abstract:Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political opposition to scale more effectively. Local decentralization provides some of the benefits of regional decentralization at less political risk, making it an imperfect but attractive substitute for central authorities. Drawing on cases from Africa and Latin America, this article discusses when and how strategic local decentralization can be an effective strategy to maintain political control in divided societies, why sometimes governments may instead opt for regional decentralization or (re)centralization, and how the choice of decentralization level depends on political geography and history as well as economic factors.
{"title":"The Politics of Decentralization Level: Local and Regional Devolution as Substitutes","authors":"Joan Ricart-Huguet, Emily A. Sellars","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0005","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political opposition to scale more effectively. Local decentralization provides some of the benefits of regional decentralization at less political risk, making it an imperfect but attractive substitute for central authorities. Drawing on cases from Africa and Latin America, this article discusses when and how strategic local decentralization can be an effective strategy to maintain political control in divided societies, why sometimes governments may instead opt for regional decentralization or (re)centralization, and how the choice of decentralization level depends on political geography and history as well as economic factors.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"233 - 279 - 280 - 315 - 316 - 352 - 353 - 389 - 390 - 437 - 438 - 438"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47676598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:This article explains how leaders can use foreign policy issues to shape their personal images. It argues in particular that presidents and presidential candidates can use hawk-ish foreign policies to craft valuable impressions of leadership strength. This dynamic can give leaders incentives to take foreign policy positions that are more hawkish than what voters actually want. The article documents the causal foundations of this argument with a preregistered survey experiment; it presents archival evidence demonstrating that presidential candidates use unpopular foreign policies to convey attractive personal traits; and it uses observational data to show how those trade-offs have shaped three decades of presidential voting. The article’s theory and evidence indicate that democratic responsiveness in foreign policy is not as simple as doing what voters want. Leaders often need to choose between satisfying voters’ policy preferences and crafting personal images that voters find appealing. Aligning foreign policy with voters’ preferences is thus easier said than done, and it is not always the best way for leaders to maximize their public standing.
{"title":"Issue-Image Trade-Offs and the Politics of Foreign Policy: How Leaders Use Foreign Policy Positions to Shape Their Personal Images","authors":"J. Friedman","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0009","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:This article explains how leaders can use foreign policy issues to shape their personal images. It argues in particular that presidents and presidential candidates can use hawk-ish foreign policies to craft valuable impressions of leadership strength. This dynamic can give leaders incentives to take foreign policy positions that are more hawkish than what voters actually want. The article documents the causal foundations of this argument with a preregistered survey experiment; it presents archival evidence demonstrating that presidential candidates use unpopular foreign policies to convey attractive personal traits; and it uses observational data to show how those trade-offs have shaped three decades of presidential voting. The article’s theory and evidence indicate that democratic responsiveness in foreign policy is not as simple as doing what voters want. Leaders often need to choose between satisfying voters’ policy preferences and crafting personal images that voters find appealing. Aligning foreign policy with voters’ preferences is thus easier said than done, and it is not always the best way for leaders to maximize their public standing.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"280 - 315"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47973040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:Politicians and scholars alike have advocated for land reform as a tool to address political instability and poverty. Yet in many cases of land reform, governments provide land but withhold property rights. Why do leaders withhold these rights, and when do they grant previously withheld rights? The authors argue that land rights are a distributive good that leaders relinquish conservatively and selectively to build popular support. Using microlevel data from Kenya—a country in which successive governments have distributed most of the country’s arable land through land reform—the article finds that leaders under democratic regimes are more willing to formalize rights than those under autocratic regimes. Further, the logic of land formalization changes with regime type. Whereas autocrats prioritize land formalization among core supporters, elites facing elections prioritize pivotal swing voters. The article demonstrates how the provision of property rights is primarily a function of political calculations rather than state capacity.
{"title":"Closing The Gap: The Politics of Property Rights in Kenya","authors":"Mai Hassan, Kathleen Klaus","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0008","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Politicians and scholars alike have advocated for land reform as a tool to address political instability and poverty. Yet in many cases of land reform, governments provide land but withhold property rights. Why do leaders withhold these rights, and when do they grant previously withheld rights? The authors argue that land rights are a distributive good that leaders relinquish conservatively and selectively to build popular support. Using microlevel data from Kenya—a country in which successive governments have distributed most of the country’s arable land through land reform—the article finds that leaders under democratic regimes are more willing to formalize rights than those under autocratic regimes. Further, the logic of land formalization changes with regime type. Whereas autocrats prioritize land formalization among core supporters, elites facing elections prioritize pivotal swing voters. The article demonstrates how the provision of property rights is primarily a function of political calculations rather than state capacity.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"233 - 279"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41912053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frederick R. Chen, Jon C. W. Pevehouse, Ryan Powers
abstract:Why is trade with some countries more popular than with others? Linking the literature on regime type and trade cooperation with the literature on trade attitudes, the authors argue that the domestic political institutions and cooperative reputations of foreign states condition the willingness of the public and policy elites to deepen trade cooperation. Using survey experiments fielded on the American public and a unique sample of US foreign economic policymakers, the authors show that respondents prefer trade with democracies over trade with nondemocracies by large margins. Further, they find that this democratic advantage stems from a strong expectation that democracies will be more reliable and consistent cooperation partners. This study provides one of the first direct and causally identified tests of the mechanisms underlying theories of the political economy of regime type and international cooperation. Although the article focuses on the case of trade attitudes, the argument is general, suggesting that support for cooperation in other issue areas is conditional on similar factors.
{"title":"Great Expectations: The Democratic Advantage in Trade Attitudes","authors":"Frederick R. Chen, Jon C. W. Pevehouse, Ryan Powers","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Why is trade with some countries more popular than with others? Linking the literature on regime type and trade cooperation with the literature on trade attitudes, the authors argue that the domestic political institutions and cooperative reputations of foreign states condition the willingness of the public and policy elites to deepen trade cooperation. Using survey experiments fielded on the American public and a unique sample of US foreign economic policymakers, the authors show that respondents prefer trade with democracies over trade with nondemocracies by large margins. Further, they find that this democratic advantage stems from a strong expectation that democracies will be more reliable and consistent cooperation partners. This study provides one of the first direct and causally identified tests of the mechanisms underlying theories of the political economy of regime type and international cooperation. Although the article focuses on the case of trade attitudes, the argument is general, suggesting that support for cooperation in other issue areas is conditional on similar factors.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"316 - 352"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46572926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:After the seventeenth century, rulers across Europe attempted reforms to replace amateur administrators with professional bureaucrats. The success of administrative reforms hinged on whether rulers could compensate entrenched officeholders and recruit salaried employees. The author demonstrates that the extent to which these conditions were met at the time of reforms depended on whether states had experienced a Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. This article shows how the Reformation, which involved the expropriation of the Catholic Church’s assets, set in motion two processes. First, to finance their wars, Protestant rulers used revenue from confiscated assets instead of selling proprietary offices, leading to fewer venal officeholders who resisted administrative reforms. Second, expropriations made churches poorer and reduced the number of plum jobs in the clergy, incentivizing a reallocation of educational investments from religious knowledge to secular skills more useful for state administration. This distinctive Protestant developmental path hastened the demise of the patrimonial state. By 1789, the only major territorial states that were bureaucratic were Protestant.
{"title":"The Protestant Road to Bureaucracy","authors":"Valentín Figueroa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3970900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3970900","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:After the seventeenth century, rulers across Europe attempted reforms to replace amateur administrators with professional bureaucrats. The success of administrative reforms hinged on whether rulers could compensate entrenched officeholders and recruit salaried employees. The author demonstrates that the extent to which these conditions were met at the time of reforms depended on whether states had experienced a Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. This article shows how the Reformation, which involved the expropriation of the Catholic Church’s assets, set in motion two processes. First, to finance their wars, Protestant rulers used revenue from confiscated assets instead of selling proprietary offices, leading to fewer venal officeholders who resisted administrative reforms. Second, expropriations made churches poorer and reduced the number of plum jobs in the clergy, incentivizing a reallocation of educational investments from religious knowledge to secular skills more useful for state administration. This distinctive Protestant developmental path hastened the demise of the patrimonial state. By 1789, the only major territorial states that were bureaucratic were Protestant.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"390 - 437"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43138120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract :This article builds on the large literature that discusses if frequent international wars enhance state-building, as famously argued by Charles Tilly. It integrates key insights of that literature and a series of additional arguments into a more comprehensive and systematic model of bargaining between rulers and ruled. The model specifies the conditions under which wars are likely to build states: if there are political institutions enabling such bargaining and expressing the consent of the ruled, if the population contributed substantially to the war efforts by providing soldiers and taxes, and if rulers are legitimized either through nationalism or success at war. The article expands the empirical horizon of existing quantitative research by assembling two measures of state development, ranging from the early modern period (for nearly 20 states) to the years from 1860 to the present (for 116 countries). Findings from a variety of regression models empirically support the model.
{"title":"Consent and Legitimacy: A Revised Bellicose Theory of State-Building with Evidence from around the World, 1500–2000","authors":"Yuval Feinstein, A. Wimmer","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"abstract :This article builds on the large literature that discusses if frequent international wars enhance state-building, as famously argued by Charles Tilly. It integrates key insights of that literature and a series of additional arguments into a more comprehensive and systematic model of bargaining between rulers and ruled. The model specifies the conditions under which wars are likely to build states: if there are political institutions enabling such bargaining and expressing the consent of the ruled, if the population contributed substantially to the war efforts by providing soldiers and taxes, and if rulers are legitimized either through nationalism or success at war. The article expands the empirical horizon of existing quantitative research by assembling two measures of state development, ranging from the early modern period (for nearly 20 states) to the years from 1860 to the present (for 116 countries). Findings from a variety of regression models empirically support the model.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"188 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48362514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract :Prominent scholarship on foreign aid argues that aid can interfere with citizens' ability to hold politicians accountable. One particular concern is that politicians receive undeserved credit for aid projects due to misattribution by voters with low information. But in some cases, politicians exert effort to ensure the success of projects and thus may deserve any credit they receive from voters. The authors show that the credit politicians receive depends both on voter information and on the capacity of politicians' offices to provide oversight. Drawing on original surveys of politicians and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) in Uganda, the authors describe circumstances in which politicians support the realization and administration of aid projects. The authors then use an experiment to show that information about foreign financing and ngo implementation of these projects reduces support for incumbent politicians only when their offices have low aid oversight capacity. The authors also provide evidence from other African countries that shows that credit-giving for aid depends on both information and state capacity. Their results suggest that voters think realistically about what politicians might have contributed to aid projects and update their assessments accordingly.
{"title":"Foreign Aid and Political Support: How Politicians' Aid Oversight Capacity and Voter Information Condition Credit-Giving","authors":"Kate Baldwin, Matthew S. Winters","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0004","url":null,"abstract":"abstract :Prominent scholarship on foreign aid argues that aid can interfere with citizens' ability to hold politicians accountable. One particular concern is that politicians receive undeserved credit for aid projects due to misattribution by voters with low information. But in some cases, politicians exert effort to ensure the success of projects and thus may deserve any credit they receive from voters. The authors show that the credit politicians receive depends both on voter information and on the capacity of politicians' offices to provide oversight. Drawing on original surveys of politicians and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) in Uganda, the authors describe circumstances in which politicians support the realization and administration of aid projects. The authors then use an experiment to show that information about foreign financing and ngo implementation of these projects reduces support for incumbent politicians only when their offices have low aid oversight capacity. The authors also provide evidence from other African countries that shows that credit-giving for aid depends on both information and state capacity. Their results suggest that voters think realistically about what politicians might have contributed to aid projects and update their assessments accordingly.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"1 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41493495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brian K. Min, E. Arima, D. Backer, A. Hicken, Ken Kollman, J. Selway
abstract :In principle, aid from donor organizations to developing countries should be based on need and the likelihood of positive impact, but political biases may intrude into decisions about aid allocations. This article elaborates a theory about why a particular form of bias, one based on partisan affiliations, can affect where aid goes and whether the goals of aid are met. Party networks can facilitate coordination of decisions and leverage bureaucratic capacity, but they can also ensure that resources, such as aid, stay in the control of copartisans to boost reelection goals. The empirical analysis evaluates whether partisan bias is evident in the locations and impact of World Bank agricultural aid to India. The authors analyze georeferenced data on aid projects, election results, and cropland coverage at the levels of state parliamentary electoral constituencies and administrative districts from 1995 to 2008. They find that alignment between local legislators and the political parties that govern state and national governments is associated with a greater number of new aid projects and with anomalous changes in cropland coverage. The evidence is consistent with arguments that partisan bias works primarily through patronage to achieve strategic party goals.
{"title":"Local Partisan Biases in Allocations of Foreign Aid: A Study of Agricultural Assistance in India","authors":"Brian K. Min, E. Arima, D. Backer, A. Hicken, Ken Kollman, J. Selway","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0000","url":null,"abstract":"abstract :In principle, aid from donor organizations to developing countries should be based on need and the likelihood of positive impact, but political biases may intrude into decisions about aid allocations. This article elaborates a theory about why a particular form of bias, one based on partisan affiliations, can affect where aid goes and whether the goals of aid are met. Party networks can facilitate coordination of decisions and leverage bureaucratic capacity, but they can also ensure that resources, such as aid, stay in the control of copartisans to boost reelection goals. The empirical analysis evaluates whether partisan bias is evident in the locations and impact of World Bank agricultural aid to India. The authors analyze georeferenced data on aid projects, election results, and cropland coverage at the levels of state parliamentary electoral constituencies and administrative districts from 1995 to 2008. They find that alignment between local legislators and the political parties that govern state and national governments is associated with a greater number of new aid projects and with anomalous changes in cropland coverage. The evidence is consistent with arguments that partisan bias works primarily through patronage to achieve strategic party goals.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"43 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44376389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract :Business elites' ability to act collectively is influenced by the scope of their political organization. Within Latin America, large cross-national differences exist on this variable. Some countries have strong encompassing associations that can speak authoritatively for the private sector as a whole, but others do not. This article examines the causes of these differences through a comparative historical analysis of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The existing scholarship offers three explanations of variance in business organizational scope in the region, focusing on threats, state encouragement, and the mode of transition to neoliberalism, respectively. This article argues that the explanations involving state encouragement and neoliberal transition are unconvincing. Although the focus on threat is more satisfying, the existing perspective on threat should be refined in two important ways. One is by emphasizing the centrality of threats to private property. Threats of other types may induce temporary cooperation, but what distinguishes cases of strong and enduring encompassing organization is the occurrence of major property threats. The second refinement is to specify that ideas about the state provide the causal mechanism linking threat to organization. Property threats engender encompassing organization by institutionalizing, within the business community, views that underscore the dangers of state economic intervention.
{"title":"Property Threats, Antistatism, and Business Organization in Latin America","authors":"Gabriel Ondetti","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0002","url":null,"abstract":"abstract :Business elites' ability to act collectively is influenced by the scope of their political organization. Within Latin America, large cross-national differences exist on this variable. Some countries have strong encompassing associations that can speak authoritatively for the private sector as a whole, but others do not. This article examines the causes of these differences through a comparative historical analysis of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The existing scholarship offers three explanations of variance in business organizational scope in the region, focusing on threats, state encouragement, and the mode of transition to neoliberalism, respectively. This article argues that the explanations involving state encouragement and neoliberal transition are unconvincing. Although the focus on threat is more satisfying, the existing perspective on threat should be refined in two important ways. One is by emphasizing the centrality of threats to private property. Threats of other types may induce temporary cooperation, but what distinguishes cases of strong and enduring encompassing organization is the occurrence of major property threats. The second refinement is to specify that ideas about the state provide the causal mechanism linking threat to organization. Property threats engender encompassing organization by institutionalizing, within the business community, views that underscore the dangers of state economic intervention.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"21 1","pages":"145 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66559853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract :In Latin America, formal workers (labor insiders) and informal workers (outsiders) tend to be enrolled in distinct welfare programs, so scholars generally assume that a fundamental political cleavage pits insiders against outsiders. According to a meta-analysis reported in this article, however, survey-based studies have hitherto shown the two groups to have relatively similar social policy preferences. The article seeks to reconcile these two strains by arguing that the insider/outsider binary oversimplifies the reality of Latin American labor markets. Workers' frequent movement between the two sectors as well as marriages between informal and formal workers endow many individuals with mixed policy interests. Using an original and nationally representative poll of Mexican adults, this article shows that an insider/outsider attitudinal cleavage does exist but is widest between informal and formal workers without mixed interests. The article also shows how new survey questions that improve on previous measures produce stronger relationships between labor traits and attitudes. The findings have implications for the study of social policy coalitions and insider/outsider politics in Latin America and beyond.
{"title":"The Microfoundations of Latin America's Social Policy Coalitions: The Insider/Outsider Labor Divide and Attitudes toward Different Welfare Programs in Mexico","authors":"Andy Baker","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0001","url":null,"abstract":"abstract :In Latin America, formal workers (labor insiders) and informal workers (outsiders) tend to be enrolled in distinct welfare programs, so scholars generally assume that a fundamental political cleavage pits insiders against outsiders. According to a meta-analysis reported in this article, however, survey-based studies have hitherto shown the two groups to have relatively similar social policy preferences. The article seeks to reconcile these two strains by arguing that the insider/outsider binary oversimplifies the reality of Latin American labor markets. Workers' frequent movement between the two sectors as well as marriages between informal and formal workers endow many individuals with mixed policy interests. Using an original and nationally representative poll of Mexican adults, this article shows that an insider/outsider attitudinal cleavage does exist but is widest between informal and formal workers without mixed interests. The article also shows how new survey questions that improve on previous measures produce stronger relationships between labor traits and attitudes. The findings have implications for the study of social policy coalitions and insider/outsider politics in Latin America and beyond.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":"75 1","pages":"144 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45505187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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