Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Pricing skewed assets in multi-asset experimental markets 多资产实验市场中扭曲资产的定价

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.005

Shuchen Zhao

Using a series of laboratory experiments, this paper examines whether preferences for positively skewed assets, commonly observed in individual decision-making, persist in market settings where assets with both positive and negative skewness coexist. Results from a traditional BDM [Becker et al., 1964] task confirm a strong preference for positively skewed assets. However, this preference does not carry over to continuous double auction (CDA) markets with balanced endowments: market prices equalize, consistent with predictions from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). More surprisingly, in CDA markets with unbalanced initial endowments, a price inversion arises in which the negatively skewed asset becomes more expensive. Robustness checks across trading formats, group sizes, and asset scopes confirm these patterns. The findings underscore how institutional features and initial endowments moderate the translation of behavioral preferences into market prices, challenging the external validity of individual-level skewness preferences in financial markets.

通过一系列实验室实验，本文检验了在个人决策中普遍观察到的对正偏性资产的偏好，是否在正偏性和负偏性并存的资产市场环境中持续存在。传统BDM [Becker et al.， 1964]任务的结果证实了对正向倾斜资产的强烈偏好。然而，这种偏好不会延续到具有平衡禀赋的连续双拍卖（CDA）市场：市场价格均衡，与资本资产定价模型（CAPM）的预测一致。更令人惊讶的是，在初始禀赋不平衡的CDA市场中，出现了价格反转，负倾斜的资产变得更加昂贵。跨交易格式、集团规模和资产范围的稳健性检查证实了这些模式。研究结果强调了制度特征和初始禀赋如何调节行为偏好向市场价格的转化，挑战了金融市场中个人水平偏度偏好的外部有效性。

引用次数: 0

Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence 具有对等机制和证据的健壮实现

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.007

Leonie Baumann

A principal must allocate a prize without monetary transfers. She wants to give it to the highest value agent. Agents know their own and their neighbors’ values, as determined by a network. Competing for the prize, agents send messages about themselves (applications) and their neighbors (references). They face a limit to lying, so information is partially verifiable. No incentive-compatible mechanism achieves robust implementation. Assigning the prize as a function of best applications and worst references achieves dominant strategy implementation for all networks and full implementation for the complete network and a class of networks if agents are partially honest.

委托人必须在没有货币转移的情况下分配奖金。她想把它交给最有价值的经纪人。代理知道自己和邻居的价值，这是由网络决定的。为了争夺奖项，代理发送关于自己（应用程序）和邻居（引用）的消息。他们说谎的能力有限，所以信息只能部分得到证实。没有激励兼容的机制能够实现稳健的执行。将奖励分配为最佳应用程序和最差参考的函数，可以实现对所有网络的主导策略实施，如果代理部分诚实，则可以实现对整个网络和一类网络的完全实施。

引用次数: 0

Corrigendum to “Values for environments with externalities – the average approach” [Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018) 49–64.] 《具有外部性的环境价值——平均方法》的勘误[游戏经济学]。行为学报，108(2018)49-64。

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.002

Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Theorem 1 in Macho-Stadler et al. (2018) is incorrect. In this note, we correct the theorem by introducing a new axiom, the non-negative payoffs axiom, and adjusting the proof accordingly. We also discuss the implications of this correction for other results presented in the paper.

Macho-Stadler et al.（2018）中的定理1是不正确的。在这篇笔记中，我们通过引入一个新的公理——非负收益公理来修正定理，并相应地调整证明。我们还讨论了这一修正对论文中提出的其他结果的影响。

引用次数: 0

Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms 愤慨与合作规范的演变

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.009

Xueheng Li

Sociologists and psychologists have long argued that emotions are essential to sustaining social norms. This study examines the role of indignation in upholding cooperation norms within society. I model indignation in a population psychological game and characterize the stochastically stable equilibrium in a noisy best-reply dynamic. The analysis yields two findings. First, indignation can sustain cooperation in the long run, irrespective of whether interactions are global or occur within a fixed local interaction structure. Second, mobility allows individuals to sort into cooperative communities, causing these communities to grow in size and persist under a wider range of conditions. Therefore, mobility fosters stable norms of cooperation and punishment in large human societies. This study is the first to apply stochastic stability to address multiple equilibria in psychological games.

社会学家和心理学家长期以来一直认为，情绪对于维持社会规范至关重要。本研究考察了义愤在维护社会合作规范中的作用。我模拟了群体心理博弈中的愤怒，并描述了嘈杂的最佳回答动态中的随机稳定均衡。分析得出了两个结论。首先，从长远来看，愤慨可以维持合作，无论互动是全球性的，还是发生在固定的局部互动结构中。其次，流动性允许个人分类成合作社区，使这些社区规模扩大，并在更广泛的条件下持续存在。因此，流动性在大型人类社会中促进了稳定的合作和惩罚规范。本研究首次将随机稳定性应用于解决心理博弈中的多重均衡问题。

引用次数: 0

Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value 盈余和沙普利值的顺序创造

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.007

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos , Inés Macho-Stadler , David Pérez-Castrillo

We introduce the family of games with intertemporal externalities, where two disjoint sets of players play sequentially. Coalitions formed by the present players create worth today, but the way these players organize also affects the future: their partition imposes externalities that influence the worth of coalitions formed by future players. We adapt the classic Shapley axioms and explore their implications. They are not sufficient to uniquely determine a value. We propose two solution concepts based on interpreting the Shapley value as the players' expected contributions to coalitions: the one-coalition externality value and the naive value. Our main results show that adding a single axiom to the classical Shapley axioms yields a unique value: the one-coalition externality value arises adding a principle of equal treatment of direct and indirect contributions or an axiom on necessary players, while the naive value is characterized adding equal treatment of externalities.

我们将介绍具有跨期外部性的游戏家族，即两组不相关的玩家按顺序进行游戏。由现在的参与者组成的联盟创造了今天的价值，但这些参与者组织的方式也影响着未来：他们的划分施加了影响未来参与者组成的联盟价值的外部性。我们改编了经典的沙普利公理，并探讨了它们的含义。它们不足以唯一地确定一个值。在将Shapley值解释为参与者对联盟的预期贡献的基础上，我们提出了两个解决方案概念：单联盟外部性值和朴素值。我们的主要研究结果表明，在经典Shapley公理的基础上增加一个公理可以得到一个独特的值：增加一个直接和间接贡献的平等处理原则或一个必要参与者的公理就会产生一个单一联盟的外部性值，而增加外部性的平等处理就会产生朴素值。

引用次数: 0

A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts 一个动态优化的委托方法与一个应用程序的志愿合同

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.002

Rene Saran

We present a novel and tractable method that is widely applicable to general delegation problems. Every delegation set is equivalent to an incentive feasible mechanism. We characterize mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity and prove that the corresponding constrained problem is equivalent to a discrete-time, finite-horizon, dynamic optimization problem. This transformation makes the problem tractable: The dynamic problem is essentially a shortest-path problem that is amenable to different solution methods. By analyzing the dynamic problem, we show that restricting to mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity broadly entails no loss to the principal and identify a novel sufficient condition for such mechanisms to be optimal. We also provide a numerical method to find an approximately optimal mechanism. Lastly, we illustrate the results in a new delegation model of volunteer contracts.

本文提出了一种新颖易行的方法，可广泛应用于一般委托问题。每个委托集都相当于一个激励可行机制。我们刻画了至多有有限多个不连续点的机构，并证明了相应的约束问题等价于一个离散时间、有限视界、动态优化问题。这种转换使问题易于处理：动态问题本质上是一个最短路径问题，可以采用不同的解决方法。通过对动力学问题的分析，我们证明了约束至多有有限个不连续点的机构广义上不会对主体造成损失，并确定了该机构为最优的一个新的充分条件。我们还提供了一种求近似最优机构的数值方法。最后，我们用一个新的委托契约模型来说明结果。

引用次数: 0

A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence 扩展概率序列对应的弱随机优势策略抗性的极大域

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.001

Kiyong Yun , Youngsub Chun

On the strict preference domain, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) introduce the probabilistic serial rule and show that the rule is weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) introduce the extended probabilistic serial correspondence, which generalizes the probabilistic serial rule to the full preference domain. However, this correspondence is not weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. In this paper, we introduce a subdomain of the full preference domain, which we call “the sequentially ranked from the top domain,” on which the correspondence is weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. In fact, it is a maximal domain on which the three requirements of stochastic dominance efficiency, stochastic dominance envyfreeness, and weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are compatible. In addition, on this domain, we provide an axiomatic characterization of it by adapting its characterization on the full preference domain (Heo and Yılmaz, 2015).

在严格偏好域上，Bogomolnaia和Moulin（2001）引入了概率序列规则，并证明该规则是弱随机优势策略证明。Katta和Sethuraman（2006）引入了扩展概率序列对应，将概率序列规则推广到全偏好域。然而，这种对应关系不是弱随机优势策略的证明。在本文中，我们引入了一个完全偏好域的子域，我们称之为“从顶域开始顺序排序”，它的对应关系是弱随机优势策略证明的。实际上，它是随机优势效率、随机优势嫉妒性和弱随机优势策略抗性这三个要求相容的极大域。此外，在这个领域，我们通过在完全偏好域上调整其特征来提供它的公理化特征（Heo和Yılmaz， 2015）。

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引用次数: 0

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices 在（最低）均衡价格下的不可操纵的房屋交换

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.004

Lars-Gunnar Svensson , Tommy Andersson , Lars Ehlers

We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and monetary transfers. Each house is initially occupied by one agent and each agent demands exactly one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. On the one hand, for price eq1uilibrium mechanisms, we show that the only non-manipulable mechanism is one with a minimum equilibrium price vector. The result is not true on the classic or the quasi-linear domains, but on reduced domains of preference profiles containing “almost all” profiles in the classic or the quasi-linear domain, respectively. On the other hand, while minimum price equilibrium mechanisms are not necessarily efficient (as prices are not zero), we show that no non-manipulable mechanism Pareto dominates a minimum price equilibrium mechanism, making them constrained efficient in the class of non-manipulable mechanisms.

我们考虑一个市场，它有不可分割的物体，称为房子，和货币转移。每栋房子最初由一个代理占有，每个代理只需要一幢房子。问题是确定一套完整的直接分配机制，可以用来在代理之间重新分配房屋。一方面，对于价格均衡机制，我们证明了具有最小均衡价格向量的机制是唯一不可操纵的机制。这一结果在经典和准线性域上不成立，但在分别包含经典和准线性域“几乎所有”偏好谱的简化域上成立。另一方面，虽然最小价格均衡机制不一定是有效的（因为价格不是零），但我们表明，没有一个不可操纵的机制帕累托支配最小价格均衡机制，使它们在不可操纵的机制类别中具有约束效率。

引用次数: 0

Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games b区块链间隙游戏的精确纳什式解决方案

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.008

Mitsunori Noguchi

This note challenges the belief that mining processes are too complex for traditional game-theoretic analysis. We provide Nash-like equilibrium solutions for two-player gap games, focusing on the strategic delay of mining rig activation in Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work (PoW) system. By delaying activation, miners can optimize profits, particularly as transaction fees become a more significant portion of their revenues (Carlsten et al., 2016). Building on the game-theoretic model of Tsabary and Eyal (2018), we offer a rigorous, proof-based analysis of this behavior, highlighting the importance of verifying simulation results through precise mathematical methods. The primary technical contribution of this note is a novel method for deriving closed-form equilibrium solutions for potentially non-differentiable ex-ante expected payoff functions U_i, defined as integrals in which the integrands—representing profit at time t—depend discontinuously on miners’ rig start times s.

这篇文章挑战了传统博弈论分析认为采矿过程过于复杂的观点。我们为两人博弈提供了类似纳什的均衡解决方案，重点关注比特币工作量证明（PoW）系统中矿机激活的战略延迟。通过延迟激活，矿工可以优化利润，特别是当交易费用成为其收入中更重要的一部分时（Carlsten et al., 2016）。在Tsabary和Eyal（2018）的博弈论模型的基础上，我们对这种行为进行了严格的、基于证据的分析，强调了通过精确的数学方法验证模拟结果的重要性。本文的主要技术贡献是一种新方法，用于推导潜在不可微的预先预期收益函数Ui的封闭形式均衡解，该函数定义为积分，其中表示时间t的利润的积分不连续地依赖于矿工的钻机启动时间s。

引用次数: 0

Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment 基于排名的偏好：一个真实的商品匹配实验

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.008

Andrew Kloosterman , Peter Troyan

We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the same object when they rank it higher. The addition of rankings-dependent utility implies that it may not be a dominant strategy to submit truthful preferences to a strategyproof mechanism, and that non-strategyproof mechanisms that give more agents objects they report as higher ranked may increase market welfare. We test these hypotheses with a matching experiment in a strategyproof mechanism, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD), and a non-strategyproof mechanism, the Boston mechanism. A novel feature of our experimental design is that the objects allocated in the matching markets are real goods, which allows us to directly measure rankings-dependence by eliciting values for goods both inside and outside of the mechanism. The experimental results are mixed, with stronger evidence for rankings-dependence in the RSD treatment than the Boston treatment. We find no differences between the two mechanisms for the rates of truth-telling and the final welfare.

我们研究了通过匹配机制接收对象的偏好是否受到代理在其报告的排名顺序列表中排名的高度的影响。我们假设在其他条件相同的情况下，当代理对同一物品的排名越高时，他们获得的效用就越大。排名依赖效用的增加意味着，向策略证明机制提交真实的偏好可能不是一个主导策略，而非策略证明机制给予更多的代理他们报告的更高排名的对象可能会增加市场福利。我们在无策略机制，随机序列独裁（RSD）和非无策略机制，波士顿机制中进行匹配实验来检验这些假设。我们实验设计的一个新特点是，在匹配市场中分配的对象是真实的商品，这使我们能够通过在机制内部和外部引出商品的价值来直接衡量排名依赖。实验结果是混合的，与波士顿治疗相比，RSD治疗有更强的证据表明排名依赖。我们发现这两种机制在讲真话的比率和最终福利方面没有差异。

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引用次数: 0

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