Electoral Studies最新文献

List proportional representation with candidate voting can facilitate policy representation in multiple dimensions. However, candidates with deviating positions may not benefit if cues such as shared socio-demographics drive candidate choice instead. Does this use of cues reflect a lack of policy-related information or a preference for descriptive representation? We study this question in a real-world context, using a survey-embedded experiment that emulates actual vote choice shortly after the 2019 Swiss elections. We vary the level of information on candidates’ policy positions in zero, one or two dimensions (left–right, environment). Our results show that spatial proximity voting increases with better information on the secondary (but not the first) dimension, indicating that information can improve the alignment of (environmental) policy views between voters and candidates. In turn, same-gender and same-age voting slightly decreases when more information is available. The preference for local candidates remains strong. Our results inform debates regarding citizens’ preferences for different types of representation and how electoral systems moderate their expression.

In 1964, the Supreme Court ended legal state legislature malapportionment. This paper considers the effects of this federal action on the partisan and ideological behavior of state legislatures in the immediate period following the Reapportionment Revolution (1959–1974), particularly in states with vast rural and urban representational differences. Using a novel dataset of state-level malapportionment rates, legislative partisanship, and state-level ideology, we find that nation-wide requirements led many state legislatures to become more competitive. Yet, while this electoral competition encouraged immediate bipartisanship, at least measured by partisan makeup and ideology, this partisan harmony was short-lived in states that malapportioned along geographic lines before the Redistricting Revolution. Thus, while we find evidence that institutional change can decrease partisanship, in cases where partisan control is reflective of perhaps a demographic or geographic imbalance, these changes can lead to a backlash effect.

Historical institutionalists have long argued that major events can shape long-term economic perceptions, but the identification of birth-cohort differences has been stymied by methodological difficulties, notably the APC problem. Taking advantage of unique Japanese data and tailored Bayesian modeling, we identify cohort effects in economic perceptions and show that they follow objective macroeconomic trends countercyclically. Cohorts whose formative ages (16–20) overlap with high GDP growth have more pessimistic views about the current and future economy, even in later years. We argue that a strong economy during one's youth raises baseline expectations and makes later, weaker growth appear disappointing. We further find partisan differences in cohort effects, particularly on prospective economic expectations, with greater pessimism among independents and supporters of opposition parties.

The radical right party family is the fastest growing party family in Europe. Initial research centered on East Central Europe has shown that radical right parties receive higher levels of support in reaction to the success of parties that support ethnic minorities. However, the strength of radical right parties can vary considerably within a country. This paper breaks new ground by investigating the subnational factors in ethnically diverse East Central European countries that contribute to the vote share that a radical right party receives within a community. We test hypotheses drawn from the literature on ethnic competition, economic deprivation, and institutional constraints using an original dataset to explore subnational variation in support for radical right parties in national elections since 2000 in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. Our research yields two main findings about countries with politically mobilized ethnic minority communities: First, radical right support is lower in ethnically diverse subnational units, and second, radical right support increases after ethnic minority parties have been in government in subnational units which experienced economic decline relative to other subnational units.

In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the US Supreme Court ruled that campaign finance regulations “are appropriate legislative weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence.” Using data from multiple survey experiments repeated across six CCES surveys from 2012 to 2020, we test whether varied information regarding US campaign finance institutions and laws alter public perceptions of the campaign finance system and campaign finance reform across time, including the perception of improper influence. Respondents had more negative attitudes toward candidates who received support from Super PACs. However, respondents were not moved by primed differences in expenditure limits, coordination, or donation disclosure. Ultimately, we find that the majority of Americans dislike and distrust the campaign finance system and generally remain unmoved by any experimentally-primed differences. These experimental findings remain consistent across time, indicating that attitudes toward the US campaign finance system are stable and resistant to change.

Negative partisanship, voters’ rejection of a party, increasingly garners scholarly attention. Yet we lack robust empirical evidence on the nature of the concept and how it shapes attitudes towards citizens of the “other side” of politics. In this paper I argue negative partisanship should be conceptualised as a type of social identity, beyond a mere “dislike” of a party. Leveraging a three-wave online panel administered during the 2021 German federal elections, I test the measurement properties of a multi-item scale measuring negative party identification. Further, I examine the effects of negative identities on attitudes towards other citizens by combining the online panel with a nine-country survey. I find that negative identification is at least as stable as (positive) partisanship and it predicts hostile attitudes towards out-voters. These findings suggest that, when dislike of a party becomes part of one’s sense of self, the consequences for social cohesion are particularly egregious.