This study considers low-ability workers with the difference in their specialization areas and investigates the consequence of automation. There are two findings. First, owing to automation, it is more difficult for displaced workers than for other workers to find a new job, because these displaced workers lose their suitable jobs. Consequently, the unemployment rate increases with an increase in the number of displaced workers. Second, unless an additional increase in unsuitable jobs is large under the introduction of new tasks, automation does not necessarily increase the unemployment rate because it is less difficult for workers to find a new job.
This paper uses an agent-based computational model to investigate whether and how considering the firm's reputation in the public procurement selection process affects the expected final contract cost. We take account of different sets of simulations and a range of model parameters (such as firm skills, level of opportunistic rebate, relative weights of reputation and rebate) and propose a reputation index based on the cost overruns recorded by winning firms at the conclusion of their contracts. We show that this index allows the awarding authority to (i) select the most efficient and the least opportunistic firms, and (ii) to exclude firms that engage in frequent opportunistic behavior whose reputation has declined. Our results suggest that reputation matters, and we derive some implications for policy.
Thirlwall's law is one of the most powerful empirical regularities in demand-led growth theories. In recent years, the challenges imposed by globalisation have led to a new wave of studies incorporating into this framework topics such as ecological sustainability, the complexity of innovation processes, the role of institutions, the composition of external imbalances, and gender issues. We notice some overlapping between two alternative interpretations: one that sees the law as a binding constraint and another that adopts a kind of ‘centre-of-gravity’ perspective. It is argued that they may be rather complementary. By means of a simple Keynesian multiplier model compatible with Harrodian instability, we show that assuming a balance-of-payments ceiling to growth gives rise to persistent and bounded fluctuations such that the external constraint works as an asymmetric ‘centre-of-gravity’. There is no need to impose a floor to output. Moreover, the model allows for different sources of autonomous demand. Numerical simulations show the robustness of our results with respect to alternative scenarios.
We investigate a supply chain comprising a manufacturer engaged in advertising and two retailers who compete with differentiated products. We examine the endogenous choice between competing on quantity or price for the retailers. Our analysis reveals that, depending on the level of product substitutability, the range of possible outcomes is varied and includes Cournot, Bertrand, and Cournot-Bertrand under informative advertising. This result contradicts the established understanding that firms tend to engage in Cournot competition as their dominant strategy. Furthermore, we find that under persuasive advertising, Cournot or Bertrand outcomes may be optimal, but Cournot-Bertrand never arises as an equilibrium.
A significant portion of the work published on firm investment adapts models that operate on an “average firm” assumption, which is different from the investment behavior of a modal firm. This study employs a Bayesian quantile regression model to explore the investment rates in the United States and finds, first, that the firms with higher investment rates have a higher responsiveness to the valuation ratio and lower responsiveness to the profit rate, and, second, that there is a decline in the responsiveness of firm investment to these factors in recent years. The paper also emphasizes the role of autonomous investments in determining firm-level investment rates, based on differing sectoral factors.
In impunity bargaining with concession, opportunistic proposers would not offer anything nor concede. Opportunistic responders should not accept first offers since second offers could be more generous, for example, due to random trembles. On the contrary, our experimental data, elicited via the strategy vector method, show that participants moderate initial claims and concede, albeit by small amounts. The considerable heterogeneity in behavior suggests that disagreement is unpleasant: participants avoid it by yielding (demanding firstly less than what can be shared) and conceding (lowering first demand). Overall agreement dominates interpersonally (one plays against another) and intrapersonally (as if one plays against oneself).
This paper uses a blended methodology—conventional tests of ‘Thirlwall's law’ combined with an in-depth growth narrative approach and unit root tests—to identify the dominant balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism in the Zambian economy over the period 1956–2017. Consistent with Thirlwall's growth law, the main results identify income changes as the dominant balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism, rather than relative price changes. The three-regime export demand function further reflects the vulnerability of the Zambian economy to unexpected busts in the world copper market, and highlights the need for effective industrial policies to create a more diversified economy into higher value-added manufactures. The analysis also demonstrates that the results are robust to some of the main criticisms that have been levelled against Thirlwall's original growth law.
This article extends previous disability models in a different and more detailed framework that contemplates both temporary and permanent disability. By introducing different degrees of disability, the paper contributes to the recent debate among empirical scholars on the growth of disability insurance programmes in several OECD countries. This approach allows us to analyse, and consequently compare, the consumption paths of able, temporarily disabled, and permanently disabled workers. Furthermore, in a numerical simulation, the analysis demonstrates that the system of dynamic incentives should adapt the disability benefits to the different disability statuses.
This article aims at stimulating a discussion on “the nine building blocks presented by Pasinetti to define the main methodological characteristic features of the classical-Keynesian school” and chosen as the guidelines of a recent collective volume. The discussion notes are tripartite. Part I presents a list of short annotations at the margin of the nine blocks for possible debate. Part II starts the discussion by focusing on “an appropriate analytical framework for dealing with technical change and economic growth” and, in particular, on the theoretical approach in terms of vertically integrated sectors. Part III deals briefly with the blocks on normal states, causality and macroeconomics versus microeconomics.

