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Issue-Image Trade-Offs and the Politics of Foreign Policy: How Leaders Use Foreign Policy Positions to Shape Their Personal Images 问题形象权衡与外交政策政治:领导人如何利用外交政策立场塑造个人形象
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-28 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0009
J. Friedman
abstract:This article explains how leaders can use foreign policy issues to shape their personal images. It argues in particular that presidents and presidential candidates can use hawk-ish foreign policies to craft valuable impressions of leadership strength. This dynamic can give leaders incentives to take foreign policy positions that are more hawkish than what voters actually want. The article documents the causal foundations of this argument with a preregistered survey experiment; it presents archival evidence demonstrating that presidential candidates use unpopular foreign policies to convey attractive personal traits; and it uses observational data to show how those trade-offs have shaped three decades of presidential voting. The article’s theory and evidence indicate that democratic responsiveness in foreign policy is not as simple as doing what voters want. Leaders often need to choose between satisfying voters’ policy preferences and crafting personal images that voters find appealing. Aligning foreign policy with voters’ preferences is thus easier said than done, and it is not always the best way for leaders to maximize their public standing.
摘要:这篇文章解释了领导人如何利用外交政策问题来塑造他们的个人形象。它特别指出,总统和总统候选人可以利用鹰派外交政策来塑造对领导力量的宝贵印象。这种动态可以激励领导人采取比选民实际想要的更强硬的外交政策立场。文章通过预先注册的调查实验记录了这一论点的因果基础;它提供了档案证据,证明总统候选人利用不受欢迎的外交政策来传达有吸引力的个人特征;它使用观察数据来显示这些权衡是如何影响三十年的总统投票的。文章的理论和证据表明,外交政策中的民主回应并不像做选民想做的那么简单。领导人往往需要在满足选民的政策偏好和塑造选民认为有吸引力的个人形象之间做出选择。因此,使外交政策与选民的偏好相一致说起来容易做起来难,而且这并不总是领导人最大限度地提高公众地位的最佳方式。
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引用次数: 0
Closing The Gap: The Politics of Property Rights in Kenya 缩小差距:肯尼亚的产权政治
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-28 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0008
Mai Hassan, Kathleen Klaus
abstract:Politicians and scholars alike have advocated for land reform as a tool to address political instability and poverty. Yet in many cases of land reform, governments provide land but withhold property rights. Why do leaders withhold these rights, and when do they grant previously withheld rights? The authors argue that land rights are a distributive good that leaders relinquish conservatively and selectively to build popular support. Using microlevel data from Kenya—a country in which successive governments have distributed most of the country’s arable land through land reform—the article finds that leaders under democratic regimes are more willing to formalize rights than those under autocratic regimes. Further, the logic of land formalization changes with regime type. Whereas autocrats prioritize land formalization among core supporters, elites facing elections prioritize pivotal swing voters. The article demonstrates how the provision of property rights is primarily a function of political calculations rather than state capacity.
摘要:政治家和学者都主张将土地改革作为解决政治不稳定和贫困问题的工具。然而,在许多土地改革的案例中,政府提供土地,但保留产权。为什么领导人拒绝行使这些权利,他们什么时候授予以前被剥夺的权利?作者认为,土地权是一种分配利益,领导人会保守而有选择地放弃土地权,以获得民众的支持。文章利用肯尼亚的微观数据发现,民主政权下的领导人比专制政权下的领袖更愿意将权利正式化。肯尼亚历届政府都通过土地改革分配了该国大部分可耕地。此外,土地形式化的逻辑也随着政权类型的变化而变化。独裁者优先考虑核心支持者的土地正规化,而面临选举的精英则优先考虑关键的摇摆选民。这篇文章展示了财产权的提供主要是政治计算的功能,而不是国家能力的功能。
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引用次数: 3
The Protestant Road to Bureaucracy 新教通往官僚主义之路
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3970900
Valentín Figueroa
abstract:After the seventeenth century, rulers across Europe attempted reforms to replace amateur administrators with professional bureaucrats. The success of administrative reforms hinged on whether rulers could compensate entrenched officeholders and recruit salaried employees. The author demonstrates that the extent to which these conditions were met at the time of reforms depended on whether states had experienced a Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. This article shows how the Reformation, which involved the expropriation of the Catholic Church’s assets, set in motion two processes. First, to finance their wars, Protestant rulers used revenue from confiscated assets instead of selling proprietary offices, leading to fewer venal officeholders who resisted administrative reforms. Second, expropriations made churches poorer and reduced the number of plum jobs in the clergy, incentivizing a reallocation of educational investments from religious knowledge to secular skills more useful for state administration. This distinctive Protestant developmental path hastened the demise of the patrimonial state. By 1789, the only major territorial states that were bureaucratic were Protestant.
17世纪以后,欧洲各国的统治者试图进行改革,用专业官僚取代业余行政人员。行政改革的成功与否,取决于统治者能否对地位稳固的官员给予补偿,能否聘用受薪雇员。作者论证了这些条件在改革时得到满足的程度取决于各州在16世纪是否经历了新教改革。这篇文章展示了宗教改革如何启动了两个过程,其中包括没收天主教会的资产。首先,新教统治者使用没收资产的收入来资助战争,而不是出售专有办公室,导致抵制行政改革的腐败官员减少。其次,征收财产使教堂变得更穷,减少了神职人员的好工作,刺激了教育投资的重新分配,从宗教知识转向对国家管理更有用的世俗技能。这种独特的新教发展道路加速了世袭制国家的消亡。到1789年,唯一的主要领土国家是官僚主义的新教国家。
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引用次数: 1
Great Expectations: The Democratic Advantage in Trade Attitudes 大期望:民主在贸易态度上的优势
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-28 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0010
Frederick R. Chen, Jon C. W. Pevehouse, Ryan Powers
abstract:Why is trade with some countries more popular than with others? Linking the literature on regime type and trade cooperation with the literature on trade attitudes, the authors argue that the domestic political institutions and cooperative reputations of foreign states condition the willingness of the public and policy elites to deepen trade cooperation. Using survey experiments fielded on the American public and a unique sample of US foreign economic policymakers, the authors show that respondents prefer trade with democracies over trade with nondemocracies by large margins. Further, they find that this democratic advantage stems from a strong expectation that democracies will be more reliable and consistent cooperation partners. This study provides one of the first direct and causally identified tests of the mechanisms underlying theories of the political economy of regime type and international cooperation. Although the article focuses on the case of trade attitudes, the argument is general, suggesting that support for cooperation in other issue areas is conditional on similar factors.
为什么与某些国家的贸易比与其他国家的贸易更受欢迎?作者将有关政权类型和贸易合作的文献与有关贸易态度的文献联系起来,认为国内政治制度和外国的合作声誉决定了公众和政策精英深化贸易合作的意愿。通过对美国公众和美国对外经济政策制定者的独特样本进行调查实验,作者表明,受访者更喜欢与民主国家进行贸易,而不是与非民主国家进行贸易。此外,他们发现这种民主优势源于一种强烈的期望,即民主国家将成为更可靠、更一致的合作伙伴。这项研究为政体类型和国际合作的政治经济学理论的基础机制提供了第一个直接和因果关系确定的测试之一。虽然这篇文章关注的是贸易态度的问题,但其论点是一般性的,表明对其他问题领域合作的支持取决于类似的因素。
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引用次数: 8
Consent and Legitimacy: A Revised Bellicose Theory of State-Building with Evidence from around the World, 1500–2000 同意与合法性:一个修正的好战的国家建设理论,来自世界各地的证据,1500-2000
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0003
Yuval Feinstein, A. Wimmer
abstract :This article builds on the large literature that discusses if frequent international wars enhance state-building, as famously argued by Charles Tilly. It integrates key insights of that literature and a series of additional arguments into a more comprehensive and systematic model of bargaining between rulers and ruled. The model specifies the conditions under which wars are likely to build states: if there are political institutions enabling such bargaining and expressing the consent of the ruled, if the population contributed substantially to the war efforts by providing soldiers and taxes, and if rulers are legitimized either through nationalism or success at war. The article expands the empirical horizon of existing quantitative research by assembling two measures of state development, ranging from the early modern period (for nearly 20 states) to the years from 1860 to the present (for 116 countries). Findings from a variety of regression models empirically support the model.
摘要:这篇文章建立在大量文献的基础上,这些文献讨论了频繁的国际战争是否会促进国家建设,正如查尔斯·蒂利所著名的那样。它将该文献的关键见解和一系列额外的论点整合到统治者和被统治者之间更全面、更系统的讨价还价模型中。该模型规定了战争可能建立国家的条件:如果有政治机构能够进行这种谈判并表达被统治者的同意,如果人民通过提供士兵和税收为战争努力做出了重大贡献,如果统治者通过民族主义或战争成功而合法化。本文通过收集两种国家发展指标,扩展了现有定量研究的经验视野,从现代早期(近20个国家)到1860年至今(116个国家)。各种回归模型的研究结果在经验上支持该模型。
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引用次数: 3
Foreign Aid and Political Support: How Politicians' Aid Oversight Capacity and Voter Information Condition Credit-Giving 对外援助与政治支持:政治家的援助监督能力与选民信息状况
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0004
Kate Baldwin, Matthew S. Winters
abstract :Prominent scholarship on foreign aid argues that aid can interfere with citizens' ability to hold politicians accountable. One particular concern is that politicians receive undeserved credit for aid projects due to misattribution by voters with low information. But in some cases, politicians exert effort to ensure the success of projects and thus may deserve any credit they receive from voters. The authors show that the credit politicians receive depends both on voter information and on the capacity of politicians' offices to provide oversight. Drawing on original surveys of politicians and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) in Uganda, the authors describe circumstances in which politicians support the realization and administration of aid projects. The authors then use an experiment to show that information about foreign financing and ngo implementation of these projects reduces support for incumbent politicians only when their offices have low aid oversight capacity. The authors also provide evidence from other African countries that shows that credit-giving for aid depends on both information and state capacity. Their results suggest that voters think realistically about what politicians might have contributed to aid projects and update their assessments accordingly.
摘要:著名的外国援助学者认为,援助会干扰公民追究政治家责任的能力。一个特别令人担忧的问题是,由于信息不足的选民的错误归因,政客们在援助项目上得到了不应有的赞扬。但在某些情况下,政客们会努力确保项目的成功,因此可能值得选民给予他们任何赞扬。作者表明,政客们获得的信贷既取决于选民信息,也取决于政客办公室提供监督的能力。根据对乌干达政界人士和非政府组织的原始调查,作者描述了政界人士支持实现和管理援助项目的情况。然后,作者通过一项实验表明,只有当现任政客的办公室援助监督能力较低时,有关外国融资和非政府组织实施这些项目的信息才会减少对他们的支持。作者还提供了其他非洲国家的证据,表明援助的信贷取决于信息和国家能力。他们的结果表明,选民们现实地思考政客们可能为援助项目做出了哪些贡献,并相应地更新他们的评估。
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引用次数: 4
Local Partisan Biases in Allocations of Foreign Aid: A Study of Agricultural Assistance in India 外援分配中的地方党派偏见:对印度农业援助的研究
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0000
Brian K. Min, E. Arima, D. Backer, A. Hicken, Ken Kollman, J. Selway
abstract :In principle, aid from donor organizations to developing countries should be based on need and the likelihood of positive impact, but political biases may intrude into decisions about aid allocations. This article elaborates a theory about why a particular form of bias, one based on partisan affiliations, can affect where aid goes and whether the goals of aid are met. Party networks can facilitate coordination of decisions and leverage bureaucratic capacity, but they can also ensure that resources, such as aid, stay in the control of copartisans to boost reelection goals. The empirical analysis evaluates whether partisan bias is evident in the locations and impact of World Bank agricultural aid to India. The authors analyze georeferenced data on aid projects, election results, and cropland coverage at the levels of state parliamentary electoral constituencies and administrative districts from 1995 to 2008. They find that alignment between local legislators and the political parties that govern state and national governments is associated with a greater number of new aid projects and with anomalous changes in cropland coverage. The evidence is consistent with arguments that partisan bias works primarily through patronage to achieve strategic party goals.
原则上,捐助组织对发展中国家的援助应基于需求和产生积极影响的可能性,但政治偏见可能会影响援助分配的决定。这篇文章阐述了一种理论,即为什么一种基于党派关系的特定形式的偏见会影响援助的去向以及援助目标是否实现。政党网络可以促进决策协调和利用官僚能力,但也可以确保援助等资源由两党控制,以推动连任目标。实证分析评估了世界银行对印度农业援助的地点和影响是否存在明显的党派偏见。作者分析了1995年至2008年各州议会选区和行政区援助项目、选举结果和农田覆盖率的地理参考数据。他们发现,地方立法者与管理州和国家政府的政党之间的结盟与更多的新援助项目以及农田覆盖率的异常变化有关。证据与党派偏见主要通过赞助实现政党战略目标的论点一致。
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引用次数: 0
Property Threats, Antistatism, and Business Organization in Latin America 拉丁美洲的财产威胁、反国家主义和商业组织
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0002
Gabriel Ondetti
abstract :Business elites' ability to act collectively is influenced by the scope of their political organization. Within Latin America, large cross-national differences exist on this variable. Some countries have strong encompassing associations that can speak authoritatively for the private sector as a whole, but others do not. This article examines the causes of these differences through a comparative historical analysis of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The existing scholarship offers three explanations of variance in business organizational scope in the region, focusing on threats, state encouragement, and the mode of transition to neoliberalism, respectively. This article argues that the explanations involving state encouragement and neoliberal transition are unconvincing. Although the focus on threat is more satisfying, the existing perspective on threat should be refined in two important ways. One is by emphasizing the centrality of threats to private property. Threats of other types may induce temporary cooperation, but what distinguishes cases of strong and enduring encompassing organization is the occurrence of major property threats. The second refinement is to specify that ideas about the state provide the causal mechanism linking threat to organization. Property threats engender encompassing organization by institutionalizing, within the business community, views that underscore the dangers of state economic intervention.
商业精英集体行动的能力受到其政治组织范围的影响。在拉丁美洲内部,这一变量存在很大的跨国差异。一些国家拥有强大的包容性协会,可以代表整个私营部门发表权威言论,但另一些国家则没有。本文通过对巴西、智利和墨西哥的比较历史分析来考察这些差异的原因。现有学者对该地区商业组织范围的差异提供了三种解释,分别侧重于威胁、国家鼓励和向新自由主义过渡的模式。本文认为,涉及国家鼓励和新自由主义过渡的解释是没有说服力的。虽然对威胁的关注更令人满意,但现有的威胁视角应该在两个重要方面加以完善。一是强调对私有财产威胁的中心地位。其他类型的威胁可能会导致暂时的合作,但区分强大和持久的包容性组织的案例是主要财产威胁的发生。第二个改进是具体说明关于国家的观念提供了将威胁与组织联系起来的因果机制。财产威胁通过将强调国家经济干预危险的观点制度化,在商业社区中产生了包容性组织。
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引用次数: 0
The Microfoundations of Latin America's Social Policy Coalitions: The Insider/Outsider Labor Divide and Attitudes toward Different Welfare Programs in Mexico 拉丁美洲社会政策联盟的微观基础:墨西哥内部/外部的劳动力差距和对不同福利计划的态度
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1353/wp.2023.0001
Andy Baker
abstract :In Latin America, formal workers (labor insiders) and informal workers (outsiders) tend to be enrolled in distinct welfare programs, so scholars generally assume that a fundamental political cleavage pits insiders against outsiders. According to a meta-analysis reported in this article, however, survey-based studies have hitherto shown the two groups to have relatively similar social policy preferences. The article seeks to reconcile these two strains by arguing that the insider/outsider binary oversimplifies the reality of Latin American labor markets. Workers' frequent movement between the two sectors as well as marriages between informal and formal workers endow many individuals with mixed policy interests. Using an original and nationally representative poll of Mexican adults, this article shows that an insider/outsider attitudinal cleavage does exist but is widest between informal and formal workers without mixed interests. The article also shows how new survey questions that improve on previous measures produce stronger relationships between labor traits and attitudes. The findings have implications for the study of social policy coalitions and insider/outsider politics in Latin America and beyond.
在拉丁美洲,正式工人(内部劳工)和非正式工人(外部劳工)往往参与不同的福利计划,因此学者们普遍认为内部工人和外部工人之间存在根本的政治分歧。然而,根据本文报道的荟萃分析,迄今为止基于调查的研究表明,这两个群体具有相对相似的社会政策偏好。本文试图调和这两种矛盾,认为内部人/外部人二元论过分简化了拉美劳动力市场的现实。工人在两个部门之间的频繁流动以及非正式工人和正式工人之间的婚姻赋予了许多个人混合的政策利益。通过对墨西哥成年人进行的一项具有全国代表性的原始民意调查,这篇文章表明,内部/外部态度的分歧确实存在,但在没有混合利益的非正式和正式工人之间最为广泛。这篇文章还展示了新的调查问题是如何在以前的测量方法的基础上产生更强的劳动特征和态度之间的关系的。这些发现对拉丁美洲及其他地区的社会政策联盟和内部/外部政治的研究具有启示意义。
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引用次数: 1
Political Competition and Authoritarian Repression 政治竞争与专制镇压
IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0043887122000132
Pearce Edwards
abstract Authoritarian regimes repress to prevent mass resistance to their rule. In doing so, regimes’ security forces require information about the dissidents who mobilize such resistance. Political competition, which fuels partisan rivalries, offers one solution to this problem by motivating civilians to provide needed information to security forces. Yet civilians share information about any political opponents, not just dissidents, which creates a challenge for regimes that want to target dissidents. Drawing on novel archival data from the immediate aftermath of the 1973 coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile, a period that included civilian collaboration with repression, this article presents evidence that close pre-coup political competition is associated with more frequent repression and more targeting of non-dissidents. The author uses pre-coup democratic elections to measure political competition and addresses the challenge of estimating political preferences unaffected by repression. Qualitative evidence and further quantitative tests probe implications of the partisan rivalry mechanism and account for alternative explanations.
专制政权进行镇压以防止对其统治的大规模抵抗。在这样做的过程中,政权的安全部队需要了解动员这种抵抗的持不同政见者的信息。政治竞争助长了党派间的对抗,通过激励平民向安全部队提供所需信息,为解决这一问题提供了一种解决方案。然而,平民分享任何政治对手的信息,而不仅仅是持不同政见者,这给想要针对持不同政见的政权带来了挑战。本文利用1973年奥古斯托·皮诺切特在智利掌权的政变后的新档案数据,提供了证据,证明政变前的激烈政治竞争与更频繁的镇压和更多针对非异见人士的镇压有关。作者利用政变前的民主选举来衡量政治竞争,并解决了估计不受镇压影响的政治偏好的挑战。定性证据和进一步的定量测试探讨了党派竞争机制的含义,并解释了其他解释。
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引用次数: 0
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World Politics
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