Pub Date : 2022-03-25DOI: 10.1177/00471178221082870
Johannes Scherzinger
After more than 25 years of scholarship, the deliberative turn in international relations (IR) theory is ready to be revisited with a fresh perspective. Using new methods from automated text analyses, this explorative article investigates how rhetoric may bind action. It does so by building upon Schimmelfennig’s original account of rhetorical entrapment. To begin, I theorize the opposite of entrapment, which I call rhetorical hollowing. Rhetorical hollowing describes a situation in which actors use normative rhetoric, but instead of advancing their interests, such rhetoric fails to increase their chances of obtaining the desired outcome because the normative force of their rhetoric has eroded over time. To provide plausibility to both entrapment and hollowing, I present two mechanisms by which language is connected with action in the United Nations Security Council. Finally, I run a series of time-series-cross-section models on selected dictionary terms conducive to entrapment or hollowing on all speeches and an original Security Council resolution corpus from 1995 to 2017. The research shows that while mentioning ‘human rights’ is consistently associated with increased odds of authorization of force; the word ‘terrorism’ is associated with a decrease of odds for intervention. This finding suggests that some terms may not only entrap or hollow but also normatively backfire.
{"title":"‘Acting under Chapter 7’: rhetorical entrapment, rhetorical hollowing, and the authorization of force in the UN Security Council, 1995–2017","authors":"Johannes Scherzinger","doi":"10.1177/00471178221082870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221082870","url":null,"abstract":"After more than 25 years of scholarship, the deliberative turn in international relations (IR) theory is ready to be revisited with a fresh perspective. Using new methods from automated text analyses, this explorative article investigates how rhetoric may bind action. It does so by building upon Schimmelfennig’s original account of rhetorical entrapment. To begin, I theorize the opposite of entrapment, which I call rhetorical hollowing. Rhetorical hollowing describes a situation in which actors use normative rhetoric, but instead of advancing their interests, such rhetoric fails to increase their chances of obtaining the desired outcome because the normative force of their rhetoric has eroded over time. To provide plausibility to both entrapment and hollowing, I present two mechanisms by which language is connected with action in the United Nations Security Council. Finally, I run a series of time-series-cross-section models on selected dictionary terms conducive to entrapment or hollowing on all speeches and an original Security Council resolution corpus from 1995 to 2017. The research shows that while mentioning ‘human rights’ is consistently associated with increased odds of authorization of force; the word ‘terrorism’ is associated with a decrease of odds for intervention. This finding suggests that some terms may not only entrap or hollow but also normatively backfire.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"10 1","pages":"3 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74982071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-25DOI: 10.1177/00471178221086147
Lotem Bassan-Nygate, G. Heimann
State and non-state actors often try to provoke moral emotions like guilt and shame to mobilize political change. However, tactics such as `naming and shaming’ are often ineffective, suggesting that policy makers engage in norm violations in ways that minimize moral emotions. We argue that when violating norms, decision makers deal with guilt and shame through coping mechanisms that allow them to pursue policies that contradict their moral standards. We conceptualize guilt and shame as two separate phenomena that provoke distinct reactions. Shame is more likely to provoke immature defenses like denial and distortion, while guilt provokes a more mature and reparative reaction. We provide empirical evidence for this theory by examining two crucial issues on the state of Israel’s political agenda during the first decade of its existence. We analyze political debates over the return of the Palestinian refugees and the reparation agreement between Israel and West Germany, using a series of primary sources from three different political forums.
{"title":"Dealing with guilt and shame in international politics","authors":"Lotem Bassan-Nygate, G. Heimann","doi":"10.1177/00471178221086147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221086147","url":null,"abstract":"State and non-state actors often try to provoke moral emotions like guilt and shame to mobilize political change. However, tactics such as `naming and shaming’ are often ineffective, suggesting that policy makers engage in norm violations in ways that minimize moral emotions. We argue that when violating norms, decision makers deal with guilt and shame through coping mechanisms that allow them to pursue policies that contradict their moral standards. We conceptualize guilt and shame as two separate phenomena that provoke distinct reactions. Shame is more likely to provoke immature defenses like denial and distortion, while guilt provokes a more mature and reparative reaction. We provide empirical evidence for this theory by examining two crucial issues on the state of Israel’s political agenda during the first decade of its existence. We analyze political debates over the return of the Palestinian refugees and the reparation agreement between Israel and West Germany, using a series of primary sources from three different political forums.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81881885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-17DOI: 10.1177/00471178221082871
Weiqing Song, Rudolf Fürst
China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have intensified their cooperation over the past decade or so. Despite some modest progress, this cooperation has performed below the expectations of the CEECs in general, and, even more so, generated negative feedback and implications more widely. This study is motivated by the puzzle over why there are widening discrepancies between the two sides after initially positive expectations. Informed by the role theory of international relations, this paper mainly argues that there is an intrarole conflict between China’s perception of its international leadership role and the corresponding role expectations of China held by the CEECs. This framework is empirically assessed on the 17 + 1 cooperation, through which China strives to forge a leadership role for itself in relation to the CEECs. Amid generally low expectations of China’s leadership role, three general patterns of responses can be identified among the CEECs, including those of dissenters, pragmatists, and persisting partners. Furthermore, China’s leadership demands encountered challenges from other players, particularly the European Union and the United States.
{"title":"China’s bid for international leadership in Central and Eastern Europe: role conflict and policy responses","authors":"Weiqing Song, Rudolf Fürst","doi":"10.1177/00471178221082871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221082871","url":null,"abstract":"China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have intensified their cooperation over the past decade or so. Despite some modest progress, this cooperation has performed below the expectations of the CEECs in general, and, even more so, generated negative feedback and implications more widely. This study is motivated by the puzzle over why there are widening discrepancies between the two sides after initially positive expectations. Informed by the role theory of international relations, this paper mainly argues that there is an intrarole conflict between China’s perception of its international leadership role and the corresponding role expectations of China held by the CEECs. This framework is empirically assessed on the 17 + 1 cooperation, through which China strives to forge a leadership role for itself in relation to the CEECs. Amid generally low expectations of China’s leadership role, three general patterns of responses can be identified among the CEECs, including those of dissenters, pragmatists, and persisting partners. Furthermore, China’s leadership demands encountered challenges from other players, particularly the European Union and the United States.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"146 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79949786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.1177/00471178211073880
M. F. Karim
In recent years, scholars have devoted increased attention to the notion of roles in foreign policy analysis and international relations. However, role theory literature has so far less frequently explored re-conceptualising role conflict. To further understand the concept of role conflict, this article aims to unpacks the notion of international audiences. To do so, this article advances the application of role conflict by arguing the importance of notion of vertical role conflict that considers the different levels of international audiences, specifically regionally and globally. Building upon the symbolic interactionist conceptualisation of social interaction as a stage, regional and global levels can be seen as arenas for role-playing but with different expectations to fulfil. The article proposes two types of vertical role conflict, stemming from the difference between the regional and global levels. These theoretical claims will be elucidated through the study of Indonesia’s regional and global engagement in two areas: human rights and trade.
{"title":"Role conflict in International Relations: the case of Indonesia’s regional and global engagements","authors":"M. F. Karim","doi":"10.1177/00471178211073880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211073880","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, scholars have devoted increased attention to the notion of roles in foreign policy analysis and international relations. However, role theory literature has so far less frequently explored re-conceptualising role conflict. To further understand the concept of role conflict, this article aims to unpacks the notion of international audiences. To do so, this article advances the application of role conflict by arguing the importance of notion of vertical role conflict that considers the different levels of international audiences, specifically regionally and globally. Building upon the symbolic interactionist conceptualisation of social interaction as a stage, regional and global levels can be seen as arenas for role-playing but with different expectations to fulfil. The article proposes two types of vertical role conflict, stemming from the difference between the regional and global levels. These theoretical claims will be elucidated through the study of Indonesia’s regional and global engagement in two areas: human rights and trade.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"72 1","pages":"96 - 116"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89245876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-24DOI: 10.1177/00471178211069754
JeongWon Bourdais Park, Dahoon Chung
The paper explores the cases of denuclearized countries, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine and primarily intends to answer the questions of how (process), why (reasons for denuclearization), and for what (benefits and gains) did these four countries abandon their strategically advantageous nuclear arsenals. For conceptual analysis, ‘a trading state’ is employed, for they commonly faced the imminent need of guaranteeing state sovereignty and the influence of changing security dynamics. The four cases exhibit both generalizable commonality and distinctive experience in the process of denuclearization. They demonstrate that two mutually-reinforcing forces, ‘global-scale structural change in world politics’ and ‘pressure for regime creation or change’, interactively led to the final decision to enact complete denuclearization, albeit not effortlessly. Furthermore, unveiling the differences in the process of denuclearization – in terms of resistance, negotiation tools and leverage, stage of nuclear development, domestic-grown technology, internal justification for legitimacy – helps to clarify the gains and benefits received in return for denuclearization. Shedding light on these four countries, under pressure from nuclear weapons states, complements conventional realism-leaning interpretations of nuclear politics and offers policy insights to understand countries with nuclear ambition in contemporary world politics.
{"title":"Sovereignty and trading states: denuclearization in Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine","authors":"JeongWon Bourdais Park, Dahoon Chung","doi":"10.1177/00471178211069754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211069754","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explores the cases of denuclearized countries, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine and primarily intends to answer the questions of how (process), why (reasons for denuclearization), and for what (benefits and gains) did these four countries abandon their strategically advantageous nuclear arsenals. For conceptual analysis, ‘a trading state’ is employed, for they commonly faced the imminent need of guaranteeing state sovereignty and the influence of changing security dynamics. The four cases exhibit both generalizable commonality and distinctive experience in the process of denuclearization. They demonstrate that two mutually-reinforcing forces, ‘global-scale structural change in world politics’ and ‘pressure for regime creation or change’, interactively led to the final decision to enact complete denuclearization, albeit not effortlessly. Furthermore, unveiling the differences in the process of denuclearization – in terms of resistance, negotiation tools and leverage, stage of nuclear development, domestic-grown technology, internal justification for legitimacy – helps to clarify the gains and benefits received in return for denuclearization. Shedding light on these four countries, under pressure from nuclear weapons states, complements conventional realism-leaning interpretations of nuclear politics and offers policy insights to understand countries with nuclear ambition in contemporary world politics.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"79 1","pages":"480 - 503"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83910443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-12DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0310
Russian foreign policy has undergone substantial shifts in the post–Cold War period. Scholarly attention toward the topic has also experienced ebbs and flows as the breakup of the Soviet Union drastically decreased general interest toward a newly emerged Russia. The initial period of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s was to a large degree a continuation of Soviet foreign policy, with its focus on cooperative relations with the West. This, in turn, combined with the general weakness of the Russian state, resulted in the relative disregard of other foreign policy directions. The deepening domestic power struggle led to a growing opposition toward the pro-Western course and paved the way for a number of domestic players to influence Russia’s foreign policy course. Vladimir Putin’s arrival to power in 2000 and the domestic changes he introduced freed foreign policy from most of its domestic constraints, at least temporarily. During his first presidential term (2000–2004), Russian foreign policy oscillated between competition with the West (the United States in particular) and attempts to integrate Russia as the West’s equal partner. The consolidation of the regime, which accelerated in Putin’s second presidential term (2004–2008), left its mark on foreign policy. Russia’s engagement with the external world underwent substantial changes, which turned out to be durable for the next decade and a half. Material resurgence, the strengthening of the state, and the domestic political consolidation fueled Russia’s assertiveness in international politics. These processes culminated in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech and the 2008 war with Georgia. The following period of the so-called tandemocracy (2008–2012), with Putin becoming prime minister and Dmitri Medvedev serving as president, led to a partial warming in relations with the West, though Russia continued its assertive policy. Russia also deepened its cooperation with a rising China. Putin’s return to power in 2012 initiated the conservative-nationalist turn in domestic politics, which was reflected in foreign policy. Russia increasingly positioned itself not only as a geopolitical challenger to the West, but also a normative one. The annexation of Crimea (2014), followed by the military intervention in Syria (2015), opened a new phase in Russian foreign policy. Moscow became bolder in using military force abroad and enlarged its presence in such regions as sub-Saharan Africa. The explanations of change and continuity in Russian foreign policy can be grouped in several camps, with scholars emphasizing power politics and external constraints, domestic politics, and the role of ideas and identity. The emerging trend is the growing popularity of pluralist explanations of Russian foreign policy.
{"title":"Russian Foreign Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0310","url":null,"abstract":"Russian foreign policy has undergone substantial shifts in the post–Cold War period. Scholarly attention toward the topic has also experienced ebbs and flows as the breakup of the Soviet Union drastically decreased general interest toward a newly emerged Russia. The initial period of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s was to a large degree a continuation of Soviet foreign policy, with its focus on cooperative relations with the West. This, in turn, combined with the general weakness of the Russian state, resulted in the relative disregard of other foreign policy directions. The deepening domestic power struggle led to a growing opposition toward the pro-Western course and paved the way for a number of domestic players to influence Russia’s foreign policy course. Vladimir Putin’s arrival to power in 2000 and the domestic changes he introduced freed foreign policy from most of its domestic constraints, at least temporarily. During his first presidential term (2000–2004), Russian foreign policy oscillated between competition with the West (the United States in particular) and attempts to integrate Russia as the West’s equal partner. The consolidation of the regime, which accelerated in Putin’s second presidential term (2004–2008), left its mark on foreign policy. Russia’s engagement with the external world underwent substantial changes, which turned out to be durable for the next decade and a half. Material resurgence, the strengthening of the state, and the domestic political consolidation fueled Russia’s assertiveness in international politics. These processes culminated in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech and the 2008 war with Georgia. The following period of the so-called tandemocracy (2008–2012), with Putin becoming prime minister and Dmitri Medvedev serving as president, led to a partial warming in relations with the West, though Russia continued its assertive policy. Russia also deepened its cooperation with a rising China. Putin’s return to power in 2012 initiated the conservative-nationalist turn in domestic politics, which was reflected in foreign policy. Russia increasingly positioned itself not only as a geopolitical challenger to the West, but also a normative one. The annexation of Crimea (2014), followed by the military intervention in Syria (2015), opened a new phase in Russian foreign policy. Moscow became bolder in using military force abroad and enlarged its presence in such regions as sub-Saharan Africa. The explanations of change and continuity in Russian foreign policy can be grouped in several camps, with scholars emphasizing power politics and external constraints, domestic politics, and the role of ideas and identity. The emerging trend is the growing popularity of pluralist explanations of Russian foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81786230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-29DOI: 10.1177/00471178211067366
G. Agostinis, Detlef Nolte
Latin American regionalism displays a long history of crises, which have affected almost all regional organisations (ROs) across different waves of regionalism. The article conducts the first comparative analysis of the outcomes of crises in Latin American ROs across time, tackling the following questions: What have been the outcomes of the crises faced by Latin American ROs? Under what conditions does a crisis result in the survival or breakdown of the affected RO in Latin America? We adopt a multi-method approach that combines QCA with process tracing to identify the causal pathways to the survival or breakdown of ROs across a universe of eight crises. The findings show that Latin American ROs have been resilient to crises, which resulted in RO survival in seven cases out of eight. The QCA reveals how the distributive nature of interstate conflicts and the availability of majority voting are both sufficient conditions for Latin American ROs to survive a crisis. Analysis of the outlier case of UNASUR shows that normative conflicts that take place in the absence of majority voting constitute a ‘perfect storm’ configuration that can lead to RO breakdown. The findings also show that Latin America ROs’ tendency to survive crises is associated with the preservation of the status quo in terms of institutional design, which in some cases is achieved through the temporary flexibilisation of existing rules. Differently from the case of the EU, then, the crises of Latin American ROs have not led to the deepening of regional integration, but rather to institutional inertia.
{"title":"Resilience to crisis and resistance to change: a comparative analysis of the determinants of crisis outcomes in Latin American regional organisations","authors":"G. Agostinis, Detlef Nolte","doi":"10.1177/00471178211067366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211067366","url":null,"abstract":"Latin American regionalism displays a long history of crises, which have affected almost all regional organisations (ROs) across different waves of regionalism. The article conducts the first comparative analysis of the outcomes of crises in Latin American ROs across time, tackling the following questions: What have been the outcomes of the crises faced by Latin American ROs? Under what conditions does a crisis result in the survival or breakdown of the affected RO in Latin America? We adopt a multi-method approach that combines QCA with process tracing to identify the causal pathways to the survival or breakdown of ROs across a universe of eight crises. The findings show that Latin American ROs have been resilient to crises, which resulted in RO survival in seven cases out of eight. The QCA reveals how the distributive nature of interstate conflicts and the availability of majority voting are both sufficient conditions for Latin American ROs to survive a crisis. Analysis of the outlier case of UNASUR shows that normative conflicts that take place in the absence of majority voting constitute a ‘perfect storm’ configuration that can lead to RO breakdown. The findings also show that Latin America ROs’ tendency to survive crises is associated with the preservation of the status quo in terms of institutional design, which in some cases is achieved through the temporary flexibilisation of existing rules. Differently from the case of the EU, then, the crises of Latin American ROs have not led to the deepening of regional integration, but rather to institutional inertia.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"40 1","pages":"117 - 143"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79444691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-29DOI: 10.1177/00471178211066224
J. Suh, J. Chun
After conflict, states occasionally succeed in reconciling with former adversaries. When they do, they do so in different ways. Some grudgingly sign a treaty to signal the end of a conflict. Others provide for not only reparations and compensations but also economic assistance as material evidence of reconciliation. Yet others offer apologies, official and unofficial, and engage their former adversaries in reflective dialog that transforms their relationship from enmity to amity. Is there a way to systemically organize different ways in which states reconcile? Can different types of reconciliation be identified? If so, what explains the types? We address these questions in this article. Based on our survey of war terminations in the post-World War II period, we identify four different types of reconciliation that former injurious states have made with their victim states – procedural, material, ideational, and substantial. We hypothesize that their choice of a reconciliation type can be explained in terms of a configuration of national interest and national reflection. In this article, we engage in a structured comparative analysis of the cases of reconciliation between France-Algeria, Japan-Korea, Germany-Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, and Germany-Poland – that we argue closely resemble the four ideal types – and demonstrate that our hypotheses are confirmed. We conclude with a consideration of how likely it is for ideational and material reconciliation to develop into substantial reconciliation
{"title":"Varieties of international reconciliation: the configuration of interest and reflection after conflict","authors":"J. Suh, J. Chun","doi":"10.1177/00471178211066224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211066224","url":null,"abstract":"After conflict, states occasionally succeed in reconciling with former adversaries. When they do, they do so in different ways. Some grudgingly sign a treaty to signal the end of a conflict. Others provide for not only reparations and compensations but also economic assistance as material evidence of reconciliation. Yet others offer apologies, official and unofficial, and engage their former adversaries in reflective dialog that transforms their relationship from enmity to amity. Is there a way to systemically organize different ways in which states reconcile? Can different types of reconciliation be identified? If so, what explains the types? We address these questions in this article. Based on our survey of war terminations in the post-World War II period, we identify four different types of reconciliation that former injurious states have made with their victim states – procedural, material, ideational, and substantial. We hypothesize that their choice of a reconciliation type can be explained in terms of a configuration of national interest and national reflection. In this article, we engage in a structured comparative analysis of the cases of reconciliation between France-Algeria, Japan-Korea, Germany-Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, and Germany-Poland – that we argue closely resemble the four ideal types – and demonstrate that our hypotheses are confirmed. We conclude with a consideration of how likely it is for ideational and material reconciliation to develop into substantial reconciliation","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"50 1","pages":"403 - 427"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85809118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-08DOI: 10.1177/00471178211059253
Jan Hornát
The United States has improved relations with no other country during the Trump administration as much as it advanced its relationship with India. US-India relations have arguably marked their historical high points since Trump entered office and India seems to be overcoming its suspicion of closer cooperation with the US. Given these developments, this article aims to theorize the relationship through the hegemonic stability theory and explain US strategy toward India. We first demonstrate why India is accepting the hegemonic standing of the US in the Indo-Pacific and then – since balance of power politics are still a staple of policymakers’ approach to stability in the Indo-Pacific – we introduce the notion of induced balancing to show what approach the United States has adopted to empower India to expand its balancing capacity vis-à-vis China. The last section of the article empirically maps the various incentives that Washington offers to New Delhi in order to situate it in the desired position of a proxy China-balancer.
{"title":"Hegemonic stability in the Indo-Pacific: US-India relations and induced balancing","authors":"Jan Hornát","doi":"10.1177/00471178211059253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211059253","url":null,"abstract":"The United States has improved relations with no other country during the Trump administration as much as it advanced its relationship with India. US-India relations have arguably marked their historical high points since Trump entered office and India seems to be overcoming its suspicion of closer cooperation with the US. Given these developments, this article aims to theorize the relationship through the hegemonic stability theory and explain US strategy toward India. We first demonstrate why India is accepting the hegemonic standing of the US in the Indo-Pacific and then – since balance of power politics are still a staple of policymakers’ approach to stability in the Indo-Pacific – we introduce the notion of induced balancing to show what approach the United States has adopted to empower India to expand its balancing capacity vis-à-vis China. The last section of the article empirically maps the various incentives that Washington offers to New Delhi in order to situate it in the desired position of a proxy China-balancer.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":"20 1","pages":"324 - 347"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80085198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-27DOI: 10.1177/00471178211059493
Patrick Quinton-Brown
This article argues that contemporary debates around intervention, and especially humanitarian intervention, have misunderstood the meaning of these concepts in Cold War international society. By comparing a specific kind of humanitarian interventionism with a specific kind of internationalism, that of a revolutionist strain of Third World practice, it shows that existing studies have paid too little attention to discursive entanglements of coercion, self-determination, and humanitarianism. The Angola case provides a significant illustration: in 1975 the problem of intervention comes to be tied not just to dictatorial interference, but to a logic of self-determination, which is itself tied to causes of anticolonialism and anti-racism. It is too easy to say that the period’s rules of non-intervention precluded the legitimate coercive prevention of atrocities and related international crimes. Particular practices of internationalism, linked to the promotion of self-determination, provided a basis for enforcing international human rights treaties, including the Genocide Convention. All this seems very different from what we usually know of the legitimacy of saving strangers and the character of Third World organising in the mid-20th century.
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