The two biggest stories of 2021 in South Korea were a cutthroat presidential nomination and the nationwide outcry over soaring housing prices. Both the ruling and opposition parties had gone through a noisy and murky nomination process. In 2021, housing prices continued to rise, causing citizens’ anxiety and anger to reach their peak, and the president apologized for the failure of the real estate policy. Despite the maladministration, president Moon Jae-in, unlike previous presidents, did not become a lame duck. Meanwhile, the popularity of Hallyu, or the Korean Wave, continued with the success of the movie Minari, K-pop band BTS, and the Netflix drama series Squid Game.
{"title":"South Korea in 2021","authors":"Woo-young Chang, Seongyi Yun","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.62.1.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.04","url":null,"abstract":"The two biggest stories of 2021 in South Korea were a cutthroat presidential nomination and the nationwide outcry over soaring housing prices. Both the ruling and opposition parties had gone through a noisy and murky nomination process. In 2021, housing prices continued to rise, causing citizens’ anxiety and anger to reach their peak, and the president apologized for the failure of the real estate policy. Despite the maladministration, president Moon Jae-in, unlike previous presidents, did not become a lame duck. Meanwhile, the popularity of Hallyu, or the Korean Wave, continued with the success of the movie Minari, K-pop band BTS, and the Netflix drama series Squid Game.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67099822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I investigate to what extent India’s Right to Information Act is useful for poor households. Drawing on empirical data from central Uttar Pradesh, I study two categories of poor households—urban and rural—possessing Below Poverty Line cards. These cards entitle their holders to several subsidies, but they are poorly targeted: certain communities receive more cards, while most of the deserving poor do not receive them. The Act is meant to create space for democratization, enabling the poor to challenge local power holders; but there are obstacles to their taking advantage of it. They are scarcely educated, and unaware of the Act, and they get no support from government agencies responsible for implementing it. This has encouraged the use of manipulative tactics by local representatives and government bureaucrats seeking power, control, and domination. But the poor do find ways to receive their entitlements.
{"title":"Do the Poor Benefit from the Right to Information Act?","authors":"S. Dutta","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.1534279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1534279","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate to what extent India’s Right to Information Act is useful for poor households. Drawing on empirical data from central Uttar Pradesh, I study two categories of poor households—urban and rural—possessing Below Poverty Line cards. These cards entitle their holders to several subsidies, but they are poorly targeted: certain communities receive more cards, while most of the deserving poor do not receive them. The Act is meant to create space for democratization, enabling the poor to challenge local power holders; but there are obstacles to their taking advantage of it. They are scarcely educated, and unaware of the Act, and they get no support from government agencies responsible for implementing it. This has encouraged the use of manipulative tactics by local representatives and government bureaucrats seeking power, control, and domination. But the poor do find ways to receive their entitlements.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As a donor, the Republic of Korea emphasizes five sectors as primary targets for official development assistance—education, health, governance, agriculture, and industry and energy—which contributed to its own rapid economic growth; that is, the country uses its own development experience as a development assistance model. This study examines the determinants of Korean ODA allocation for each of these sectors. We hypothesize that Korea is likely to allocate more targeted ODA to countries with less achievement in these sectors, and that this tendency is stronger for low-income countries. Using disaggregated Korean ODA allocation data for 2006 to 2015, we find that while the income of recipient countries generally has a significant effect on the allocation of ODA to each sector, the level of development of that particular sector does not appear to have systematic effects on allocations. This null finding may be due to the lack of coordination among the country’s many ODA institutions and the alignment of ODA with the demands and preferences of the recipient countries.
{"title":"Lessons from the Past and Sectoral Priorities in Bilateral Official Development Assistance","authors":"M. Yoon, Chung‐in Moon","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.1537303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1537303","url":null,"abstract":"As a donor, the Republic of Korea emphasizes five sectors as primary targets for official development assistance—education, health, governance, agriculture, and industry and energy—which contributed to its own rapid economic growth; that is, the country uses its own development experience as a development assistance model. This study examines the determinants of Korean ODA allocation for each of these sectors. We hypothesize that Korea is likely to allocate more targeted ODA to countries with less achievement in these sectors, and that this tendency is stronger for low-income countries. Using disaggregated Korean ODA allocation data for 2006 to 2015, we find that while the income of recipient countries generally has a significant effect on the allocation of ODA to each sector, the level of development of that particular sector does not appear to have systematic effects on allocations. This null finding may be due to the lack of coordination among the country’s many ODA institutions and the alignment of ODA with the demands and preferences of the recipient countries.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pakistan began the year with an energized opposition that directly challenged the military establishment, but as the year progressed, the opposition alliance fell apart under the strain of internal divisions. The military establishment pushed back against the ruling PTI and regained control of the political system. Religious extremists were emboldened and posed a challenge to both civilian and military centers of power. The economy rebounded from the collapse of 2020, but Pakistan continues to face macro- and micro-economic challenges. The Delta variant took its toll on Pakistanis, but the government was able to make significant progress in its vaccination program by the end of 2021. Pakistan gained considerable geostrategic leverage due to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.
{"title":"Pakistan in 2021","authors":"Sahar Shafqat","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.62.1.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.17","url":null,"abstract":"Pakistan began the year with an energized opposition that directly challenged the military establishment, but as the year progressed, the opposition alliance fell apart under the strain of internal divisions. The military establishment pushed back against the ruling PTI and regained control of the political system. Religious extremists were emboldened and posed a challenge to both civilian and military centers of power. The economy rebounded from the collapse of 2020, but Pakistan continues to face macro- and micro-economic challenges. The Delta variant took its toll on Pakistanis, but the government was able to make significant progress in its vaccination program by the end of 2021. Pakistan gained considerable geostrategic leverage due to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
India and Russia have enjoyed a strong relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union, partially as a legacy of the Indo–Soviet partnership during the Cold War. But how will this invasion impact future relations between New Delhi and Moscow? We argue that the war will likely harm this relationship over the long term, although some scenarios might minimize this harm. Western sanctions and Russian material losses in the war will make it difficult for Russia to fulfill Indian arms orders, especially if the sanctions regime remains in place for several years, forcing India to turn to other sources of weapons, including the United States. Its increasing isolation from Europe could also force Russia to move even closer to India’s rival China, making India less secure. There may be opportunities to improve energy ties between India and Russia, but Western sanctions and geographic barriers will limit any energy gains.
{"title":"India–Russia Relations after Ukraine","authors":"Spenser A. Warren, Š. Ganguly","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.1799235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1799235","url":null,"abstract":"India and Russia have enjoyed a strong relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union, partially as a legacy of the Indo–Soviet partnership during the Cold War. But how will this invasion impact future relations between New Delhi and Moscow? We argue that the war will likely harm this relationship over the long term, although some scenarios might minimize this harm. Western sanctions and Russian material losses in the war will make it difficult for Russia to fulfill Indian arms orders, especially if the sanctions regime remains in place for several years, forcing India to turn to other sources of weapons, including the United States. Its increasing isolation from Europe could also force Russia to move even closer to India’s rival China, making India less secure. There may be opportunities to improve energy ties between India and Russia, but Western sanctions and geographic barriers will limit any energy gains.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67099714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Russia invaded Ukraine, South Korea’s initial response was cautious. While criticizing Moscow’s actions, the Moon administration also indicated it would join any multilateral sanctions effort but would not impose its own unilateral sanctions as the United States, the European Union, and other Western democracies had done. After receiving internal and external criticism along with the likelihood of economic repercussions for not imposing its own sanctions, South Korea changed course and altered its hedging strategy toward a more robust response to Russian aggression. The war forced South Korea to reassess its relationship with Russia, and despite landing on Moscow’s list of “unfriendly” states, determined that its long-term interests were better served by altering its ties with Russia in favor of greater alignment with other liberal democracies.
{"title":"Becoming an “Unfriendly” State","authors":"Terence Roehrig","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.1799278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1799278","url":null,"abstract":"When Russia invaded Ukraine, South Korea’s initial response was cautious. While criticizing Moscow’s actions, the Moon administration also indicated it would join any multilateral sanctions effort but would not impose its own unilateral sanctions as the United States, the European Union, and other Western democracies had done. After receiving internal and external criticism along with the likelihood of economic repercussions for not imposing its own sanctions, South Korea changed course and altered its hedging strategy toward a more robust response to Russian aggression. The war forced South Korea to reassess its relationship with Russia, and despite landing on Moscow’s list of “unfriendly” states, determined that its long-term interests were better served by altering its ties with Russia in favor of greater alignment with other liberal democracies.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67099716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Malaysia remained firmly in the grip of both the COVID-19 pandemic and economic turmoil in 2021. Ongoing political instability led to an emergency proclamation that suspended Parliament for the first time since 1969, followed by an unprecedented public rebuke of political leaders by the Malaysian king, and the third new government in as many years. This returned the long-dominant UMNO to power. An unexpected political ceasefire promised extensive reforms, but their implementation was uncertain.
{"title":"Malaysia in 2021","authors":"Kai Ostwald","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.62.1.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.08","url":null,"abstract":"Malaysia remained firmly in the grip of both the COVID-19 pandemic and economic turmoil in 2021. Ongoing political instability led to an emergency proclamation that suspended Parliament for the first time since 1969, followed by an unprecedented public rebuke of political leaders by the Malaysian king, and the third new government in as many years. This returned the long-dominant UMNO to power. An unexpected political ceasefire promised extensive reforms, but their implementation was uncertain.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67099881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In response to the outbreak of a new viral infection in the early weeks of 2020, some countries imposed strict entry restrictions on visitors from China, while others opted for less stringent measures. Among the explanations for such variation, this study is focused on the argument that a country’s economic dependence on China, particularly via trade, affected its decision. This economic vulnerability argument posits that countries highly dependent on China for trade avoided imposing a ban because it might have caused (1) primary economic losses from trade disruptions and (2) secondary economic losses from Chinese sanctions. I empirically test this argument using an original data set on entry restrictions on China. The findings do not support such a hypothesis. Using the nonconforming cases of Japan and South Korea, I speculate that country-specific factors, which tend to be idiosyncratic and political, may have played a role.
{"title":"The Vulnerability Effect that Wasn’t","authors":"Y. Oh","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.1711062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1711062","url":null,"abstract":"In response to the outbreak of a new viral infection in the early weeks of 2020, some countries imposed strict entry restrictions on visitors from China, while others opted for less stringent measures. Among the explanations for such variation, this study is focused on the argument that a country’s economic dependence on China, particularly via trade, affected its decision. This economic vulnerability argument posits that countries highly dependent on China for trade avoided imposing a ban because it might have caused (1) primary economic losses from trade disruptions and (2) secondary economic losses from Chinese sanctions. I empirically test this argument using an original data set on entry restrictions on China. The findings do not support such a hypothesis. Using the nonconforming cases of Japan and South Korea, I speculate that country-specific factors, which tend to be idiosyncratic and political, may have played a role.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67099660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Japan’s population is aging faster than any other nation’s, producing many more older voters, and raising an important question related to intergenerational equity. Do older voters prioritize their short-term self-interest at the expense of other generations? I find that the older voters in Japan are surprisingly less self-interested—even less than similarly aged voters in other advanced economies—in maximizing their benefits as service consumers to the detriment of younger voters. This behavior of older voters in Japan is an enigma. To stimulate dialogue about an equitable and sustainable welfare system, I consider a set of structural and institutional factors that may, individually or collectively, help explain the apparently less self-interested preferences of older voters in Japan.
{"title":"Intergenerational Politics in an Aging Society","authors":"Y. Takao","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.1698940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1698940","url":null,"abstract":"Japan’s population is aging faster than any other nation’s, producing many more older voters, and raising an important question related to intergenerational equity. Do older voters prioritize their short-term self-interest at the expense of other generations? I find that the older voters in Japan are surprisingly less self-interested—even less than similarly aged voters in other advanced economies—in maximizing their benefits as service consumers to the detriment of younger voters. This behavior of older voters in Japan is an enigma. To stimulate dialogue about an equitable and sustainable welfare system, I consider a set of structural and institutional factors that may, individually or collectively, help explain the apparently less self-interested preferences of older voters in Japan.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67099655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars have noted that the Chinese government has been grooming a range of grass-roots social organizations in Hong Kong since the handover. Hometown associations (HTAs), in particular, are seen as an important cultural nexus capable of integrating patron–client relationships based on material benefits with social relationships rooted in common culture and identity. Few studies, however, have documented the mobilizing power of HTAs quantitatively. This article examines the mobilizing power of HTAs in the 2021 Legislative Council elections, where the state attempted to promote voter participation to protect the legitimacy of the “reformed” electoral system. Analysis at the level of District Council constituencies shows that the presence of HTAs was indeed related to higher voter turnout. I also test whether the impact of HTAs was conditioned by population characteristics. General implications of the findings are discussed.
{"title":"Hometown Associations as Mobilizing Agents","authors":"Francis L. F. Lee","doi":"10.1525/as.2022.1714374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.1714374","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have noted that the Chinese government has been grooming a range of grass-roots social organizations in Hong Kong since the handover. Hometown associations (HTAs), in particular, are seen as an important cultural nexus capable of integrating patron–client relationships based on material benefits with social relationships rooted in common culture and identity. Few studies, however, have documented the mobilizing power of HTAs quantitatively. This article examines the mobilizing power of HTAs in the 2021 Legislative Council elections, where the state attempted to promote voter participation to protect the legitimacy of the “reformed” electoral system. Analysis at the level of District Council constituencies shows that the presence of HTAs was indeed related to higher voter turnout. I also test whether the impact of HTAs was conditioned by population characteristics. General implications of the findings are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67099664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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