Journal of Regional Science最新文献

This paper examines the effects of COVID-19-induced lockdowns on recorded crime in England. The enforcement of lockdowns at both the national and local levels allows unveiling the impact on criminal activities by type of shutdown policy. Using official crime data across the universe of local authorities, we find that unlike local lockdowns national lockdowns significantly change the shape of recorded criminal activity, with the first nationally-imposed lockdown having the strongest impact. Findings also reveal that police operations play a prominent role in explaining changes in reported crimes. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that lockdowns reduced the economic costs of crime by £4.2 billion.

Using individual-level, geocode data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth's 1997 cohort, I ask whether business dynamism in local labor markets, defined as the rates of job creation and establishment entry, affects the location decisions of labor force participants, and I examine how effects differ for highly and less educated labor force participants. I find that a one standard deviation increase in business dynamism is associated with a 2%–4% increase in the probability a college graduate chooses a metropolitan statistical area and an 8%–15% decrease for high school graduates with no college experience. These results support recent findings documenting a decrease in responsiveness to local labor market conditions and suggest that incentivizing job creation in local labor markets may not be enough to offset the trend of declining internal migration in the United States.

Urban blight is a complex problem that has been challenging for cities in the United States “Rust Belt” region for many decades. However, in the wake of the real estate and financial crisis, it is also a growing challenge for urban communities in many states such as California, Arizona, Nevada, and Texas. Detroit was particularly hit hard, where more than 40,000 blighted structures were identified in 2014. To curb blight, the city mobilized the most extensive demolition program in the country. Funded through the Federal Hardest Hit Fund (HHF), the Detroit Demolition Program began in 2014 and has demolished more than 20,800 properties at the cost of over $250 million. Furthermore, during 2009–2015, the city demolished 11,400 structures with hazardous materials such as asbestos. In this article, we assess the impacts of demolitions on the value of neighboring properties using a Repeat Sales (RS) regression approach. Specifically, we use housing sales price information from 2009 through 2019 to construct real estate price indices. We also rely on information from the 2009 Detroit Residential Survey to differentiate by dilapidation and blight levels before the start of the program. On average, blight removal through the demolition program does not appear to have been capitalized into the residential property prices. However, when considering the effect of ex-ante program property characteristics, we find a modest positive effect of demolitions on property prices in areas with a low level of blight before the demolitions. Given the magnitude of the observed effect and the high costs associated with the demolition program, our results highlight the need for further research on alternative blight removal strategies that might provide a more cost-effective solution to this urban challenge.

We study the effect on housing values of cutting funding for the maintenance of local parks and recreational areas. It is the first study we find on house prices and park maintenance spending, and only the second open space study we find that uses regression discontinuity. We study tax votes with exogenous timing for renewing current expense spending on parks and recreation, adding to the vibrant literature on house price capitalization of environmental amenities. We find that otherwise similar communities that barely vote to cut taxes suffer an 11% drop in house prices, compared to communities that barely vote to renew tax funding. The capitalization discount grows to 13% and 16% in later periods. Voting against spending saves $70 a year for a typical house but cuts house values by over $30,000. We find stronger effects for large tax levies and more expensive houses.

In this paper, we develop a three-region economic geography model with workers of heterogeneous skills and mobility rates to consider how first-nature, regional differences impact both inter- and intraregional inequality. In our model, the skill premium within a region summarizes both the degree of intraregional inequality between mobile, skilled workers and immobile, unskilled workers and the interregional inequality through differences in the welfare of unskilled workers across regions. Regions with the highest skill premium have the greatest degree of intraregional inequality and provide the lowest level of welfare to unskilled workers, relative to other regions. We find that the skill premium will be higher in regions with a greater supply of unskilled labor, lower supply of housing, or are more remote. An increase in a region's housing supply or centrality will lower intraregional inequality and raise the welfare of the local, unskilled workforce. However, the magnitude of these changes are declining in the initial number of skilled workers in the region. The model is extended to consider imperfectly elastic housing supply. The larger the price elasticity of housing, the larger the range of values, such that more populated regions will host a disproportionate share of skilled workers, have lower levels of intraregional inequality, and provide higher levels of welfare for unskilled workers.

It is well known that the value of a house depends both on the physical characteristics and on some features of the neighborhood in which it is located. If so, organized-crime activities can significantly affect urban real estate values. Antimafia policies, in turn, can be intended as a tool to influence those external features. This paper compares the effects on real estate values of the two main antimafia policies implemented in Italy since the 1990s at the municipal level. While we do not find any significant effect of dismissal policies on house prices, we find a statistically significant effect of reassignment policies depending on the specific destination of confiscated property.

City officials are continuously working to attract airlines willing to fly to new destinations. The inherent expectation is that a more extensive aviation network stimulates economic growth. This paper investigates empirically the causal implication of this hypothesis. Using data on nonstop flights by origin and destination over the period 1984–2013, we propose a new measure for a metropolitan area's connectivity to the national aviation network. We then use this measure to investigate its contribution to local economic development, as captured by the growth in population, in total employment, in per-capita income, and new firm entry. To ensure causality, we use instrumental variable methods that exploit geography and destination airports growth as a way to capture the exogenous variation in the likelihood to add new travel routes. Our results suggest that a metropolitan area's air connectivity, resulting from an expansive local aviation network, has a positive effect on population, on employment and on the number of businesses established in that location.

As wildfires increase in both severity and frequency, understanding the role of risk saliency on human behaviors in the face of fire risks becomes paramount. While research has shown that homebuyers capitalize wildfire risk following a fire, studies of the role that risk saliency plays on residential development is limited. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying the link between wildfire risk saliency and the rate of residential development in wildfire-prone areas, by treating recent wildfires as conditionally exogenous shocks to saliency. Using geospatial data on residential development in Colorado, we show that saliency shocks due to wildfire lead to statistically significant reductions in the rate of new development in wildfire risk zones that last upwards of 5 years, a result that is robust to a number of alternative explanations. We explore the policy implications of these findings, noting that education on fire risks may curtail some but not all of the development in these high wildfire-risk areas due to the rapid growth of development in these regions.

We use the case of Chile to analyze the effectiveness of a spatially blind employment relief program (hereafter referred to as the LPE program) established by the Chilean government and implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. Chile is an interesting case because on the one hand its nonpharmaceutical interventions were spatially driven by health indicators based on small geographical areas; hence, producing sizeable regional and temporal variation of the local conditions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, the LPE program was designed and implemented nationally without distinction of local labor market or pandemic conditions, and each firm could decide whether to enroll in the program. By exploiting the spatial-temporal variation of exogenously imposed lockdowns and using a difference-in-differences panel data framework, we find that the LPE program was only effective for a group of regions in the country but, more importantly, that the LPE program was less effective during lockdowns. Moreover, the requirements of the LPE program were vague and did not target specific populations or entities. Consequently, our results suggest that women, informal and small firm workers, and most economic sectors throughout the country were less able to take advantage of the benefits of this program.

Populations are affected by shocks of different kinds, and wars, a priori, may be among the most prominent. This article studies the effect of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) shock on the distribution of population, especially on cities. One of the main contributions of this study is that it underlines the importance of distinguishing between winning and losing sides, an aspect which until now has been largely overlooked. While previous research on war shocks has also tended to be concerned with inter-state wars, this paper concentrates on a civil war. We take advantage of a new, long-term, annual data set. Our results show that, overall, the Spanish Civil War did not have a significant effect on city growth. However, we also find a significant and negative effect in the growth of cities that aligned themselves with the losing side. These results are robust to heterogeneity in the effect of the war shock, measured as war severity and duration. Although short lived, the temporary effect on growth results in a permanent effect on the size of cities on the losing side.