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On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-12-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019
Laura Doval , Balázs Szentes
We study a two-sided dynamic matching market where agents arrive randomly. An arriving agent is immediately matched if agents are waiting on the other side. Otherwise, the agent decides whether to exit the market or join a queue to wait for a match. Waiting is costly: agents discount the future and incur costs while they wait. We characterize the equilibrium and socially optimal queue sizes under first-come, first-served. Depending on the model parameters, equilibrium queues can be shorter or longer than efficiency would require them to be. Indeed, socially optimal queues may be unbounded, even if equilibrium queues are not. By contrast, when agents only incur flow costs while they wait, equilibrium queues are typically longer than socially optimal ones (cf. Baccara et al., 2020). Unlike one-sided markets, the comparison between equilibrium and socially optimal queues in two-sided markets depends on agents' time preferences.
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引用次数: 0
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-12-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017
Shurojit Chatterji , Jordi Massó , Shigehiro Serizawa
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.
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引用次数: 0
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-12-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018
Mikhail Freer , Khushboo Surana
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the characterization for identifying intrahousehold consumption patterns. We demonstrate that without price variation for private goods among potential couples, intrahousehold resource allocations can only be identified for non-committed couples. We conduct simulations using Dutch household data to support our theoretical findings. Our results show that with price variation, the empirical implications of marital stability allow for the identification of household consumption allocations for both committed and non-committed couples.
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引用次数: 0
When is trust robust?
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015
Luca Anderlini , Larry Samuelson , Daniele Terlizzese
We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or by arbitrarily small infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. Scoundrels may thus have the effect of making trust more robust.
{"title":"When is trust robust?","authors":"Luca Anderlini ,&nbsp;Larry Samuelson ,&nbsp;Daniele Terlizzese","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or by arbitrarily small infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. Scoundrels may thus have the effect of making trust more robust.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 34-47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taming selten's horse with impulse response
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.014
Tibor Neugebauer , Abdolkarim Sadrieh , Reinhard Selten
The paper experimentally examines the predictive power of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium concept in the three-player Game of Selten's Horse. At first sight, our data show little support of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium and rather favor the imperfect equilibrium. We introduce deterministic impulse response trajectories that converge on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. The impulse response trajectories are remarkably close – closer than the trajectories from a reinforcement learning model – to the observed dynamics of the game in the short run (50 periods). The quantal response approach also converges on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the error rates decline, suggesting that the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium may be reached in the long run. In the long run (up to 250 periods), however, behavior seems to settle at a non-equilibrium distribution of strategies that rather supports efficient outcomes, instead of converging to the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
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引用次数: 0
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016
Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar, Mehdi Feizi
For the random assignment problem, we introduce the notion of collusion-proofness that happens if the rule is immune to any collusion on misreporting preferences as it is either not profitable to form or profitable to betray. We characterize collusion-proofnessand prove that an assignment rule is collusion-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Therefore, the random serial dictatorship rule is immune to any collusive agreement between agents on preference misrepresentation, though it is not (weakly) group strategy-proof. This result gives us a possibility between collusion-proofness, ex-post Pareto efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. Furthermore, we proved that a large family of strategy-proof mechanisms called rank exchange mechanisms, à la Shende and Purohit (2023), are collusion-proof but group manipulable.
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引用次数: 0
Status quo bias with choice overload 选择过多的现状偏见
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012
Jiaqi Yang
This paper proposes a model that parsimoniously captures evidence on status quo bias, the reference effect and choice overload. Choice overload is behaviorally defined as an increase in intensity of status quo bias when the menu enlarges. Our decision maker follows a two-step procedure by first limiting consideration to the alternatives that weakly dominate the status quo according to a menu-dependent list of attributes, and then maximizing preference over this subset with tie breaking in favor of the status quo. Choice overload is generated by the key feature that the list of attributes is increasing in menu size. An axiomatic characterization and three applications are provided. In particular, a policy maker has to nudge the agent through a series of small changes in her choice problems. An incumbent firm can deter entry by exploiting choice overload, while an entrant firm can introduce new product more efficiently using information on attention.
本文提出了一个模型，该模型可以简洁地捕获关于现状偏差、参考效应和选择过载的证据。选择过载在行为上被定义为当菜单扩大时，对现状的偏见强度增加。我们的决策者遵循两步程序，首先根据菜单依赖的属性列表限制对弱支配现状的替代方案的考虑，然后在这个子集上最大化偏好，并打破对现状的支持。选择过载是由属性列表在菜单大小中增加这一关键特性产生的。给出了一种公理化性质和三种应用。特别是，政策制定者必须推动代理人通过她的选择问题中的一系列小变化。现有企业可以利用选择过载来阻止进入，而进入企业可以利用注意力信息更有效地推出新产品。
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引用次数: 0
A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011
Yuya Wakabayashi , Ryosuke Sakai , Shigehiro Serizawa
We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
{"title":"A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices","authors":"Yuya Wakabayashi ,&nbsp;Ryosuke Sakai ,&nbsp;Shigehiro Serizawa","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
School choice with farsighted students 有远见的学生选择学校
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
Ata Atay , Ana Mauleon , Vincent Vannetelbosch
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.
我们考虑有远见的学生优先选择学校的问题。我们证明了由Top Trading Cycles （TTC）机制得到的匹配组成的单例集是一个有远见的稳定集。然而，从延迟接受（DA）机制获得的匹配可能不属于任何前视稳定集。因此，TTC机制提供的分配不仅是帕累托效率，而且是长远稳定的。此外，展望未来三步已经足以稳定从TTC获得的匹配。此外，我们表明，在没有正当嫉妒的情况下，TTC的变化是稳定的，但可能需要学生更有远见。
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引用次数: 0
Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles 公理讨价还价理论：旧瓶装新酒
IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior
Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009
Dominik Karos , Shiran Rachmilevitch
Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the n-th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.
五个经典且无争议的公理--对称性、弱帕累托最优性、受限单调性、中点支配和超累加性--是讨价还价方案的特征。它将每个参与者的中点，即他们乌托邦点的第 n 个份额分配给他们，并平分剩余的部分。
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引用次数: 0
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