The present stock-flow consistent model aims at capturing the second causal link of endogenous monetary theory, from deposits to reserves, by including intrasectoral flows within the banking sector and debt maturity structure decisions. For this purpose, banks can choose the demanded duration of interbank loans, either overnight or term, according to a measure for maturity mismatch which captures funding liquidity risk. The simulations show that: (i) a well-functioning term interbank market is needed when banks face exogenous shocks; and (ii) banks’ funding structure may act as an endogenous source of credit market pressures.
{"title":"Interbank market and funding liquidity risk in a stock-flow consistent model","authors":"Jessica Reale","doi":"10.1111/meca.12380","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12380","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The present stock-flow consistent model aims at capturing the second causal link of endogenous monetary theory, from deposits to reserves, by including intrasectoral flows within the banking sector and <i>debt maturity structure</i> decisions. For this purpose, banks can choose the demanded duration of interbank loans, either overnight or term, according to a measure for maturity mismatch which captures funding liquidity risk. The simulations show that: (i) a well-functioning term interbank market is needed when banks face exogenous shocks; and (ii) banks’ funding structure may act as an endogenous source of credit market pressures.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 3","pages":"734-769"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meca.12380","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42251437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies Bertrand–Edgeworth competition among firms producing a homogeneous commodity under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization is reached. Our focus is on a subset of the no pure-strategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which, in a well-defined sense, some firms are large and the others are small. We characterize equilibria for such subset. For each firm, the payoffs are the same at any equilibrium and, for each type of firm, they are proportional to capacity. While there is a single profile of equilibrium distributions for the large firms, there is a continuum of equilibrium distributions for the small firms: what is uniquely determined, for the latter, is the capacity-weighted sum of their equilibrium distributions and hence the union of the supports of their equilibrium strategies.
{"title":"Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly: Characterization of mixed strategy equilibria when some firms are large and the others are small","authors":"Massimo A. De Francesco, Neri Salvadori","doi":"10.1111/meca.12382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies Bertrand–Edgeworth competition among firms producing a homogeneous commodity under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization is reached. Our focus is on a subset of the no pure-strategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which, in a well-defined sense, some firms are large and the others are small. We characterize equilibria for such subset. For each firm, the payoffs are the same at any equilibrium and, for each type of firm, they are proportional to capacity. While there is a single profile of equilibrium distributions for the large firms, there is a continuum of equilibrium distributions for the small firms: what is uniquely determined, for the latter, is the capacity-weighted sum of their equilibrium distributions and hence the union of the supports of their equilibrium strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 3","pages":"803-824"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meca.12382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42191829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Neo-Kaleckian model predicts that actual capacity utilisation is endogenous to demand shocks and positively correlated with growth in the short and long run. Competing macroeconomic theories predict that such correlation does not exist in the long run and demand shocks have transitory effects on capacity utilisation. Using a quarterly unbalanced panel of 21 developed and developing countries, we show that taking into account direct survey measures, capacity utilisation is stationary, positively correlated with growth in the short run and uncorrelated with growth in the long run. These results are inconsistent with the long-run behaviour of the Neo-Kaleckian model.
{"title":"On the empirical content of the convergence debate: Cross-country evidence on growth and capacity utilisation","authors":"Santiago José Gahn, Alejandro González","doi":"10.1111/meca.12383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Neo-Kaleckian model predicts that actual capacity utilisation is endogenous to demand shocks and positively correlated with growth in the short and long run. Competing macroeconomic theories predict that such correlation does not exist in the long run and demand shocks have transitory effects on capacity utilisation. Using a quarterly unbalanced panel of 21 developed and developing countries, we show that taking into account direct survey measures, capacity utilisation is stationary, positively correlated with growth in the short run and uncorrelated with growth in the long run. These results are inconsistent with the long-run behaviour of the Neo-Kaleckian model.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 3","pages":"825-855"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44855555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study an extraction site reclamation problem in a two-player differential game setting over a finite time horizon. Environmental regulation requires each firm to engage in reclamation efforts during the entire lifespan of the extraction site and to pay an abandonment reclamation fee at the end of its lease term for the unclaimed pollution caused by firms’ activities. Firms determine their reclamation efforts in order to minimize their reclamation cost. We analyze and compare individual firms’ choices and the pollution stock in the noncooperative and the cooperative cases by distinguishing between situations in which firms are homogeneous and heterogeneous. We study the case in which firms have different lease durations and different degrees of environmental liability. We show that the dynamics of the reclamation efforts may be substantially different under noncooperation and cooperation, and in both cases, it is mainly determined by how the rate of time preference and the growth rate of firms’ liabilities compare. Moreover, in all scenarios, the reclamation efforts generally rise with the degree of liability and fall with the lease duration, suggesting that in order to promote better environmental outcomes, the regulators should carefully determine the lease conditions by introducing intra-term reclamation fees along with stringent environmental accountability.
{"title":"Reclamation of a resource extraction site: A differential game approach","authors":"Simone Marsiglio, Nahid Masoudi","doi":"10.1111/meca.12381","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12381","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study an extraction site reclamation problem in a two-player differential game setting over a finite time horizon. Environmental regulation requires each firm to engage in reclamation efforts during the entire lifespan of the extraction site and to pay an abandonment reclamation fee at the end of its lease term for the unclaimed pollution caused by firms’ activities. Firms determine their reclamation efforts in order to minimize their reclamation cost. We analyze and compare individual firms’ choices and the pollution stock in the noncooperative and the cooperative cases by distinguishing between situations in which firms are homogeneous and heterogeneous. We study the case in which firms have different lease durations and different degrees of environmental liability. We show that the dynamics of the reclamation efforts may be substantially different under noncooperation and cooperation, and in both cases, it is mainly determined by how the rate of time preference and the growth rate of firms’ liabilities compare. Moreover, in all scenarios, the reclamation efforts generally rise with the degree of liability and fall with the lease duration, suggesting that in order to promote better environmental outcomes, the regulators should carefully determine the lease conditions by introducing intra-term reclamation fees along with stringent environmental accountability.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 3","pages":"770-802"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meca.12381","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47660155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU) spends more than one billion euros per year ensuring translation and interpretation of 24 languages to preserve multilingualism. We examine how this budget should be fairly allocated, taking into account linguistic and economic realities of each member country. Our analysis tries to estimate the value of keeping English as a procedural language (in fact, almost a lingua franca) in the post-Brexit EU, where, today, just about one percent of the population speaks it as native language.
{"title":"Brexit and multilingualism in the European Union","authors":"Victor Ginsburgh, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero","doi":"10.1111/meca.12379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12379","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The European Union (EU) spends more than one billion euros per year ensuring translation and interpretation of 24 languages to preserve multilingualism. We examine how this budget should be fairly allocated, taking into account linguistic and economic realities of each member country. Our analysis tries to estimate the <i>value</i> of keeping English as a procedural language (in fact, almost a <i>lingua franca</i>) in the post-Brexit EU, where, today, just about one percent of the population speaks it as native language.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 2","pages":"708-731"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meca.12379","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137963102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently economists have developed Kaleckian-Harrodian models, in which non-capacity-creating autonomous demand acts as a stabilizing force that drives long-run growth. But critics have questioned the plausibility of the stability conditions for these models. Motivated by this controversy, in this paper I formulate an alternative framework, in which stable equilibria need not exist, and solution trajectories can perpetually fluctuate in violent and aperiodic ways, but the long-run dynamics can be understood in terms of time averages. On this basis I argue that key findings in the Kaleckian-Harrodian literature can be sustained even if the stability conditions are rejected.
{"title":"“The total movement of this disorder is its order”: Investment and utilization dynamics in long-run disequilibrium","authors":"Stephen Thompson","doi":"10.1111/meca.12377","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12377","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recently economists have developed Kaleckian-Harrodian models, in which non-capacity-creating autonomous demand acts as a stabilizing force that drives long-run growth. But critics have questioned the plausibility of the stability conditions for these models. Motivated by this controversy, in this paper I formulate an alternative framework, in which stable equilibria need not exist, and solution trajectories can perpetually fluctuate in violent and aperiodic ways, but the long-run dynamics can be understood in terms of time averages. On this basis I argue that key findings in the Kaleckian-Harrodian literature can be sustained even if the stability conditions are rejected.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 2","pages":"638-682"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41495762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In importing trade model, Cournot competition occurs between domestic semi-public and foreign firms in domestic market; the government implements specific/ad valorem tariff. We examine the welfare effect of tariff simplification. Under general demand function, when semi-public firms are more efficient than foreign firms with low/high privatization, tariff simplification hurts/benefits the domestic country. When semi-public firms are less efficient than foreign firms with medium privatization, tariff simplification hurts the domestic country; else, it benefits the domestic country. When the government adopts optimal tariff rate and optimal privatization, and domestic semi-public firms are less efficient than foreign firms, optimal privatization increases after tariff simplification.
{"title":"Tariff simplification, privatization, and welfare superiority","authors":"Ya-Po Yang, Qidi Zhang, Leonard F. S. Wang","doi":"10.1111/meca.12378","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12378","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In importing trade model, Cournot competition occurs between domestic semi-public and foreign firms in domestic market; the government implements specific/ad valorem tariff. We examine the welfare effect of tariff simplification. Under general demand function, when semi-public firms are more efficient than foreign firms with low/high privatization, tariff simplification hurts/benefits the domestic country. When semi-public firms are less efficient than foreign firms with medium privatization, tariff simplification hurts the domestic country; else, it benefits the domestic country. When the government adopts optimal tariff rate and optimal privatization, and domestic semi-public firms are less efficient than foreign firms, optimal privatization increases after tariff simplification.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 2","pages":"683-707"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44740107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a novel empirical investigation into demand and distribution dynamics using a heterogeneous panel structural vector autoregression model for a panel of 10 emerging economies during the 1970–2017 period. Following the Kaleckian tradition, the theoretical analysis is based on a dynamic macro model where distributive shares and labor productivity are determined endogenously by introducing conflicting-claims theory of inflation and Kaldor–Verdoorn effects. The paper indicates profit-led demand regime only in the short run and profit-squeeze effects when allowing for the contemporaneous effect of labor share on capacity utilization and capital accumulation. However, after incorporating the contemporaneous effect of demand on labor share and thus controlling for the short-term effect of pro-cyclical labor productivity on labor share, the results provide evidence for wage-led demand and wage-squeeze effects. These results underline how the importance of addressing endogeneity issues when estimating demand and distribution regimes and how different assumptions about the interactions among demand, distribution, and labor productivity result in diverse findings.
{"title":"Endogenous income distribution and aggregate demand: Empirical evidence from heterogeneous panel structural vector autoregression","authors":"Betül Mutlugün","doi":"10.1111/meca.12376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents a novel empirical investigation into demand and distribution dynamics using a heterogeneous panel structural vector autoregression model for a panel of 10 emerging economies during the 1970–2017 period. Following the Kaleckian tradition, the theoretical analysis is based on a dynamic macro model where distributive shares and labor productivity are determined endogenously by introducing conflicting-claims theory of inflation and Kaldor–Verdoorn effects. The paper indicates profit-led demand regime only in the short run and profit-squeeze effects when allowing for the contemporaneous effect of labor share on capacity utilization and capital accumulation. However, after incorporating the contemporaneous effect of demand on labor share and thus controlling for the short-term effect of pro-cyclical labor productivity on labor share, the results provide evidence for wage-led demand and wage-squeeze effects. These results underline how the importance of addressing endogeneity issues when estimating demand and distribution regimes and how different assumptions about the interactions among demand, distribution, and labor productivity result in diverse findings.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 2","pages":"583-637"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46950943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the presence of many heterogeneous players with two public goods under Cobb–Douglas preferences. It provides a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium including contributors providing both public goods, and shows that contributors providing both public goods appear frequently. This uniqueness property allows us to conduct a comparative statics analysis with a contributor and a free rider of both public goods, showing the role of the contributor providing both public goods.
{"title":"Existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a game of voluntary public good provision with two public goods","authors":"Kenichi Suzuki, Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi, Jun-ichi Itaya, Akitomo Yamanashi","doi":"10.1111/meca.12375","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper shows the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the presence of many heterogeneous players with two public goods under Cobb–Douglas preferences. It provides a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium including contributors providing both public goods, and shows that contributors providing both public goods appear frequently. This uniqueness property allows us to conduct a comparative statics analysis with a contributor and a free rider of both public goods, showing the role of the contributor providing both public goods.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 2","pages":"567-582"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45752804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a neo-Kaleckian growth-model, we endogenize the dividend rate and corporate debt in the long run and investigate the possibility of multiple equilibria and instability in the economy. We find that the economy is in a wage-led demand and debt-burdened growth regime. However, both debt-led and debt-burdened demand regimes are possible. In some instances, the speed of the adjustment parameter related to the dividend dynamics plays a crucial role in stabilizing the economy. Otherwise, the economy may lose its stability and gives birth to limit cycles. A rise in the floor level of the targeted dividend–capital ratio has a destabilizing effect on the economy. The same is true for a rise in the interest rate. Moreover, a significant rise in the interest rate may cause instability in the economy. Therefore, a lower value of the floor level of the targeted dividend–capital ratio and a lower level of interest rate are desirable for promoting stability in the economy.
{"title":"Corporate debt, endogenous dividend rate, instability and growth","authors":"Pintu Parui","doi":"10.1111/meca.12373","DOIUrl":"10.1111/meca.12373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a neo-Kaleckian growth-model, we endogenize the dividend rate and corporate debt in the long run and investigate the possibility of multiple equilibria and instability in the economy. We find that the economy is in a wage-led demand and debt-burdened growth regime. However, both debt-led and debt-burdened demand regimes are possible. In some instances, the speed of the adjustment parameter related to the dividend dynamics plays a crucial role in stabilizing the economy. Otherwise, the economy may lose its stability and gives birth to limit cycles. A rise in the floor level of the targeted dividend–capital ratio has a destabilizing effect on the economy. The same is true for a rise in the interest rate. Moreover, a significant rise in the interest rate may cause instability in the economy. Therefore, a lower value of the floor level of the targeted dividend–capital ratio and a lower level of interest rate are desirable for promoting stability in the economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":46885,"journal":{"name":"Metroeconomica","volume":"73 2","pages":"514-549"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44523310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}