voluntarily to embrace the opportunity to learn the language for a low price. The amendment of the legal rules underlying integration courses through the so-called Integrationsgesetz in 2016, lead to an increase in the share of the obligatory participants to two-thirds (193,000 persons in 2017).1

From the point of view of normative theory, the distinction between obligatory integration policies and those merely involving incentives for voluntary compliance is of major importance. Obviously, there is nothing pro tanto unjust about states creating incentives for immigrants to integrate, as long as the incentives in question are reasonable in scope and

无论如何,所提出的论点并没有授权东道国社会向移民发号施令,要求他们在一系列同样有效的提高就业能力的选择中选择哪一个。第四,就移民而言,有一个对本国人来说不存在的特殊限制:国家要求他们融入社会的权利取决于他们可能在东道国逗留的时间长短。如果移民只打算短期逗留--比如难民,他们打算在情况允许时立即返回原籍国--那么他们就没有义务学习从长远来看才有利的技能。更重要的是,大多数东道国最初都会向移民发放临时居留证。一个只被允许逗留两年的移民,如果被允许逗留更长时间的前景并不明朗,在道义上肯定没有义务投入几个月的时间来学习语言,以便能够找到工作(尽管她很可能有义务接受低工资水平的工作邀请,或参加一个简短的应聘讲习班)。因此,东道国社会面临着一个取舍问题:要么给予移民更好的居留前景,要么接受失业移民没有义务为改善其在劳动力市场上的前景作出重大努力的观点。越来越多的学者主张无条件的基本收入,因此他们不同意国家有权要求人们努力寻找工作。根据这种观点,在一个失业率很高的富裕社会中,一个人是否愿意找工作以及找多 少工作都应被视为一个自由的决定。如果这些作者的观点是正确的,每个人都有获得无条件基本收入的道德诉求,或者如果一个国家确实决定落实每个人获得基本收入的法定权利,那么国家强制移民改善其在劳动力市场上的前景的权利就不复存在了。总之,避免依赖福利制度援助的责任意味着国家有权强制某类移民参加语言课程或采取进一步措施(如应用培训),以提高他们找到工作的机会。然而,我们没有理由断定所有失业移民都必须这样做。他们是否必须这样做,取决于他们的意愿、他们在法律上是否被允许永久居留,以及他们是否有适应劳动力市场的选择。在所提出的论点中,融入只被视为一种找工作的手段,因此,强制性融入政策的内容必须局限于确实有助于在劳动力市场上站稳脚跟的内容。最后,强制性融入政策的理由可以是移民与本地人之间的一个显著区别:本地人一直生活在自己的国家,而移民则是出于一个决定而生活在东道国。因此,可以说移民有义务融入社会,因为他们在移民时就接受了这一义务。换句话说,移民可能已经与东道国签订了一份合同,该合同将移民的居留许可与移民的某些互惠行为联系在一起。有趣的是,在关于融合的哲学文献中,这些契约的作用微乎其微,20 而在现实政治中,却有一些重要的例子将移民作为东道国与移民之间的契约,如法国的 "共和融合契约 "和奥地利的 "融合联盟"。特别是,它们可以要求那些被接纳的移民同意一项融合契约,其中包括承诺采取某些促进融合的措施。这样,移民就有义务参加融合课程或其他融合措施,而这完全是基于他们在入境时所作的承诺。由于大多数合同义务都可以强制执行,因此有理由认为国家有权对违反义务的行为进行制裁。
{"title":"The normative justification of obligatory integration policies","authors":"Matthias Hoesch","doi":"10.1111/josp.12506","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12506","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since the late 1990s a class of political measures that can be called “obligatory integration policies” has constantly gained importance in Europe (cf. Goodman, <span>2010</span>; Goodman &amp; Wright, <span>2015</span>; Joppke, <span>2017</span>; Michalowski &amp; van Oers, <span>2012</span>; Triadafilopoulos, <span>2011</span>). These policies require immigrants to take certain actions or to demonstrate certain competences that, in the eyes of the host society, serve their integration.</p><p>Some of these measures are aimed at integration in a general sense. The requirement in several European states to take up residence in a particular place (“residence condition”), for instance, is intended to “facilitate the integration [of immigrants]” (EuGH Press Release No. 22/16), without specifying what integration consists in. Typically, however, these measures focus on learning the host society's language as the key to integration. In particular, many Western states prescribe some groups of immigrants to attend language classes. Often, these measures additionally seek to promote “civic” integration, for example, when integration courses encompass, beside language lessons, units about the host society's values, politics, culture, and history.</p><p>Obligatory integration policies are obligatory in the sense that they do not seek to promote attendance with <i>incentives</i>, but to compel it with <i>sanctions</i> or penalties. In case of incentives, immigrants are at liberty to respond to them or not. If, for example, the state subsidizes language courses so that the fee is very low or if the state pays grants to immigrants for successfully joining classes, many immigrants will decide to participate of their own free will. In case of obligatory integration policies, however, immigrants cannot choose whether or not they respond to an incentive; they simply have to comply with the legal obligation and any violation is deemed to be wrongdoing. In recent decades, there has been a shift in many European states from integration policies based on incentives toward obligatory integration policies. When, for instance, publicly subsidized integration courses were established in Germany in 2005, about a third of the participants in the courses were obliged to attend, whereas a majority chose voluntarily to embrace the opportunity to learn the language for a low price. The amendment of the legal rules underlying integration courses through the so-called <i>Integrationsgesetz</i> in 2016, lead to an increase in the share of the obligatory participants to two-thirds (193,000 persons in 2017).<sup>1</sup></p><p>From the point of view of normative theory, the distinction between obligatory integration policies and those merely involving incentives for voluntary compliance is of major importance. Obviously, there is nothing pro tanto unjust about states creating incentives for immigrants to integrate, as long as the incentives in question are reasonable in scope and ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"562-578"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12506","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41834646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political activism, egalitarian justice, and public reason 政治激进主义、平等正义和公共理性
IF 0.8 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12501
Blain Neufeld
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引用次数: 0
Social pathologies of informational privacy 信息隐私的社会病态
IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Pub Date : 2022-12-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12504
Wulf Loh
<p>Following the recent practice turn in privacy research, informational privacy is increasingly analyzed with regard to the “appropriate flow of information” within a given practice, which preserves the “contextual integrity” of that practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 149; <span>2015</span>). Such a practice-theoretical take on privacy emphasizes the normative structure of practices as well as its structural injustices and power asymmetries, rather than focusing on the intentions and moral considerations of individual or institutional actors. Since privacy norms are seen to be institutionalized via the role obligations of the practice's participants, this approach can analyze structural and systematic privacy infringements in terms of “defective role performances and defective social relations” (Roessler & Mokrosinska, <span>2013</span>, p. 780).</p><p>Unfortunately, it is still often somewhat unclear what this exactly means within the context of informational privacy, why these performances and relations are defective and for whom. This raises the common objection of a so-called “practice positivism” (Applbaum, <span>1999</span>, p. 51), that is, the difficulty of practice–theoretical accounts to take a practice-independent standpoint, from which to normatively evaluate the existing practice norms themselves. For example, Nissenbaum herself initially argues for a “presumption in favor of the status quo” with respect to the appropriateness and flow of privacy norms within a practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2004</span>, p. 127). Such a “practice conservatism” (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 169) comes dangerously close to committing a naturalistic fallacy, if not undergirded by practice-external criteria (which is ultimately what she does).</p><p>Merely resorting to existing practice norms to assess what defective role performances amount to, only shifts the question from how to recognize an appropriate flow of information to the question of how to recognize those defective role performances and social relations. Against this backdrop, the central aim of this article is to shed light on this question without resorting to practice-independent first principles or far-reaching universalistic anthropological assumptions. For this, I will analyze the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” in terms of social pathologies.<sup>1</sup> Doing so has two advantages: First of all, it can draw on already existing concepts and distinctions, which help to categorize the different levels of analysis that exist in informational privacy research and situate the notion of “defective role performances” within them (Section 1). Second, those concepts and distinctions can serve as a basis for establishing a typology of phenomena with regard to deficient practices of informational privacy (Section 4).</p><p>Having thus set the scene in Section 1, I can move on to address the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” w
在相应的数据化子实践中,所有 BCR 都承认对方是标准权威,从而确立并维持了实践的 "标准权威"。正如我在上文所论证的,这意味着所有数据收集主体和数据化主体相互承认对方批评他人角色表演的权威,并由此承认数据化实践的结构本身。在一个信息私有的实践中,所有数据化主体由于在相应的数据化子实践中具有标准权威,因此有权质疑、争辩并要求为其数据的系统收集、存储、处理和传播提供正当理由。凭借这种权威,他们可以有效地解释这种做法,从而可以复制并改变这种做法。但这并不意味着他们的权威必须始终得到遵守,才能称之为 "私人 "数据化实践。什么是实践中的 "适当信息流",仍然取决于普遍接受的实践规范。由此可见,标准权威的概念并不是指一种理想的话语环境,在这种环境中,所有参与者都是平等的(Habermas, 1986; Habermas, 2001)15。尽管如此,正如医生的例子所显示的,相互冲突的解释往往会被明确化(Brandom, 1998; Celikates, 2018)。在病理实践中,往往正是这种明确化的能力,被错误地承认为实践参与者中的某一部分是标准权威而扭曲了。正如我在上一节中所阐述的,这种承认需要(a)对数据化子实践中其他 BCR 的角色表演提出质疑的权威;以及(b)要求他们为自己对角色义务的解释提供正当理由。如第 1 节所述,"结构性 "和 "系统性 "指的是持久和全面的缺陷,这些缺陷通常会影响到数据化子实践中的所有或大部分行为者--或者说,正如我们现在可以具体说明的那样,影响到数据化子实践中的一种或多种业连管。通过将斯塔尔关于标准权威的论述移植到信息隐私领域,SORM给出了诊断层面的答案,即 "什么是信息隐私的社会病理学 "这一问题的答案。尽管如此,我们仍然需要评估为什么这些对标准权威的结构性和系统性错误认知会构成一种社会病理学。答案与社会实践的内在运作息息相关:社会实践依赖于这种相互承认:(a) 其稳定相互行为预期的能力;(b) 其逐步调整这些预期内容的能力。在社会实践中,参与者不断地相互批评,从而解释、确定角色行为并使之正常化(Berger &amp; Luckmann, 1967; Giddens, 1984)。这些解释即行为在复制实践的同时也在逐步改变实践:它捕捉到了社会实践中的规范因素,而这正是社会实践整合的原因(哈贝马斯,1986 年,第 2 卷;洛克伍德,1964 年),因此,一方面,它将社会实践与巧合的一致行为区分开来,另一方面,它又将社会实践与单纯的强制协调区分开来。没有这种认可,第 2 节中定义的社会实践就不可能存在,因为从长远来看,它们将失去可重复性,也就是说,它们不可能在内部稳定下来,也不可能适应不断变化的规范解释。如果没有这种信念(以内化的 "知道-诀窍 "的形式),就不会出现规范性地约束参与者的共同实践(哈特,1994 年,第 89 页)。唯一可以通过社会整合实现稳定的形式是来自实践外部的强制或协调力量。此外,解释--行为--之间的不断往返不仅解释了角色义务是如何演变和正常化的,也解释了它们是如何随着时间的推移而变化的。总之,作为标准权威的相互承认是可复制性(在整合、稳定和适应性的意义上)的必要条件,从而也是数据化实践发挥作用的必要条件。
{"title":"Social pathologies of informational privacy","authors":"Wulf Loh","doi":"10.1111/josp.12504","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12504","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Following the recent practice turn in privacy research, informational privacy is increasingly analyzed with regard to the “appropriate flow of information” within a given practice, which preserves the “contextual integrity” of that practice (Nissenbaum, &lt;span&gt;2010&lt;/span&gt;, p. 149; &lt;span&gt;2015&lt;/span&gt;). Such a practice-theoretical take on privacy emphasizes the normative structure of practices as well as its structural injustices and power asymmetries, rather than focusing on the intentions and moral considerations of individual or institutional actors. Since privacy norms are seen to be institutionalized via the role obligations of the practice's participants, this approach can analyze structural and systematic privacy infringements in terms of “defective role performances and defective social relations” (Roessler &amp; Mokrosinska, &lt;span&gt;2013&lt;/span&gt;, p. 780).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, it is still often somewhat unclear what this exactly means within the context of informational privacy, why these performances and relations are defective and for whom. This raises the common objection of a so-called “practice positivism” (Applbaum, &lt;span&gt;1999&lt;/span&gt;, p. 51), that is, the difficulty of practice–theoretical accounts to take a practice-independent standpoint, from which to normatively evaluate the existing practice norms themselves. For example, Nissenbaum herself initially argues for a “presumption in favor of the status quo” with respect to the appropriateness and flow of privacy norms within a practice (Nissenbaum, &lt;span&gt;2004&lt;/span&gt;, p. 127). Such a “practice conservatism” (Nissenbaum, &lt;span&gt;2010&lt;/span&gt;, p. 169) comes dangerously close to committing a naturalistic fallacy, if not undergirded by practice-external criteria (which is ultimately what she does).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Merely resorting to existing practice norms to assess what defective role performances amount to, only shifts the question from how to recognize an appropriate flow of information to the question of how to recognize those defective role performances and social relations. Against this backdrop, the central aim of this article is to shed light on this question without resorting to practice-independent first principles or far-reaching universalistic anthropological assumptions. For this, I will analyze the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” in terms of social pathologies.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; Doing so has two advantages: First of all, it can draw on already existing concepts and distinctions, which help to categorize the different levels of analysis that exist in informational privacy research and situate the notion of “defective role performances” within them (Section 1). Second, those concepts and distinctions can serve as a basis for establishing a typology of phenomena with regard to deficient practices of informational privacy (Section 4).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Having thus set the scene in Section 1, I can move on to address the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” w","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"541-561"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12504","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42251597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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Journal of Social Philosophy
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