Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge-transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge-acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly understood, they are shown to be compatible with SSI since they don’t give rise to improper knowledge acquisition. The upshot is a better understanding of the nature and structure of these transmission principles.
{"title":"Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering","authors":"Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock","doi":"10.1111/papq.12381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12381","url":null,"abstract":"Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge-transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge-acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly understood, they are shown to be compatible with SSI since they don’t give rise to improper knowledge acquisition. The upshot is a better understanding of the nature and structure of these transmission principles.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papq.12381","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45003192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incapacity, Inconceivability, and Two Types of Objectivity","authors":"Nicholas Sars","doi":"10.1111/PAPQ.12376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPQ.12376","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPQ.12376","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44019725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: Luck skepticism is the view that no one is ever morally responsible for anything because of the nature and ubiquity of luck. One acclaimed argument in favor of this view is Neil Levy’s luck pincer. The luck pincer holds that all morally significant acts or events involve either present luck, constitutive luck, or both and that present and constitutive luck each negate moral responsibility. Therefore, no one is ever morally responsible for any action or event. I argue that this argument is unsound as both of its premises are false. First, not all morally significant events involve present or constitutive luck. Some morally significant events are non-lucky. Second, present and constitutive luck do not always negate moral responsibility. Luck — independent of ontological concerns — is not as threatening to free will as is often thought.
{"title":"What's Luck Got to do with the Luck Pincer?","authors":"Jesse Hill","doi":"10.1111/PAPQ.12378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPQ.12378","url":null,"abstract":": Luck skepticism is the view that no one is ever morally responsible for anything because of the nature and ubiquity of luck. One acclaimed argument in favor of this view is Neil Levy’s luck pincer. The luck pincer holds that all morally significant acts or events involve either present luck, constitutive luck, or both and that present and constitutive luck each negate moral responsibility. Therefore, no one is ever morally responsible for any action or event. I argue that this argument is unsound as both of its premises are false. First, not all morally significant events involve present or constitutive luck. Some morally significant events are non-lucky. Second, present and constitutive luck do not always negate moral responsibility. Luck — independent of ontological concerns — is not as threatening to free will as is often thought.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPQ.12378","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44284755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"There Are No Irrational Emotions","authors":"Steven Gubka","doi":"10.1111/PAPQ.12377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPQ.12377","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPQ.12377","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41624369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Growth and the Shape of a Life","authors":"Ian D. Dunkle","doi":"10.1111/papq.12372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12372","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papq.12372","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42438231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Faith Entails Belief: Three Avenues of Defense Against the Argument from Doubt","authors":"Joshua Mugg","doi":"10.1111/papq.12374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12374","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papq.12374","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49042782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: The Spinozan theory of belieffixation holdsthatmentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I ex- plore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.
{"title":"Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions","authors":"Federico Bongiorno","doi":"10.1111/papq.12373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12373","url":null,"abstract":": The Spinozan theory of belieffixation holdsthatmentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I ex- plore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papq.12373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49060877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most philosophers have largely downplayed any relevance of multiple meanings of the folk concept of truth in the empirical domain. However, confusions about what truth is have surged in political and everyday discourse. In order to resolve these confusions, we argue that we need amore accurate picture of how the term‘true’ is in fact used.Our experimental studies reveal that the use of ‘true’ shows substantial variance within the empirical domain, indicating that ‘true’ is ambiguous between a correspondence and a coherence reading.We then explore the consequences of these results for the project of re-engineering truth.
{"title":"Empirical Studies on\u0000 Truth\u0000 and the Project of Re‐engineering\u0000 Truth","authors":"K. Reuter, G. Brun","doi":"10.1111/papq.12370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12370","url":null,"abstract":"Most philosophers have largely downplayed any relevance of multiple \u0000meanings of the folk concept of truth in the empirical domain. However, confusions \u0000about what truth is have surged in political and everyday discourse. In order \u0000to resolve these confusions, we argue that we need amore accurate picture of how \u0000the term‘true’ is in fact used.Our experimental studies reveal that the use of ‘true’ \u0000shows substantial variance within the empirical domain, indicating that ‘true’ is \u0000ambiguous between a correspondence and a coherence reading.We then explore \u0000the consequences of these results for the project of re-engineering truth.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papq.12370","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42286017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：