{"title":"Maxwell A. Cameron and Grace M. Jaramillo , eds., Challenges to Democracy in the Andes: Strongmen, Broken Constitutions, and Regimes in Crisis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2022. Tables, figures, 263 pp.; hardcover $98, ebook $98.","authors":"John Polga-Hecimovich","doi":"10.1017/lap.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48111859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Germán Feierherd, Patricio Larroulet, Wei Long, N. Lustig
ABSTRACT Latin American countries experienced a significant reduction in income inequality at the turn of the twenty-first century. From the early 2000s to around 2012, the average Gini coefficient fell from 0.51 to 0.47. The period of falling inequality coincided with leftist presidential candidates achieving electoral victories across the region: by 2009, 11 of the 17 countries had a leftist president—the so-called Pink Tide. Using a difference-in-differences design, a range of econometric models, inequality measurements, and samples, this study finds evidence that leftist governments lowered income inequality faster than non-leftist regimes, increasing the income share captured by the first 7 deciles at the expense of the top 10 percent. The analysis suggests that this reduction was achieved by increasing social pensions, minimum wages, and tax revenue.
{"title":"The Pink Tide and Income Inequality in Latin America","authors":"Germán Feierherd, Patricio Larroulet, Wei Long, N. Lustig","doi":"10.1017/lap.2022.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.47","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Latin American countries experienced a significant reduction in income inequality at the turn of the twenty-first century. From the early 2000s to around 2012, the average Gini coefficient fell from 0.51 to 0.47. The period of falling inequality coincided with leftist presidential candidates achieving electoral victories across the region: by 2009, 11 of the 17 countries had a leftist president—the so-called Pink Tide. Using a difference-in-differences design, a range of econometric models, inequality measurements, and samples, this study finds evidence that leftist governments lowered income inequality faster than non-leftist regimes, increasing the income share captured by the first 7 deciles at the expense of the top 10 percent. The analysis suggests that this reduction was achieved by increasing social pensions, minimum wages, and tax revenue.","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"110 - 144"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42529181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The government of Colombia, led by President Álvaro Uribe, imposed a high tax on the country’s wealthy citizens during his first term in office (2002–10), justified by public safety concerns. At the time, the country was internationally seen as a “failed state,” and violence caused by criminal groups and irregular forces seemed impossible to stop. The tax served to fund the military’s professionalization and expansion. Despite the high cost, the tax was successful, and the wealthy continued to pay it for several years. Other Latin American countries attempted, with varying degrees of success, to address their own security issues through similar taxes. In this book, Gustavo Flores-Macías describes a theory in which “demand and supply factors” (2) explain why economic elites in Latin America pay for public goods, even though they have a history of avoiding investing in the state, especially through taxes. Flores-Macías argues that in a world where Latin America is the most dangerous region, organized crime affects not only the daily lives of poor residents but also the activities of companies and wealthy families. When facing a security threat, the economic elite demands state protection. On the supply side, the government provides policy solutions, some of which involve business groups. The linkages between business and government authorities, such as “consultation forums, collaboration mechanisms, and the inclusion of corporate leaders or their representatives into government positions” (49), determine whether the elite tax can be successfully enacted. These relationships are especially strong in right-wing governments, such as in Colombia, Honduras, and several Mexican subnational states, where elites have shown willingness to pay a higher tax. The book connects well the historical literature on state formation to the current discussion on elite taxes. Its main contribution is that contemporary risks to public safety mimic prior systemic crises, which, according to the state formation literature, offer incentives for elites to invest in public safety. Homicide rates in Latin America are currently driving governments and elites to seek remedies that include higher budgetary revenues. This implied longitudinal comparison suggests that the government can hardly force elites to pay security taxes, as would be expected, for example, under a leftist administration. Business actors are still powerful. So, in this context of “strong society, weak state,” the elite’s willingness to invest in public safety is an essential condition. While this argument is compelling and relies on the vibrant literature of state building, there are parts that could benefit from further clarification. State
{"title":"Gustavo Flores-Macías, Contemporary State Building: Elite Taxation and Public Safety in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Figures, tables, bibliography, index, 260 pp.; hardcover $99.99, ebook $99.99.","authors":"Luis Garcia","doi":"10.1017/lap.2023.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2023.6","url":null,"abstract":"The government of Colombia, led by President Álvaro Uribe, imposed a high tax on the country’s wealthy citizens during his first term in office (2002–10), justified by public safety concerns. At the time, the country was internationally seen as a “failed state,” and violence caused by criminal groups and irregular forces seemed impossible to stop. The tax served to fund the military’s professionalization and expansion. Despite the high cost, the tax was successful, and the wealthy continued to pay it for several years. Other Latin American countries attempted, with varying degrees of success, to address their own security issues through similar taxes. In this book, Gustavo Flores-Macías describes a theory in which “demand and supply factors” (2) explain why economic elites in Latin America pay for public goods, even though they have a history of avoiding investing in the state, especially through taxes. Flores-Macías argues that in a world where Latin America is the most dangerous region, organized crime affects not only the daily lives of poor residents but also the activities of companies and wealthy families. When facing a security threat, the economic elite demands state protection. On the supply side, the government provides policy solutions, some of which involve business groups. The linkages between business and government authorities, such as “consultation forums, collaboration mechanisms, and the inclusion of corporate leaders or their representatives into government positions” (49), determine whether the elite tax can be successfully enacted. These relationships are especially strong in right-wing governments, such as in Colombia, Honduras, and several Mexican subnational states, where elites have shown willingness to pay a higher tax. The book connects well the historical literature on state formation to the current discussion on elite taxes. Its main contribution is that contemporary risks to public safety mimic prior systemic crises, which, according to the state formation literature, offer incentives for elites to invest in public safety. Homicide rates in Latin America are currently driving governments and elites to seek remedies that include higher budgetary revenues. This implied longitudinal comparison suggests that the government can hardly force elites to pay security taxes, as would be expected, for example, under a leftist administration. Business actors are still powerful. So, in this context of “strong society, weak state,” the elite’s willingness to invest in public safety is an essential condition. While this argument is compelling and relies on the vibrant literature of state building, there are parts that could benefit from further clarification. State","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"180 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43438375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carlos A. Pérez Ricart, Cien años de espías y drogas. La historia de los agentes antinarcóticos de Estados Unidos en México. Mexico City: Penguin Random House, 2022. Bibliography, 375 pp.; paperback MX$349, ebook MX$249.","authors":"Sonja Wolf","doi":"10.1017/lap.2022.69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.69","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"162 - 165"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48502451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT Are Latin American presidents at greater risk for removal in remittance-dependent countries? Departing from the debate about whether remittances produce democratic or autocratic outcomes, this article asks whether remittances contribute to presidential removals, which are an important characteristic of Latin American democracies since the Third Wave. It uses questions about supporting a military coup under high corruption and crime scenarios to gauge remittance recipients’ support for early removal of a president. It finds that remittances create a constituency that tolerates military coups. Using data from Martínez (2021), the analysis also shows that remittances increase the risk of removal for presidents who face a greater number of scandals; but remittances do not pose this threat under poor economic performance.
{"title":"Do Remittances Contribute to Presidential Instability in Latin America?","authors":"J. Acevedo","doi":"10.1017/lap.2022.68","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.68","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Are Latin American presidents at greater risk for removal in remittance-dependent countries? Departing from the debate about whether remittances produce democratic or autocratic outcomes, this article asks whether remittances contribute to presidential removals, which are an important characteristic of Latin American democracies since the Third Wave. It uses questions about supporting a military coup under high corruption and crime scenarios to gauge remittance recipients’ support for early removal of a president. It finds that remittances create a constituency that tolerates military coups. Using data from Martínez (2021), the analysis also shows that remittances increase the risk of removal for presidents who face a greater number of scandals; but remittances do not pose this threat under poor economic performance.","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"72 - 94"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47655877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT Because conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) can address the deep roots of violence, many scholars and policymakers have assumed them to be an effective and innocuous tool to take on the issue. I argue that while CCTs may have positive economic effects, they can also trigger social discord, criminal predation, and political conflict and, in doing so, increase violence. To test this claim, I take advantage of the exogenous shock caused by the randomized expansion of Mexico’s flagship CCT, PROGRESA/Oportunidades. I find that the experimental introduction of the program increased rather than decreased violence. Then, I analyze all the data compiled by LAPOP on the issue over the years. I find that, other things constant, Latin Americans are more exposed to violence and insecurity when they participate in CCTs than when they do not. These findings urge us to reconsider the effects of social programs on violence.
{"title":"The Unintended Consequences of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs for Violence: Experimental and Survey Evidence from Mexico and the Americas","authors":"Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga","doi":"10.1017/lap.2022.67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.67","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Because conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) can address the deep roots of violence, many scholars and policymakers have assumed them to be an effective and innocuous tool to take on the issue. I argue that while CCTs may have positive economic effects, they can also trigger social discord, criminal predation, and political conflict and, in doing so, increase violence. To test this claim, I take advantage of the exogenous shock caused by the randomized expansion of Mexico’s flagship CCT, PROGRESA/Oportunidades. I find that the experimental introduction of the program increased rather than decreased violence. Then, I analyze all the data compiled by LAPOP on the issue over the years. I find that, other things constant, Latin Americans are more exposed to violence and insecurity when they participate in CCTs than when they do not. These findings urge us to reconsider the effects of social programs on violence.","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"1 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50167383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT This article describes the process of legal contention between civil society, political parties, and state institutions for the baldíos lands in the Colombian Altillanura region in the last two decades, a region considered the country’s “last agricultural frontier.” The article focuses on the dual and sometimes contradictory roles of the state institutions, both as facilitators of baldíos grabbing and as guarantors of the peasants’ legal land rights. It analyzes the different attempts by the Colombian government to remove the legal limitations to land accumulation and the resistance put up by civil society and the political parties, which resorted to the existing legal mechanisms to deactivate those attempts. The results reveal the two-sided role of the state: while the government introduces legal changes to facilitate baldíos grabbing, state bodies are actively denouncing and sanctioning illegalities or ruling in favor of peasants deprived of their lands.
{"title":"The Legal Contention for Baldíos Land in the Colombian Altillanura","authors":"Carolina Hurtado-Hurtado, Dionisio Ortiz-Miranda, Eladio Arnalte-Alegre","doi":"10.1017/lap.2022.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.38","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article describes the process of legal contention between civil society, political parties, and state institutions for the baldíos lands in the Colombian Altillanura region in the last two decades, a region considered the country’s “last agricultural frontier.” The article focuses on the dual and sometimes contradictory roles of the state institutions, both as facilitators of baldíos grabbing and as guarantors of the peasants’ legal land rights. It analyzes the different attempts by the Colombian government to remove the legal limitations to land accumulation and the resistance put up by civil society and the political parties, which resorted to the existing legal mechanisms to deactivate those attempts. The results reveal the two-sided role of the state: while the government introduces legal changes to facilitate baldíos grabbing, state bodies are actively denouncing and sanctioning illegalities or ruling in favor of peasants deprived of their lands.","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"55 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44280119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT How does the execution of horizontal accountability mechanisms affect cabinet members’ instability? This article analyzes distinct features of no-confidence motions (NCMs) in presidential systems, using a mixed-method research design that identifies elements of legislative control mechanisms in Peruvian and Colombian polities. Although the congress in presidential systems rarely approves NCMs, high salience policy shocks trigger their proposal, resulting in the dismissal or resignation of the cabinet member in question. Those results are subtle opportunities for opposition legislators to indicate the incompetence of the incumbent government in particular policy areas. This study contributes to understanding how contextual factors affect the effectiveness of the check and balance principle in presidential systems.
{"title":"Too Legit to Quit? Analyzing the Effect of No-Confidence Motions on Cabinet Members’ Instability in Presidential Systems: The Cases of Colombia and Peru","authors":"Jhon Kelly Bonilla-Aranzales","doi":"10.1017/lap.2023.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2023.1","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How does the execution of horizontal accountability mechanisms affect cabinet members’ instability? This article analyzes distinct features of no-confidence motions (NCMs) in presidential systems, using a mixed-method research design that identifies elements of legislative control mechanisms in Peruvian and Colombian polities. Although the congress in presidential systems rarely approves NCMs, high salience policy shocks trigger their proposal, resulting in the dismissal or resignation of the cabinet member in question. Those results are subtle opportunities for opposition legislators to indicate the incompetence of the incumbent government in particular policy areas. This study contributes to understanding how contextual factors affect the effectiveness of the check and balance principle in presidential systems.","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"95 - 127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44755823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT Earlier empirical research on party list proportional representation systems shows that women spend less on campaigns than men, particularly when quotas are applied. An analysis of the candidate campaign expenses for the 2014 and 2018 Colombian Lower Chamber elections provides a novel test of this gender gap and its underlying causes. The research design leverages Colombia’s unique context of electoral institutions, with interdistrict variation in terms of quota rules, and the availability of detailed information on campaign spending and funding. The regression models show that the gender gap in campaign spending is limited to districts with quota rules and disappears among incumbents and candidates listed first on the ballot. As for funding, women candidates are most disadvantaged with regard to personal funds and corporate donations but attract as many individual donations as men do.
{"title":"Legislative Quotas and the Gender Gap in Campaign Finance: The Case of the 2014 and 2018 Legislative Elections in Colombia","authors":"Bart Maddens, Gertjan Muyters, Gert-Jan Put","doi":"10.1017/lap.2022.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.39","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Earlier empirical research on party list proportional representation systems shows that women spend less on campaigns than men, particularly when quotas are applied. An analysis of the candidate campaign expenses for the 2014 and 2018 Colombian Lower Chamber elections provides a novel test of this gender gap and its underlying causes. The research design leverages Colombia’s unique context of electoral institutions, with interdistrict variation in terms of quota rules, and the availability of detailed information on campaign spending and funding. The regression models show that the gender gap in campaign spending is limited to districts with quota rules and disappears among incumbents and candidates listed first on the ballot. As for funding, women candidates are most disadvantaged with regard to personal funds and corporate donations but attract as many individual donations as men do.","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"83 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43997180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LAP volume 65 issue 1 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/lap.2022.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.56","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46899,"journal":{"name":"Latin American Politics and Society","volume":"65 1","pages":"b1 - b3"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43367940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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