This paper investigates the impact of internet voting (i-voting) on voter turnout in Russia's 2024 presidential election. While i-voting has been widely studied in democratic contexts, its effects in authoritarian regimes remain underexplored. To address this gap, the study combines a difference-in-differences design with pre-matching to estimate the causal impact of i-voting across Russian regions. The hypothesis is grounded in a theoretical framework that identifies how i-voting can serve authoritarian strategies of turnout management—through controlled mobilisation, reduced visibility of coercion, and potential for covert manipulation. Contrary to the initial expectation, the findings reveal that, while positive, the impact of i-voting on turnout is not statistically significant, with robustness checks confirming the reliability of these results. Rather than driving a significant rise in participation, i-voting may have played a more subtle, stabilising role in managing turnout, aligning with the regime's strategic goals targeting the regions with historically lower turnout. Additionally, the shifting of the same loyal voters from offline to the online platform and demobilisation of certain voter segments may have limited its impact on increasing turnout. These results open up new avenues for understanding how digital technologies are deployed in authoritarian regimes, not necessarily to expand participation but to ensure tighter control over electoral processes.
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