Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009062
J. Landy, Pritik A. Shah
The act of suicide is commonly viewed as wrong in some sense, but it is not clear why this is. Based on past empirical research and philosophical theorizing, we test ten different explanations for why suicide is opposed on normative grounds. Using a within-subjects design, Study 1 showed that seven out of ten manipulations had significant effects on normative judgments of suicide: time left to live, lack of close social relationships, a history of prior immoral behavior, the manner in which the suicide is committed, painful, incurable medical issues, impulsive decision-making, and the actor’s own moral-religious background. However, in all cases, the act of suicide was still considered wrong, overall. Using a between-subjects design, Study 2 tested the combined effect of the seven significant manipulations from Study 1. In combination, the seven manipulations eliminated opposition to suicide, on average. Implications for moral psychology and suicide prevention are discussed.
{"title":"What drives opposition to suicide? Two exploratory studies of normative\u0000 judgments","authors":"J. Landy, Pritik A. Shah","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009062","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The act of suicide is commonly viewed as wrong in some sense, but it is\u0000 not clear why this is. Based on past empirical research and philosophical\u0000 theorizing, we test ten different explanations for why suicide is opposed on\u0000 normative grounds. Using a within-subjects design, Study 1 showed that seven\u0000 out of ten manipulations had significant effects on normative judgments of\u0000 suicide: time left to live, lack of close social relationships, a history of\u0000 prior immoral behavior, the manner in which the suicide is committed,\u0000 painful, incurable medical issues, impulsive decision-making, and the\u0000 actor’s own moral-religious background. However, in all cases, the act of\u0000 suicide was still considered wrong, overall. Using a between-subjects\u0000 design, Study 2 tested the combined effect of the seven significant\u0000 manipulations from Study 1. In combination, the seven manipulations\u0000 eliminated opposition to suicide, on average. Implications for moral\u0000 psychology and suicide prevention are discussed.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47003332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008470
S. Chandrashekar, S. Yeung, Ka Chai Yau, Chung Yee Cheung, Tanay Agarwal, Cho Yan Joan Wong, Tanishka Pillai, Thea Natasha Thirlwell, Wing Nam Leung, Colman Tse, Yan Tung Li, Boley Cheng, Hill Yan Cedar Chan, Gilad Feldman
Bias Blind Spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people tend to perceive themselves as less susceptible to biases than others. In three pre-registered experiments (overall N = 969), we replicated two experiments of the first demonstration of the phenomenon by Pronin et al. (2002). We found support of the BBS hypotheses, with effects in line with findings in the original study: Participants rated themselves as less susceptible to biases than others (d = –1.00 [–1.33, –0.67]). Deviating from the original, we found an unexpected effect that participants rated themselves as having fewer shortcomings (d = –0.34 [–0.46, –0.23]), though there was support for the target’s main premise that BBS was stronger for biases than for shortcomings (d = –0.43 [–0.56, –0.29]). Extending the replications, we found that beliefs in own free will were positively associated with BBS (r ∼ 0.17–0.22) and that beliefs in both own and general free will were positively associated with self-other asymmetry related to personal shortcomings (r ∼ 0.16–0.24). Materials, datasets, and code are available on https://osf.io/3df5s/.
{"title":"Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs","authors":"S. Chandrashekar, S. Yeung, Ka Chai Yau, Chung Yee Cheung, Tanay Agarwal, Cho Yan Joan Wong, Tanishka Pillai, Thea Natasha Thirlwell, Wing Nam Leung, Colman Tse, Yan Tung Li, Boley Cheng, Hill Yan Cedar Chan, Gilad Feldman","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008470","url":null,"abstract":"Bias Blind Spot (BBS) is the phenomenon that people tend to perceive themselves as less susceptible to biases than others. In three pre-registered experiments (overall N = 969), we replicated two experiments of the first demonstration of the phenomenon by Pronin et al. (2002). We found support of the BBS hypotheses, with effects in line with findings in the original study: Participants rated themselves as less susceptible to biases than others (d = –1.00 [–1.33, –0.67]). Deviating from the original, we found an unexpected effect that participants rated themselves as having fewer shortcomings (d = –0.34 [–0.46, –0.23]), though there was support for the target’s main premise that BBS was stronger for biases than for shortcomings (d = –0.43 [–0.56, –0.29]). Extending the replications, we found that beliefs in own free will were positively associated with BBS (r ∼ 0.17–0.22) and that beliefs in both own and general free will were positively associated with self-other asymmetry related to personal shortcomings (r ∼ 0.16–0.24). Materials, datasets, and code are available on https://osf.io/3df5s/.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57323282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008500
Joshua Hascher, N. Desai, I. Krajbich
A core principle in decision science is that people choose according to their subjective values. These values are often measured using unincentivized scales with arbitrary units (e.g., from 0 to 10) or using incentivized willingness-to-pay (WTP) with dollars and cents. What is unclear is whether using WTP actually improves choice predictions. In two experiments, we compare the effects of three different subjective valuation procedures: an unincentivized rating scale, the same scale with incentives, and incentivized WTP. We use these subjective values to predict behavior in a subsequent binary food-choice task. The unincentivized rating task performed better than the incentivized WTP task and no worse than the incentivized rating task. These findings challenge the view that subjective valuation tasks need to be incentivized. At least for low-stakes decisions, commonly used measures such as WTP may reduce predictive power.
{"title":"Incentivized and non-incentivized liking ratings outperform willingness-to-pay in predicting choice","authors":"Joshua Hascher, N. Desai, I. Krajbich","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008500","url":null,"abstract":"A core principle in decision science is that people choose according to their subjective values. These values are often measured using unincentivized scales with arbitrary units (e.g., from 0 to 10) or using incentivized willingness-to-pay (WTP) with dollars and cents. What is unclear is whether using WTP actually improves choice predictions. In two experiments, we compare the effects of three different subjective valuation procedures: an unincentivized rating scale, the same scale with incentives, and incentivized WTP. We use these subjective values to predict behavior in a subsequent binary food-choice task. The unincentivized rating task performed better than the incentivized WTP task and no worse than the incentivized rating task. These findings challenge the view that subjective valuation tasks need to be incentivized. At least for low-stakes decisions, commonly used measures such as WTP may reduce predictive power.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42796339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008457
Sudeep Bhatia, G. Loomes, D. Read
Mathematical and computational decision models are powerful tools for studying choice behavior, and hundreds of distinct decision models have been proposed over the long interdisciplinary history of decision making research. The existence of so many models has led to theoretical fragmentation and redundancy, obscuring key insights into choice behavior, and preventing consensus about the essential properties of preferential choice. We provide a synthesis of formal models of risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal choice, three important domains in decision making. We identify recurring insights discovered by scholars of different generations and different disciplines across these three domains, and use these insights to classify over 150 existing models as involving various combinations of eight key mathematical and computational properties. These properties capture the main avenues of theoretical development in decision making research and can be used to understand the similarities and differences between decision models, aiding both theoretical analyses and empirical tests.
{"title":"Establishing the laws of preferential choice behavior","authors":"Sudeep Bhatia, G. Loomes, D. Read","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008457","url":null,"abstract":"Mathematical and computational decision models are powerful tools for studying choice behavior, and hundreds of distinct decision models have been proposed over the long interdisciplinary history of decision making research. The existence of so many models has led to theoretical fragmentation and redundancy, obscuring key insights into choice behavior, and preventing consensus about the essential properties of preferential choice. We provide a synthesis of formal models of risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal choice, three important domains in decision making. We identify recurring insights discovered by scholars of different generations and different disciplines across these three domains, and use these insights to classify over 150 existing models as involving various combinations of eight key mathematical and computational properties. These properties capture the main avenues of theoretical development in decision making research and can be used to understand the similarities and differences between decision models, aiding both theoretical analyses and empirical tests.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46654362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In social interactions, people frequently encounter gain (i.e., all outcomes are gains from the status-quo) or loss (all outcomes are losses from the status-quo) social dilemmas, where their personal interests conflict with social interests. We ask whether there are any behavioral differences in social interactions when it comes to gains and losses. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games, in three studies we observed that participants were less cooperative in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This effect was robust, not moderated by payoff amount (Study 1), cooperation index (Study 1), domain comparison (Studies 1 and 2), and personal loss aversion (Study 3). Social motive and belief explained this effect: compared to the gain domain, participants in the loss domain aroused more pro-self motive and less prosocial motive, and showed stronger beliefs that their partner would defect, which led them to cooperate less. These findings suggest that gain and loss domains affect individual motivation and belief, subsequently affecting strategic choices in social dilemmas.
{"title":"Differences in cooperation between social dilemmas of gain and loss","authors":"Qingzhou Sun, Haozhi Guo, Jiarui Wang, Jing Zhang, Chengming Jiang, Yongfang Liu","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008524","url":null,"abstract":"In social interactions, people frequently encounter gain (i.e., all outcomes are gains from the status-quo) or loss (all outcomes are losses from the status-quo) social dilemmas, where their personal interests conflict with social interests. We ask whether there are any behavioral differences in social interactions when it comes to gains and losses. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games, in three studies we observed that participants were less cooperative in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This effect was robust, not moderated by payoff amount (Study 1), cooperation index (Study 1), domain comparison (Studies 1 and 2), and personal loss aversion (Study 3). Social motive and belief explained this effect: compared to the gain domain, participants in the loss domain aroused more pro-self motive and less prosocial motive, and showed stronger beliefs that their partner would defect, which led them to cooperate less. These findings suggest that gain and loss domains affect individual motivation and belief, subsequently affecting strategic choices in social dilemmas.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45694786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s193029750000855x
Andressa Couto Cleno Kakinohana Regis Travain Mariana Schim Bonafé-Pontes, Cleno Couto, Regis K. Kakinohana, M. Travain, Luísa Schimidt, Ronaldo Pilati
Messaging applications are changing the communication landscape in emerging countries. While offering speed and affordability, these solutions have also opened the way for the spread of misinformation. Aiming to better understand the dynamics of COVID-19 as infodemic, we asked Brazilian participants (n=1007) to report the perceived accuracy of 20 messages (10 true and 10 false). Each message was randomly presented within five fictitious WhatsApp group chats of varying political orientation. Correlational analyses revealed that right-wing participants had lower levels of truth discernment as did those with greater trust in social media as a reliable source of coronavirus information. Conversely, open-minded thinking about evidence and trust in the WHO and traditional media was positively associated with truth discernment. Familiarity with the content consistently increased perceived truthness for both true and false messages. Results point to the nefarious effects of COVID-19 politicization and underline the importance of promoting the ability to recognize and value new evidence as well as enhancing trust in international agencies and traditional media.
{"title":"COVID-19 as infodemic: The impact of political orientation and open-mindedness on the discernment of misinformation in WhatsApp","authors":"Andressa Couto Cleno Kakinohana Regis Travain Mariana Schim Bonafé-Pontes, Cleno Couto, Regis K. Kakinohana, M. Travain, Luísa Schimidt, Ronaldo Pilati","doi":"10.1017/s193029750000855x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s193029750000855x","url":null,"abstract":"Messaging applications are changing the communication landscape in emerging countries. While offering speed and affordability, these solutions have also opened the way for the spread of misinformation. Aiming to better understand the dynamics of COVID-19 as infodemic, we asked Brazilian participants (n=1007) to report the perceived accuracy of 20 messages (10 true and 10 false). Each message was randomly presented within five fictitious WhatsApp group chats of varying political orientation. Correlational analyses revealed that right-wing participants had lower levels of truth discernment as did those with greater trust in social media as a reliable source of coronavirus information. Conversely, open-minded thinking about evidence and trust in the WHO and traditional media was positively associated with truth discernment. Familiarity with the content consistently increased perceived truthness for both true and false messages. Results point to the nefarious effects of COVID-19 politicization and underline the importance of promoting the ability to recognize and value new evidence as well as enhancing trust in international agencies and traditional media.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47565604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008482
J. Zadelaar, J. A. V. Rentergem, Jessica V. Schaaf, T. Dekkers, N. D. Vent, L. Dekkers, Maria C. Olthof, Brenda R. J. Jansen, H. Huizenga
In decision making, people may rely on their own information as well as on information from external sources, such as family members, peers, or experts. The current study investigated how these types of information are used by comparing four decision strategies: 1) an internal strategy that relies solely on own information; 2) an external strategy that relies solely on the information from an external source; 3) a sequential strategy that relies on information from an external source only after own information is deemed inadequate; 4) an integrative strategy that relies on an integration of both types of information. Of specific interest were individual and developmental differences in strategy use. Strategy use was examined via Bayesian hierarchical mixture model analysis. A visual decision task was administered to children and young adolescents (N=305, ages 9–14). Individual differences but no age-related changes were observed in either decision accuracy or strategy use. The internal strategy was dominant across ages, followed by the integrative and sequential strategy, respectively, while the external strategy was extremely rare. This suggests a reluctance to rely entirely on information provided by external sources. We conclude that there are individual differences but not developmental changes in strategy use pertaining to perceptual decision-making in 9- through 14-year-olds. Generalizability of these findings is discussed with regard to different forms of social influence and varying perceptions of the external source. This study provides stepping stones in better understanding and modeling decision making processes in the presence of both internal and external information.
{"title":"Development of decision making based on internal and external information: A hierarchical Bayesian approach","authors":"J. Zadelaar, J. A. V. Rentergem, Jessica V. Schaaf, T. Dekkers, N. D. Vent, L. Dekkers, Maria C. Olthof, Brenda R. J. Jansen, H. Huizenga","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008482","url":null,"abstract":"In decision making, people may rely on their own information as well as on information from external sources, such as family members, peers, or experts. The current study investigated how these types of information are used by comparing four decision strategies: 1) an internal strategy that relies solely on own information; 2) an external strategy that relies solely on the information from an external source; 3) a sequential strategy that relies on information from an external source only after own information is deemed inadequate; 4) an integrative strategy that relies on an integration of both types of information. Of specific interest were individual and developmental differences in strategy use. Strategy use was examined via Bayesian hierarchical mixture model analysis. A visual decision task was administered to children and young adolescents (N=305, ages 9–14). Individual differences but no age-related changes were observed in either decision accuracy or strategy use. The internal strategy was dominant across ages, followed by the integrative and sequential strategy, respectively, while the external strategy was extremely rare. This suggests a reluctance to rely entirely on information provided by external sources. We conclude that there are individual differences but not developmental changes in strategy use pertaining to perceptual decision-making in 9- through 14-year-olds. Generalizability of these findings is discussed with regard to different forms of social influence and varying perceptions of the external source. This study provides stepping stones in better understanding and modeling decision making processes in the presence of both internal and external information.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47159817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008469
Lauren E. Montgomery, M. Lee
We study whether experts and novices differ in the way they make predictions about National Football League games. In particular, we measure to what extent their predictions are consistent with five environmental regularities that could support decision making based on heuristics. These regularities involve the home team winning more often, the team with the better win-loss record winning more often, the team favored by the majority of media experts winning more often, and two others related to surprise wins and losses in the teams’ previous game. Using signal detection theory and hierarchical Bayesian analysis, we show that expert predictions for the 2017 National Football League (NFL) season generally follow these regularities in a near optimal way, but novice predictions do not. These results support the idea that using heuristics adapted to the decision environment can support accurate predictions and be an indicator of expertise.
{"title":"Expert and novice sensitivity to environmental regularities in predicting NFL games","authors":"Lauren E. Montgomery, M. Lee","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008469","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether experts and novices differ in the way they make predictions about National Football League games. In particular, we measure to what extent their predictions are consistent with five environmental regularities that could support decision making based on heuristics. These regularities involve the home team winning more often, the team with the better win-loss record winning more often, the team favored by the majority of media experts winning more often, and two others related to surprise wins and losses in the teams’ previous game. Using signal detection theory and hierarchical Bayesian analysis, we show that expert predictions for the 2017 National Football League (NFL) season generally follow these regularities in a near optimal way, but novice predictions do not. These results support the idea that using heuristics adapted to the decision environment can support accurate predictions and be an indicator of expertise.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41401715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008494
George Lifchits, Ashton Anderson, D. Goldstein, J. Hofman, D. Watts
Many popular books and articles that purport to explain how people, companies, or ideas succeed highlight a few successes chosen to fit a particular narrative. We investigate what effect these highly selected “success narratives” have on readers’ beliefs and decisions. We conducted a large, randomized, pre-registered experiment, showing participants successful firms with founders that all either dropped out of or graduated college, and asked them to make incentive-compatible bets on a new firm. Despite acknowledging biases in the examples, participants’ decisions were very strongly influenced by them. People shown dropout founders were 55 percentage points more likely to bet on a dropout-founded company than people who were shown graduate founders. Most reported medium to high confidence in their bets, and many wrote causal explanations justifying their decision. In light of recent concerns about false information, our findings demonstrate how true but biased information can strongly alter beliefs and decisions.
{"title":"Success stories cause false beliefs about success","authors":"George Lifchits, Ashton Anderson, D. Goldstein, J. Hofman, D. Watts","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008494","url":null,"abstract":"Many popular books and articles that purport to explain how people, companies, or ideas succeed highlight a few successes chosen to fit a particular narrative. We investigate what effect these highly selected “success narratives” have on readers’ beliefs and decisions. We conducted a large, randomized, pre-registered experiment, showing participants successful firms with founders that all either dropped out of or graduated college, and asked them to make incentive-compatible bets on a new firm. Despite acknowledging biases in the examples, participants’ decisions were very strongly influenced by them. People shown dropout founders were 55 percentage points more likely to bet on a dropout-founded company than people who were shown graduate founders. Most reported medium to high confidence in their bets, and many wrote causal explanations justifying their decision. In light of recent concerns about false information, our findings demonstrate how true but biased information can strongly alter beliefs and decisions.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43362409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008536
D. Peleg, Guy Hochman, T. Levine, Y. Klar, S. Ayal
In two studies, we tested the power of revenge as a justification mechanism that enables people to cheat with a clear conscience. Specifically, we explored the effects of prior dishonesty and unfairness towards participants on their subsequent moral behavior, as well as the physiological arousal associated with it. To this end, we employed a two-phase procedure. In the first phase, participants played one round of a bargaining game (the Ultimatum game in Study 1 and the Dictator game in Study 2) in which we manipulated whether the players had been treated (un)fairly and (dis)honestly by their opponent. In the second phase, they did a perceptual task that allowed them to cheat for monetary gain at the expense of their opponent from the first phase. In Study 1, participants also took a lie detector test to assess whether their dishonesty in the second phase could be detected. The behavioral results in both studies indicated that the opponent’s dishonesty was a stronger driver than the opponent’s unfairness for cheating as a form of retaliation. However, the physiological arousal results suggest that feeling mistreated in general (and not just cheated) allowed the participants to get revenge by cheating the offender while dismissing their associated guilt feelings.
{"title":"Revenge is not blind: Testing the ability of retribution to justify dishonesty","authors":"D. Peleg, Guy Hochman, T. Levine, Y. Klar, S. Ayal","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008536","url":null,"abstract":"In two studies, we tested the power of revenge as a justification mechanism that enables people to cheat with a clear conscience. Specifically, we explored the effects of prior dishonesty and unfairness towards participants on their subsequent moral behavior, as well as the physiological arousal associated with it. To this end, we employed a two-phase procedure. In the first phase, participants played one round of a bargaining game (the Ultimatum game in Study 1 and the Dictator game in Study 2) in which we manipulated whether the players had been treated (un)fairly and (dis)honestly by their opponent. In the second phase, they did a perceptual task that allowed them to cheat for monetary gain at the expense of their opponent from the first phase. In Study 1, participants also took a lie detector test to assess whether their dishonesty in the second phase could be detected. The behavioral results in both studies indicated that the opponent’s dishonesty was a stronger driver than the opponent’s unfairness for cheating as a form of retaliation. However, the physiological arousal results suggest that feeling mistreated in general (and not just cheated) allowed the participants to get revenge by cheating the offender while dismissing their associated guilt feelings.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41886863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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