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IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12421

引用次数: 0

Rethinking the right to know and the case for restorative epistemic reparation 重新思考知情权和恢复性认知赔偿的案例

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-09-12 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12492

Melanie Altanian

引用次数: 1

Reparative responsibility for the harms of forced migration 对强迫移徙造成的伤害承担赔偿责任

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-09-11 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12493

Laura Santi Amantini

引用次数: 0

Supererogatory and obligatory rescues: Should we institutionalize the duty to intervene? 强制性和强制性救助:我们应该将干预义务制度化吗?

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12491

Sara Van Goozen

引用次数: 0

Direct and structural injustice against refugees 对难民的直接和结构性不公正

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12486

Bradley Hillier-Smith

The dominant philosophical approach to understanding the moral duties that states in the Global North have toward the 26 million refugees worldwide is what we can call the Duty of Rescue Approach.1 According to this approach, states in the Global North (hereafter Northern states) are mere innocent bystanders overlooking the humanitarian crisis of refugee displacement unfold, and these states have moral duties to rescue refugees from this situation, at least if such states are able to do so at little cost to themselves.2Serena Parekh's recent normative analysis (2017, 2020) has sought to challenge this dominant approach. Parekh highlights certain Northern state policies and practices used in response to refugees while they are displaced and suggests that refugees endure extensive harms as result of such policies and practices, including the harms of containment and encampment, and their being prevented from accessing adequate refuge. These harms, Parekh argues, are an injustice. Thus, for Parekh, certain Northern states, far from being mere innocent bystanders, are responsible for injustice against refugees.In this article, I fully endorse Parekh's claims that refugees endure certain harms as a result of Northern state practices, and that such harms constitute an injustice against refugees. Yet, I will explore how we ought to understand this injustice. I contest Parekh's claim that the harms refugees endure as a result of Northern state practices are, and ought to be understood as, a structural injustice—an unfortunate, unintended unjust outcome resulting from structural processes (call this Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach). Instead, I contend that these harms are, and ought to be understood as, a direct injustice against refugees—an unjust outcome directly resulting from specific and avoidable policies enacted by relatively unconstrained actors (call this the Direct Injustice Approach). I argue that Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach fails to accurately capture the causal and normative relations between Northern state practices and the harms endured by refugees, and that this approach fails to provide any advancement on, and suffers from same the problems as, the standard Duty of Rescue Approach to which it is ostensibly an alternative. I instead advocate a Direct Injustice Approach to understanding the harms that refugees endure as a result of Northern states practices. If these harms are indeed a direct injustice, then responsible Northern states are certainly not mere innocent bystanders, and are not merely involved in structural processes that have an unintended unjust outcome (as on Parekh's Structural Injustice Approach), but are instead directly committing a grave injustice against innocent refugees and thus have urgent negative duties to refrain from unjustly harming the world's displaced.Section 1 explains Parekh's

理解全球北方国家对全球2600万难民的道德义务的主要哲学方法是我们可以称之为“救援责任方法”。1根据这种方法，全球北方国家(以下简称北方国家)仅仅是无辜的旁观者，忽视了难民流离失所的人道主义危机的展开，这些国家有道德责任从这种情况中拯救难民。至少如果这些国家能够以很少的代价这么做的话。2Serena Parekh最近的规范分析(2017,2020)试图挑战这种主导方法。Parekh强调了北方各州在难民流离失所时采取的某些政策和做法，并指出，由于这些政策和做法，难民遭受了广泛的伤害，包括围堵和扎营的危害，以及他们无法获得适当的庇护。帕瑞克认为，这些伤害是不公平的。因此，在帕雷克看来，某些北方国家远不是无辜的旁观者，而是对难民的不公正负有责任。在这篇文章中，我完全赞同Parekh的说法，即由于北方国家的做法，难民遭受了某些伤害，这种伤害构成了对难民的不公正。然而，我将探讨我们应该如何理解这种不公正。我不同意帕瑞克的观点，即北方国家的做法导致难民遭受的伤害是，也应该被理解为一种结构性的不公正——一种由结构性过程导致的不幸的、意想不到的不公正结果(称之为帕瑞克的结构性不公正方法)。相反，我认为这些伤害是，而且应该被理解为，对难民的直接不公正——由相对不受约束的行为者制定的具体和可避免的政策直接导致的不公正结果(称之为直接不公正方法)。我认为，Parekh的结构性不公正方法未能准确地捕捉到北方国家的做法与难民所遭受的伤害之间的因果关系和规范关系，而且这种方法未能提供任何进步，并遭受与标准的救援义务方法相同的问题，它表面上是一种替代方法。相反，我主张用直接不公正的方法来理解北方各州的做法给难民带来的伤害。如果这些伤害确实是一种直接的不公正，那么负责任的北方各州肯定不仅仅是无辜的旁观者，也不仅仅是参与了产生意外不公正结果的结构性过程(如Parekh的结构性不公正方法)，而是直接对无辜的难民犯下了严重的不公正，因此有紧急的消极责任来避免不公正地伤害世界上的流离失所者。第1节更详细地解释了Parekh的论点。第二节回顾了Iris Marion Young(2010)对结构性不公正的描述(Parekh的论点基于此)，以建立结构性不公正的必要条件。第三节对难民因北方国家的做法而面临的伤害是否可以根据必要的条件准确地描述为结构性不公正提出了质疑。第4节提出了反对将这些伤害理解为结构性不公正的规范性论点，因为这样的理解(除了其他不足之外)将无法在救援责任方法上提供任何进展，也无法为解决针对难民的不公正问题提供(重要的)道德责任。第5节总结。Parekh(2020)批评了在理解对难民的义务方面占主导地位的“救援责任”方法，在这种方法中，“(北方各州)往往只被视为与难民一旦流离失所所面临的伤害无关的救援者。”在这个“救援框架”上，北方各州“没有做错任何事”。他们没有让难民陷入危险，而只是介入帮助”(第18页)。这一框架未能捕捉到“难民所经历的伤害以及[北方各州]在这一结果中所扮演的角色”和“我们[北方各州]所造成的伤害”的现实(第19,158页)。在两本书中，Parekh让人们注意到由于北方国家的做法，难民所遭受的两种特别的伤害:首先是对难民的遏制和营地，其次是难民无法获得庇护。在《难民与被迫流离失所的伦理》(2017)一书中，Parekh关注了难民的收容和营地问题。北方各州通过各种政策和做法，设法将难民收容在远离北方领土的全球南方地区。在这些地区，难民被无限期地留在难民营中，北方各州在财政和政治上支持将难民安置在难民营中，因为这是他们对难民的首选反应(而不是重新安置或给予大量难民庇护;Parekh, 2017，第37-9页)。这种封锁和营地的危害包括"一种被囚禁的感觉，以及长时间剥夺自由、自治和基本人权[.]"(第5页)。难民营中的难民被动地依赖国际援助，对未来前景感到焦虑不安，缺乏充分自主生存所必需的机会。难民在这样的条件下忍受数年、数十年，有时甚至几代人(第3页)。帕雷克进一步证明了难民营如何影响难民的权利。“第一难民营很少维护难民根据1951年《难民公约》所享有的权利。”第二，“因为难民营中的难民非常脆弱，基本人权经常受到其他难民、国家和非政府组织的侵犯，难民没有能力要求他们的权利或得到纠正”(第31页)。Parekh借鉴了一些实证研究，这些研究发现了某些难民营中侵犯人权的完整目录，并得出结论，难民营的结构本身——作为封闭空间，超越法治，否认自由流动——意味着将难民封闭在难民营中，与尊重他们的人权是不相容的(verdiame et al.， 2005)。帕瑞克指出，难民营中最严重、最普遍的侵犯行为是性暴力。“家庭暴力、性剥削和各种性折磨的发生率极高。”这“已知在全球所有营地设置中都会发生”(2017年，第34页)。在《无避难所》(2020)中，帕瑞克关注的是难民无法获得避难所的危害。Parekh将避难理解为“人类尊严的最低条件”，包括适当的生活水平(包括食物、水、衣服、适当的住房和医疗)以及免受基本人权威胁的人身安全(第11-3页)。Parekh指出，绝大多数难民(86%)一旦离开原籍国，就会居住在全球南方地区，在那里他们实际上面临着三种选择:在肮脏的难民营中度过很长一段时间，没有足够的自主权或安全保障;在没有正式援助的情况下生活在赤贫中，在城市地区面临剥削和侵犯人权的行为;或冒着生命危险踏上危险的旅程，忍受广泛的侵犯人权行为，以在北方各州获得足够的安全和生存。这三种选择中的每一种都不能提供人类尊严的最低条件，因此世界上绝大多数难民无法获得庇护(第105-6页)。对帕瑞克来说，无法获得庇护是北方各州惯例造成的伤害。寻求控制其边界的北方各州采取了各种政策和做法，旨在将难民挡在北方领土之外，防止他们获得庇护。Parekh列举的例子包括在欧洲边境对难民的抵制，美国阻止难民寻求庇护的儿童分离政策，澳大利亚在海上拦截并将难民送回瑙鲁的离岸拘留中心，将难民拘留在希腊的难民营和中心，欧盟与利比亚的安排将难民拘留在利比亚海岸的中心，并将难民收容在北非地区，以及欧盟-土耳其协议，该协议封锁了移民路线，阻止难民抵达欧洲(2016年，第121-40页)。此外，北方国家没有提供获得庇护的适当途径或重新安置大量难民，而是选择在全球南方提供和资助难民营，作为它们对难民的首选反应，正如我们在上面看到的那样，这带来了一种被囚禁和广泛侵犯人权的感觉(第105页)。由于这些做法，难民无法有效地获得北部各州的庇护，只能在南方国家的城市地区忍受肮脏的难民营或贫困，或者冒着生命危险前往北部各州，现在越来越困难和危险。因此，由于北方各州的做法，“我们造成了这样一种局面:绝大多数难民实际上无法获得任何有意义的庇护;也就是说，他们不能享有人类尊严的最低条件”(第159页)。对帕瑞克来说，上述两种伤害——对难民的收容和营地，以及难民无法找到避难所——代表了对难民的不公正。因此，北方各州远不是无辜的旁观者或仅仅是潜在的救援者，而是对难民的不公正负有责任。虽然杨没有明确指出必要条件，但我们可以从她的分析中推断出，结构性不公正是:一种不公正的结果，它(1)不同于直接的个人互动造成的伤害和错误;(2)不同于由国家(或其他机构)的行为和政策直接导致的伤害和错误;相

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引用次数: 0

Digital participatory democracy: A normative framework for the democratic governance of the digital commons 数字参与式民主：数字公域民主治理的规范框架

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12489

Alec Stubbs

引用次数: 0

Skill-selection and socioeconomic status: An analysis of migration and domestic justice 技能选择和社会经济地位:移民和国内正义的分析

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12485

Michael Ball-Blakely

引用次数: 0

“How should we respond to climate change? Virtue ethics and aggregation problems” “我们应该如何应对气候变化？美德伦理和聚合问题”

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12488

Dominic Lenzi

One of the most discussed questions in climate ethics is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions, or even to become carbon neutral. However, virtue ethics has been largely absent from this debate. This article explores the implications of a neo-Aristotelian account, examining how we respond to climate change as a shared problem, and the characteristic reasons that motivate us to do what we can in response. I contrast this account with consequentialist and deontological approaches, showing that while virtue concepts will often require individuals to reduce their individual emissions, this does not depend on showing that individual emitting actions are harmful. To understand the virtue-ethical notion of acting well in response to climate change, we must tell a richer story about our moral contexts and characters. In telling such a story, we will see that merely reducing one's personal emissions while refraining from other actions could reflect vice, while acting well could consist in assisting local adaptation or raising awareness, rather than reducing one's emissions to zero.Section 1 explores the differences between standard approaches to climate responsibility and virtue ethical approaches, introducing the core theoretical claims of the latter. Section 2 returns to Parfit's discussion of aggregation problems to clarify the basic approach. Section 3 explores the thought that in response to climate change, acting well means doing what we can. This admittedly vague response gives rise to concerns with action-guidance and demandingness. Thus, Section 4 argues that acting well must be understood in light of one's context. This shows that there are many ways to act well in response to climate change, and that the poor and young people who have emitted little can nonetheless respond to climate change as a shared moral problem. Finally, Section 5 explores the importance of exemplary climate actions, their difference from otherwise good actions, and argues that such actions can inspire us to do more than we thought ourselves capable.To understand how virtue ethics approaches our question, consider first how most philosophers have approached it. In the large debate about individual climate responsibility, the desiderata for a successful argument are as follows: first, we attribute causal responsibility to an agent for harm resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases. Second, we attribute moral responsibility if the agent knew or should have known that harm would result from these actions. Third, we identify a moral obligation to cease contributing to harm, and/or to compensate those harmed (Vanderheiden, 2007).The most significant dispute concerns whether the right kind of causal connection holds between individual actions and the harms of climate change (Nefsky, 2019). This is difficult to establish since each individual is an extremely sma

气候伦理中讨论最多的问题之一是，个人是否有道德责任减少排放，甚至实现碳中和。然而，美德伦理在这场辩论中基本上是缺席的。本文探讨了新亚里士多德理论的含义，考察了我们如何将气候变化作为一个共同的问题来应对，以及激励我们采取应对措施的特征原因。我将这种解释与结果主义和义务论方法进行了对比，表明虽然美德概念通常要求个人减少个人排放，但这并不取决于表明个人排放行为是有害的。要理解在应对气候变化方面表现良好的道德观念，我们必须讲述一个关于我们的道德背景和性格的更丰富的故事。在讲述这个故事的过程中，我们会看到，仅仅减少个人的排放而不采取其他行动可能是一种恶习，而做得好可能是帮助当地适应或提高认识，而不是将自己的排放减少到零。第1节探讨了气候责任的标准方法与美德伦理方法之间的差异，介绍了后者的核心理论主张。第2节回到Parfit对聚合问题的讨论，以澄清基本方法。第三节探讨了应对气候变化的思想，做好行动意味着尽我们所能。这种公认的模糊反应引起了对行动指导和要求的关注。因此，第4节认为，良好的行为必须根据一个人的背景来理解。这表明，应对气候变化有很多方法可以采取行动，而排放很少的穷人和年轻人仍然可以将气候变化作为一个共同的道德问题来应对。最后，第5节探讨了模范气候行动的重要性，它们与其他良好行动的区别，并认为这些行动可以激励我们做得比我们认为自己有能力做的更多。要理解美德伦理学是如何处理我们的问题的，首先考虑大多数哲学家是如何处理这个问题的。在关于个人气候责任的大规模辩论中，成功论证的理想条件如下:首先，我们将温室气体排放造成的危害归因于一个代理人。第二，如果行为人知道或应该知道这些行为会造成伤害，我们就赋予道德责任。第三，我们确定了一种道德义务，即停止造成伤害，和/或赔偿那些受到伤害的人(Vanderheiden, 2007)。最重要的争议是，个人行为与气候变化的危害之间是否存在正确的因果关系(Nefsky, 2019)。这很难确定，因为每个人都是由数十亿行动者组成的因果链中极小的一部分，可以追溯到工业革命之初。一些人认为，个人的行为对气候变化造成的危害没有实质性的影响。Baylor Johnson(2003)认为，个人行为不会造成与气候相关的危害。罗纳德·桑德勒(2010)认为，个人行为在产生气候变化方面是“无关紧要的”，这是对戴尔·贾米森(2007)类似观点的回应，而乔金·桑德伯格(2011)认为，个人行为不会带来相应的伤害。Walter Sinnott-Armstrong(2005)声称，驾驶一辆效率低下的汽车兜风并没有什么道德上的问题，因为这种行为不会产生明显的伤害。Galvin和Harris(2014)认为，由于个人行为是无能的，基于权利的论点和预期效用的论点都不会产生道德义务。koko - chor Tan(2015)反对改变生活方式以实现碳中和的义务，因为这种方式的政治影响仍然不确定。Ben Hale(2011)和Johnson(2003)认为，由于需求和供给的市场力量，个人选择不排放不会产生任何影响Garrett Cullity(2015)在没有归因于因果伤害的情况下，拒绝了个人对导致气候危害的集体行动的几种可能贡献。相反，Christian Barry和Gerhard Øverland(2015)认为，如果没有任何特定个人的贡献，同样的气候危害也会发生。许多人反对这些观点。史蒂夫·范德海登(2007)认为，个人与他人一起造成伤害。艾弗拉姆·希勒认为，“周日开车兜风在道德上相当于毁了别人的下午”(2011,57，强调原文)，这意味着在整个一生中会造成相当大的伤害(参见Morgan-Knapp &古德曼,2014)。Simo Kyllönen(2016)认为，个人故意造成总体伤害，违反了无伤害原则。然而，在德性的基础上，我们可以说，优秀的行为是有德性的人的特征，被他们认为是真正的要求，就像足够好的行为是有德性的人的要求一样。进一步的观点是，模范不太可能对道德要求有与其他人相同的看法。正如亚里士多德所指出的，有美德的人对善的判断不太可能被那些缺乏美德的人所分享(1934,1144a)。因此，模范的回答往往会鼓舞有才华的人，就像他们在恶毒或自私的人看来莫名其妙或愚蠢一样。道德模范也可能受到他人道德失败的激励而做得更多。这与关于那些已经公正行事的人是否应该“收拾残局”并做更多的事情来弥补其他人的不公正不作为的争论有关，或者如果其他人都尽自己的一份力量，是否足够做公平的事情(Miller, 2011;墨菲,2000)。榜样将他人的失败视为自己做得更多的理由。然而，模范们似乎不太可能被这样的想法所激励，即他们只是在做自己的一份工作，尽管他们可能认为自己在做自己的一份工作(见第4节)。他们也可能被对他人不作为的愤慨所激励，除了正义的原因之外，还有与其他美德相关的原因，比如对帮助弱势群体的仁慈关怀。人们可能会想，美德伦理学家是否放过了那些未能对气候变化做出适当反应的人。要求一些人做得更多，难道不是要求过高，甚至不公平吗?难道连道德上可疑的人都没有道德责任吗?然而，我们并没有争辩说，在应对气候变化方面，有些人应该比其他人做得更多。我们已经说过，当面对共同的道德问题时，一些人可以被期望做得更多，因为他们拥有更大的实践智慧和更可靠的动机，无论是在他们做出反应的原因还是他们的情感态度方面。这并不意味着道德较差的人可以证明做得少是合理的，尤其是通过推理，因为他们不那么道德，所以对他们的要求就更少。如果有人以这种方式推理，他们在任何描述下都不会表现得很好，他们会为他们不愿意做的事情寻找借口。那些自私、无情或对他人命运漠不关心的人没有理由不采取行动。vice的用法本身就暗示着一种道德谴责的判断。相反，这个观点是预言性的:我们认为自私、无情和冷漠的人不太可能受到道德原因的影响而采取行动。事实上，亚里士多德认为，邪恶的人只能对惩罚的威胁做出反应，因为他们受到了糟糕的教育，因此对道德原因不敏感(1934,1179b5-15)。那些对道德原因不敏感的人可能会对成本增加或储蓄等经济激励做出反应。然而，按照这样的动机行事，还不足以表现良好。因此，那些仅仅为了省钱而在家里安装太阳能电池板的人，在应对气候变化方面不会表现得很好，尽管他们也不会表现得很糟糕。关于要求的最后一点。正如富特所指出的，我们似乎对什么使一项行动有要求，从而值得赞扬有不同的直觉虽然优秀的行为，真正优秀的行为，似乎需要更多的赞扬，但对于一个有美德的人来说，他们可能不会被要求更多。另一方面，对于一个有经验的人来说，即使他所做的事情很少，他也可能主观上要求更高，因此可能更值得称赞，因为他必须克服他的动机不足。因此，评估应对气候变化的要求需要对人们的性格和动机有更多的了解。我认为，美德伦理观点提供了一种独特的方式来思考我们应该如何应对气候变化，这可能比依赖于对伤害的因果解释来产生道德义务的方法更苛刻。这是因为美德术语确定了(几乎)每个人都应该回应的理由。美德术语鼓励我们思考我们能做什么，从我们的社会环境中推理。这涉及到与正义、仁慈和其他美德相关的原因，并没有明确区分我们作为个人的行为和我们与他人的行为。在面对共同的气候变化问题时，我们每个人都应该尽自己的一份力

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引用次数: 2

The populist challenge to European Union legitimacy: Old wine in new bottles? 民粹主义对欧盟合法性的挑战:新瓶装旧酒?

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12487

I. Cozzaglio, Dimitrios E. Efthymiou

引用次数: 1

Official apologies as reparations for dirty hands 官方道歉是对肮脏行径的补偿

IF 0.8 3区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Social Philosophy

Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/josp.12490

Christina Nick

引用次数: 2

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