Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10317645
John Greco
In this excellent book, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion defend an etiological-functionalist account of the normativity of assertion. Specifically, the etiological function of assertion is to generate knowledge in hearers. Kelp and Simion argue that this functionalist thesis has two important implications: a) that epistemically good assertions are those that are disposed to generate knowledge in hearers, and b) that epistemically permissible assertions are those that conform to the Knowledge Rule of Assertion (KRA). One important feature of the book is a sophisticated defense of KRA by means of an etiological-functionalist framework.The book is lucidly written, rigorously argued, informed, and original. All of this is as expected, coming from two authors who have already made significant contributions to the topic. Indeed, the book draws on both their single-authored and coauthored work on related issues, including the normativity of assertion, the epistemology of testimony, epistemic norms, and epistemic normativity. The result is that an etiological-functionalist account of assertion is now front and center among competing views.The book also contains several other interesting and original discussions, all by way of applying the authors’ etiological-functionalist framework to prominent issues in the literature on assertion and beyond. These include a chapter on epistemic injustice (defending a duty to believe on the part of hearers), a chapter on whether there is a constitutive rule of assertion (rejecting Williamson’s strong constitution thesis, but defending a weaker version), a chapter on contextualism (arguing, contra DeRose, that KRA counts against a contextualist semantics of knowledge attributions), and an appendix on the value of knowledge (offering an original defense of our concern with knowledge, as well as a functionalist account of knowledge’s value). In my judgment, the book advances discussions on all of these topics in important and original ways.In the remainder of the review, I clarify what Kelp and Simion mean by a functionalist account of assertion, and I review what I take to be the authors’ most interesting arguments in favor of KRA and their etiological-functionalist account. I end by raising some questions about the view that results.Kelp and Simion tell us that they are arguing for a “function first” account of the normativity of assertion. Three points of clarifications are important here. First, this an account of the epistemic normativity of assertion, that is, an account of what makes an assertion epistemically (as opposed to practically, morally, or all-things-considered) good, proper, or right. Second, by “function,” the authors mean etiological function. This makes their account a competitor with ones that ground the normativity of assertion in human intentions (or what I will call the intended function of assertion). For example, it is a competitor with accounts that ground the normativity of assertion in human in
{"title":"<i>Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion</i>","authors":"John Greco","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10317645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10317645","url":null,"abstract":"In this excellent book, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion defend an etiological-functionalist account of the normativity of assertion. Specifically, the etiological function of assertion is to generate knowledge in hearers. Kelp and Simion argue that this functionalist thesis has two important implications: a) that epistemically good assertions are those that are disposed to generate knowledge in hearers, and b) that epistemically permissible assertions are those that conform to the Knowledge Rule of Assertion (KRA). One important feature of the book is a sophisticated defense of KRA by means of an etiological-functionalist framework.The book is lucidly written, rigorously argued, informed, and original. All of this is as expected, coming from two authors who have already made significant contributions to the topic. Indeed, the book draws on both their single-authored and coauthored work on related issues, including the normativity of assertion, the epistemology of testimony, epistemic norms, and epistemic normativity. The result is that an etiological-functionalist account of assertion is now front and center among competing views.The book also contains several other interesting and original discussions, all by way of applying the authors’ etiological-functionalist framework to prominent issues in the literature on assertion and beyond. These include a chapter on epistemic injustice (defending a duty to believe on the part of hearers), a chapter on whether there is a constitutive rule of assertion (rejecting Williamson’s strong constitution thesis, but defending a weaker version), a chapter on contextualism (arguing, contra DeRose, that KRA counts against a contextualist semantics of knowledge attributions), and an appendix on the value of knowledge (offering an original defense of our concern with knowledge, as well as a functionalist account of knowledge’s value). In my judgment, the book advances discussions on all of these topics in important and original ways.In the remainder of the review, I clarify what Kelp and Simion mean by a functionalist account of assertion, and I review what I take to be the authors’ most interesting arguments in favor of KRA and their etiological-functionalist account. I end by raising some questions about the view that results.Kelp and Simion tell us that they are arguing for a “function first” account of the normativity of assertion. Three points of clarifications are important here. First, this an account of the epistemic normativity of assertion, that is, an account of what makes an assertion epistemically (as opposed to practically, morally, or all-things-considered) good, proper, or right. Second, by “function,” the authors mean etiological function. This makes their account a competitor with ones that ground the normativity of assertion in human intentions (or what I will call the intended function of assertion). For example, it is a competitor with accounts that ground the normativity of assertion in human in","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135673466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10317632
Duncan Pritchard
A new book by Ernest Sosa is always an event. In a philosophical age where much of the focus is on piecemeal issues, Sosa has forged ahead with a novel virtue-theoretic treatment of a range of core questions in epistemology that is self-consciously systematic. Note that ‘epistemology’ is here broadly conceived. Indeed, a key part of the Sosa project has been to enlarge the reach of mainstream epistemology and thereby draw out connections with other areas of philosophy that have hitherto been underexplored, especially ethics, philosophy of mind and action, and metaphysics. Moreover, Sosa is also unusual among contemporary philosophers in having an acute grasp of the history of the subject, which he brings to bear in support of his program. The result is an incredibly sophisticated vision of how a range of topics in epistemology fit together.1Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains is the new installment in Sosa’s distinctive brand of virtue epistemology. The book is organized into four parts. Part 1 is devoted to articulating the telic virtue epistemology framework that Sosa defends. In light of this framework, he explores how we should account for the undoubted importance of first-hand knowledge and understanding and how we should conceive of the relationship between the theory of knowledge and intellectual ethics. Part 2 offers a comprehensive treatment of the epistemology of suspension. Part 3 is primarily concerned with default assumptions and understanding how they lead to refinements of telic virtue epistemology. Among other things, this part defends a metaphysical hierarchy of epistemic categories that includes a discussion of what Sosa terms secure knowledge, which is a particularly important epistemic category within his framework. Part 4 builds on the account of default assumptions in part 3 by offering an extended discussion of how this bears on the Wittgenstein–Moore debate (roughly, the clash of hinge epistemology with a form of epistemic foundationalism). Like all Sosa’s work, the writing is refreshingly crisp. It is also deceptively readable, in that one can find oneself surprised at just how much philosophical ground is being covered.There is much that I agree with in this book, but I would like to take this opportunity to critically focus on Sosa’s intriguing appeal to default assumptions and how it plays out both in terms of his theory of knowledge and his approach to radical skepticism. As will be familiar to readers of Sosa’s work, he understands knowledge in terms of what he calls aptness. Roughly, a performance is apt (‘accurate because adroit’) when one’s success in the target endeavour is properly attributable to one’s manifestation of relevant skill. As applied to the epistemic realm, we thus get the idea that knowledge is apt belief—that is, one knows when one’s cognitive success (true belief) is properly attributable to one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency.2Sosa’s novel cla
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Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10294448
Peter Adamson
There have been philosophers who sought to preserve and ratify the dictates’ common sense, and there have been philosophers who were willing to overturn and correct those dictates. And then there was Averroes. His most notorious doctrine is not just counterintuitive. It commits him to something that seems self-evidently false, namely that there is only a single mind to which all human thought is related. As his most famous critic, Thomas Aquinas, pointed out, it seems simply obvious that we each have a mind of our own, and that we can each think as individuals. Averroes—to use the Latinized version of his name, Ibn Rushd—seemed to deny this in his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, triggering a protracted debate in Latin medieval and Renaissance philosophy.1 Why spill so much ink over such an implausible theory? Part of the reason was surely Averroes’s stature as the most authoritative commentator on Aristotle. When Aquinas devoted a treatise specifically to the issue, he met Averroes on his own ground by disputing the unity theory as an interpretation of On the Soul. His concern was not mainly to refute a false philosophical view, but to rescue Aristotle from being associated with that view.And there was another reason the topic attracted so much attention: Averroes’s arguments for the unity of intellect were surprisingly powerful. Just how powerful is shown in a superb new book by Stephen Ogden. Applying the sort of sympathetic approach and analytic acuity now standardly brought to the works of Aristotle himself, Ogden explains that Averroes had strong philosophical and exegetical reasons for endorsing the unity of the intellect. With regular reference to Aquinas as a foil, Ogden makes a convincing case that Averroes’s apparently unbelievable view in fact made a great deal of sense within an Aristotelian framework. Indeed, within that framework it often seems to be at an advantage against the apparently far more plausible view of Aquinas, for whom intellect is immaterial but individual: one mind per human, not one mind for the whole human race.Averroes’ position was, as he noted himself, unique within the complex history of interpretations of Aristotle’s On the Soul chapters 3.4–5, the chapters that deal most centrally with intellect. Ogden indeed says that the Averroist view “boasts novelty galore” (92). But it was actually not new to posit a single mind standing over all human individuals. The Aristotelian God was such a mind, as was the nous postulated by Plotinus. Closer to Averroes in time, culture, and intention was Avicenna (again, this name is a Latinization, in this case of Ibn Sīnā). He held that the so called “active intellect” (AI) described by Aristotle in the brief and inscrutable chapter 3.5 of On the Soul is a single transcendent principle that somehow allows individual humans to think. (Exactly how it does so is a matter of extensive dispute among Avicenna scholars.) By contrast, the potential or material intellect (MP
有哲学家试图保留和认可命令的常识，也有哲学家愿意推翻和纠正这些命令。然后是阿威罗伊斯。他最臭名昭著的学说不仅仅是违反直觉。它使他陷入一种似乎不证自明的错误，即只有一个心灵与人类的一切思想有关。正如他最著名的批评家托马斯·阿奎那(Thomas Aquinas)所指出的那样，似乎很明显，我们每个人都有自己的思想，我们每个人都可以独立思考。阿威罗伊——用他名字的拉丁化版本，伊本·拉什——似乎在他对亚里士多德的《论灵魂》的长篇评论中否认了这一点，引发了拉丁中世纪和文艺复兴时期哲学史上一场旷日持久的辩论为什么要在这样一个不可信的理论上花那么多笔墨呢?部分原因肯定是阿威罗伊作为最权威的亚里士多德评论家的地位。当阿奎那专门为这个问题写了一篇论文时，他在自己的立场上遇到了阿威罗伊，他争论统一理论作为《论灵魂》的解释。他关心的主要不是驳斥一个错误的哲学观点，而是拯救亚里士多德，使其不与那个观点联系在一起。这个话题吸引如此多关注还有另一个原因:阿威罗伊关于智力统一性的论证令人惊讶地有力。史蒂芬·奥格登(Stephen Ogden)的一本出色的新书展示了这种力量有多强大。奥格登运用了亚里士多德自己的作品中通常采用的那种同情的方法和敏锐的分析能力，他解释说，阿威罗伊有强大的哲学和训诂上的理由来支持智力的统一性。奥格登经常引用阿奎那作为衬托，提出了一个令人信服的例子，即阿威罗伊表面上令人难以置信的观点，实际上在亚里士多德的框架内是有很大意义的。事实上，在这个框架内，它似乎经常比阿奎那的观点更有优势，阿奎那认为智力是非物质的，而是个体的:每个人都有一个头脑，而不是整个人类的一个头脑。阿威罗伊的立场，正如他自己所说，在亚里士多德《论灵魂》第3.4-5章的复杂历史解释中是独一无二的，这几章主要是关于智力的。奥格登确实说过，阿威罗伊主义的观点“拥有丰富的新颖性”(92)。但事实上，假设一个单一的思想凌驾于所有人类个体之上并不是什么新鲜事。亚里士多德的上帝就是这样一种精神，就像普罗提诺所假定的诺斯一样。在时间、文化和意图上更接近阿威罗伊的是阿维森纳(同样，这个名字是拉丁化的，在伊本·s·纳伊的例子中)。他认为，亚里士多德在《论灵魂》简短而晦涩的第3.5章中所描述的所谓“主动智能”(AI)是一种单一的超越原则，它以某种方式允许个体人类思考。(它究竟是如何做到这一点的，在阿维森纳的学者之间存在广泛争议。)相比之下，负责接收可理解信息的潜在智力或物质智力(MPI)对阿维森纳来说是每个人类智力所独有的。正如奥格登所言，阿威罗伊和阿奎那一致认为，人工智能和MPI之间的这种不匹配是不可持续的。要么两者都是独立的，要么两者都是一体的。阿奎那当然采纳了前者的观点，而阿威罗伊则反对后者。为什么?在阅读奥格登的书之前，我认为阿威罗伊的立场的一个主要原因是物质是个性化的原则。例如，两朵向日葵属于向日葵的种类，但它们的形式是个性化的，因为它们被接收在两个时空不同的物质中。但亚里士多德明确指出，智力是一种非物质的力量。因此，没有什么可以区分不同的个体智力。然而，奥格登提出了一个令人信服的案例，证明这不是阿威罗伊主义理论背后的论点(98-100)。毕竟，与天界有关的智慧同样是非物质的，然而它们设法彼此区别开来。它们可能在某种程度上有所不同，这对于个体的人类智力来说是不可能的，但这需要进一步的论证。因此，当阿威罗伊认为MPI是一种确定的、非物质的实体时，这本身就留下了一个问题，即是否存在一个这样的智力或多个这样的智力(105-8)。事实上，阿维森纳用了一个很像阿威罗伊的论点来证明MPI的非物质性，同时认为每个人都有自己的MPI。因此，虽然奥格登承认，对个性化的关注可能有助于提出一个统一理论，而且肯定会给阿奎那的观点(见220页)带来问题，但他认为，阿威罗伊主义理论最好以另一种方式得到证明。这是通过他所谓的“统一论证”来实现的，该论证指出，“解释我们如何都能思考同一件事的最好方法是，在一个智力中，只有一件事是被思考的”(109)。 正如奥格登所言，似乎亚里士多德学派的阿威罗伊在这里沉迷于柏拉图主义的直觉(113)。当你我都理解了向日葵的形态，我们就应该抓住同一个思想对象。但阿威罗伊认为，一个可理解的对象必须始终存在于心灵中，而不是像柏拉图式的形式那样独立存在。由此可见，所有可理解的东西都是在一个人的头脑中接受的。唯一的选择是说你对向日葵有一种理解，而我对向日葵有另一种理解。但这样一来，我们实际上就不会在思考同一件事，或者，我们可以说，"有同样的想法"这就给阿威罗伊留下了一个问题:如何解释为什么我们似乎在以个体的方式思考。事实上，这并不是唯一的问题。奥格登在这里提出了另一个很好的观点，即困难不仅是现象学的，而且是本体论的(166)。人类个体应该是思考的主体，我们认为这是事实，这就是本体论主张的证据。当阿奎那在他反对阿威罗伊关于智力统一性的论文中提出这一反对意见时，他反复挑战阿威罗伊主义者解释“这个人思考(hic homo intelligit)”(McInerny 1993)这一事实时，这一反对意见在两个层面上都起作用。现代的诠释者试图代表阿威罗伊回答这个问题。一般来说，他们想要表明，在某种意义上，每个人都是阿威罗伊的智力思维的主体，例如，通过某种单一智力的统一，或者因为我们较低的认知活动为这种智力提供了必要的基础。因此，当我记忆中的向日葵形象被单一的智力用来思考向日葵的可理解形式时，在我看来，我似乎是一个从事思考的人。奥格登认为这也许可以解释现象学上的表象，即我在思考。但当涉及到反对的本体论版本时，他认为阿威罗伊会咬紧牙关。他会承认，严格地说，没有人能够理解或思考普遍可理解的对象。只有一个聪明的人才会这么做。智力存在于个体人类认知之外，这就是为什么它只能以一种模棱两可的方式被称为“灵魂”(51 - 2,184)。因此，奥格登把“错误理论”归于阿威罗伊(174)，根据这一理论，我们错误地认为自己在从事真正的思考，而实际上我们并没有。具身人类所能做的最多的是处理抽象或“模糊”的个人形象，这些形象近似于普遍的可理解性，而不是完全实现它(199)。所以事实证明，你和我确实对向日葵有自己的看法，这些看法来自于我们对特定向日葵的不同体验。向日葵只有在单一的智力水平上才有单一的思想。奥格登礼貌而坚定地批评了其他学者试图逃避这一结论的尝试，例如，他说，在智力和个体人类之间存在某种形式的统一(正如理查德·c·泰勒(Richard C. Taylor) 2013年所强调的那样，单一的智力将是“我们的形式”)。奥格登认为，这是正确的，因为在智力和个人之间存在一种有效的统一(205)。但是，智能使用我大脑中的记忆和想象图像这一事实显然并不意味着我就是智能，就像一台在线服务器与我的笔记本电脑并不相同，因为它使用的是从我的笔记本电脑硬盘上上传的数据(我的类比，不是奥格登的，尽管他使用了类似的类比)。如果智力是人类的实体形式，那么它将与人类个体相同(174)，但显然不是这样，因为它不可能同时是我的实体形式和你的实体形式。虽然我猜一些现代的阿威罗伊专家可能会对这种阅读犹豫不决，但奥格登能够指出中世纪和文艺复兴时期的思想家对阿威罗伊有着同样的无拘无束的理解。他至少把解释的责任放在了阐释者
{"title":"<i>Averroes on Intellect: from Aristotelian Origins to Aquinas’s Critique</i>","authors":"Peter Adamson","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10294448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10294448","url":null,"abstract":"There have been philosophers who sought to preserve and ratify the dictates’ common sense, and there have been philosophers who were willing to overturn and correct those dictates. And then there was Averroes. His most notorious doctrine is not just counterintuitive. It commits him to something that seems self-evidently false, namely that there is only a single mind to which all human thought is related. As his most famous critic, Thomas Aquinas, pointed out, it seems simply obvious that we each have a mind of our own, and that we can each think as individuals. Averroes—to use the Latinized version of his name, Ibn Rushd—seemed to deny this in his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, triggering a protracted debate in Latin medieval and Renaissance philosophy.1 Why spill so much ink over such an implausible theory? Part of the reason was surely Averroes’s stature as the most authoritative commentator on Aristotle. When Aquinas devoted a treatise specifically to the issue, he met Averroes on his own ground by disputing the unity theory as an interpretation of On the Soul. His concern was not mainly to refute a false philosophical view, but to rescue Aristotle from being associated with that view.And there was another reason the topic attracted so much attention: Averroes’s arguments for the unity of intellect were surprisingly powerful. Just how powerful is shown in a superb new book by Stephen Ogden. Applying the sort of sympathetic approach and analytic acuity now standardly brought to the works of Aristotle himself, Ogden explains that Averroes had strong philosophical and exegetical reasons for endorsing the unity of the intellect. With regular reference to Aquinas as a foil, Ogden makes a convincing case that Averroes’s apparently unbelievable view in fact made a great deal of sense within an Aristotelian framework. Indeed, within that framework it often seems to be at an advantage against the apparently far more plausible view of Aquinas, for whom intellect is immaterial but individual: one mind per human, not one mind for the whole human race.Averroes’ position was, as he noted himself, unique within the complex history of interpretations of Aristotle’s On the Soul chapters 3.4–5, the chapters that deal most centrally with intellect. Ogden indeed says that the Averroist view “boasts novelty galore” (92). But it was actually not new to posit a single mind standing over all human individuals. The Aristotelian God was such a mind, as was the nous postulated by Plotinus. Closer to Averroes in time, culture, and intention was Avicenna (again, this name is a Latinization, in this case of Ibn Sīnā). He held that the so called “active intellect” (AI) described by Aristotle in the brief and inscrutable chapter 3.5 of On the Soul is a single transcendent principle that somehow allows individual humans to think. (Exactly how it does so is a matter of extensive dispute among Avicenna scholars.) By contrast, the potential or material intellect (MP","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135673481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10294422
Tyler Brooke-Wilson
Perception solves computationally demanding problems at lightning fast speed. It recovers sophisticated representations of the world from degraded inputs, often in a matter of milliseconds. Any theory of perception must be able to explain how this is possible; in other words, it must be able to explain perception’s computational tractability. One of the few attempts to move toward such an explanation is the information encapsulation hypothesis, which posits that perception can be fast because it keeps computational costs low by forgoing access to information stored in cognition. I argue that we have no compelling reason to believe that encapsulation explains (or even contributes to an explanation of) perceptual tractability, and much reason to doubt it. This is because there exist much deeper computational challenges for perception than information access, and these threaten to make the costs of access irrelevant. If this is right, it undermines a core computational motivation for encapsulation and sends us back to the drawing board for explanations of perceptual tractability.
{"title":"How Is Perception Tractable?","authors":"Tyler Brooke-Wilson","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10294422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10294422","url":null,"abstract":"Perception solves computationally demanding problems at lightning fast speed. It recovers sophisticated representations of the world from degraded inputs, often in a matter of milliseconds. Any theory of perception must be able to explain how this is possible; in other words, it must be able to explain perception’s computational tractability. One of the few attempts to move toward such an explanation is the information encapsulation hypothesis, which posits that perception can be fast because it keeps computational costs low by forgoing access to information stored in cognition. I argue that we have no compelling reason to believe that encapsulation explains (or even contributes to an explanation of) perceptual tractability, and much reason to doubt it. This is because there exist much deeper computational challenges for perception than information access, and these threaten to make the costs of access irrelevant. If this is right, it undermines a core computational motivation for encapsulation and sends us back to the drawing board for explanations of perceptual tractability.","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135673482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10294461
Thomas Williams
Everybody knows (for the relevant value of ‘everybody’) that, for Thomas Aquinas, perfect happiness consists in intellectual contemplation of the divine essence, with the will’s delight or enjoyment being a necessary concomitant of that beatific vision but not, strictly speaking, part of the essence of happiness. Beyond this boilerplate statement, however, most of us would be hard-pressed to say much more about contemplation in Aquinas. What sort of act is it, and how does it relate to other acts of intellect? What acts of contemplation are available in this present life, and how do those acts fit into a life of faith or a life devoted to philosophical or theological study? What contribution, if any, does contemplation make to this-worldly happiness? In Thomas Aquinas and Contemplation, Rik Van Nieuwenhove takes up these and related questions and develops Aquinas’s account of contemplation in a systematic way, elaborating even what “everybody knows” in unexpected directions and unearthing important but neglected material. There are even some surprises along the way.Van Nieuwenhove notes that although Aquinas identifies contemplation as the goal or end of human life, he nowhere offers a precise definition of contemplation. In fact, he speaks of contemplation in a variety of ways and contexts, ranging from the perfect vision of God in the next life, through theoretical contemplation in this life, whether theological or philosophical, all the way to the insight that ordinary Christians can have—and indeed are called to have—into divine truth. What unites all these varieties of contemplation, Van Nieuwenhove argues, is that they culminate in “a non-discursive moment of understanding (intuitus simplex), a simple intellective insight into truth, (what is sometimes called an Aha-Erlebnis in German)” (16). In theological and philosophical contemplation, such nondiscursive insight is the hard-won result of a discursive process; in the contemplation that characterizes the ordinary Christian life, by contrast, it arises directly out of a divinely granted kinship (“connaturality”) between the believer and “the deep things of God” (1 Corinthians 2:10). It is an advantage of this broad understanding of contemplation as intuitus simplex that it “can incorporate the acts of contemplation of the Greek sage, as well as those of the vetula who enjoys the benefit of her Christian faith” (47–48).This vetula (Van Nieuwenhove leaves the word untranslated; it means “little old woman”) has a minor recurring part in the book, as she has in Aquinas’s own writing. In his sermon on the Apostles’ Creed, Aquinas writes that “not one of the philosophers before the coming of Christ, however hard they tried, could know as much about God and about what is necessary for eternal life as one vetula after the coming of Christ can know through faith” (In symbolum apostolorum, pr.; all translations of Aquinas are my own). In his sermon Attendite a falsis, Aquinas writes:The vetula may n
每个人都知道(因为“每个人”的相关价值)，对托马斯·阿奎那来说，完美的幸福包括对神圣本质的理智思考，而意志的愉悦或享受是这种美好愿景的必要伴随物，但严格地说，不是幸福本质的一部分。然而，除了这句陈词滥调之外，我们大多数人都很难对阿奎那的沉思多说些什么。这是一种什么样的行为，它与其他智力行为有什么关系?在现在的生活中有哪些沉思的行为，这些行为如何适合信仰的生活或致力于哲学或神学研究的生活?如果有的话，沉思对现世的幸福有什么贡献?在《托马斯·阿奎那与沉思》一书中，里克·范nieuwenhove接受了这些和相关的问题，并以系统的方式发展了阿奎那对沉思的描述，甚至在意想不到的方向上详细阐述了“每个人都知道”的东西，并发掘了重要但被忽视的材料。一路上甚至还有一些惊喜。范nieuwenhove注意到，虽然阿奎那认为沉思是人类生活的目标或终点，但他没有给出沉思的精确定义。事实上，他以各种不同的方式和背景来谈论沉思，从对上帝来生的完美想象，到今生的理论沉思，无论是神学的还是哲学的，一直到普通基督徒能够拥有的——实际上是被召唤去拥有的——对神圣真理的洞察。凡·Nieuwenhove认为，将所有这些不同的沉思统一起来的是，它们的高潮是“一个非话语的理解时刻(intuitus simplex)，一个对真理的简单的理性洞察(有时在德语中称为ah - erlebnis)”(16)。在神学和哲学的沉思中，这种非话语的洞察力是话语过程中来之不易的结果;相比之下，在普通基督徒生活所特有的沉思中，它直接产生于信徒与“神的深层事物”(哥林多前书2:10)之间的神圣授予的亲属关系(“自然”)。这种将沉思作为单纯直觉的广泛理解的优势在于，它“可以结合希腊圣贤的沉思行为，以及那些享受基督教信仰好处的女祭司的沉思行为”(47-48)。这篇短文(范nieuwenhove)没有翻译这个词;它的意思是“小老妇人”)在书中有一个次要的反复出现的部分，就像她在阿奎那自己的作品中一样。在他关于使徒信经的布道中，阿奎那写道:“在基督降临之前，没有一个哲学家，无论他们多么努力，都不能像基督降临之后的一个维特拉那样，通过信仰了解上帝和永生的必要条件。”所有阿奎那的译本都是我自己的)。在他的布道中，阿奎那写道:，vetula可能不是范nieuwenhove的理想例子，因为她在这两段中所说的认知显然是命题知识，而不是简单的直觉。Van Nieuwenhove从ST III, q. 27, a. 5, ad . 3中找到了一个更好的例子，“阿奎那写道圣母玛利亚享受‘在沉思中使用智慧’……但不是‘在教学中使用智慧’”(4n)。无论“普通”基督徒沉思的最好例子是什么——我指的是“对神圣真理的开放或接受，这应该是基督徒生活的特征”(198)，这些基督徒要么没有，要么缺乏机会去锻炼，从事学术神学或哲学研究所需的智力——这种沉思的可能性需要重新思考一些“人人都知道”的关于阿奎那的幸福观的东西。正如范nieuwenhove所说，在最近的解释者中有一种近乎一致的解读，那就是阿奎那的“不完美的幸福”只是亚里士多德式的幸福——通过运用我们的自然力量在今生获得的幸福，可以通过哲学思考或有道德的公民活动来表达——而“完美的幸福”是一种幸福的愿景，一种只有在来世才能获得的幸福，只有通过超自然的礼物才能获得。亚里士多德对神学的沉思一无所知(至少不是在神学作为神圣教义的意义上);他当然不知道什么是“由慈善和美德塑造的生活”(13)。然而，在阿奎那看来，这两者都可以促成现世的或“不完美的”幸福，而且两者——就它们涉及“对神圣真理的沉思”而言——都是“幸福的早期阶段(inchoatio)，从这里开始，在未来的世界中完成”(ST II-II, q. 180, a, 4)范nieuwenhove强调“这种连续性对神学家阿奎那来说并非没有意义，对他来说，恩典使自然完美，但没有废除它”是正确的(47)。 在导论一章之后，范nieuwenhove在第一部分中列出了他阅读阿奎那关于沉思的认识论和形而上学基础。第二章专门讨论认识论问题，特别是智力的各种行为和沉思在其中的地位。关于阿奎那对新柏拉图主义来源的依赖而不是亚里士多德的讨论尤其有用。第三章更具试探性和思辨性，运用先验理论来理解沉思——这是阿奎那本人从未明确做过的，正如范nieuwenhove所承认的(49)。这里有一个重要的结论，根据第2章的认识论，是没有基础来解读阿奎那的神圣启示学说。正如范nieuwenhove所说，“真理在神的观念中有形而上学的基础，这一事实并没有使阿奎那陷入神学或光明主义的认识论观点”(59)。这一观察将我们带到了托马斯·阿奎那和沉思中一个重要的反复出现的主题:范nieuwenhove反对一些最近的学术，这些学术将阿奎那解释为“一个思想家，他的神学也许最好被贴上智慧的标签(例如J. P. Torrell, B. McGinn)，奥古斯丁-光明主义者(约翰·米尔班克)，甚至是有魅力的……[也就是]深受圣灵恩赐的影响(例如Servais Pinckers, Andrew Pinsent)”(18)。这些人的共同之处在于，他们都倾向于试图把阿奎那变成博纳文蒂尔，而范nieuwenhove的批判是尖锐的，有保证的，令人信服的，但总是有些仁慈。既然我已经简要地看了他对“光明主义”解读的拒绝，接下来我要转向智慧解读。我发现“智慧的智慧”这个概念一开始很令人困惑——毕竟，sapientia只是拉丁语中智慧的意思，那么智慧的智慧是什么呢?但范尼文霍夫解释说，它的意思是“一种品尝或品味的智慧”(174)。Sapientia确实来自动词sapio，意思是品尝或品味，阿奎那并不反对使用词源学来支持一个观点，只要它们符合他的目的。因此，更值得注意的是，阿奎那认为智慧和品味之间的词源联系无关紧要:“在拉丁语中可能是这样，但在其他语言中不是这样”(178，引用III Sent)。D. 35, q. 2, a. 1, qc。3、ad1;阿奎那使同样的观点在ST II-II, q. 45, a. 2, ad . 2)。在一般情况下，如范nieuwenhove显示，阿奎那抵制的想法，神学智慧本质上是有效的。即使是圣灵所赐的智慧，本质上也不是情感上的:它是认知上的，是一种神圣的智力提升，使其拥有者能够正确地判断神圣的事物。当然，这种恩赐根植于慈善，它属于意志，并赋予信徒一种与神圣事物的亲属关系或“自然”，以便她可以正确地判断，但这种恩赐本身属于智力(178-79)。这种恩赐并不是——现在我们转向对阿奎那的“魅力”解读——神学洞察力所必需的:“当然，神学家将理想地享受圣灵的恩赐，或者至少在道德上是正直的。受肉体欲望奴役的神学家在追求真理的道路上会受到阻碍。然而，阿奎那拒绝在神学的学术追求中赋予天赋一个重要的角色”(180)。这些批评，以及更多的积极的描述，都是在第三部分(“神学，基督徒生活和沉思”)中提出的。对这一讨论的丰富性作一个简短的回顾是不可能公正的。(特别值得注意的是，范nieuwenhove在第5章中解释了神学——更严格地说，sacra doctrina——是一门次于上帝自己的科学的科学的重要性，以及他在第7章中对阿奎那对圣灵恩赐作用的理解逐渐发
{"title":"<i>Thomas Aquinas and Contemplation</i>","authors":"Thomas Williams","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10294461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10294461","url":null,"abstract":"Everybody knows (for the relevant value of ‘everybody’) that, for Thomas Aquinas, perfect happiness consists in intellectual contemplation of the divine essence, with the will’s delight or enjoyment being a necessary concomitant of that beatific vision but not, strictly speaking, part of the essence of happiness. Beyond this boilerplate statement, however, most of us would be hard-pressed to say much more about contemplation in Aquinas. What sort of act is it, and how does it relate to other acts of intellect? What acts of contemplation are available in this present life, and how do those acts fit into a life of faith or a life devoted to philosophical or theological study? What contribution, if any, does contemplation make to this-worldly happiness? In Thomas Aquinas and Contemplation, Rik Van Nieuwenhove takes up these and related questions and develops Aquinas’s account of contemplation in a systematic way, elaborating even what “everybody knows” in unexpected directions and unearthing important but neglected material. There are even some surprises along the way.Van Nieuwenhove notes that although Aquinas identifies contemplation as the goal or end of human life, he nowhere offers a precise definition of contemplation. In fact, he speaks of contemplation in a variety of ways and contexts, ranging from the perfect vision of God in the next life, through theoretical contemplation in this life, whether theological or philosophical, all the way to the insight that ordinary Christians can have—and indeed are called to have—into divine truth. What unites all these varieties of contemplation, Van Nieuwenhove argues, is that they culminate in “a non-discursive moment of understanding (intuitus simplex), a simple intellective insight into truth, (what is sometimes called an Aha-Erlebnis in German)” (16). In theological and philosophical contemplation, such nondiscursive insight is the hard-won result of a discursive process; in the contemplation that characterizes the ordinary Christian life, by contrast, it arises directly out of a divinely granted kinship (“connaturality”) between the believer and “the deep things of God” (1 Corinthians 2:10). It is an advantage of this broad understanding of contemplation as intuitus simplex that it “can incorporate the acts of contemplation of the Greek sage, as well as those of the vetula who enjoys the benefit of her Christian faith” (47–48).This vetula (Van Nieuwenhove leaves the word untranslated; it means “little old woman”) has a minor recurring part in the book, as she has in Aquinas’s own writing. In his sermon on the Apostles’ Creed, Aquinas writes that “not one of the philosophers before the coming of Christ, however hard they tried, could know as much about God and about what is necessary for eternal life as one vetula after the coming of Christ can know through faith” (In symbolum apostolorum, pr.; all translations of Aquinas are my own). In his sermon Attendite a falsis, Aquinas writes:The vetula may n","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135673475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10317593
J. P. Studd
Logicians and philosophers have had a good 120 years to get used to the idea that not every condition defines a set. One popular coping strategy is to maintain that each instantiated condition does at least determine a ‘plurality’ (i.e., one or more items). This is to say that friends of traditional plural logic accept—often as a trivial or evident or logical truth—each instance of plural comprehension: Unless nothing is φ, some things include everything that is φ, and nothing else. Set-theoretic paradoxes are avoided by recognizing a type distinction between singular quantifiers (‘something’) and plural ones (‘some things’).This book defends a heterodox version of plural logic. Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo advocate a set theory based on a ‘critical plural logic’ that refutes many instances of plural comprehension. In particular, they deny that there are one or more things that include everything. Instead, they argue, when it comes to resolving the paradoxes, a ‘package deal’ that restricts plural comprehension to ‘extensionally definite’ conditions is more attractive than its competitors that either limit the range of our quantifiers (‘generality relativism’) or constrain ‘singularization.’ Florio and Linnebo’s rejection of traditional plural logic permits them to combine two otherwise incompatible views: (i) ‘the set of’ operation is a universal singularization, so that it injectively maps each plurality to an object (namely, its set), and (ii) the domain of ‘everything’ may contain absolutely everything, so that it cannot be surpassed by singularization.The argument for adopting critical plural logic in preference to traditional plural logic comes in the fourth and final part of the book. The first three parts make the authors’ case for taking plural resources seriously in the first place. Part I reappraises the debate between pluralism, ‘which takes plural resources at face value’ (2), and singularism, which takes the opposite view. Part II compares ‘four different ways to talk about many objects simultaneously’ (119), including second-order quantification, and the use of ‘individual sums’, in addition to sets and pluralities. Part III focuses on philosophical applications of plural logic. Along the way, the book tackles many other topics of interest, including whether plural logic counts as ‘pure logic’ (168), or carries distinctive ontological commitments (chap. 8), how plural resources interact with modality (chap. 10), and whether the pluralization operation can be iterated to obtain superplural terms the denote ‘pluralities of pluralities’ (180) (chap. 9).The Many and the One covers an impressive amount of difficult territory in an admirably clear and engaging way. Florio and Linnebo offer a fresh perspective on the pluralism debate and defend a novel response to the paradoxes. The driving force behind their arguments is usually logic, broadly construed, rather than linguistics or the philosophy of language. But Florio and Linneb
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10123800
C. Van Dyke
{"title":"The Thirteenth-Century Animal Turn: Medieval and Twenty-First Century Perspectives\u0000 Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary between Humans and Animals","authors":"C. Van Dyke","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10123800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10123800","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49540250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10123839
L. Antony
{"title":"The Right to Sex: Feminism in the Twenty-First Century","authors":"L. Antony","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10123839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10123839","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41844098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1215/00318108-10123761
A. Stephenson
This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the Barcan formulas, and Kant’s views on what he distinguishes as three different kinds of modality are then considered in light of this connection.
{"title":"Existence and Modality in Kant: Lessons from Barcan","authors":"A. Stephenson","doi":"10.1215/00318108-10123761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10123761","url":null,"abstract":"This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the Barcan formulas, and Kant’s views on what he distinguishes as three different kinds of modality are then considered in light of this connection.","PeriodicalId":48129,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW","volume":"72 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41246790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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