Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-72-91
Ye.A. Ivanov, K. Melnikov, N. V. Petrov
This paper aims to examine the elite structure in Russia. Given the widely recognized dominance of personal relations over formal institutions in the political and economic spheres in Russia, to explore this question, the authors turn to the concept of the informal network and Social Network Analysis (SNA). Modelling an informal network requires operationalization of two elements: nodes and edges. The nodes are represented by the individuals who occupied top 50 positions in the “100 Most Influential Politicians of Russia” ranking in March-April, 2020. In contrast to the majority of the researchers who employ network approach to study elites, when deciding on edges (links) of the network, the authors take into account not only politicians’ ties that were formed during their previous career steps, but also other sources of their personal connections (outside work), and assess the relevance of the established connections in politicians’ biographies. The resulting informal network highlights the peculiarities of the organization of the Russian elite, which are quite curious in their multidirectionality. On the one hand, its structure has an obvious center in the person of Vladimir Putin, who is far superior to other players in terms of the number of connections, degree of closeness to all elite actors, and his intermediary role. On the other hand, the level of centralization of the network is rather moderate. The reason is the variety of horizontal ties between the rest of the elite. On the one hand, there are several clearly identifiable communities in the network. On the other hand, there are more connections between such communities than within them. Almost all representatives of law enforcement agencies belong to the same network community. However, there are practically no horizontal ties within the law enforcement network community. In general, the informal network of the Russian elite demonstrates a high level of coherence, with the dominance of complex, multicomponent ties that manifest themselves in different formats of personal relationships. This level of integration can play a significant role in minimizing intra-elite divisions — the “Achilles heel” of authoritarian regimes.
{"title":"Informal Structure of the Elite Space in Russia (Evidence from Network Analysis)","authors":"Ye.A. Ivanov, K. Melnikov, N. V. Petrov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-72-91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-72-91","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to examine the elite structure in Russia. Given the widely recognized dominance of personal relations over formal institutions in the political and economic spheres in Russia, to explore this question, the authors turn to the concept of the informal network and Social Network Analysis (SNA). Modelling an informal network requires operationalization of two elements: nodes and edges. The nodes are represented by the individuals who occupied top 50 positions in the “100 Most Influential Politicians of Russia” ranking in March-April, 2020. In contrast to the majority of the researchers who employ network approach to study elites, when deciding on edges (links) of the network, the authors take into account not only politicians’ ties that were formed during their previous career steps, but also other sources of their personal connections (outside work), and assess the relevance of the established connections in politicians’ biographies. The resulting informal network highlights the peculiarities of the organization of the Russian elite, which are quite curious in their multidirectionality. On the one hand, its structure has an obvious center in the person of Vladimir Putin, who is far superior to other players in terms of the number of connections, degree of closeness to all elite actors, and his intermediary role. On the other hand, the level of centralization of the network is rather moderate. The reason is the variety of horizontal ties between the rest of the elite. On the one hand, there are several clearly identifiable communities in the network. On the other hand, there are more connections between such communities than within them. Almost all representatives of law enforcement agencies belong to the same network community. However, there are practically no horizontal ties within the law enforcement network community. In general, the informal network of the Russian elite demonstrates a high level of coherence, with the dominance of complex, multicomponent ties that manifest themselves in different formats of personal relationships. This level of integration can play a significant role in minimizing intra-elite divisions — the “Achilles heel” of authoritarian regimes.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81523789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-183-198
V. Malakhov
The article is devoted to the analysis of differences in the approaches of European Union member states to the inclusion of migrants into the political community by granting them citizenship. These differences are operationalized through the category of “citizenship regimes”. The article distingui shes three types of citizenship regimes — liberal, restrictive, and mixed. Whether a particular regime can be categorized into one of these citizenship regime types is determined on the basis of three indicators: (1) application/nonapplication of birthright citizenship (jus soli), (2) the presence of the institution of dual (multiple) citizenship, and (3) the relative simplicity/complexity of the naturalization procedure. At the same time, due to the lack of the comprehensive statistical data, which would allow assessing all possible components of this procedure, in order to evaluate the degree of the simplicity/complexity of the procedure, the authors focus on such a parameter as the minimum time period of residence in the country required to apply for citizenship. Having considered the evolution of the legal systems of the EU states, the authors reveal important differences in the approaches to the naturalization of migrants along the axis between the “old” countries of the European Union, on the one hand, and new members of the United Europe from the former socialist countries, on the other. While the “old” EU members tend to gradually liberalize citizenship regimes, the new ones are leaning towards a restrictive model, which manifests itself both in the difficult conditions of naturalization and rejection of the birthright citizenship law. The convergence of the positions of these two groups of countries on this issue is not visible.
{"title":"Citizenship Regimes in the EU Countries and the Inclusion of the Immigrant Population in the Political Community","authors":"V. Malakhov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-183-198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-183-198","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the analysis of differences in the approaches of European Union member states to the inclusion of migrants into the political community by granting them citizenship. These differences are operationalized through the category of “citizenship regimes”. The article distingui shes three types of citizenship regimes — liberal, restrictive, and mixed. Whether a particular regime can be categorized into one of these citizenship regime types is determined on the basis of three indicators: (1) application/nonapplication of birthright citizenship (jus soli), (2) the presence of the institution of dual (multiple) citizenship, and (3) the relative simplicity/complexity of the naturalization procedure. At the same time, due to the lack of the comprehensive statistical data, which would allow assessing all possible components of this procedure, in order to evaluate the degree of the simplicity/complexity of the procedure, the authors focus on such a parameter as the minimum time period of residence in the country required to apply for citizenship. Having considered the evolution of the legal systems of the EU states, the authors reveal important differences in the approaches to the naturalization of migrants along the axis between the “old” countries of the European Union, on the one hand, and new members of the United Europe from the former socialist countries, on the other. While the “old” EU members tend to gradually liberalize citizenship regimes, the new ones are leaning towards a restrictive model, which manifests itself both in the difficult conditions of naturalization and rejection of the birthright citizenship law. The convergence of the positions of these two groups of countries on this issue is not visible.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"2015 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73300746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-110-130
Dr. Muntasser Majeed Hameed
The research article deals with the process of building or rebuilding the state in Iraq after 2003 in its various dimensions, in light of the vision and foundational procedures that were developed and supervised by the United States in cooperation with the new leaders of Iraq based on the mechanism of sectarianethnic representation, and diagnosing the imbalances that arose out of that vision and the accompanying procedures, which led to the emergence of new variables in the political process, especially in the post-ISIS* phase, which produced important challenges to the political system and the Iraqi state. The political dynamics and balances emerging after ISIS* represented at the same time opportunities and risks in the process of building the Iraqi state, as opportunities arose to transcend the identity policies adopted by the political system, and address the failures of the political process, and thus strengthen the path of state building, but the risks of those transformations seeking reform may push towards more state fragility, given the weakness of the political administration of the system in the face of the complexities of the political environment and its effects that were rooted in the p olitical system.
{"title":"State-building and Ethnic Pluralism in Iraq after 2003","authors":"Dr. Muntasser Majeed Hameed","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-110-130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-110-130","url":null,"abstract":"The research article deals with the process of building or rebuilding the state in Iraq after 2003 in its various dimensions, in light of the vision and foundational procedures that were developed and supervised by the United States in cooperation with the new leaders of Iraq based on the mechanism of sectarianethnic representation, and diagnosing the imbalances that arose out of that vision and the accompanying procedures, which led to the emergence of new variables in the political process, especially in the post-ISIS* phase, which produced important challenges to the political system and the Iraqi state. The political dynamics and balances emerging after ISIS* represented at the same time opportunities and risks in the process of building the Iraqi state, as opportunities arose to transcend the identity policies adopted by the political system, and address the failures of the political process, and thus strengthen the path of state building, but the risks of those transformations seeking reform may push towards more state fragility, given the weakness of the political administration of the system in the face of the complexities of the political environment and its effects that were rooted in the p olitical system.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72469094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-131-161
L. Bliakher, M. Bliakher
The article is devoted to the phenomenon of imperial cities — structures, the main function of which is to transmit power impul se from the imperial center to its adjacent periphery, linking the heterogeneous body of the empire. Such cities are not merely a result of natural agglome ration proces ses, but rather they represent political constructs that make it possible to hold the empire together and at the same time take into account its heterogeneity. Today, in the vast post-Soviet space, the imperial cities of the vanished empire of the USSR (capitals of the former Soviet republics, regional, economic and military centers) are undergoing a period of transformation, which is often described as the absorption of the city by its surrounding periphery. It is difficult to identify the main determinants of such transformation and build a stable model for predicting further changes, because even today this process is far from being complete, which makes it impossible for researchers to reveal all groups of factors that could impact the development of an imperial city outside the influence of the empire that left it. To solve this problem, the authors turn to the experience of the imperial city, which has already undergone a similar evolution, the so called “Russian Harbin”. The article describes the transformations of the external appearance of the city, daily household routines, power distribution in the urban space, which are considered to be markers of change in the meanings of the imperial signals. Along with the trends that are common to the imperial cities of the East of Russia (“Europe for Asia”), there are also trends that are specific to Harbin as an imperial city outside the empire. The article demonstrates that the structure of the imperial city, which was created to transmit power impulse, is capable of transmitting the meanings of another empire. The authors show that the disappearance of the “Russian Harbin” as a historical and cultural phenomenon does not mean the disappearance of the imperial city, which comes back to life every time the political center begins to produce meanings that need to be relayed to a heterogeneous territory.
{"title":"A City in the Shadow of Empires: Life, Death and Afterlife of the Imperial City of Harbin","authors":"L. Bliakher, M. Bliakher","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-131-161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-131-161","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the phenomenon of imperial cities — structures, the main function of which is to transmit power impul se from the imperial center to its adjacent periphery, linking the heterogeneous body of the empire. Such cities are not merely a result of natural agglome ration proces ses, but rather they represent political constructs that make it possible to hold the empire together and at the same time take into account its heterogeneity. Today, in the vast post-Soviet space, the imperial cities of the vanished empire of the USSR (capitals of the former Soviet republics, regional, economic and military centers) are undergoing a period of transformation, which is often described as the absorption of the city by its surrounding periphery. It is difficult to identify the main determinants of such transformation and build a stable model for predicting further changes, because even today this process is far from being complete, which makes it impossible for researchers to reveal all groups of factors that could impact the development of an imperial city outside the influence of the empire that left it. To solve this problem, the authors turn to the experience of the imperial city, which has already undergone a similar evolution, the so called “Russian Harbin”. The article describes the transformations of the external appearance of the city, daily household routines, power distribution in the urban space, which are considered to be markers of change in the meanings of the imperial signals. Along with the trends that are common to the imperial cities of the East of Russia (“Europe for Asia”), there are also trends that are specific to Harbin as an imperial city outside the empire. The article demonstrates that the structure of the imperial city, which was created to transmit power impulse, is capable of transmitting the meanings of another empire. The authors show that the disappearance of the “Russian Harbin” as a historical and cultural phenomenon does not mean the disappearance of the imperial city, which comes back to life every time the political center begins to produce meanings that need to be relayed to a heterogeneous territory.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85885214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-92-109
I. Grigoriev
In most countries, the main task of the constitutional court is to review compliance with the constitution. The basic method to perform this task is the elimination of violations upon an external request: after the court receives from applicants information about such violations in the form of claims or requests, it assesses the validity of such claim/requests and makes a decision on the particular issue that was brought up by an applicant, thereby restoring the constitutional order within the legal sphere in question. It is clear that one properly functioning court does not suffice for the successful realization of such a review model. One needs the coherent ecosystem of court helpers, who would collect relevant information about violations and supply it to judges — practically like raw materials, without which judicial control is impossible. The article analyzes the relationship of the Russian Constitutional Court with a specific type of such helpers — the Ombudsman. Based on the quantitative analysis of the database of the decisions of the Constitutional Court, the author traces the evolution of these relations over the time period from 1999 to the present day and attempts to identify the reasons why, despite the growing “friendliness” of the Constitutional Court towards the Ombudsman, the role of the latter in the judicial review is declining.
{"title":"Helpers of the Court: Russian Constitutional Court and Ombudsman","authors":"I. Grigoriev","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-92-109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-92-109","url":null,"abstract":"In most countries, the main task of the constitutional court is to review compliance with the constitution. The basic method to perform this task is the elimination of violations upon an external request: after the court receives from applicants information about such violations in the form of claims or requests, it assesses the validity of such claim/requests and makes a decision on the particular issue that was brought up by an applicant, thereby restoring the constitutional order within the legal sphere in question. It is clear that one properly functioning court does not suffice for the successful realization of such a review model. One needs the coherent ecosystem of court helpers, who would collect relevant information about violations and supply it to judges — practically like raw materials, without which judicial control is impossible. The article analyzes the relationship of the Russian Constitutional Court with a specific type of such helpers — the Ombudsman. Based on the quantitative analysis of the database of the decisions of the Constitutional Court, the author traces the evolution of these relations over the time period from 1999 to the present day and attempts to identify the reasons why, despite the growing “friendliness” of the Constitutional Court towards the Ombudsman, the role of the latter in the judicial review is declining.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81451707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Severe uncertainty plays a critical role in many problems of distributive justice, such as social security, public health, public projects, budget deficits, and climate change. Under severe uncertainty, available information does not allow us to assign precise probabilities to possible states of affairs. A recent example of severe uncertainty is the impact of COVID-19. How policy-makers should evaluate different distributions of well-being in such a situation of severe uncertainty is of vital importance to society. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic has induced a need to ration medical resources, such as vaccines, using relevant principles of distribution. Such principles have been hotly debated by egalitarians, many of whom are pluralists.1 This article addresses the problem of the distribution of well-being by using an axiomatic approach to pluralist egalitarianism.</p><p>Rowe and Voorhoeve’s view can be interpreted as an axiomatic approach to pluralist egalitarianism; it helps to clarify competing claims of a relevant kind and thereby enables policy-makers to evaluate uncertain social situations. They illustrate this by showing how RV pluralist egalitarianism works in particular examples.</p><p>There is a need to articulate the axioms involved more explicitly, however, as well as to analyze more rigorously whether and to what extent those axioms are compatible with each other. Furthermore, to assess and choose between competing claims, it would be useful to have a criterion for social evaluation that satisfies the relevant axioms and that orders all possible distributions in a consistent manner. In this article, we introduce axioms of impartiality, efficiency, ex post egalitarianism, and social rationality under severe uncertainty, and address the issue of their compatibility. We then characterize a social evaluation criterion, <i>statewise maximin</i>, by those axioms.3</p><p>Although we focus on cases of severe uncertainty, our results show that axiomatization is invaluable in determining what kind of value pluralism is promising as an egalitarian theory. As Iwao Hirose has argued in a different but related context, pluralist theories are often unclear about how many principles they include and/or to what extent those principles are (in)compatible with each other.4 An axiomatic analysis can address these issues—through axiomatic characterization, we can spell out a normative criterion of pluralist egalitarianism.</p><p>The argument in this article proceeds as follows. Section II presents our basic framework. Section III specifies the principles of egalitarianism, impartiality, and social rationality. Section IV argues that a standard efficiency axiom under uncertainty, <i>ex ante Pareto,</i> is not compelling, and substitutes another axiom, <i>Pareto for equal or no risk</i>. Section V addresses <i>statewise maximin</i> and its axiomatic representation. Section VI presents some brief concluding remarks. The Appendix lays out a formal analysis.
{"title":"A Defense of Pluralist Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty: Axiomatic Characterization*","authors":"Akira Inoue, Kaname Miyagishima","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12276","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jopp.12276","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Severe uncertainty plays a critical role in many problems of distributive justice, such as social security, public health, public projects, budget deficits, and climate change. Under severe uncertainty, available information does not allow us to assign precise probabilities to possible states of affairs. A recent example of severe uncertainty is the impact of COVID-19. How policy-makers should evaluate different distributions of well-being in such a situation of severe uncertainty is of vital importance to society. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic has induced a need to ration medical resources, such as vaccines, using relevant principles of distribution. Such principles have been hotly debated by egalitarians, many of whom are pluralists.1 This article addresses the problem of the distribution of well-being by using an axiomatic approach to pluralist egalitarianism.</p><p>Rowe and Voorhoeve’s view can be interpreted as an axiomatic approach to pluralist egalitarianism; it helps to clarify competing claims of a relevant kind and thereby enables policy-makers to evaluate uncertain social situations. They illustrate this by showing how RV pluralist egalitarianism works in particular examples.</p><p>There is a need to articulate the axioms involved more explicitly, however, as well as to analyze more rigorously whether and to what extent those axioms are compatible with each other. Furthermore, to assess and choose between competing claims, it would be useful to have a criterion for social evaluation that satisfies the relevant axioms and that orders all possible distributions in a consistent manner. In this article, we introduce axioms of impartiality, efficiency, ex post egalitarianism, and social rationality under severe uncertainty, and address the issue of their compatibility. We then characterize a social evaluation criterion, <i>statewise maximin</i>, by those axioms.3</p><p>Although we focus on cases of severe uncertainty, our results show that axiomatization is invaluable in determining what kind of value pluralism is promising as an egalitarian theory. As Iwao Hirose has argued in a different but related context, pluralist theories are often unclear about how many principles they include and/or to what extent those principles are (in)compatible with each other.4 An axiomatic analysis can address these issues—through axiomatic characterization, we can spell out a normative criterion of pluralist egalitarianism.</p><p>The argument in this article proceeds as follows. Section II presents our basic framework. Section III specifies the principles of egalitarianism, impartiality, and social rationality. Section IV argues that a standard efficiency axiom under uncertainty, <i>ex ante Pareto,</i> is not compelling, and substitutes another axiom, <i>Pareto for equal or no risk</i>. Section V addresses <i>statewise maximin</i> and its axiomatic representation. Section VI presents some brief concluding remarks. The Appendix lays out a formal analysis.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"30 3","pages":"370-394"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12276","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81014211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In this article, we argue that least-developed countries (LDCs) should be treated as a distinct group from developing countries within theories of international justice generally, and theories of trade justice more specifically. While authors within the trade justice literature occasionally make passing reference to LDCs’ entitlement to special favourable treatment from other states, they say little about what form this treatment should take, and how such entitlements relate to the obligations and entitlements of their trade partners, both developed and developing. This oversight is untenable because it overlooks the significantly different needs that LDCs have compared to developing countries with respect to the economic opportunities afforded by international markets. Moreover, by grouping states into the binary categories of developed and developing (or rich and poor), trade justice theorists have ended up obscuring and passing over a fundamental conflict between least-developed and developing countries’ interests, the weighing of which should be central to any complete normative evaluation of the trade regime.</p><p>The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we introduce the category of least-developed countries, a category which is recognized as a basis for differential treatment of states within the global trade regime and the international order more broadly, but which is typically subsumed by political philosophers into the larger category of ‘developing countries’. We relate this neglect of the distinctive features and needs of LDCs to two broader shortcomings which characterize much of the philosophical literature on trade justice, shortcomings which we seek to overcome in our subsequent discussion of LDCs’ trade-based entitlements. In Section III, we argue that developed countries, as well as some of the wealthier and larger developing countries, have a duty to help remedy the extreme immiseration characteristic of life within LDCs by actively diverting trade flows towards LDCs. We suggest that they ought to do so by committing to ensuring that a certain minimum percentage of their imports come from LDCs. We label this proposal the ‘LDC quota’. In Section IV we note that wide adoption of an LDC quota would foreseeably harm some developing countries, some of which are themselves very badly off. Nevertheless, we argue that in the absence of better alternatives this does not undermine the basic case for diverting trade towards LDCs. We then raise and refute several objections that affected developing countries may have to the LDC quota. All told, this article presents both a novel conceptualization of the problems of trade justice, and a promising proposal for how states ought to act upon their duties to LDCs.</p><p>In the last decade or so, philosophers writing on international justice have increasingly shifted their focus away from big-picture debates about the international order as a whole towards normative analysis of specifi
{"title":"Trade Justice and the Least-Developed Countries*","authors":"Tadhg Ó Laoghaire, Thomas R. Wells","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12278","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jopp.12278","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, we argue that least-developed countries (LDCs) should be treated as a distinct group from developing countries within theories of international justice generally, and theories of trade justice more specifically. While authors within the trade justice literature occasionally make passing reference to LDCs’ entitlement to special favourable treatment from other states, they say little about what form this treatment should take, and how such entitlements relate to the obligations and entitlements of their trade partners, both developed and developing. This oversight is untenable because it overlooks the significantly different needs that LDCs have compared to developing countries with respect to the economic opportunities afforded by international markets. Moreover, by grouping states into the binary categories of developed and developing (or rich and poor), trade justice theorists have ended up obscuring and passing over a fundamental conflict between least-developed and developing countries’ interests, the weighing of which should be central to any complete normative evaluation of the trade regime.</p><p>The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we introduce the category of least-developed countries, a category which is recognized as a basis for differential treatment of states within the global trade regime and the international order more broadly, but which is typically subsumed by political philosophers into the larger category of ‘developing countries’. We relate this neglect of the distinctive features and needs of LDCs to two broader shortcomings which characterize much of the philosophical literature on trade justice, shortcomings which we seek to overcome in our subsequent discussion of LDCs’ trade-based entitlements. In Section III, we argue that developed countries, as well as some of the wealthier and larger developing countries, have a duty to help remedy the extreme immiseration characteristic of life within LDCs by actively diverting trade flows towards LDCs. We suggest that they ought to do so by committing to ensuring that a certain minimum percentage of their imports come from LDCs. We label this proposal the ‘LDC quota’. In Section IV we note that wide adoption of an LDC quota would foreseeably harm some developing countries, some of which are themselves very badly off. Nevertheless, we argue that in the absence of better alternatives this does not undermine the basic case for diverting trade towards LDCs. We then raise and refute several objections that affected developing countries may have to the LDC quota. All told, this article presents both a novel conceptualization of the problems of trade justice, and a promising proposal for how states ought to act upon their duties to LDCs.</p><p>In the last decade or so, philosophers writing on international justice have increasingly shifted their focus away from big-picture debates about the international order as a whole towards normative analysis of specifi","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"30 4","pages":"512-534"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12278","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79004202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>It is a common view that philosophers treat intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. Following Herman Cappelen, we may refer to this view as centrality.1 Advocates of centrality typically assume that claims about cases (henceforth, case verdicts) are treated as evidence for and against philosophical theories because of their intuitiveness. On the basis of their examination of prominent philosophers’ use of cases, however, critics of centrality, like Cappelen and Max Deutsch, claim that philosophers <i>argue</i> for case verdicts, and take that to suggest that advocates of centrality are mistaken in their assumption that the intuitiveness of the verdicts plays an epistemic role.2 I’ll refer to these critics as “intuition deniers.”3 The intuition deniers’ rejection of centrality has launched a considerable debate over the nature of the philosophical method and the role of intuitions in philosophical argument.</p><p>This article contributes to that debate by investigating cases from a genre of philosophy—political philosophy—that has not been the main focus so far. Within this branch (and within moral philosophy more generally), not only has it been claimed that intuitions are treated as evidence,4 but some claim that not doing so would leave the prospects of the discipline quite bleak.5 I respond to the challenge of providing positive evidence for centrality—a challenge posed by Cappelen6—by developing an analytical framework. This framework will also help develop a common response to the intuition deniers’ arguments: that they mistake abductive arguments—in which case verdicts function as premises that support a theoretical account—for arguments that support case verdicts.</p><p>I examine cases from two influential articles in which some of the first attempts to formulate different versions of luck egalitarianism were made: Ronald Dworkin’s “What Is Equality? Part 1” and Gerald A. Cohen’s “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.”7 I argue that a close examination of these articles indicates that their authors do treat intuitions as evidence. Both Dworkin and Cohen treat case verdicts as starting points for abductive arguments and use intuition-terminology (“intuition,” “intuitively,” and cognate terms) to express or to refer to these verdicts. I argue that the conjunction of these two observations constitutes positive evidence that they treat intuitions as evidence.</p><p>Cohen and Dworkin are viewed as being among the most influential thinkers in the literature on justice, and their discussion of expensive tastes is viewed as one of the most important debates in 1980s and 1990s political philosophy. Many regard them as two of the principal luck egalitarian thinkers.8 Due to their influence and importance, examining these articles is interesting in and of itself. Moreover, I think the current inquiry is of general interest. If centrality is false, we would not expect to find that intuitions figure as central evidence in influential co
{"title":"Are Intuitions Treated as Evidence? Cases from Political Philosophy*","authors":"Sebastian J. Conte","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12277","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jopp.12277","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is a common view that philosophers treat intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. Following Herman Cappelen, we may refer to this view as centrality.1 Advocates of centrality typically assume that claims about cases (henceforth, case verdicts) are treated as evidence for and against philosophical theories because of their intuitiveness. On the basis of their examination of prominent philosophers’ use of cases, however, critics of centrality, like Cappelen and Max Deutsch, claim that philosophers <i>argue</i> for case verdicts, and take that to suggest that advocates of centrality are mistaken in their assumption that the intuitiveness of the verdicts plays an epistemic role.2 I’ll refer to these critics as “intuition deniers.”3 The intuition deniers’ rejection of centrality has launched a considerable debate over the nature of the philosophical method and the role of intuitions in philosophical argument.</p><p>This article contributes to that debate by investigating cases from a genre of philosophy—political philosophy—that has not been the main focus so far. Within this branch (and within moral philosophy more generally), not only has it been claimed that intuitions are treated as evidence,4 but some claim that not doing so would leave the prospects of the discipline quite bleak.5 I respond to the challenge of providing positive evidence for centrality—a challenge posed by Cappelen6—by developing an analytical framework. This framework will also help develop a common response to the intuition deniers’ arguments: that they mistake abductive arguments—in which case verdicts function as premises that support a theoretical account—for arguments that support case verdicts.</p><p>I examine cases from two influential articles in which some of the first attempts to formulate different versions of luck egalitarianism were made: Ronald Dworkin’s “What Is Equality? Part 1” and Gerald A. Cohen’s “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.”7 I argue that a close examination of these articles indicates that their authors do treat intuitions as evidence. Both Dworkin and Cohen treat case verdicts as starting points for abductive arguments and use intuition-terminology (“intuition,” “intuitively,” and cognate terms) to express or to refer to these verdicts. I argue that the conjunction of these two observations constitutes positive evidence that they treat intuitions as evidence.</p><p>Cohen and Dworkin are viewed as being among the most influential thinkers in the literature on justice, and their discussion of expensive tastes is viewed as one of the most important debates in 1980s and 1990s political philosophy. Many regard them as two of the principal luck egalitarian thinkers.8 Due to their influence and importance, examining these articles is interesting in and of itself. Moreover, I think the current inquiry is of general interest. If centrality is false, we would not expect to find that intuitions figure as central evidence in influential co","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"30 4","pages":"411-433"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12277","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83360091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Limits of Limitarianism*","authors":"R. Huseby","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12274","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81059725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
THIS article discusses ‘limitarianism’, which in its most general formulation is the idea that in the world as it is, no one should have more than a certain upper limit of valuable goods, in particular, income and wealth. What, if anything, does ‘limitarianism’ add to normative political philosophy? In Section I, I describe the context in which limitarianism has been introduced. Section II will provide a more detailed statement about limitarianism, including some more recent contributions to and developments in the literature. In the next two sections, I discuss egalitarianism (Section III) and sufficientarianism (Section IV) and ask whether they can do what I envision to be the task of limitarianism. Section V argues that within theories of distributive justice, limitarianism is best seen as part of a pluralist account. This is illustrated by sketching the proposal of a pluralist account combining sufficientarianism, opportunity egalitarianism, and limitarianism. Section VI concludes by pulling everything together, and will give an answer to the question of what limitarianism contributes to normative political philosophy.
{"title":"Why Limitarianism?☆","authors":"I. Robeyns","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12275","url":null,"abstract":"THIS article discusses ‘limitarianism’, which in its most general formulation is the idea that in the world as it is, no one should have more than a certain upper limit of valuable goods, in particular, income and wealth. What, if anything, does ‘limitarianism’ add to normative political philosophy? In Section I, I describe the context in which limitarianism has been introduced. Section II will provide a more detailed statement about limitarianism, including some more recent contributions to and developments in the literature. In the next two sections, I discuss egalitarianism (Section III) and sufficientarianism (Section IV) and ask whether they can do what I envision to be the task of limitarianism. Section V argues that within theories of distributive justice, limitarianism is best seen as part of a pluralist account. This is illustrated by sketching the proposal of a pluralist account combining sufficientarianism, opportunity egalitarianism, and limitarianism. Section VI concludes by pulling everything together, and will give an answer to the question of what limitarianism contributes to normative political philosophy.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88783800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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