The paper investigates whether ESG-linked managerial incentives, also known as ESG contracting, align or compete with stakeholder interests in the banking sector. The few related literature, focussed on non-financial companies, shows arguments both pro and against pay for sustainability. Using a panel data set of 595 worldwide listed banks for the period 2010–2021, the paper studies the effectiveness of ESG incentives in improving ESG performance and limiting ESG controversies. ESG contracting is shown to improve both ESG performance and ESG disputes, thus suggesting that it is more symbolic than substantial in meeting stakeholder interests. ESG strategy, ESG committee and managerial risk-taking are significant channels through which ESG incentives affect ESG performance and ESG controversies in the banking sector.
Using the 2018 US-China trade war as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate how downstream shrinkage affects upstream employment. Utilizing a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, we reveal a negative effect of downstream shrinkage on upstream firm employment. Our mechanism analysis indicates that trade wars increase the tax burden, inventories, and accounts payable for downstream firms while reducing their employment. This shrinkage of downstream firms limits the scale of investment and operations for upstream firms through supply chain transmission, thereby decreasing employment of upstream firms. Moreover, our finding is more pronounced for specific types of firms, such as non-state-owned firms, firms operating across multiple industries. Our study provides an essential reference for firms in building resilient supply chain networks to better cope with potential negative shocks.
This study explores how shareholder activism affects the behaviors of non-target companies with the same investment portfolio. Employing a matching-DiD methodology, we find that the portfolio non-target treatment firms tend to conduct greater tax avoidance compared to the control firms. This effect is stronger for firms facing financial constraints, under experienced activist scrutiny, involved in hostile campaigns, targeting financial and M&A matters, and with higher activist shareholdings. Increased tax avoidance is attributed to improved tax planning, enhancing firm value, and reducing future targeting risks. These findings align with the threat effect, where both fortification and fire-drill channels can be at play. Overall, this study sheds light on how companies balance financial demands of shareholders with the tax obligations to the government in their tax strategy decisions, which may provide valuable insights into how businesses keep the balance between multiple stakeholders.
Liquidity regulation framework is one of the pillars of Basel III implementation. In this paper, we evaluate how Basel III liquidity regulations, namely the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), as well as their interactions affect financial stability. Theory suggests that, in maintaining financial stability, liquidity regulations may not act as complements. If one regulation is a binding constraint, the other may become a slack. Using Indonesia, an early adopter of the LCR and the NSFR, as a testing ground, we find that the LCR significantly reduces bank systemic risk, thus acting as a binding liquidity regulation. Lower systemic risk reflects lower fire-sale spillover implications in the financial system after the implementation of the LCR. The NSFR, however, does not have a significant effect on systemic risk, confirming its role as a slack.