Electoral Studies最新文献

Are political leaders less popular among voters than they used to be? If so, why? Many studies have mapped a decline in citizens' political trust and satisfaction with democracy, but we know less about whether leader popularity is in decline, and if so, what drives this trend. This paper examines these questions using unique data on major party leader popularity and leadership traits from the Australian Election Study collected over four decades. The results show that Australia's major party leaders have become less popular over time. We test a theoretical model which explains declining leader popularity by partisan dealignment and the role of leader integrity. The analyses show that the effect of partisanship on leader popularity has weakened over time, while leader integrity traits have become more important. These findings apply to both major party leaders that have won elections as well as those leaders that have lost elections.

Across Western Europe, the electoral base of formerly dominating parties on the left and the right has been eroding in the past decades. In contrast, both far-right parties and green parties could expand their vote share in numerous elections all over Western Europe - especially among younger voters. Still, those transformations in multiparty systems remain understudied: Are those electoral differences representing a cohort effect within the left and within the right bloc? This study uses survey data from ten Western European countries spanning over 60 years to test for cohort differences in political blocs. By applying multilevel logistic regression models and generalized additive mixed models, the analysis yields generational differences within the left and the right, with more recent cohorts being more likely to vote for greens than other left-wing and more likely to prefer the far-right over other right-wing parties. Those results shed light on the cohort-driven electoral realignment in Western Europe.

Previous studies have found an ‘empowerment effect’ of minority representation, but often face a difficult methodological obstacle: any observed correlation between visible political leadership by marginalized groups and political engagement of its members may be due to reverse causation or unaccounted-for confounders. We use a novel video-vignette design and conduct two pre-registered survey experiments to test if visible political leadership of Muslims affects American Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ political engagement. In both studies, Muslim and non-Muslim respondents randomized into the inclusive treatment judged the political system to be more fair and legitimate. Treated Muslim participants also showed slightly more positive attitudes towards prospective political participation and political candidacy. These findings suggest that the visible representation of underrepresented groups can have outcomes beneficial to inclusion and democracy, and that increasing the political visibility of one group does not necessarily harm the legitimacy perceived by members of another group.

Previous research on the voting behavior of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) in Europe showed that LGB people favor left-wing or progressive parties (Turnbull-Dugarte 2020; Hunklinger 2021; Wurthmann 2023). Furthermore, Turnbull-Dugarte (2021) showed that LGB voters are, possibly due to their socialization, supportive of social liberalism and progressive issues. As we know from classic voting theory, there are different explanations for voting behavior, e.g. issue orientation, candidate and party preferences. This paper explores why LGB persons vote for left-wing parties in Austria. We use a sample among LGB persons conducted upfront the 2019 national elections in Austria. We test to what extent issue and candidate orientations (including LGB issues) as well as group identity affect LGB persons' intended voting behavior for left-wing parties in Austria. Our results show that instead of group-specific issue orientations, a general issue orientation, and socio-cultural attitudes are crucial for LGB persons to vote for left-wing parties.

The features of electoral systems affect electoral outcomes even for fixed societal preferences. We analyze a quasi-experiment around a change in voting technology that reduces the cost of split-ticket voting. We find that the reform increases split-ticket voting, has no impact on vote shares in executive races, and benefits small parties in multiple-seat races, resulting in higher political fragmentation. This suggests that voters prioritize executive races and that, when the costs to split the ticket are large, straight-ticket voting is incentivized and decisions on the executive race drive decisions on other races. In particular, strategic voting on the single-seat race has spillovers to races with a proportional representation system, where strategic incentives are less prominent. The reform reduces the costs of disassociating executive from legislative races and allows voters to more easily express their preferences.

Politicians often engage in blame avoidance behaviours in order to evade electoral punishment following allegations of misconduct. A key question concerns the (in)effectiveness of such behaviours in mitigating voter opinions about the alleged misconduct and the appropriate punishment. In this article, we examine how this (in)effectiveness may be shaped by: (1) the characteristics of blame avoidance behaviours, and (2) voters' partisan (mis)alignment with the alleged offender. We address this question using a between-subject survey experiment among a sample of Norwegian citizens (N = 1996). Our main findings suggest that blame avoidance behaviours can be effective in mitigating voters' assessment of the alleged misconduct and of the punishment the politician should face. This is particularly true when it concerns politicians from respondents' most-preferred party, and among left-wing voters. These findings help explain when and why scandals may (fail to) affect politicians’ electoral fortunes.

After hundreds of field experiments assessing their effectiveness, voter mobilization tactics are often considered “settled science.” In this research note, we posit that this assumption is incorrect, due to inconsistent and insufficient attention to electoral salience in the literature. Researchers often conduct mobilization field experiments in low-salience elections due to limited resources and the need for adequate statistical power. However, practitioners often apply these findings in high-salience contexts. Theory suggests that effects of mobilization tactics will attenuate in high-salience elections due to heightened attention. We present refined meta-analytic estimates of common mobilization tactics in U.S. elections—canvassing, phone calls, direct mail, and SMS messages—based on electoral salience. Results show that effects of tactics attenuate 33%–62% from low-to high-salience contexts. We translate all findings into intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates to highlight the impact of declining contact rates. Finally, we identify significant gaps in the research and offer solutions.

Trust in the integrity of the electoral process is essential for a functioning democracy. However, doubts about the legitimacy of electoral processes have increased in established and emerging democracies. We analyzed electoral integrity perceptions and related variables across 26 elections and 18 countries using post-election surveys conducted between 2004 and 2021 as part of the Comparative National Elections Project. We found that citizens' experiences of electoral integrity failures, such as bribery and intimidation, are crucial in shaping their perceptions of electoral integrity. Additionally, we found that autonomous electoral offices have little effect on citizens’ perceptions of integrity and freedom in the electoral process. Finally, electoral integrity perceptions significantly impact attitudes towards democracy. Our results emphasize the importance of well-functioning electoral processes and institutions in upholding the legitimacy of democracies.

European party systems have become increasingly complex in recent years, resulting in ideologically more heterogeneous coalition governments with far-reaching policy compromises. Consequently, an important goal of the parties' electoral campaign strategies is to present the voters a distinct policy profile on which the electorate can evaluate the competing parties. We argue that voters reward those coalition parties that attack their government partners in the election campaign and try to clarify their programmatic positions with the help of a more aggressive campaign strategy. Based on data from the CSES, the Comparative Manifesto Project database and a novel data base on party campaign statements in seven European countries from 2007 to 2018, we find that voters’ support for coalition parties increases if the latter attack their partners in the last four weeks before election day. Yet, this relationship is only observable in contexts when the ideological diversity of the incumbent coalition government is rather low.

Depression is among the most prevalent mental health problems. Previous research indicates that depressive symptoms and cognitive regulation processes are differentially associated with political attitudes. Here we build and test a model based on cognitive aspects of depression that provides an explanation for those differential associations. We test this formulation using a novel survey dataset that includes measures of worry and stress due to the COVID-19 pandemic, cognitive regulation processes, and depression. We posit that rumination mediates the association between depression and self-related political attitudes, whereas negativity bias mediates the association between depression and government-related attitudes. We find considerable support for these claims. Our findings elucidate how depression may influence people's perceptions of politics.