{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12423","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 4","pages":"446-447"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134880327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Academic philosophy has witnessed a significant change in the last years from nonideal investigations of social wrongs as being a rather marginal topic in comparison to what was assumed to be more fundamental questions to those very investigations drawing significant attention and taking their rightful place in the midst of the profession of philosophy. Yet, despite these advances and the increasing awareness of social wrongs in relation to—for example, gender, race, class, and disability—social philosophers are still regularly asked to justify what they are doing or to justify that what they are doing is rightfully called philosophy. This special issue is motivated by the following three ideas: First, to increase awareness for nonideal investigations into gender, race, class, and disability. Second, to draw attention to the insight that our philosophical methods and the topics we are concerned with are not two separate issues; in fact, what we investigate and how we do so are tightly connected. Third, to question the ways in which philosophy as a discipline excludes certain voices, topics, and methods.</p><p>Many of the papers in this issue were the result of a conference marked by the attempt to bring investigations of social wrongs in the tradition of post-Analytic philosophy to the German-speaking philosophy world—a context still very much behind on investigations of social wrongs in a nonideal manner. This conference, which took place in Vienna, and which was organized in 2014 by Hilkje C. Hänel, Daniel James, and Odin Kroeger, served as an international forum for social philosophers to think about the way in which we do philosophy and the topics that are often strikingly absent from philosophy. Since then, much has changed, but the need to question what philosophy is, what it can do, and who is doing it remains. Before we provide a brief overview of the papers in this issue, let us say a bit more about the three aspects mentioned above.</p><p>Discussions of gender, race, and disability have slowly paved their way into the midst of philosophical theorizing and have become an essential aspect of academia; this is evidenced by recent hires in feminist philosophy and critical race studies, the emergence of journals on the topics of gender, race, and most recently, disability, or the central place that these topics take in the APA newsletter, conferences, as well as book and article publications. (This is of course due to the resistant struggle of a few to make our profession better and more welcoming for marginalized and oppressed philosophers.) However, neither nonideal investigations of social wrongs in general nor debates on gender, race, and disability—and many other important sites of oppression and injustice—have a secure place within academic philosophy yet; as can be seen by recent backlashes against trans philosophy or the metaphysical debates that claim that gender and race (and likely disability) are not substantive debates within
{"title":"Analyzing social wrongs","authors":"Hilkje C. Hänel, Sally Haslanger, Odin Kroeger","doi":"10.1111/josp.12505","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12505","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Academic philosophy has witnessed a significant change in the last years from nonideal investigations of social wrongs as being a rather marginal topic in comparison to what was assumed to be more fundamental questions to those very investigations drawing significant attention and taking their rightful place in the midst of the profession of philosophy. Yet, despite these advances and the increasing awareness of social wrongs in relation to—for example, gender, race, class, and disability—social philosophers are still regularly asked to justify what they are doing or to justify that what they are doing is rightfully called philosophy. This special issue is motivated by the following three ideas: First, to increase awareness for nonideal investigations into gender, race, class, and disability. Second, to draw attention to the insight that our philosophical methods and the topics we are concerned with are not two separate issues; in fact, what we investigate and how we do so are tightly connected. Third, to question the ways in which philosophy as a discipline excludes certain voices, topics, and methods.</p><p>Many of the papers in this issue were the result of a conference marked by the attempt to bring investigations of social wrongs in the tradition of post-Analytic philosophy to the German-speaking philosophy world—a context still very much behind on investigations of social wrongs in a nonideal manner. This conference, which took place in Vienna, and which was organized in 2014 by Hilkje C. Hänel, Daniel James, and Odin Kroeger, served as an international forum for social philosophers to think about the way in which we do philosophy and the topics that are often strikingly absent from philosophy. Since then, much has changed, but the need to question what philosophy is, what it can do, and who is doing it remains. Before we provide a brief overview of the papers in this issue, let us say a bit more about the three aspects mentioned above.</p><p>Discussions of gender, race, and disability have slowly paved their way into the midst of philosophical theorizing and have become an essential aspect of academia; this is evidenced by recent hires in feminist philosophy and critical race studies, the emergence of journals on the topics of gender, race, and most recently, disability, or the central place that these topics take in the APA newsletter, conferences, as well as book and article publications. (This is of course due to the resistant struggle of a few to make our profession better and more welcoming for marginalized and oppressed philosophers.) However, neither nonideal investigations of social wrongs in general nor debates on gender, race, and disability—and many other important sites of oppression and injustice—have a secure place within academic philosophy yet; as can be seen by recent backlashes against trans philosophy or the metaphysical debates that claim that gender and race (and likely disability) are not substantive debates within","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"53 4","pages":"448-453"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12505","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48860842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justice for (and by) philosophers: Professional ethics and punishing our own","authors":"Timothy Weidel","doi":"10.1111/josp.12508","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12508","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"471-492"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43312959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Since the late 1990s a class of political measures that can be called “obligatory integration policies” has constantly gained importance in Europe (cf. Goodman, <span>2010</span>; Goodman & Wright, <span>2015</span>; Joppke, <span>2017</span>; Michalowski & van Oers, <span>2012</span>; Triadafilopoulos, <span>2011</span>). These policies require immigrants to take certain actions or to demonstrate certain competences that, in the eyes of the host society, serve their integration.</p><p>Some of these measures are aimed at integration in a general sense. The requirement in several European states to take up residence in a particular place (“residence condition”), for instance, is intended to “facilitate the integration [of immigrants]” (EuGH Press Release No. 22/16), without specifying what integration consists in. Typically, however, these measures focus on learning the host society's language as the key to integration. In particular, many Western states prescribe some groups of immigrants to attend language classes. Often, these measures additionally seek to promote “civic” integration, for example, when integration courses encompass, beside language lessons, units about the host society's values, politics, culture, and history.</p><p>Obligatory integration policies are obligatory in the sense that they do not seek to promote attendance with <i>incentives</i>, but to compel it with <i>sanctions</i> or penalties. In case of incentives, immigrants are at liberty to respond to them or not. If, for example, the state subsidizes language courses so that the fee is very low or if the state pays grants to immigrants for successfully joining classes, many immigrants will decide to participate of their own free will. In case of obligatory integration policies, however, immigrants cannot choose whether or not they respond to an incentive; they simply have to comply with the legal obligation and any violation is deemed to be wrongdoing. In recent decades, there has been a shift in many European states from integration policies based on incentives toward obligatory integration policies. When, for instance, publicly subsidized integration courses were established in Germany in 2005, about a third of the participants in the courses were obliged to attend, whereas a majority chose voluntarily to embrace the opportunity to learn the language for a low price. The amendment of the legal rules underlying integration courses through the so-called <i>Integrationsgesetz</i> in 2016, lead to an increase in the share of the obligatory participants to two-thirds (193,000 persons in 2017).<sup>1</sup></p><p>From the point of view of normative theory, the distinction between obligatory integration policies and those merely involving incentives for voluntary compliance is of major importance. Obviously, there is nothing pro tanto unjust about states creating incentives for immigrants to integrate, as long as the incentives in question are reasonable in scope and
{"title":"The normative justification of obligatory integration policies","authors":"Matthias Hoesch","doi":"10.1111/josp.12506","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12506","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since the late 1990s a class of political measures that can be called “obligatory integration policies” has constantly gained importance in Europe (cf. Goodman, <span>2010</span>; Goodman & Wright, <span>2015</span>; Joppke, <span>2017</span>; Michalowski & van Oers, <span>2012</span>; Triadafilopoulos, <span>2011</span>). These policies require immigrants to take certain actions or to demonstrate certain competences that, in the eyes of the host society, serve their integration.</p><p>Some of these measures are aimed at integration in a general sense. The requirement in several European states to take up residence in a particular place (“residence condition”), for instance, is intended to “facilitate the integration [of immigrants]” (EuGH Press Release No. 22/16), without specifying what integration consists in. Typically, however, these measures focus on learning the host society's language as the key to integration. In particular, many Western states prescribe some groups of immigrants to attend language classes. Often, these measures additionally seek to promote “civic” integration, for example, when integration courses encompass, beside language lessons, units about the host society's values, politics, culture, and history.</p><p>Obligatory integration policies are obligatory in the sense that they do not seek to promote attendance with <i>incentives</i>, but to compel it with <i>sanctions</i> or penalties. In case of incentives, immigrants are at liberty to respond to them or not. If, for example, the state subsidizes language courses so that the fee is very low or if the state pays grants to immigrants for successfully joining classes, many immigrants will decide to participate of their own free will. In case of obligatory integration policies, however, immigrants cannot choose whether or not they respond to an incentive; they simply have to comply with the legal obligation and any violation is deemed to be wrongdoing. In recent decades, there has been a shift in many European states from integration policies based on incentives toward obligatory integration policies. When, for instance, publicly subsidized integration courses were established in Germany in 2005, about a third of the participants in the courses were obliged to attend, whereas a majority chose voluntarily to embrace the opportunity to learn the language for a low price. The amendment of the legal rules underlying integration courses through the so-called <i>Integrationsgesetz</i> in 2016, lead to an increase in the share of the obligatory participants to two-thirds (193,000 persons in 2017).<sup>1</sup></p><p>From the point of view of normative theory, the distinction between obligatory integration policies and those merely involving incentives for voluntary compliance is of major importance. Obviously, there is nothing pro tanto unjust about states creating incentives for immigrants to integrate, as long as the incentives in question are reasonable in scope and ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"562-578"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12506","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41834646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political activism, egalitarian justice, and public reason","authors":"Blain Neufeld","doi":"10.1111/josp.12501","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12501","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 2","pages":"299-316"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49284963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Following the recent practice turn in privacy research, informational privacy is increasingly analyzed with regard to the “appropriate flow of information” within a given practice, which preserves the “contextual integrity” of that practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 149; <span>2015</span>). Such a practice-theoretical take on privacy emphasizes the normative structure of practices as well as its structural injustices and power asymmetries, rather than focusing on the intentions and moral considerations of individual or institutional actors. Since privacy norms are seen to be institutionalized via the role obligations of the practice's participants, this approach can analyze structural and systematic privacy infringements in terms of “defective role performances and defective social relations” (Roessler & Mokrosinska, <span>2013</span>, p. 780).</p><p>Unfortunately, it is still often somewhat unclear what this exactly means within the context of informational privacy, why these performances and relations are defective and for whom. This raises the common objection of a so-called “practice positivism” (Applbaum, <span>1999</span>, p. 51), that is, the difficulty of practice–theoretical accounts to take a practice-independent standpoint, from which to normatively evaluate the existing practice norms themselves. For example, Nissenbaum herself initially argues for a “presumption in favor of the status quo” with respect to the appropriateness and flow of privacy norms within a practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2004</span>, p. 127). Such a “practice conservatism” (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 169) comes dangerously close to committing a naturalistic fallacy, if not undergirded by practice-external criteria (which is ultimately what she does).</p><p>Merely resorting to existing practice norms to assess what defective role performances amount to, only shifts the question from how to recognize an appropriate flow of information to the question of how to recognize those defective role performances and social relations. Against this backdrop, the central aim of this article is to shed light on this question without resorting to practice-independent first principles or far-reaching universalistic anthropological assumptions. For this, I will analyze the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” in terms of social pathologies.<sup>1</sup> Doing so has two advantages: First of all, it can draw on already existing concepts and distinctions, which help to categorize the different levels of analysis that exist in informational privacy research and situate the notion of “defective role performances” within them (Section 1). Second, those concepts and distinctions can serve as a basis for establishing a typology of phenomena with regard to deficient practices of informational privacy (Section 4).</p><p>Having thus set the scene in Section 1, I can move on to address the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” w
{"title":"Social pathologies of informational privacy","authors":"Wulf Loh","doi":"10.1111/josp.12504","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12504","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Following the recent practice turn in privacy research, informational privacy is increasingly analyzed with regard to the “appropriate flow of information” within a given practice, which preserves the “contextual integrity” of that practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 149; <span>2015</span>). Such a practice-theoretical take on privacy emphasizes the normative structure of practices as well as its structural injustices and power asymmetries, rather than focusing on the intentions and moral considerations of individual or institutional actors. Since privacy norms are seen to be institutionalized via the role obligations of the practice's participants, this approach can analyze structural and systematic privacy infringements in terms of “defective role performances and defective social relations” (Roessler & Mokrosinska, <span>2013</span>, p. 780).</p><p>Unfortunately, it is still often somewhat unclear what this exactly means within the context of informational privacy, why these performances and relations are defective and for whom. This raises the common objection of a so-called “practice positivism” (Applbaum, <span>1999</span>, p. 51), that is, the difficulty of practice–theoretical accounts to take a practice-independent standpoint, from which to normatively evaluate the existing practice norms themselves. For example, Nissenbaum herself initially argues for a “presumption in favor of the status quo” with respect to the appropriateness and flow of privacy norms within a practice (Nissenbaum, <span>2004</span>, p. 127). Such a “practice conservatism” (Nissenbaum, <span>2010</span>, p. 169) comes dangerously close to committing a naturalistic fallacy, if not undergirded by practice-external criteria (which is ultimately what she does).</p><p>Merely resorting to existing practice norms to assess what defective role performances amount to, only shifts the question from how to recognize an appropriate flow of information to the question of how to recognize those defective role performances and social relations. Against this backdrop, the central aim of this article is to shed light on this question without resorting to practice-independent first principles or far-reaching universalistic anthropological assumptions. For this, I will analyze the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” in terms of social pathologies.<sup>1</sup> Doing so has two advantages: First of all, it can draw on already existing concepts and distinctions, which help to categorize the different levels of analysis that exist in informational privacy research and situate the notion of “defective role performances” within them (Section 1). Second, those concepts and distinctions can serve as a basis for establishing a typology of phenomena with regard to deficient practices of informational privacy (Section 4).</p><p>Having thus set the scene in Section 1, I can move on to address the notion of “defective role performances and social relations” w","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"541-561"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12504","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42251597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Increased international coordination after the Second World War saw both the creation of more multilateral institutions but also the deepening of existing institutions' authority. Since then, many international institutions have faced criticism from both civil society and state representatives (e.g. Zürn et al., <span>2012</span>) which has intensified in recent years. Yet, addressing global problems such as poverty or climate change requires greater international collaboration than ever. So, how should we evaluate the authority of international institutions that demand compliance? When are such institutions legitimate? The question of state legitimacy has been at the core of political philosophy, and the concept and standards of legitimacy in respect of international institutions have recently garnered much attention (e.g. Adams et al., <span>2020</span>; Besson, <span>2014</span>; Buchanan & Keohane, <span>2006</span>; Christiano, <span>2012</span>; Sandven & Scherz, <span>2022</span>). However, one aspect has largely been neglected in this debate, namely how and when legitimate authority is able to bind not only individuals but also states.</p><p>The concept of legitimacy is traditionally applied to state institutions, though questions of legitimacy also arise for international institutions as soon as they demand compliance. International institutions seek to bind and therefore demand compliance primarily of states through their rules or agreements, while they do so of individuals only secondarily through their states. It remains unclear how normative conceptions of legitimacy apply to states. Therefore, it is important to understand how legitimacy is applicable internationally to bind states.</p><p>This paper tackles precisely this question: Under what circumstances <i>should</i> states comply with international institutions? It is generally assumed that legitimate authority can demand compliance of subjected individuals also in cases when compliance conflicts (or is seen to conflict) with their self-interest according to normative considerations such as the common good, rights, or moral reasons. Yet, for states, such normative considerations are often seen as naïve and thus quickly abandoned for realist international relations theories. Therefore, the legitimate authority of international institutions is often challenged on the basis of state sovereignty. On the other hand, if the normative side is taken seriously, state consent is criticized for as a legitimacy standard. Can states be bound in order to solve global problems or to comply with human rights even without their consent? If individuals have a right to “personal pursuits” (Tan, <span>2004</span>) based on their freedom or autonomy, then states might have a similar right to decide for themselves and only be subjected to the authority of international institutions to which they have explicitly consented. However, the use of such “domestic analogies” has often been critici
{"title":"You can't tell me what to do! Why should states comply with international institutions?","authors":"Antoinette Scherz","doi":"10.1111/josp.12503","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12503","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Increased international coordination after the Second World War saw both the creation of more multilateral institutions but also the deepening of existing institutions' authority. Since then, many international institutions have faced criticism from both civil society and state representatives (e.g. Zürn et al., <span>2012</span>) which has intensified in recent years. Yet, addressing global problems such as poverty or climate change requires greater international collaboration than ever. So, how should we evaluate the authority of international institutions that demand compliance? When are such institutions legitimate? The question of state legitimacy has been at the core of political philosophy, and the concept and standards of legitimacy in respect of international institutions have recently garnered much attention (e.g. Adams et al., <span>2020</span>; Besson, <span>2014</span>; Buchanan & Keohane, <span>2006</span>; Christiano, <span>2012</span>; Sandven & Scherz, <span>2022</span>). However, one aspect has largely been neglected in this debate, namely how and when legitimate authority is able to bind not only individuals but also states.</p><p>The concept of legitimacy is traditionally applied to state institutions, though questions of legitimacy also arise for international institutions as soon as they demand compliance. International institutions seek to bind and therefore demand compliance primarily of states through their rules or agreements, while they do so of individuals only secondarily through their states. It remains unclear how normative conceptions of legitimacy apply to states. Therefore, it is important to understand how legitimacy is applicable internationally to bind states.</p><p>This paper tackles precisely this question: Under what circumstances <i>should</i> states comply with international institutions? It is generally assumed that legitimate authority can demand compliance of subjected individuals also in cases when compliance conflicts (or is seen to conflict) with their self-interest according to normative considerations such as the common good, rights, or moral reasons. Yet, for states, such normative considerations are often seen as naïve and thus quickly abandoned for realist international relations theories. Therefore, the legitimate authority of international institutions is often challenged on the basis of state sovereignty. On the other hand, if the normative side is taken seriously, state consent is criticized for as a legitimacy standard. Can states be bound in order to solve global problems or to comply with human rights even without their consent? If individuals have a right to “personal pursuits” (Tan, <span>2004</span>) based on their freedom or autonomy, then states might have a similar right to decide for themselves and only be subjected to the authority of international institutions to which they have explicitly consented. However, the use of such “domestic analogies” has often been critici","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"450-470"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12503","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45996494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neither race nor ethnicity: Latinidad as a social affordance","authors":"Alejandro Arango, Adam Burgos","doi":"10.1111/josp.12500","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12500","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"502-521"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42955357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Political philosophy often focuses on what the state may legitimately do to, or in the name of, its citizens. Yet, how well a society lives up to political-philosophical ideals arguably also depends on the decisions that individuals make in their daily lives regarding, for instance, how to treat others, what to work with, and how to spend their free time. Many contemporary social movements for increased justice hence seem to focus less on reforming institutions and laws, and instead attempt to change the values and principles that individuals accept and act on. In political-philosophical terms, these movements are less interested in the “basic structure” of a society, and more intent on changing its “ethos.”<sup>1</sup> Part of this change could happen by influencing what people think are reasonable principles of justice, but the efforts to reform what is seen as acceptable behavior often also involves individuals monitoring each other and issuing positive and negative sanctions in response to each other's actions. Recent years have seen social media and other technological developments boosting the power of such sanctions, allowing millions of strangers to join in the criticism of particular wrongdoers. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic brought these kinds of social mechanisms to the center of attention, as decentralized and informal monitoring and sanctioning of people's response to pandemic-related regulations appeared to be at least as important as more classical forms of state enforcement. This article assumes that there are, indeed, moral demands on individuals to act in certain ways not only in times of crisis but also in order to further a just society, and sets out and defends an account of the concept of ethos that helps to conceptualize how individual compliance with these demands can be encouraged, or enforced.</p><p>The assumption that the degree of justice in a society does not only depend on how its institutions are set up is closely associated with philosopher G. A. Cohen's influential critique of John Rawls. The core of their disagreement is that, while Rawls suggests that principles of justice apply primarily to the major political and economic institutions of a society—its basic structure—Cohen argues that principles of justice would also shape a social ethos that inspires citizens to act in particular ways in their daily lives. Specifically, Cohen is skeptical of Rawls's willingness to accept as just equality-upsetting economic incentives that motivate individuals to work productively. Rejecting authoritarian attempts to coerce people to contribute, Cohen suggests that justice rather requires an egalitarian ethos that inspires and motivates individuals to make certain decisions about how much to work and with what.<sup>2</sup> Such an ethos, Cohen suggests, is a “moral climate,”<sup>3</sup> or “… a structure of response lodged in the motivations that inform everyday life …,”<sup>4</sup> that somehow influences individual
{"title":"Tying ourselves to the mast, or acting for the sake of justice? Ethos, individual duties, and social sanctions","authors":"Markus Furendal","doi":"10.1111/josp.12502","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12502","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Political philosophy often focuses on what the state may legitimately do to, or in the name of, its citizens. Yet, how well a society lives up to political-philosophical ideals arguably also depends on the decisions that individuals make in their daily lives regarding, for instance, how to treat others, what to work with, and how to spend their free time. Many contemporary social movements for increased justice hence seem to focus less on reforming institutions and laws, and instead attempt to change the values and principles that individuals accept and act on. In political-philosophical terms, these movements are less interested in the “basic structure” of a society, and more intent on changing its “ethos.”<sup>1</sup> Part of this change could happen by influencing what people think are reasonable principles of justice, but the efforts to reform what is seen as acceptable behavior often also involves individuals monitoring each other and issuing positive and negative sanctions in response to each other's actions. Recent years have seen social media and other technological developments boosting the power of such sanctions, allowing millions of strangers to join in the criticism of particular wrongdoers. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic brought these kinds of social mechanisms to the center of attention, as decentralized and informal monitoring and sanctioning of people's response to pandemic-related regulations appeared to be at least as important as more classical forms of state enforcement. This article assumes that there are, indeed, moral demands on individuals to act in certain ways not only in times of crisis but also in order to further a just society, and sets out and defends an account of the concept of ethos that helps to conceptualize how individual compliance with these demands can be encouraged, or enforced.</p><p>The assumption that the degree of justice in a society does not only depend on how its institutions are set up is closely associated with philosopher G. A. Cohen's influential critique of John Rawls. The core of their disagreement is that, while Rawls suggests that principles of justice apply primarily to the major political and economic institutions of a society—its basic structure—Cohen argues that principles of justice would also shape a social ethos that inspires citizens to act in particular ways in their daily lives. Specifically, Cohen is skeptical of Rawls's willingness to accept as just equality-upsetting economic incentives that motivate individuals to work productively. Rejecting authoritarian attempts to coerce people to contribute, Cohen suggests that justice rather requires an egalitarian ethos that inspires and motivates individuals to make certain decisions about how much to work and with what.<sup>2</sup> Such an ethos, Cohen suggests, is a “moral climate,”<sup>3</sup> or “… a structure of response lodged in the motivations that inform everyday life …,”<sup>4</sup> that somehow influences individual","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"55 3","pages":"522-540"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12502","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42492413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>I encountered a turtle midway through crossing the road. I stopped the car and waited for her, but she had seized up. I got out and gently lifted her to the side of the road. It was a face-to-face encounter with a <i>wild</i> animal who had unknowingly entered a “human” world. Her action disrupted my naive attitude that a road is a place for me to drive along, a place for cars, and not a place for turtles. But, she just needed to get to the other side; the road cut through her world. My naive attitude that the road is not a place for turtles fails to acknowledge the turtles' jurisdiction over their habitat on both sides of the road. In this article, I explore how Indigenous political ontology, from the First Nations<sup>1</sup> of Canada and the northern United States, allows us to conceive of a world where animals have jurisdiction over their land. On such an account when roads or other interventions cut through their territories without providing accommodations we have done something wrong.</p><p>Wild animals have their place in the world as part of autonomous communities outside human institutions like industrial agriculture, laboratories, zoos, and our homes. In order to restrain human interventions in the places and practices of autonomous nonhuman animal communities, some have suggested that wild animals be understood as “sovereign” (Donaldson & Kymlicka, <span>2011</span>; Goodin et al., <span>1997</span>). Designating wild animals “sovereign” is one way to establish the jurisdiction of nonhuman animal communities. In line with the norms of international relations, recognizing wild animal communities as sovereign limits foreign (in this case, humans and domestic animals) access to their spaces and establishes limits on the human ability to intervene when it affects their jurisdiction.</p><p>A sovereignty conception of jurisdiction is missing something, namely that wild animal communities have no sovereigns—there are no kings of lion prides, ministers of owl parliaments, or presidents of salamander congresses. Wild animals can only be “sovereign” through human institutions. Recommending a novel institution fails to capture the jurisdiction of wild animals that goes unrecognized when humans fail to appropriately limit their interventions. After all, some humans already advocate for limited interventions in wild animals' territory, for example, when activists and environmental government agencies challenge the construction of highways through wetlands or when Indigenous water protectors and land defenders refuse to allow oil pipelines (Sainato, <span>2021</span>) or the destruction of old-growth forests (Larsen, <span>2021</span>). These advocates are usually not defending the supposed rights of a sovereign nonhuman animal community. Instead, they often defend the rights of First Nations to govern land shared with more-than-human beings.<sup>2</sup></p><p>The shared jurisdiction, attested to in some traditional Indigenous thought, offe
{"title":"Indigenizing wild animal sovereignty","authors":"Dennis Papadopoulos him/his","doi":"10.1111/josp.12498","DOIUrl":"10.1111/josp.12498","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I encountered a turtle midway through crossing the road. I stopped the car and waited for her, but she had seized up. I got out and gently lifted her to the side of the road. It was a face-to-face encounter with a <i>wild</i> animal who had unknowingly entered a “human” world. Her action disrupted my naive attitude that a road is a place for me to drive along, a place for cars, and not a place for turtles. But, she just needed to get to the other side; the road cut through her world. My naive attitude that the road is not a place for turtles fails to acknowledge the turtles' jurisdiction over their habitat on both sides of the road. In this article, I explore how Indigenous political ontology, from the First Nations<sup>1</sup> of Canada and the northern United States, allows us to conceive of a world where animals have jurisdiction over their land. On such an account when roads or other interventions cut through their territories without providing accommodations we have done something wrong.</p><p>Wild animals have their place in the world as part of autonomous communities outside human institutions like industrial agriculture, laboratories, zoos, and our homes. In order to restrain human interventions in the places and practices of autonomous nonhuman animal communities, some have suggested that wild animals be understood as “sovereign” (Donaldson & Kymlicka, <span>2011</span>; Goodin et al., <span>1997</span>). Designating wild animals “sovereign” is one way to establish the jurisdiction of nonhuman animal communities. In line with the norms of international relations, recognizing wild animal communities as sovereign limits foreign (in this case, humans and domestic animals) access to their spaces and establishes limits on the human ability to intervene when it affects their jurisdiction.</p><p>A sovereignty conception of jurisdiction is missing something, namely that wild animal communities have no sovereigns—there are no kings of lion prides, ministers of owl parliaments, or presidents of salamander congresses. Wild animals can only be “sovereign” through human institutions. Recommending a novel institution fails to capture the jurisdiction of wild animals that goes unrecognized when humans fail to appropriately limit their interventions. After all, some humans already advocate for limited interventions in wild animals' territory, for example, when activists and environmental government agencies challenge the construction of highways through wetlands or when Indigenous water protectors and land defenders refuse to allow oil pipelines (Sainato, <span>2021</span>) or the destruction of old-growth forests (Larsen, <span>2021</span>). These advocates are usually not defending the supposed rights of a sovereign nonhuman animal community. Instead, they often defend the rights of First Nations to govern land shared with more-than-human beings.<sup>2</sup></p><p>The shared jurisdiction, attested to in some traditional Indigenous thought, offe","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"54 4","pages":"583-601"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10947386/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46019553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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