Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009116
James Matthew Thom, U. Afzal, Natalie Gold
Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity, measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies, those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to predict their strategy.
{"title":"Testing team reasoning: Group identification is related to coordination\u0000 in pure coordination games","authors":"James Matthew Thom, U. Afzal, Natalie Gold","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their\u0000 choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is\u0000 through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just\u0000 assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been\u0000 suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged\u0000 to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an\u0000 in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity,\u0000 measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in\u0000 nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no\u0000 descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the\u0000 others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online\u0000 experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected\u0000 effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and\u0000 team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies,\u0000 those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier\u0000 to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said\u0000 they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a\u0000 follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with\u0000 strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and\u0000 team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior\u0000 was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A\u0000 hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team\u0000 reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the\u0000 strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may\u0000 have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to\u0000 predict their strategy.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46164602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009141
How Hwee Ong, A. Evans, R. Nelissen, I. van Beest
Believers of karma believe in ethical causation where good and bad outcomes can be traced to past moral and immoral acts. Karmic belief may have important interpersonal consequences. We investigated whether American Christians expect more trustworthiness from (and are more likely to trust) interaction partners who believe in karma. We conducted an incentivized study of the trust game where interaction partners had different beliefs in karma and God. Participants expected more trustworthiness from (and were more likely to trust) karma believers. Expectations did not match actual behavior: karmic belief was not associated with actual trustworthiness. These findings suggest that people may use others’ karmic belief as a cue to predict their trustworthiness but would err when doing so.
{"title":"Belief in karma is associated with perceived (but not actual)\u0000 trustworthiness","authors":"How Hwee Ong, A. Evans, R. Nelissen, I. van Beest","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009141","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Believers of karma believe in ethical causation where good and bad\u0000 outcomes can be traced to past moral and immoral acts. Karmic belief may\u0000 have important interpersonal consequences. We investigated whether American\u0000 Christians expect more trustworthiness from (and are more likely to trust)\u0000 interaction partners who believe in karma. We conducted an incentivized\u0000 study of the trust game where interaction partners had different beliefs in\u0000 karma and God. Participants expected more trustworthiness from (and were\u0000 more likely to trust) karma believers. Expectations did not match actual\u0000 behavior: karmic belief was not associated with actual trustworthiness.\u0000 These findings suggest that people may use others’ karmic belief as a cue to\u0000 predict their trustworthiness but would err when doing so.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45345025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009074
Jantsje M. Mol, W. Botzen, J. Blasch
Many individuals experience problems understanding and preparing for low-probability/high-impact risk, like natural disasters and pandemics – unless they experience these events, yet then it is often too late to avoid damages. Individuals with recent disaster risk experience are, on average, better prepared. This seems to be mediated through emotions and a better understanding of the consequences. In this study, we use immersive virtual reality (VR) technology to examine whether a simulated disaster can stimulate people to invest in risk reducing measures in the context of flooding, which is one of the deadliest and most damaging natural disasters in the world. We investigate the possibility to boost risk perception, coping appraisal, negative emotions and damage-reducing behavior through a simulated flooding experience. We find that participants who experienced the virtual flood invest significantly more in the flood risk investment game than those in the control group. The investments in the VR treatment seem to decrease after four weeks but not significantly so.
{"title":"After the virtual flood: Risk perceptions and flood preparedness after\u0000 virtual reality risk communication","authors":"Jantsje M. Mol, W. Botzen, J. Blasch","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009074","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Many individuals experience problems understanding and preparing for\u0000 low-probability/high-impact risk, like natural disasters and pandemics –\u0000 unless they experience these events, yet then it is often too late to avoid\u0000 damages. Individuals with recent disaster risk experience are, on average,\u0000 better prepared. This seems to be mediated through emotions and a better\u0000 understanding of the consequences. In this study, we use immersive virtual\u0000 reality (VR) technology to examine whether a simulated disaster can\u0000 stimulate people to invest in risk reducing measures in the context of\u0000 flooding, which is one of the deadliest and most damaging natural disasters\u0000 in the world. We investigate the possibility to boost risk perception,\u0000 coping appraisal, negative emotions and damage-reducing behavior through a\u0000 simulated flooding experience. We find that participants who experienced the\u0000 virtual flood invest significantly more in the flood risk investment game\u0000 than those in the control group. The investments in the VR treatment seem to\u0000 decrease after four weeks but not significantly so.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46052920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009013
Carlos A. de Matos Fernandes, Dieko M. Bakker, J. Dijkstra
Decades of research show that (i) social value orientation (SVO) is related to important behavioral outcomes such as cooperation and charitable giving, and (ii) individuals differ in terms of SVO. A prominent scale to measure SVO is the social value orientation slider measure (SVOSM). The central premise is that SVOSM captures a stable trait. But it is unknown how reliable the SVOSM is over repeated measurements more than one week apart. To fill this knowledge gap, we followed a sample of N = 495 over 6 months with monthly SVO measurements. We find that continuous SVO scores are similarly distributed (Anderson-Darling k-sample p = 0.57) and highly correlated (r ≥ 0.66) across waves. The intra-class correlation coefficient of 0.78 attests to a high test-retest reliability. Using multilevel modeling and multiple visualizations, we furthermore find that one’s prior SVO score is highly indicative of SVO in future waves, suggesting that the slider measure consistently captures one’s SVO. Our analyses validate the slider measure as a reliable SVO scale.
{"title":"Assessing the test-retest reliability of the social value orientation\u0000 slider measure","authors":"Carlos A. de Matos Fernandes, Dieko M. Bakker, J. Dijkstra","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Decades of research show that (i) social\u0000 value orientation (SVO) is related to important behavioral outcomes such as\u0000 cooperation and charitable giving, and (ii)\u0000 individuals differ in terms of SVO. A prominent scale to measure SVO is the\u0000 social value orientation slider measure (SVOSM). The central premise is that\u0000 SVOSM captures a stable trait. But it is unknown how reliable the SVOSM is\u0000 over repeated measurements more than one week apart. To fill this knowledge\u0000 gap, we followed a sample of N = 495 over 6\u0000 months with monthly SVO measurements. We find that continuous SVO scores are\u0000 similarly distributed (Anderson-Darling k-sample\u0000 p = 0.57) and highly correlated\u0000 (r ≥ 0.66) across waves. The intra-class\u0000 correlation coefficient of 0.78 attests to a high test-retest reliability.\u0000 Using multilevel modeling and multiple visualizations, we furthermore find\u0000 that one’s prior SVO score is highly indicative of SVO in future waves,\u0000 suggesting that the slider measure consistently captures one’s SVO. Our\u0000 analyses validate the slider measure as a reliable SVO scale.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48300449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009189
M. Korbmacher, C. Kwan, Gilad Feldman
Above-and-below-average effects are well-known phenomena that arise when comparing oneself to others. Kruger (1999) found that people rate themselves as above average for easy abilities and below average for difficult abilities. We conducted a successful pre-registered replication of Kruger’s (1999) Study 1, the first demonstration of the core phenomenon (N = 756, US MTurk workers). Extending the replication to also include a between-subject design, we added two conditions manipulating easy and difficult interpretations of the original ability domains, and with an additional dependent variable measuring perceived difficulty. We observed an above-average-effect in the easy extension and below-average-effect in the difficult extension, compared to the neutral replication condition. Both extension conditions were perceived as less ambiguous than the original neutral condition. Overall, we conclude strong empirical support for Kruger’s above-and-below-average effects, with boundary conditions laid out in the extensions expanding both generalizability and robustness of the phenomenon.
{"title":"Both better and worse than others depending on difficulty: Replication\u0000 and extensions of Kruger’s (1999) above and below average effects","authors":"M. Korbmacher, C. Kwan, Gilad Feldman","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009189","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Above-and-below-average effects are well-known phenomena that arise when\u0000 comparing oneself to others. Kruger (1999) found that people rate themselves\u0000 as above average for easy abilities and below average for difficult\u0000 abilities. We conducted a successful pre-registered replication of Kruger’s\u0000 (1999) Study 1, the first demonstration of the core phenomenon\u0000 (N = 756, US MTurk workers). Extending the\u0000 replication to also include a between-subject design, we added two\u0000 conditions manipulating easy and difficult interpretations of the original\u0000 ability domains, and with an additional dependent variable measuring\u0000 perceived difficulty. We observed an above-average-effect in the easy\u0000 extension and below-average-effect in the difficult extension, compared to\u0000 the neutral replication condition. Both extension conditions were perceived\u0000 as less ambiguous than the original neutral condition. Overall, we conclude\u0000 strong empirical support for Kruger’s above-and-below-average effects, with\u0000 boundary conditions laid out in the extensions expanding both\u0000 generalizability and robustness of the phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46342559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009049
Ying Han, D. Budescu
The accuracy of human forecasters is often reduced because of incomplete information and cognitive biases that affect the judges. One approach to improve the accuracy of the forecasts is to recalibrate them by means of non-linear transformations that are sensitive to the direction and the magnitude of the biases. Previous work on recalibration has focused on binary forecasts. We propose an extension of this approach by developing an algorithm that uses a single free parameter to recalibrate complete subjective probability distributions. We illustrate the approach with data from the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB), document the potential benefits of this approach, and show how it can be used in practical applications.
{"title":"Recalibrating probabilistic forecasts to improve their accuracy","authors":"Ying Han, D. Budescu","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009049","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The accuracy of human forecasters is often reduced because of incomplete\u0000 information and cognitive biases that affect the judges. One approach to\u0000 improve the accuracy of the forecasts is to recalibrate them by means of\u0000 non-linear transformations that are sensitive to the direction and the\u0000 magnitude of the biases. Previous work on recalibration has focused on\u0000 binary forecasts. We propose an extension of this approach by developing an\u0000 algorithm that uses a single free parameter to recalibrate complete\u0000 subjective probability distributions. We illustrate the approach with data\u0000 from the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the\u0000 European Central Bank (ECB), document the potential benefits of this\u0000 approach, and show how it can be used in practical applications.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43249241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009001
Hajdi Moche, Tom Gordon-Hecker, Tehila Kogut, D. Västfjäll
Can deliberation increase charitable giving when giving is impulsive (i.e., a one-time small gift in response to an immediate appeal)? We conduct two studies in Israel and Sweden to compare two forms of deliberation, unguided and guided, in their ability to decrease the singularity effect (i.e., giving more to one than many victims), often evident in impulsive giving. Under unguided deliberation, participants were instructed to simply think hard before making a donation decision whereas participants in the guided deliberation condition were asked to think how much different prespecified decision attributes should influence their decision. We find that both types of deliberation reduce the singularity effect, as people no longer value the single victim higher than the group of victims. Importantly, this is driven by donations being decreased under deliberation only to the single victim, but not the group of victims. Thus, deliberation affects donations negatively by overshadowing the affective response, especially in situations in which affect is greatest (i.e., to a single victim). Last, the results show that neither type of deliberation significantly reversed the singularity effect, as people did not help the group significantly more than the single victim. This means that deliberate thinking decreased the overall willingness to help, leading to a lower overall valuation of people in need.
{"title":"Thinking, good and bad? Deliberative thinking and the singularity effect\u0000 in charitable giving","authors":"Hajdi Moche, Tom Gordon-Hecker, Tehila Kogut, D. Västfjäll","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Can deliberation increase charitable giving when giving is impulsive\u0000 (i.e., a one-time small gift in response to an immediate appeal)? We conduct\u0000 two studies in Israel and Sweden to compare two forms of deliberation,\u0000 unguided and guided, in their ability to decrease the singularity effect\u0000 (i.e., giving more to one than many victims), often evident in impulsive\u0000 giving. Under unguided deliberation, participants were instructed to simply\u0000 think hard before making a donation decision whereas participants in the\u0000 guided deliberation condition were asked to think how much different\u0000 prespecified decision attributes should influence their decision. We find\u0000 that both types of deliberation reduce the singularity effect, as people no\u0000 longer value the single victim higher than the group of victims.\u0000 Importantly, this is driven by donations being decreased under deliberation\u0000 only to the single victim, but not the group of victims. Thus, deliberation\u0000 affects donations negatively by overshadowing the affective response,\u0000 especially in situations in which affect is greatest (i.e., to a single\u0000 victim). Last, the results show that neither type of deliberation\u0000 significantly reversed the singularity effect, as people did not help the\u0000 group significantly more than the single victim. This means that deliberate\u0000 thinking decreased the overall willingness to help, leading to a lower\u0000 overall valuation of people in need.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44918981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009037
Zhijian He, Junyi Dai
Previous research has demonstrated systematic discrepancies between description- and experience-based risky choices. This description-experience gap has been attributed to several factors such as reliance on small samples and differential probability weighting patterns. Because context-dependent outcome expectation regarding safe options might influence experience-based risky choices, it constitutes another potential contributor to the gap. Using a free-sampling paradigm and risky options with rare outcomes that were either attractive or unattractive relative to the frequent ones, two experiments examined the existence and impact of such outcome expectation in experience-based risky choices. Both experiments had two information conditions: hint information meant to eliminate outcome expectation was provided in one condition but not the other. Experiment 1, which indicated the numbers of possible outcomes regarding both safe and risky options under the hint condition, revealed different choice behaviors regarding risky-safe trials between the two information conditions, no matter whether the rare outcome of the risky option in such a trial (i.e., the local context) was attractive or unattractive. However, this result provided only indirect evidence for the role of outcome expectation because it was unclear whether the hint information affected only the outcome expectation and thus evaluation of safe options or the evaluations of both safe and risky ones. With refined hint information arguably removing potential impacts on the evaluation of risky options, Experiment 2 showed that expectation of a non-existent rare outcome of safe options did contribute to experience-based risky choices. In addition, it appeared that the rare outcomes of the risky options in other decision problems presented in the same experiment (i.e., the global context) also affected outcome expectation. Future research could investigate how the interaction between local and global contexts determines outcome expectation to deepen our understanding of its contribution to experience-based risky choice and the description-experience gap.
{"title":"Context-dependent outcome expectation contributes to experience-based\u0000 risky choice","authors":"Zhijian He, Junyi Dai","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Previous research has demonstrated systematic discrepancies between\u0000 description- and experience-based risky choices. This\u0000 description-experience gap has been\u0000 attributed to several factors such as reliance on small samples and\u0000 differential probability weighting patterns. Because context-dependent\u0000 outcome expectation regarding safe options might influence experience-based\u0000 risky choices, it constitutes another potential contributor to the gap.\u0000 Using a free-sampling paradigm and risky options with rare outcomes that\u0000 were either attractive or unattractive relative to the frequent ones, two\u0000 experiments examined the existence and impact of such outcome expectation in\u0000 experience-based risky choices. Both experiments had two information\u0000 conditions: hint information meant to eliminate outcome expectation was\u0000 provided in one condition but not the other. Experiment 1, which indicated\u0000 the numbers of possible outcomes regarding both safe and risky options under\u0000 the hint condition, revealed different choice behaviors regarding risky-safe\u0000 trials between the two information conditions, no matter whether the rare\u0000 outcome of the risky option in such a trial (i.e., the\u0000 local context) was attractive or\u0000 unattractive. However, this result provided only indirect evidence for the\u0000 role of outcome expectation because it was unclear whether the hint\u0000 information affected only the outcome expectation and thus evaluation of\u0000 safe options or the evaluations of both safe and risky ones. With refined\u0000 hint information arguably removing potential impacts on the evaluation of\u0000 risky options, Experiment 2 showed that expectation of a non-existent rare\u0000 outcome of safe options did contribute to experience-based risky choices. In\u0000 addition, it appeared that the rare outcomes of the risky options in other\u0000 decision problems presented in the same experiment (i.e., the\u0000 global context) also affected outcome\u0000 expectation. Future research could investigate how the interaction between\u0000 local and global contexts determines outcome expectation to deepen our\u0000 understanding of its contribution to experience-based risky choice and the\u0000 description-experience gap.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43394062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008998
Manja Gärtner, D. Andersson, D. Västfjäll, G. Tinghög
We study the effects of experimental manipulation of decision mode (rational “brain” vs. affective “heart”) and individual difference in processing styles (intuition vs. deliberation) on prosocial behavior. In a survey experiment with a diverse sample of the Swedish population (n = 1,828), we elicited the individuals’ processing style and we experimentally manipulated reliance on affect or reason, regardless of subjects’ preferred mode. Prosocial behavior was measured across a series of commonly used and incentivized games (prisoner’s dilemma game, public goods game, trust game, dictator game). Our results show that prosocial behavior increased for the affective (“heart”) decision mode. Further, individual differences in processing style did not predict prosocial behavior and did not interact with the experimental manipulation.
{"title":"Affect and prosocial behavior: The role of decision mode and individual\u0000 processing style","authors":"Manja Gärtner, D. Andersson, D. Västfjäll, G. Tinghög","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500008998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008998","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study the effects of experimental manipulation of decision mode\u0000 (rational “brain” vs. affective “heart”) and individual difference in\u0000 processing styles (intuition vs. deliberation) on prosocial behavior. In a\u0000 survey experiment with a diverse sample of the Swedish population\u0000 (n = 1,828), we elicited the individuals’\u0000 processing style and we experimentally manipulated reliance on affect or\u0000 reason, regardless of subjects’ preferred mode. Prosocial behavior was\u0000 measured across a series of commonly used and incentivized games (prisoner’s\u0000 dilemma game, public goods game, trust game, dictator game). Our results\u0000 show that prosocial behavior increased for the affective (“heart”) decision\u0000 mode. Further, individual differences in processing style did not predict\u0000 prosocial behavior and did not interact with the experimental\u0000 manipulation.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43008818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009086
Yun Jie
Curbing the COVID-19 pandemic remains an ongoing global challenge. Institutions often release information about confirmed COVID-19 cases by citing the total number of cases (e.g., 100,000), their (relative) frequency (e.g., 100 per 1,000,000), or occasionally their proportion (e.g., 0.0001) in a region. I compared the effect of these three presentation formats — total cases, frequency, and proportion — on people’s perceived risk. I found people perceived a higher risk of COVID-19 from a total-cases format than from frequency formats when the denominators are relatively small, and the lowest risk from a proportion format. Correspondingly, people underestimated total infections when given frequency and overestimated frequency when given total number of cases. Additional comparisons were made among mathematically equivalent variations of frequency formats (e.g., 1 in 100, 10 in 1,000, 1,000 in 10,000, etc.). The results provided qualified support for denominator neglect, which seems to occur in bins into which denominators are grouped (e.g., 1–1000, 10000–100000), such that only across bins could participants perceive differences. Finally, a mixed format of proportion and total cases reduced perceived risks from total cases alone, while a mixed format of frequency and total cases failed to produce similar results. I conclude by providing concrete suggestions regarding COVID-19 information releases.
{"title":"Frequency or total number? A comparison of different presentation formats\u0000 on risk perception during COVID-19","authors":"Yun Jie","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009086","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Curbing the COVID-19 pandemic remains an ongoing global challenge.\u0000 Institutions often release information about confirmed COVID-19 cases by\u0000 citing the total number of cases (e.g., 100,000), their (relative) frequency\u0000 (e.g., 100 per 1,000,000), or occasionally their proportion (e.g., 0.0001)\u0000 in a region. I compared the effect of these three presentation formats —\u0000 total cases, frequency, and proportion — on people’s perceived risk. I found\u0000 people perceived a higher risk of COVID-19 from a total-cases format than\u0000 from frequency formats when the denominators are relatively small, and the\u0000 lowest risk from a proportion format. Correspondingly, people underestimated\u0000 total infections when given frequency and overestimated frequency when given\u0000 total number of cases. Additional comparisons were made among mathematically\u0000 equivalent variations of frequency formats (e.g., 1 in 100, 10 in 1,000,\u0000 1,000 in 10,000, etc.). The results provided qualified support for\u0000 denominator neglect, which seems to occur in bins into which denominators\u0000 are grouped (e.g., 1–1000, 10000–100000), such that only across bins could\u0000 participants perceive differences. Finally, a mixed format of proportion and\u0000 total cases reduced perceived risks from total cases alone, while a mixed\u0000 format of frequency and total cases failed to produce similar results. I\u0000 conclude by providing concrete suggestions regarding COVID-19 information\u0000 releases.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42071256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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